The Professions in Australia : a critical appraisal by Boreham, Paul et al.
/sy6 
o2/ 
I-
' I 
<' 
<• 
'• 
<• 
: 
< 
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
Presented to 
THE 
FRYER MEMORIAL LIBRARY 
OF 
AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE 
by 
University of Queensland Press 
THE PROFESSIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
THE PROFESSIONS 
IN AUSTRALIA 
A Critical Appraisal 
edited by 
PAUL BOREHAM 
ALEC PEMBERTON 
PAUL WILSON 
University of Queensland Press 
© University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1976 
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the 
purposes of private study, research, criticism, or review, as 
permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced 
by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be 
made to the publishers. 
Typeset by Academy Press, Brisbane 
Printed and bound by Silex Enterprise & Printing Co. 
Hong Kong 
Distributed in the United Kingdom, Europe, the Middle East, 
Africa, and the Caribbean by Prentice-Hall International, 
International Book Distributors Ltd., 66 Wood Lane End, Hemel 
Hempstead, Herts., England 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication data 
The professions in Australia. 
Index. 
Bibliography. 
ISBN 0 7022 1173 7. 
ISBN 0 7022 1183 4 Paperback. 
1. Professions - Australia — Addresses, essays, 
lectures, I. Boreham, Paul, ed. II. Pemberton, 
Alec, joint ed. III. Wilson, Paul Richard, 
1941- , jointed. 
301.550994 
Contents 
Acknowledgments vii 
Introduction 
PAUL BOREHAM, ALEC PEMBERTON, and PAUL WILSON j 
Part 1 The Study of the Professions 13 
1. Towards a Reorientation of Sociological Studies 
of the Professions 
ALEC PEMBERTON and PAUL BOREHAM 15 
2. The Professions: Reason and Rhetoric 
DON S. ANDERSON and JOHN WESTERN 42 
3. Professional Knowledge and Social Welfare: 
Towards a Grammar of Possibilities 
RALPH LOCKE 56 
4. The Universities and the Academic Professions 
BILL JONES 76 
Part 2 The Professions in Australia 89 
5. The Clergy and Organized Religion 
EDWIN DOWDY and GILLIAN LUPTON 91 
6. The Law: Professional Autonomy and the Public 
Interest 
ROBERT ANGYAL and SUSAN PAYNE 110 
7. The Medical Profession and Minority Groups 
JOHN MacKAY 134 
8. The Profession of Teaching 
DOUG WHITE 156 
9. Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 
ROBIN WINKLER and UNA GAULT 169 
10. A Critical Appraisal of Social Work 
HAROLD THROSSELL 179 
11. The CounseUing Profession 
BRIAN HAZELL 196 
12. Industrial Psychology and Sociology in 
Australia 
ALEX CAREY 220 
13. The Physical Environment Professions and 
the Australian Environmental Crisis 
PATRICK MULLINS 256 
Epilogue: The Future of the Helping Professions in Australia 
PAUL WILSON 275 
Index 281 
Acknowledgments 
Completing a project such as editing a volume of papers inevitably 
involves incurring a considerable debt to a large number of people. 
We are grateful to all those who assisted with the production of this 
manuscript and to those who commented on earlier drafts of our 
editorial material. In particular, we would like to thank Mrs. Ann 
Pemberton who typed many drafts of the manuscript and Diane 
Gibson who assisted with the collection of material for the editorial 
papers. Special thanks are also due to Bill Jones and Paul Schacht 
who offered suggestions and criticisms of the content and style of our 
earlier drafts. We are indebted to the Department of Anthropology 
and Sociology at the University of Queensland for material as-
sistance which allowed us to approach the subject in a more substan-
tial manner than we had earlier envisaged. Finally, we are especially 
grateful to the authors who contributed papers and who responded to 
our comments and suggestions. 
Introduction 
PAUL BOREHAM, ALEC PEMBERTON, 
AND PAUL WILSON 
One of the most important distinguishing characteristics of twentieth 
century industrial societies is the proliferation in both extent and 
character of activities which are designed to mould, remould, repair, 
and adjust the social and psychological attitudes and aspirations, as 
well as the physical well-being, of a large and ever-increasing propor-
tion of the population. We are referring to those occupations which 
have been called the "personal service" or "helping professions", a 
group which includes the clergy, doctors, teachers, social workers, 
counsellors, human relations experts, psychiatrists, and so on. The 
extent to which we have become dependent upon the knowledge and 
skill of these professional experts—whose interests enter more and 
more into our everyday lives—ought to give rise to serious questions 
concerning the shaping and direction of human society. Rarely, 
however, has there been such an uncritical acceptance of a social 
movement whose claims have such crucial implications for the whole 
community. For to call it a "social movement" is no exaggeration, if 
there is any truth in the assessment of British sociologist Paul 
Halmos when he claims to "have shown how the very leadership of 
society is penetrated, and even in some cases taken over by ... 
professionals and how, as a consequence of this, the ideology of this 
personnel permeates the quality and sets the direction of social 
change in our time" (Halmos 1971, p.584). 
That is not to say the professions have had it all their own way. 
Generally, however, the murmurings of discontent have been con-
fined to accusations surrounding the high cost of professional help or 
the quality of services received, as instanced by the occasional 
malpractice suit brought against members of the medical profession 
in Australia. The "big" questions about the professions have largely 
gone unanswered. The claims made by most professionals that they 
are the possessors of complex and esoteric knowledge which is 
beyond the understanding of the untrained individual are seldom 
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challenged. We accept their right to intervene in personal and social 
problems which we believe we could not attempt to deal with by 
ourselves. 
Characteristically, the professions also claim to employ their skills 
and knowledge in an objective, unbiased way and to direct their 
energies towards the benefit of the community as a whole rather than 
for personal gain or sectional self-interest. The credence which is 
granted to these claims is institutionalized in the legal sanctions 
which allow professionals the exclusive right to undertake certain ac-
tivities and to perform their services in a manner which is indepen-
dent of the demands of the clients with whom they are working. In 
other words, the professionals have become the final arbiters of the 
need for, and the quality of, their own services. 
The aim of this volume is to undertake a critical examination of 
precisely those claims of the professions which have allowed them to 
be elevated to such an exalted position of autonomy and authority in 
our society. But before we do that it would be appropriate to provide 
some background data about the helping professions in Australia. 
The professions In Australia: a profile 
During the past few decades Australia has experienced a marked 
expansion in professional occupations. The proportion of law profes-
sionals in the work force, for example, increased by 76.4 per cent in 
the period 1947-66 compared with an overall growth rate in the total 
work force of only 52 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of medical 
practitioners and dentists increased by 79.8 per cent during this 
period. Indeed, the major area of growth in the work force has been 
in-*he professional and public authority group which has increased 
from 11.5 per cent of the work force in 1947 to 15.9 per cent in 1966. 
Table 1 indicates the growth in actual numbers of various profes-
sional groups over the post-war years. The figures in this table also 
show that the more traditional professions are male dominated— 
females are considerably outnumbered representing only 6.3 per cent 
and 13.1 per cent of those in the legal and medical professions 
respectively. 
The expansion of professional occupations has been accompanied 
by a relative increase in the earnings of professionals compared with 
the rest of the work force. In Victoria, for example, increases in the 
real income of professional men between 1956 and 1964 ranged from 
63 per cent for dentists to 28.5 per cent for doctors and 27.6 per cent 
for lawyers compared with an increase in average weekly earnings 
for all emploved males of 18.3 per cent during the same period 
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Table 1. Increases in selected professional occupations, 1947-71 
Year Males Females 
Total 
Persons 
Medical practitioners and dentists 
1947 8,890 
1961 13,910 
1966 15,491 
1971 17,267 
656 
1,483 
1,673 
2,317 
9,546 
15,393 
17,164 
19,584 
Law professionals 
1947 
1961 
1966 
1971 
4,467 
6,478 
7,694 
9,690 
109 
258 
377 
609 
4,576 
6,736 
8,071 
10,299 
Clergy and related members of religious orders 
1947 8,158 1,662 
1961 10,938 3,120 
1966 12,573 3,767 
1971 10,360 2,479 
9,820 
14,058 
16,340 
12,839 
Teachers 
1947 
1961 
1966 
1971 
21,852 
44,601 
59,325 
67,009 
28,903 
56,722 
75,591 
88,528 
50,755 
101,323 
134,916 
155,537 
Social workers 
1966 
1971 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
2,18 
4,61 
SOURCE: Census data, Australian Bureau of Statistics (Brisbane, 1974). 
(Graven 1957, 1964). The actual differences in mean incomes of 
professionals and other occupational groups listed in table 2 are also 
illuminating. Professional incomes exceed those of any other oc-
cupational group with doctors earning between four and five times 
the average income for all workers. 
The prestige derived by professionals from their advantageous 
position in the distribution of income is reaffirmed by the position 
accorded to them in most attempts to rank occupational prestige. 
Congalton (1969, pp.93-94) has investigated the ranking of 134 oc-
cupations by a large sample of the Australian population. The most 
highly regarded occupations were: 
1. doctor 
2. university professor 
3. solicitor 
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Table 2. Mean incomes for full time workers in selected occupations for year 1968-69 
Occupation Mean Income (in $) 
Medical specialists 17,182 
General practitioners 12,900 
Judges, magistrates, barristers, solicitors, and legal officers 11,090 
Directors and managers—finance and property 7,190 
Real estate salesmen 5,580 
Government clerical workers 3,650 
Motor vehicle mechanics 3,220 
Building and construction labourers 2,750 
Average incomes for all full-time workers 3,650 
SOURCE: Income distribution 1968-69, part 2, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(Canberra, 1973). 
4. architect 
5. director of large company 
6. owner of business (valued at more than $100,000) 
7. professional engineer 
8. dentist 
9. veterinary surgeon 
10. clergyman (with university degree). 
Significantly, eight out of the ten occupations considered to have the 
highest status ranking were professions. 
One would not need to be particularly erudite to observe that the 
professions are likely to be politically conservative. However, the ex-
tent to which members of these occupations support the conservative 
political parties is of interest. Results of an opinion poll taken before 
the 1969 federal elections indicated that the A.L.P. was unlikely to 
receive much more than 25 per cent of the professional vote. In view 
of the much greater tendency to support the A.L.P. among school 
teachers who represent a significant proportion of the professional 
population, the conservative voting intentions of the more es-
tablished professions would be overwhelming. 
Let us now turn to a brief consideration of the background from 
which entrants are drawn. Firstly, it is evident from figures in table 4 
that a considerable majority of students in the professions of 
medicine and law come from high status home backgrounds two-
thirds have fathers in professional or managerial occupations com-
pared with only 14 per cent of all school leavers with fathers in these 
occupations. The figures in this table demonstrate that children with 
parents in blue collar occupations have only one chance in three of 
entering these professions compared with a better than four-to-one 
chance for the children of parents in managerial or professional oc-
cupations. 
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Table 3. Voting intentions of professionals, 1969 elections 
Political Party 
Labor 
Liberal/Country Party 
D.L.P. 
Undecided/other 
Professionals 
% Support 
22.8 
62.5 
3.9 
10.8 
Actual Votes 
Recorded (All Electors) 
45.8 
42.2 
5.9 
6.1 
SOURCE: 1971. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian public opinion polls, 
1969. Official year book of the Commonwealth of Australia no.57. 
Canberra: Commonwealth Govt. Printer. 
Table 4. Occupational status of fathers of university entrants in medicine and law in 
1965-67 compared with all school leavers 
Father's Occupation 
Professionals 
Managers 
Clerical and Sales 
Skilled, semi-skilled, 
and unskilled 
Farmers 
Totals (=100%) 
% among 
Medical Students 
32 
23 
19 
19 
4 
573 
% among 
Law Students 
29 
33 
11 
18 
5 
646 
% among 
All School Leavers 
7 
7 
15 
57 
14 
N.A. 
SOURCE: D.S. Anderson and J.S. Western, Study of Professional Socialization 
(MS, University of Queensland, 1974). 
Finally, table 5 shows that entrants to law and medical courses are 
much less likely to have attended a state school than other school 
leavers. Indeed, they are seven times more likely to have come from 
independent (private) schools. 
Generally speaking then, we may conclude that there has been a 
rapid expansion of professional occupations in the past decade and 
that the subjective and material status of these occupations has been 
increasing disproportionately compared with the remainder of the 
work force. The backgrounds of those who are able to become 
professionals have not broadened significantly, however. The profes-
sional faculties still draw overwhelmingly from males of high status 
family and educational backgrounds. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the professions are dominated by politically and 
socially conservative males. It does strike us as somewhat surprising, 
however, that the authority accorded to professional judgment in a 
wide range of socially important matters is seldom questioned with 
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Table 5. School background of entrants to medicine and law 1965-67 
Last School Attended 
Independent (private) 
school 
State school 
Roman Catholic school 
Other 
Total (=100%) 
% among 
Medical Students 
35 
34 
26 
5 
573 
% among 
Law Students 
34 
32 
29 
5 
646 
% among 
All School Leavers 
5 
76 
19 
N.A. 
SOURCE: D.S. Anderson and J.S. Western, Study of Professional Socialization 
(MS, University of Queensland, 1974). 
respect to the backgrounds of those making the judgments. It is not 
clear whether this reflects a general assumption that social class 
origins—and concomitant political attitudes—are irrelevant to 
professional practice, or an assumption that they enable the profes-
sional to do a better job by virtue of his elite background. 
A critical view of the professions 
When sociologists have turned their attention to the professions in 
modern society, their commentaries have mostly emphasized what 
.they see as the beneficial role of the professions and their contribu-
tion to the common good. Much of the sociological writing has read 
more like a public relations exercise for the professions than critical, 
independent scholarship. Two examples from the Australian 
literature will serve to demonstrate this point. Consider first one at-
tempt by sociologists to define the main characteristics of a "profes-
sion" (Maley 1970): 
(i) a high level of generalized and systematic knowledge leading to a 
formal qualification 
(ii) work directed towards general community or cultural benefit 
rather than to individual self-interest 
(iii) large measure of autonomy correlated with recognition of 
responsibility towards clients or employers, and public 
(iv) self-consciousness and measure of corporate control of profes-
sional group through lengthy socialization processes and 
traditional codes of conduct 
(v) money and honours regarded as symbols of work achievement 
and thus as ends in themselves rather than as means to serve 
other self-interests. 
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We shall try to show that such a description represents little more 
than an uncritical acceptance of the assertions and statements of 
various professional codes and charters. 
At other times, sociologists have sounded like mere apologists for 
bad professional practices (See chapter 2 of this book): 
Because he is confronted with a succession of clients, many of whom 
are seen in some distress, a doctor must not allow himself to become 
too emotionally involved in any one case. To do so may impair his 
technical judgment. Furthermore, because he sees a large number of 
patients in a day, he must be able to "switch off after seeing one in 
order to be ready for the next. This professional demeanour of the 
medical man is sometimes misread as cynicism; in fact, it is more ac-
curately described as a professional detachment which enables him to 
apply specialized technical skills to the problem at hand with the 
greatest efficiency. 
There are many matters which the authors fail to examine here: 
the clinical advisability of "assembly-line" medical interviews; the 
question of financial self-interest; the adequacy of the claimed skills 
and knowledge as the grounds for action in any situation; whether 
"professional detachment" is applied equally to all social groups; 
and whether such detachment may be the motivational basis for the 
medical profession's often appalling treatment of various minority 
groups and the lower socio-economic strata in the community. 
In keeping with the recent re-discovery of social problems 
(poverty, crime, racial discrimination, and so on) and the criticism of 
dominant social institutions, there has been a questioning of the ac-
tivities of the professions in Western society. This has certainly been 
the case in America and in England and it appears to be happening 
to some extent in Australia. Sometimes the criticisms of the profes-
sions have been made from the outside, by academics and even by 
the clients themselves; on other occasions the voices of discontent 
have been raised from within the professions. Yet in Australia, where 
a thoroughgoing appraisal of the welfare professions is overdue, one 
can look in vain for such critical commentary—even, for example, in 
the reports of a recent symposium on the professions in the 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology (1973). 
In this book we are concerned to argue the case for a radical 
perspective on the professions and the part they play in society. Thus 
we start from a particular standpoint about the nature of contem-
porary society and especially about the place of power in our social 
arrangements. We would contend that Australian society (as is the 
case with all other Western industrial systems) is founded upon une-
qual relationships between the powerful and powerless groups or 
classes. The powerful consist of a small segment of society with dis-
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proportionately large physical and symbolic resources for protecting 
and enhancing their own interests and position. The exercise of 
power by this "power elite" may be either wilful and methodical or it 
may be the uncoordinated outcomes of powerful groups each acting 
in their own self-interest (Encel 1970; Playford and Kirsner 1972). 
Primarily, the powerful employ a wide range of "technologies of 
consent" in such institutions as the mass media and the education 
system to ensure their moral, cultural, and political hegemony over 
society. They are also in an advantageous position to use their con-
siderable political and economic resources to legislate social policies 
which favourably affect their own life chances and unfavourably in-
fluence the social conditions of the powerless. Finally, and usually as 
a last resort, they employ the machinery of social control (in the 
form of the use or threat of coercive forces) such as the law-making 
and law-enforcing agencies to maintain the established social order 
and thus perpetuate the structure of inequality (Thio 1973, pp. 1-2). 
Professionals, especially members of the personal service profes-
sions, play a vanguard role in this creating and shaping of the social 
and cultural climate of society. Corporations, factories, hospitals, 
courts, and educational institutions are manned by the helping 
professions carrying out vital tasks in the name and interests of the 
power elite to preserve the existing socio-political alignment. 
Freidson (1970, p.303) summed it up this way: 
What is distinct about a complex civilization like ours, compared to a 
simple society, is the existence of special classes of men who are 
engaged on a full-time basis in creating knowledge, formulating laws, 
morals, and procedures, and applying knowledge and moral principles 
to concrete cases. These men formulate and administer a special cor-
pus of social meanings that is always different in kind from the social 
meanings of the ordinary citizenry. What these men do contributes to 
the official social order, and although the content of a viable official 
order is rarely wholly divorced from that of the average citizen, it is 
different. The official social order is politically and culturally domi-
nant, refiecting the values and knowledge of the dominant classes of 
the society, it is not necessarily hostile to the values of everyday life, 
but it is nonetheless imposed on everyday life, and its imposition is 
supported by organized political, economic and normative forces. 
The critique of the helping professions developed in the following 
chapters focuses on a number of vital issues. Firstly, there is an ex-
amination of the basis for the professions' monopoly over knowledge 
which is central to important areas of social needs. This knowledge 
has assumed a mystique which raises it above the reach of the un-
initiated. Furthermore, professional associations have fostered 
often calculatingly and cynically, safeguards which effectively define 
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boundaries between those who have access to such esoteric 
knowledge and those who are not of the cognoscenti. Thus the 
professions have a significant incentive to maintain a process of 
mystification which effectively retains the knowledge base of their 
activities in their own keeping. Significantly, however, the profes-
sions' claim to expertise may be consistently demonstrated to far ex-
ceed that which is indicated from a more critical scrutiny of their ac-
tivities. Within the social welfare field, for instance, the massive 
failure of anti-poverty programmes to change the economic circum-
stances of the poor has been placed alongside the tremendous and 
rapid growth in the numbers of social workers, welfare ad-
ministrators, and planners. Some critics have concluded that welfare 
professionals have done more to help themselves than to aid the 
needy and that their claim to specialized competence in dealing with 
poverty has been found sorely wanting. 
Secondly, the claims by professionals that they direct their ser-
vices to the benefit of the general community are institutionalized in 
codes of ethics and are a significant factor responsible for the status 
accorded to them. There is little evidence, however, to support the 
validity of claims that professionals are more concerned with, and 
sensitive to, community welfare than are members of other oc-
cupational groups. This is not a surprising conclusion, though the 
primacy of the "service ethic" in the rhetoric of professional 
ideologies poses the question of the motives associated with retaining 
exclusive controls over socially significant areas of occupational ac-
tivity. Are we really justified, for example, in trusting psychiatrists, 
lawyers, land developers, advertisers—or any other occupations for 
that matter—to keep their own house in order, and to live up to their 
claims to eschew self-interest in favour of what is good for the 
general public? 
Thirdly, the book takes up the claim of the professions that their 
services are available, and applied, equally and in an unbiased man-
ner to all those who require them. There is now quite a deal of 
evidence to show that not only are professional services offered in a 
selective and discriminatory fashion but also that the quality of the 
service delivered varies significantly with the social and ethnic 
background of the recipients. Australian psychiatrists now have to 
face the truth of the assertion, based on mounting evidence, that 
their own middle-class backgrounds predispose them to seek out 
patients from their own social strata and to actively reject prospec-
tive patients from lower down the socio-economic ladder—as the 
American data plainly show. Similarly, social workers have been 
charged with virtually deliberately disengaging themselves from con-
tact with the indigent, who may require their help, while actively 
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recruiting a more prestigious middle-class clientele. 
These are the more important themes and they will be found to 
recur in the following chapters as the various contributors undertake 
a critical evaluation of the helping professions—no easy task, for 
they have been recently and aptly described as "the glamour occupa-
tions of our time". 
We have frequently employed the word "critical" and it is impor-
tant to be as precise as possible about its use in this context. In the 
first place, we are concerned to identify malpractices and defects in 
professional services, and, in that sense, "critical" has its usual 
negative connotations. We also hope to highlight the most important 
trends in contemporary practice, including contradictions in profes-
sional life, and to indicate new possibilities for client-professional 
relations based on a more equalitarian footing. Ideally, the con-
tributors to this book have struck a balance between identifying 
various deficiencies in the helping professions and pointing the way 
to realistic change for the future. 
The organization of the book 
We have divided the book into two sections. The four chapters 
comprising the first section are primarily theoretical and it is hoped 
that they will provide important steps toward developing a radical 
perspective on the professions as well as serving as background for 
the critical commentaries on specific professions which are 
developed at some length in the second section. The nine chapters in 
the second section are not intended to represent a single conceptual 
orientation, but rather are concerned with a variety of approaches to 
the problems of the individual professions with which their authors 
are familiar. It is our particular aim in this volume to draw out from 
these critiques of individual professions a number of unifying themes 
which will enable us to develop a fuller understanding of the nature 
of the activities of the helping professions in Australian society. The 
concluding chapter of the book considers, in broad outline, some of 
the future possibilities and draws attention to the situation that may 
prevail if we neglect to attend to the more serious consequences of 
society's increasing reliance on the guidance of the helping profes-
sions as they are presently constituted. 
In the opening chapter of the first section we undertake a critical 
evaluation of sociological studies of the professions and attempt to 
develop an alternative perspective paying more heed to those conflic-
tual aspects of professional life which the traditional studies have 
largely neglected. Our analysis examines the role of the professions 
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in supporting the existing patterns of social—particularly class— 
stratification in both their ideological alignment and in their every-
day practice. 
In chapter two Don Anderson and John Western review some of 
the traditional concerns of the sociology of the professions. They 
view the achievement of professional status as largely based on a 
societal consensus. Such a consensus is achieved through the 
"interaction between political and economic power and occupational 
representation". However, as they suggest, the involvement of con-
sumer groups and others who may adopt a more critical stance 
toward professional services may lead to some dissipation of this 
consensus. 
Drawing on data from an extensive study of professional socializa-
tion in Australia, Anderson and Western go on to examine the 
development of professional attitudes. They suggest that during this 
process the development of allegiance to the profession tends to out-
weigh more altruistic motivations—possibly to the detriment of 
those to whom professional services are directed. 
There has appeared in the last three decades a proliferation of 
rationales for the organized activities of the welfare professions. In 
chapter three Ralph Locke focuses on the theoretical bases of the 
conceptualization of problems in social welfare terms which underlie 
these rationales. He examines the construction of sociological data 
and their application to welfare action in terms of the interpretations 
of both the welfare professionals and their clients. 
Before new strategies can be developed in professional practice 
many obstacles that exist in the training process must be overcome. 
In the final chapter of this section Bill Jones examines the role of the 
universities and the academics who prepare the aspirants to profes-
sional occupations. He suggests that claims of academic standards of 
objectivity are only valid for those who share the same preconcep-
tions. Attempts to confront the consensus with alternative assump-
tions relating to either social or physical phenomena will scarcely be 
received with the same objective responses. The adoption of such a 
conservative stance by educators may provide considerable insight 
into the approach of those who would seek to apply knowledge to 
society. In particular, it sheds light on their seeming inability to take 
into account alternative conceptions of what constitutes the public 
good in any particular instance. 
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PART 1 
The Study of the Professions 
1 
Towards a Reorientation of Sociological 
Studies of the Professions 
ALEC PEMBERTON AND PAUL BOREHAM 
Writing in 1933, Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964, p.iii) began their 
landmark study of the professions by deploring the lack of 
sociological work in this field. Since then, theoretical and empirical 
interest has proliferated, perhaps reflecting agreement among many 
sociologists with Talcott Parsons' assertion that the professions have 
become "the most important single component in the structure of 
modern societies" (Parsons 1968, p.545). However, there is presently 
an increasing disenchantment with the traditional sociological ap-
proaches and considerable disagreement about the most appropriate 
directions for studies of the professions. In this paper we seek to 
point out some of the inadequacies of the dominant perspective 
which is guided by structural functional theory and positivist 
methodology. Specifically, we shall argue that the usual sociological 
concern with matters such as cataloguing the features of a profession 
or investigating the socialization process in graduate schools has 
diverted attention from a critical appreciation of the part played by 
the professions in society. We intend to look at them from a different 
point of view, one which identifies the professions in modern times in 
a state of crisis involving both their knowledge foundations and their 
practical day-to-day situations. 
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While it is quite reasonable to assert that some scholars (notably 
Rueschmeyer 1964; Johnson 1972; Elliot 1972) have already drawn 
attention to conflict within the professions, the point we want to 
make—the very step which the others have not taken—is the need to 
place the professions in a critical perspective; to begin to account for 
their role in an unjust, hierarchical society and their part in the 
maintenance of contemporary capitalism. We view this paper as a 
preliminary attempt to construct an alternative theoretical approach 
to the professions, while recognizing the difficulties inherent in mak-
ing such a break from the dominant perspective. Such a project is 
timely and important. In his influential work, Paul Halmos (1971, 
1973fl, 1973ft) has written disparagingly of the critical trend in 
sociological analyses of the professions, accusing them of an 
ideological bias in their over-commitment to finding fault. Such 
studies, he claims, postulate a model of man which stresses his 
negative, pessimistic, and combative aspects and neglects his 
positive, optimistic, and pacific orientations (Halmos 1971, p.587). 
For Halmos, the professions are a positive moral force in the com-
munity and it is the task of sociological studies to explore the ways in 
which they contribute to social betterment, by leadership and 
through intellectual and cultural enrichment. On the other hand, we 
contend that a critical theory must begin with the recognition that 
professional practice is carried on in an unequal society stratified by 
class, race, and sex. Such an approach seeks to examine the 
. consequences—however unpalatable the results may be to prac-
titioners and sociologists alike—and to come to an understanding of 
such contradictions in contemporary professional life as the 
mounting evidence that many services are delivered in a selective and 
socially discriminatory way, despite the claims of the professions 
that they are helping all who are in need. Our conception of critical 
theory is consonant with the ideas of Schroyer (1973, pp.27,34) and 
encompasses a threefold task: to criticize existing exploitive and 
repressive social practices; to identify immanent trends; and to point 
the way for emancipatory social action. 
Our analysis here focuses on what Halmos has called the "per-
sonal service professions"—the clergy, doctors, teachers, social 
workers, and so on. He believes they are all of a kind because their 
principal function is "to bring about changes in the body or 
personality of the client", and because they share an ideology of 
"kindness, tolerance, acceptance, permissiveness, and a scepticism 
about strong loves and hates" (Halmos 1970, pp.22-23). Combs, 
Avila, and Purkey provide a similar formulation in their concept of 
the "helping professions" which includes doctors, psychologists, 
social workers, counsellors, human relations experts, psychiatrists. 
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and others. In their view some of these occupations perform work of 
a rehabilitative kind ("they help the sick and discouraged, the 
casualties of the system") while others ("seeking to forestall illness") 
may be seen in a preventive capacity (Combs, Avila, and Purkey 
1971, pp.2-3). Our remarks will be confined to these occupations and 
especially to psychiatry, clinical psychology and social work simply 
because they are the ones with which we are most familiar. There 
are, however, good reasons to examine the "helping professions" 
alone; they comprise a large and influential group in society and, as 
many commentators have noted, their influence is growing rapidlv. 
Traditional perspectives in the sociology of the professions 
Much sociological thought about the professions has celebrated their 
importance in society by emphasizing the contribution they make to 
social harmony and stability.' In a real sense, the sociological corpus 
evolved from Emile Durkheim's work,^ which contrasted the social 
and mechanistic solidarity of pre-industrial society (in which the 
social and occupational milieux were congruent with and enhanced 
the maintenance of social cohesion) with the withdrawal of in-
dividual involvement as a consequence of the value system associated 
with industrial societies and the division of labour. His thesis was 
that industrialism and the division of labour were replacing social 
order based upon a recognizable homogeneity of social life with an 
enforced consensus based on the interdependence of functions within 
the newly developing occupational structures. Durkheim recognized, 
however, that the contemporary occupational structure could lead to 
a greater potential for conflict rather than for consensus. In par-
ticular, he considered in some detail the loss of integration between 
separate functions in the social structure and the social conflict 
which generated an equilibrium based on the predominance of power 
relationships in society. The solution to the conflict-generating 
anomic form of the division of labour was, for Durkheim, an 
emphasis on the new morality based on occupational membership— 
a shared morality that would regulate occupational activities and ac-
commodate men to the differential psychological and physical 
rewards associated with industrial society. A moral force was re-
quired for the maintenance of society and social order. And 
Durkheim saw the professions as the major avenue for subjugating 
individual motives of self-interest to the needs of the community in a 
manner which was functional for society. 
Two strands of thought in the 1930s warrant consideration. 
Talcott Parsons attempted to refute the critiques of American 
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capitalism which were intensified by the economic situation at the 
time. He minimized the capitalistic orientations which were features 
of both business and professional occupations and emphasized the 
development of altruistic and community motivations. "Many of the 
most important features of our society", he contended, "are to a 
considerable extent dependent on the smooth functioning of the 
professions ... their results have become so closely interwoven in the 
fabric of modern society that it is difficult to imagine how it could 
get along without basic structural changes if they were seriously im-
paired" (Parsons 1964, p.34). 
A similar theme was to be found in the classic study of the profes-
sions in England by Carr-Saunders and Wilson when they argued 
that professional associations "are stabilizing elements in society. 
They engender modes of life, habits of thought and standards of 
judgment which render them centres of resistance to crude forces 
which threaten steady and peaceful evolution ... [they] stand like 
rocks against which the waves raised by these forces beat in vain" 
(Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1964, p.497). Carr-Saunders and Wilson 
and T.H. Marshall were concerned to champion the professional 
cause; they were particularly anxious to answer the Fabian 
Socialists—Shaw, the Webbs, and Laski—who criticized the profes-
sions for their resistance to change and obsessive concern with finan-
cial and social status. Marshall replied to the charge of narrow and 
excessive self-centredness by reaffirming the ethic of service, the 
primacy of the welfare of the client, and by arguing that the pursuit 
of material rewards was not necessarily inimical to the clients' best 
interests. In a characteristic passage (written in 1939), he expressed 
his faith in the professions by setting them the Herculean task of 
finding "for the sick and suffering democracies a peaceful solution to 
their problems" (Marshall 1963, p.l70). 
The important studies we have mentioned have accepted without 
question the premise that the professions are unequivocally 
beneficial for society. Clearly the sociological implications of this as-
sumption have far-reaching consequences, but no systematic critique 
of these has been forthcoming. Thus Halmos (1971, p.584) was able 
to reiterate the claim that: 
I have shown how the very leadership of society is penetrated, and in 
some cases taken over by ... professionals and how, as a consequence 
of this, the ideology of this personnel permeates the quality and sets 
the direction of social change in our time ... Certain moral outcomes 
... issue from the cultivation of [these] services ... and these con-
stituted "betterment" in terms of the principal moral values of 
modern industrial societies. 
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We wish to examine in detail three aspects of a sociology of the 
professions which has been built on the themes we have outlined. 
One of our primary concerns has been to identify the distinguishing 
features or characteristics of a profession; that is, to list the at-
tributes marking off occupations which may be counted as profes-
sions from the non-professions, an activity which Johnson (1972, 
p.23) has called "trait theory" or the "trait approach". In the 
catalogue of features which are seen as important, most writers 
would nominate some or all of the following attributes: a systematic 
body of theoretical knowledge; professional authority or ter-
ritoriality over a field of competence; community approval or sanc-
tion for the specialized domain; and a code of ethics focusing on ser-
vice to a particular clientele. What Johnson says is reasonable, but 
only up to a point, for, as Toren has wisely pointed out, with the 
proliferation of professions in modern societies it probably makes 
more sense to talk about the degree of professionalization of an oc-
cupation rather than about the professions as a whole (Toren 1972). 
A number of criticisms may be directed at the trait approach, 
principally on the grounds that there is more to an adequate 
sociology of the professions than mere "definition-mongering" as 
Johnson puts it (1972, p.31). Often it seems as though sociologists 
accept as given the definitions of situations and meanings 
propagated by the professions—they take too literally the claims of 
professional groups. Perhaps because of the "order" or "consensus" 
bias in social theory, there has often been a failure to scrutinize 
professional ideologies, leading to a mystification of the process 
through which rhetoric about community service and altruism is self-
serving, functioning instead as a legitimation of the power and 
authority of the professions. 
Our next point about the traditional approach is really a criticism 
of scholars for their failure to examine more fully the position of the 
professions in the class structure. To date, very little has been done 
save the mere assertion of their primacy in the occupational system 
by Parsons (1968, p.536). Three aspects of the sociological literature 
deserve brief attention. One line of thought has speculated about the 
proper niche in the class system for the professions. Should they be 
lumped with other white collar jobs to constitute a "new middle 
class" or should they merit special treatment in a separate category? 
Other studies have examined the part played by the professions as an 
avenue to social mobility; typically, interest has focused on entry to 
the so-called "semi-professions" (notably teaching and social work) 
as a means of limited upward mobility for students from lower 
middle-class and working-class families. Numerous studies have also 
demonstrated the socially selective nature of recruitment to the 
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professions. Medicine and law, for example, have drawn their stu-
dents almost exclusively from high status home backgrounds 
(Merton et al. 1957; Anderson and Western 1967; Carlin 1966). 
These remarks may be illustrated by the reports of a recent major 
Australian research project on professional education. The process 
of selection for the professions was described in these terms: 
"Presumably the final decision represents a balance of self-image 
and occupational image. This is exercised within the available op-
tions, and many applicants do not end up in the profession of their 
first choice" (Western and Anderson 1968, p.96 emphasis added). 
Discussing selection for the teaching profession, the authors go on to 
say that "social class tends to narrow the field of choice and direct 
young people towards particular sorts of occupations ... the univer-
sity is a vehicle for social mobility and while working class families 
are underrepresented, there are still many students who are prepar-
ing to enter strata very different from that of their parents" 
(Anderson and Western 1972, p.295). Significantly, their "objec-
tive", "scientific" appraisal finds no place for any expression of dis-
approval or disquiet about the problems of selection in an unequal 
society whereby large sections of the community are systematically 
excluded from entry into the professions. Moreover, they fail to take 
up many crucial questions about the peculiar social composition of 
recruits; questions such as the nature of the differential distribution 
of vocational aspirations and opportunities, and about whether 
professional bodies pursue conscious policies of selection designed to 
exclude the lower social ranks. The latter seems an especially 
promising line of enquiry for a critical theory, as evidenced by a 
statement made in 1958 by a member of the British Royal College of 
Surgeons who claimed that "there has always been a nucleus in a 
medical school of students from cultured homes ... medicine would 
lose immeasurably if the proportion of such students in the future 
were to be reduced in favour of precocious children who qualify for 
subsidies from the state purely on examination results" (Elliot 1972, 
p.67). 
The crucial point is that such analyses of the professions are con-
sensual rather than conflictual in the sense that they take the existing 
class structure for granted, or note favourably such aspects as the 
presumed "openness" of the class system in modern Western 
societies. What is missing in these cases is any kind of critique of the 
present pattern of social differentiation, and more importantly, a 
critical appreciation of the role of the professions in supporting the 
existing class alignment by ideology or by action. 
Finally, studies of the making of professionals—including in-
vestigations of anticipatory socialization and later processes of 
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enculturation—reveal the value-free ethic and functionalist preoc-
cupation endemic in contemporary sociological work on the profes-
sions. Most of the empirical analyses of the professions have been in 
this area. Two investigations of medical students conducted during 
the 1950s remain exemplars of research; one is Merton et al.'s 
Student-physician (1957), in the Columbia tradition of empirical 
social research, and the other is Becker et al.'s participant observa-
tion study Boys in white (1961) from the Chicago school. Infused as 
it is with positivist assumptions about the feasibility of a "natural 
science of society",' the Columbia tradition has been the more in-
fluential. Research on professional socialization has relied heavily on 
questionnaire and survey methods to generate precise, quantitative 
data on a range of mostly narrow and manageable problems, at the 
expense of the collection of ethnographies and studies of situated 
practices and meanings in everyday professional scenes. Carr-
Saunders and Wilson (1964, p.iii), for example, recognized that their 
own careful historical analysis had missed something important 
when they drew attention to the fact that: "Every profession lives in 
a world of its own. The language which is spoken by its inhabitants, 
the landmarks so familiar to them, their customs and conventions 
can only be thoroughly learnt by those who reside there." Salutary 
advice as a methodological prescription, for sociologists ought to be 
involved in research to gain first-hand knowledge of the com-
monsense everyday worlds of professional life, which they have rare-
ly bothered to do so far. Such close contact with professional work is 
likely to reveal the kinds of inequalities that Sudnow (1967) 
described in his participant observation study of an emergency 
medical ward. 
We are concerned also to focus our critical attention on the 
theoretical underpinnings of socialization studies where there are im-
portant deficiencies to be remedied. Two prominent Australian 
scholars make their theoretical stance plain when they define 
"socialization" as "the process which changes natural, biological 
man into a good working member of his community. The socialized 
individual is one who has acquired the habits, beliefs, knowledge and 
dispositions which are characteristic of his culture" (Western and 
Anderson 1968, p.91, emphasis added). Clearly the emphasis here is 
on the socialization experience producing "man the conformer"— 
someone who fits into his social milieu—with no thought that the 
practices to which individuals are socialized might be undesirable, 
inadequate, or deleterious. Central to the notion of professional 
socialization is the concept of a "professional culture" (Merton et al. 
1957, p.287; Western and Anderson 1968, p. 103), which is said to 
comprise both cognitive elements (skills, techniques, knowledge) and 
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evaluative aspects (attitudes, values, and norms). The research 
problem then becomes the study of professional socialization or role 
learning—"the complex process whereby the recruit comes to learn 
about and internalise the culture of a profession ... the transmission 
of the professional culture" (Western and Anderson 1968, 
pp.96,101). Such an orientation, however, seems to ignore the pos-
sibility that a professional culture may consist of more than a single 
cognitive-evaluative profile. In this way it fails to take into account, 
for example, the conflict faced by the neophyte who may find his at-
titudes and opinions at variance with the dominant values of the 
profession.^ By viewing the professional culture as a unitary set of 
techniques, knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs, sociologists have 
avoided the conceptual and methodological problems which must be 
faced if it is considered seriously that the professions in modern 
society may be characterized by alternative, competing normative 
systems and institutionalized alternative answers to technical 
problems. 
Obviously this is one of the crucial points of difference we are try-
ing to highlight, and in the following pages we hope to explore it in 
some detail. In this context, an important shortcoming of the func-
tionalist approach might be mentioned with regard to the study of 
anticipatory socialization to the professions. It is frequently assumed 
that the socialization process is continuous and sequential so that 
learning and internalization during .the first or pre-training phase is 
relevant to and congruent with later experiences rather than mis-
leading or perhaps obstructive to further socialization. In other 
words, the enculturation process may be neither a smooth nor a 
happy time for the recruit—beliefs and skills acquired in the earlier 
years may conflict with what he is expected to think or do in later 
training or practice.' 
To conclude, studies of professional development suffer from the 
same defects as most research on socialization in a wider context. As 
Dreitzel (1973, pp.5-24) has noted, the passivity of the subject of the 
socialization process is a central assumption and the possibility that 
the child may be an active, even controlling partner no less than the 
adult is ignored. Similarly, investigations of the effect of professional 
training on the recruit have made little or no attempt to assess the 
reciprocal impact of the students upon the graduate school; for in-
stance, the serious and strenuous efforts of students—both radical 
and the merely reformist—to alter the form and content of profes-
sional courses has largely been ignored as a legitimate topic by 
researchers. Moreover, there is a distinctly elitist bias in the typical 
concerns of investigators. Questions like. Who makes an early 
decision? or What personal attributes are related to success in 
23 
Sociological Studies of the Professions 
training? are mainly of interest to the "top-dogs" (administrators, 
academics and leaders of the professions) while questions concerning 
the problems of the "under-dogs" (students and clients)—such as. 
What personal and situational factors are important in resistance to 
curriculum changes? or What is the evidence that the motives of 
idealism and community service are systematically suppressed dur-
ing professional training?—have been denied currency. 
We have suggested that the studies which dominate the existing 
sociology of the professions are biased in the range of questions the\ 
pursue and are singularly narrow in perspective. Part of the explana-
tion for this bias is the fact that both the decision to undertake 
research as well as the interpretation of the results (of that research) 
are often responses to a complex interplay of academic and political 
considerations associated particularly with the funding of research 
programmes (this point has been argued fully and cogently by 
Leventman, 1971). If studies of professional socialization are to 
claim intellectual respectability, then it will be essential to refocus in-
terest on a wider range of issues than is presently included in the 
establishment-oriented research programmes. 
By now we have said enough about the traditional perspective and 
our criticisms of it. In this paper we are calling for a reorientation of 
theory and research in the study of the professions. Until recently, 
certain issues and questions constituted the field of the sociology of 
the professions at the expense of the systematic study of other mat-
ters. We hope that our remarks will encourage sociologists to reveal 
and to justify the assumptions behind the concepts and methods 
which lead them to the selective investigations of some particular 
problems rather than others. The first task is to raise the possibility 
of alternative approaches within the sociology of the professions and 
the second task is to begin to explore them. Thus we believe Halmos 
(1973ft) is mistaken when he says (in a review of Johnson's Profes-
sions and Power): "To write about professions and power inevitably 
selects one perspective and neglects the other. The division of labour 
among sociologists justifies special perspectives ... ". The issue at 
stake is not the division of sociological labour or even intellectual 
pluralism but rather the specification of the grounds of competing 
paradigms—theory, application and instrumentation—in the 
sociology of the professions.'' There are radical discontinuities in the 
aims, tasks, and approaches of the sociology of the professions in the 
conflictual stance which we espouse and the consensual position 
adopted by Halmos. Having said that, it is time to turn now to what 
we have called the crisis in the professions. 
Stated simply, it is our thesis that the professions in contemporary 
society are in a state of crisis. An intellectually serious study of the 
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professions must recognize this by seeking to capture both the 
urgency of the crisis and the uncertainty and the turbulence follow-
ing from it.' Two aspects of the crisis will occupy our attention—the 
crisis in the knowledge base of the professions and the crisis of 
professional practice in day-to-day affairs. From the beginning it 
must be understood that this analysis is not presented as an ex-
haustive or definitive statement. Instead, it is an attempt to pull 
together into a single coherent account the various strands of critique 
and attack from diverse sources which, taken together, characterize 
the condition of the professions today. The picture that emerges 
from such an exercise is vastly different from that gleaned from the 
bulk of the sociological literature. We turn first to the crisis of 
professional practice. 
The crisis of professional practice 
Three matters will be considered: the charge that many of the 
helping professions offer services which are demonstrably ineffec-
tive; the charge that professional services are offered in a socially dis-
criminatory fashion; and finally, the rejection of professional help 
following from the so-called "revolt of the client". 
The first charge is that many of the helping professions fail to 
deliver the goods. By this we mean that studies of the outcome of 
therapeutic intervention by many of the personal service professions 
reveal they may be quite ineffective. Numerous investigations of the 
various psychotherapies, for example, have cast considerable doubt 
on the use of this procedure. As Eysenck said, "published research 
failed to disprove the null-hypothesis with respect to psy-
chotherapeutic effectiveness ... additional studies ... particularly 
those making use of a control group, have been so uniformly 
negative in their outcome that a somewhat stronger conclusion ap-
pears warranted. The results do show that whatever effects psy-
chotherapy may have are likely to be extremely small" (Eysenck 
1965, p. 136). More recent assessments are equally pessimistic and 
give little room for comfort. Bergin's sympathetic evaluation of psy-
chotherapy as practised over the last forty years reached the conclu-
sion that it "has had an average effect that is modestly positive. It is 
clear, however, that the average group data on which this conclusion 
is based obscure the existence of a multiplicity of processes occurring 
in therapy, some of which are now known to be either unproductive 
or actually harmful" (Bergin 1971, p.263). From their review of the 
literature Truax and Carkhuff pronounced the grim verdict that: 
"On the average, psychotherapy may be harmful as often as helpful. 
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with an average effect comparable to receiving no help" (1969, p.21). 
For the social work profession the picture from recent reviews is 
an equally disturbing one; there is scant evidence to show that social 
work treatment intervention has any positive effects (Segal 1972; 
Fischer 1973).* Segal, for example, concluded his exceptionally 
thorough and careful survey in this way (p. 15): "The evidence with 
respect to the effectiveness of social work therapeutic intervention 
remains equivocal. The trends in the data, however, point strongly in 
the negative direction." Nor is he alone in noting the possible 
negative aspects of social work help. Fischer observed that in about 
half of the studies he reviewed, clients receiving casework tended to 
deteriorate (Fischer 1973). 
This is damaging evidence against the helping professions and it 
must surely be reason for deep disquiet. While it is not surprising to 
find that the implications of this have rarely been taken up by the 
professions themselves, it is curious that the relevance of these 
findings has largely been ignored for the sociology of the professions. 
There has been a strange lapse in the sociological imagination that 
such a gap between promise and performance, as it were, should go 
unexamined for so long. Indeed, we must ask the helping professions 
some pointed questions about what they say they are doing, and 
about their claims for professional status and legitimacy— 
particularly in the light of evidence suggesting that their services may 
be ineffectual, or worse, even harmful. 
The second charge against the personal service professions is the 
by now familiar assertion that they fail to live up to the service-ethic 
of help to all who qualify as their clients; in other words, they do not 
serve all-comers equally well. It has been claimed—although the 
supporting evidence is of varying substance— that the helping 
professions are both racist and sexist.' Perhaps the best documented 
charge of social discrimination states that these professions are 
class-biased in the delivery of their services. Certainly there is abun-
dant evidence to support such a claim in the numerous investigations 
following Hollingshead and Redlich's discovery about the New 
Haven (U.S.A.) community in the fifties, of "real differences in 
where, how and how long persons in the several classes have been 
cared for by psychiatrists" (Hollingshead and Redlich 1967, p.300). 
The results of the more recent studies have been consistent and 
disturbing: there is a bias in treatment against the blue collar patient 
who is—in comparison with patients from higher status 
backgrounds—less likely to be accepted for treatment, more likely 
to receive physical therapies or merely custodial care, more likely to 
be given an unfavourable diagnosis and a poor prognosis, and less 
likely to remain in therapy—either by premature termination by the 
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therapist or by voluntary dropping-out (Kandel 1966; Rowden et al. 
1970; Marx and Lee Spray 1972).'° Further, as Marc Fried 
demonstrates from his comprehensive survey of research, differential 
and discriminatory social and professional responses are by no 
means limited to the psychiatric arena. There is, he believes, ample 
evidence to show a bias against the lower classes in a whole range of 
services such as psychological clinics, the emergency wards of 
general hospitals in their dealing with alcoholics, and in social work 
agencies (Fried 1969, pp.156-158). 
As long ago as 1933, Carr-Saunders and Wilson recognized some 
serious deficiencies in professional services (1964, p.472): 
No one who examines the daily activities of professional men can fail 
to be profoundly impressed by the generosity which an ideal of service 
brings forth ... But it is within the knowledge of all, and it should be 
especially apparent to the members of the professions, that a large 
part of the population is so situated that it cannot command profes-
sional services. 
Yet it seems as though they underestimated the problem. Far from 
being objective, value-neutral and extending their services to all who 
need them, the helping professions have operated selectively by 
working in a socially discriminatory manner at the expense (for ex-
ample) of the lower classes in society. That fact, coupled with the re-
cent evidence of racial and sexual bias in many professions, makes a 
formidable indictment against the personal service professions which 
may not be easily sidestepped. Having said that, it is only fair to note 
that during the 1960s spokesmen for the helping professions began to 
publicly acknowledge the need to engage the poor and deprived in 
their programmes. Almost at the same time, however, further in-
vestigations revealed that not only were they making little or no 
headway against class discrimination, but that new deficiencies and 
inequalities in professional services were identified by researchers 
and by black and women militants. Clearly this state of affairs 
makes a mockery of the principle of "service to all" which 
presumably underwrites so much professional activity. For the 
future, it will be essential to explore the implications of the selective 
delivery of services in the helping professions, indeed, it must 
become one of the core problems of the sociology of the professions. 
Much remains to be done—for example, on the social dynamics of 
selection and discrimination in professional-client interactions, and 
about the speed, adequacy, and seriousness of the professional 
response to demands for change to eliminate inequalities in the 
provision of help to the needy. 
Third, if there is a crisis in the professions as we have attempted to 
demonstrate, it is probably most clearly visible in the recent 
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responses of many patient and client groups to the helping profes-
sions. Here of course we are referring to the so-called "revolt of the 
clients" (Haug and Sussman 1969), which has involved the 
emergence of various minority and client groups organizing on their 
own behalf for social action and to secure their civil and political 
rights. These have included homosexuals, welfare recipients, blacks, 
various hospital patients, alcoholics, and drug addicts. The revolt of 
the client has important consequences for the professions which 
might be illustrated with two examples. 
It has implications for professional autonomy, for instance, when 
welfare recipients begin to challenge the claims of the expert to 
specialized knowledge and altruism. There have been numerous 
cases of welfare clients (overseas and here in Australia) confronting 
social workers and administrators with demands for power in the 
running of agencies, welfare projects, and hospitals as well as 
organizing welfare marches and sit-ins in agencies, and demanding a 
say in the determination of benefits and other services. Similarly, the 
Gay Liberation movement has actively crusaded for the rights of 
homosexuals; its activities have included attempts to counter the 
stigma of contact with medical and psychiatric personnel, and a re-
jection of the technical competence and moral right of psychiatrists 
to intrude into the lives of homosexuals. Actually, there is an in-
teresting parallel in these illustrations with what Merton has called 
the "insider" doctrine—that only black sociologists can understand 
the social life of blacks, only women can understand women, and so 
on. Obviously there are difficulties, because (as Merton recognizes) 
these claims may lead to a regress such as "only young black women 
are capable of understanding other young black women" (Merton 
1972, pp.11-21). However, few would want to deny that homosex-
uals, black power and women's rights advocates—claiming "in-
sider" knowledge—have in fact righted many wrongs and corrected 
some grave misunderstandings about their particular social groups. 
The reaction of the helping professions to the client revolt deserves 
special comment. Sometimes it has been favourable and recently we 
have seen the emergence of radical, critical groups within the profes-
sions such as radical psychiatrists and radical lawyers." In some in-
stances, groups of radical professionals have formed with little or no 
prompting from clients, but rather, by the professionals themselves. 
There has also been a development of new and potentially innovative 
professional roles to cope with the challenge. Two examples of these 
are social work advocates and radical therapists in psychiatry, who 
claim greater sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of their 
clients than is to be found in the traditional styles of work favoured 
by their colleagues. 
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Yet it needs to be emphasized that the development of reform 
measures within the professions may not be initiated out of entirely 
altruistic motives. The adoption of a critical stance by professional 
associations allows them to accommodate potentially conflictual de-
mands from within the professions and to defuse the criticism of 
client groups without necessarily involving a change in professional 
activities. More often, however, the professional response has been 
outright hostility and rejection or, at least, lukewarm acceptance 
with the cooperation of a few representatives of client groups onto 
the existing decision-making bodies and power structures in the 
health and welfare fields (Haug and Sussman 1969; Krause 1968). 
But all of this has been virtually ignored in sociological writings on 
the professions. We need to recognize that such things as the revolt 
of the client in the face of professionalism cannot be subsumed under 
the familiar rubrics of "trait-theory" or "professional socialization". 
Some clients are presently denying the technical competence of the 
experts and rejecting the legitimacy of professionals to interfere in 
their lives. If the blinkers of the functionalist stance have narrowed 
our vision by an over-emphasis on order and consensus, then 
sociological theorizing about the professions may need to entertain a 
different orientation, one which acknowledges conflict and dishar-
mony, for a clearer perspective. As it is, there are too many impor-
tant problems ignored in what passes for the sociology of the profes-
sions. Thus far we have outlined three aspects of what has been cal-
led the contemporary crisis in the professions. It is time to turn now 
to other matters related to critical commentaries on the intellectual 
foundation of the professions. 
The crisis in the l^nowledge base of the professions 
Quite plainly, there is much wrong with the professions today and 
the contemporary crisis runs deep, touching their intellectual base in 
ways that raise fundamental questions about them. In this section we 
examine some aspects of the intellectual ferment evident in the help-
ing professions and in the academic disciplines which support them. 
However, a caveat is in order; many of the points to be made are of a 
conceptual kind, sometimes rather speculative in nature with little 
supporting evidence. (Indeed, it is not always clear what sort of 
evidence would count for or against them.) The main thing is for the 
reader to realize that a number of important objections are now 
being raised about the adequacy of know ledge in the helping profes-
sions. It is by no means a trivial matter that their knowledge base is 
presently coming under intense questioning. Indeed, this reflects a 
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serious state of affairs since specialized knowledge forms one of the 
pillars of professional standing. 
The first point to be made is a general one from the writings of 
social theorists including Herbert Marcuse, Jiirgen Habermas, and 
Jack D. Douglas. It is that the human sciences and their practical 
extensions—like psychiatry, psychology and social work—are non-
neutral, ideologically laden activities. These writers claim that 
science and technology operating within a particular social order 
reflect the values and norms of that society and, because they serve 
the interests of the dominant strata, must also be seen as ideological. 
Marcuse (1972, pp.223-24) makes this point strongly when he stat'js 
that: 
The very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not onl\ 
the application of technology but technology itself is domination, of 
nature and men: methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating con-
trol. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted 
upon technology "subsequently" and from the outside; they enter the 
very construction of the technical apparatus. Technolog) is always a 
historical-social project; in it is projected what a society and its ruling 
interests intend to do with men and things. 
Clearly, there are significant differences in access to the technical 
apparatus of the state which lead to differences in the power to con-
struct and disseminate ideology. In addition there has been a steady 
development of the "technicians of consent" (Stedman-Jones's 
phrase 1969, pp.31-32), those persons concerned with the making 
and manipulation of public opinion and the management of personal 
and social strain. On this account then, science and technology 
(including their manifestations in the field of human affairs) function 
to control and dominate men in the interests of the ruling classes. 
While few sociologists would accept the argument in the strong form 
presented here, many observers have noted apprehensively the trend 
in modern Western societies to allocate individual and societal 
problems to the new human studies. These disciplines, underpinned 
by rationality and scientific method, lie at the very core of 
technologically based industrial societies. One consequence of this is 
that the importance of moral problems like responsibility and 
freedom in human affairs is diminished and obscured while technical 
issues such as those involved in the mechanics of the control and 
prediction of human behaviour are emphasized. 
Following closely from that point (but in a different intellectual 
tradition) is the charge that the helping professions are misconceived 
and misdirected in their activities. Although c\a\m\i\g prima facie to 
be about psychological and social problems (crime, delinquency, 
mental illness, alcoholism, poverty, and so on), they are really, with 
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regard to the central thrust of their activities, concerned with issues 
of morality, rules and norms, and the policing of infringements of 
these. Writing about psychiatry, Szasz (1960) and Leifer (1970-71) 
have argued that clinical judgments about human affairs, though 
couched in medical terms, are in fact about deviance and conformity. 
To put it more directly, the personal service professions masquerade 
under the guise of help, treatment, and service—the rhetoric of the 
Therapeutic State—when all the while they are really concerned with 
morality and social control, the enforcement of standards and 
values, and the reinforcement of dominant social practices. 
Indeed, the human relations specialists and the mental health ex-
perts have become very much like the "New Mandarins" described 
by Noam Chomsky (1969) in another context. Following the lead of 
Max Weber, who recognized some time ago that Western societies 
laud and rely heavily on rationality and scientific reasoning,'^ Jack 
Douglas has argued that a characteristic feature of modern societies 
is the strong feeling of need for expert, scientific advice and decision-
making in an ever-widening range of activities (1970, pp.16-19). 
Because of this, or so Douglas asserts, scientific rhetoric is "created" 
to bridge the gap between the felt needs of the public (including 
politicians and policy makers) and the capabilities of science. Public 
demand plays no small part in the establishment of a plausible set of 
scientific-technical terms, precise and quantitative measures and 
techniques of analysis, and theories for any field in which the market 
demand is high—the rewards for the practitioners, of course, are in 
prestige, money, and especially in power. 
For Douglas, the degree of monopolistic control that experts exert 
over information and knowledge, the felt ignorance of non-experts, 
and the wide feelings of public need for expert help are all important 
in determining whether a particular discipline is accepted as a 
science or not. In a passage particularly relevant to our critique of 
the helping professions, Douglas asserts that: 
Regardless of how or why a given discipline becomes socially 
categorized as a science, once it is so categorized the public makes 
even more demands on the expert practitioners of this new science, 
and the more pressing are the problems the science is supposed to 
solve. Thus there are greater incentives than ever, both rewards and 
punishments, especially the fear of being proved a fake for presenting 
expert knowledge as more scientific than can be effectively 
demonstrated to be the case—that is, for constructing expertise." 
We have good reason to be disturbed about the consequences 
which follow when any discipline concerned with human affairs 
achieves scientific status because men lose control over more and 
more areas of personal life. An alarming aspect of this trend is the 
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increased legitimacy, authority, and autonomy which follow from 
specialist knowledge and support. Consequently sociologists, psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, social workers and their kind are in heavy 
demand for policies and programmes concerned with personal and 
social disorganization. The language of science and the promise of 
quantitative data have a seductive appeal which ensures that the ap-
plied human sciences are well represented in government agencies 
and on committees to alleviate poverty or to control delinquency. 
Yet their role is symbolic rather than pragmatic in most cases, for 
they have little to offer the policy maker or administrator in terms of 
precise results or concrete proposals derived from their empirical 
studies. Schur has performed a real service by calling for a thorough 
revaluation of our ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency in his 
recent book Radical non-intervention. Drawing attention to the 
failure of social science to isolate or understand the causes of delin-
quency, and the failure of preventive and rehabilitative programmes 
mounted by the helping professions, Schur argues that the safest 
strategy may be one of "radical non-intervention" or, put plainly, 
"Leave the kids alone wherever possible" (Schur 1973, p. 155). The 
same dismal story might be told about poverty and mental illness— 
here again the record of the human sciences and their applied dis-
ciplines is not flattering—the non-intervention prescription has equal 
relevance with regard to the dangers of stigmatization through con-
tact with welfare and psychiatric agencies.'"* 
We may put this gloomy picture in a clearer perspective by 
reference to Derek Phillips's answer to the question of whether the 
social sciences (and sociology in particular) have a unique and 
valuable corpus of knowledge and expertise. After a painstaking but 
fair survey of the behavioural sciences, he noted that most psy-
chological and sociological research only accounts for something 
like 10-13 per cent of the variance of the dependent variable, and 
that while there are numerous generalizations in the literature of 
social science, most of these either remain unconfirmed by empirical 
research or they are of such minor importance in explaining any 
observed facts as to be of little use. There is little comfort to be found 
in Phillips's conclusion (some would say an overly pessimistic one) 
that "much of the evidence utilized by sociologists is of questionable 
validity; that, furthermore, the relationships between our chief in-
dependent and dependent variables are generally quite weak; and, 
finally, that even if we had valid measures and strong relationships 
the problems of interpretation are extremely formidable" (1973, 
p.14; see also Phillips 1971). Phillips's assessment has disturbing im-
plications for those who would pin their faith on a psychiatry or 
social work established on the knowledge base of the behavioural 
sciences. 
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Probably the most penetrating attack on the intellectual founda-
tions of the helping professions comes from those who doubt the 
theoretical adequacy let alone the utility of any human science—as 
the underpinning for practical activities and policy statements— 
based on the application of natural science methods to the social 
world. For as Douglas has observed (1970, p. 16), " . . . scientific—or 
even technological—reasoning cannot be directly applied to our 
everyday lives as we now live them. The kinds of situations we face 
and the decisions we make are almost always emergent—or existen-
tial." The strong rejection of positivism here is unmistakable and 
considerable discontent has been articulated lately in the prolifera-
tion of new points of view—searching for a more adequate founda-
tion for the study of man—and claiming to be quite different from 
and a break with traditional approaches in psychiatry, psychology 
and social work.'-
As an example, consider the movement stimulated by 
phenomenology and existentialism, which seems to be arguing the 
case for a thoroughgoing reorientation of theory and practice in the 
pure and applied human sciences. Two themes evident in this trend 
have been an attempt to replace the old "S-R" models of man and a 
rejection of the ideologies of control, in favour of a view of man 
emphasizing self-actualization and self-direction. The following 
quotes from Rollo May (1967, pp.68-69,77), the existential psy-
chiatrist, illustrate this point well. Generally speaking, he says, the 
significant dimension for human beings is the future: "Personality 
can be understood only as we see it on a trajectory towards its future; 
a man can understand himself only as he projects himself forward ... 
the person is always becoming, always emerging into the future. The 
self is to be seen in its potentiality." Specifically, in the case of the 
analysis of dreams, the focus of existential psychiatry is upon what 
the patient's dreams reveal about " . . . where he is at the moment and 
what he is moving toward .. . The context is the patient not as a set of 
psychic dynamisms or mechanisms but as a human being who is 
choosing, committing, and pointing himself toward something right 
now; the context is dynamic, immediately real, and present." 
There are two things to be said about this. To begin with, the 
thrust of this approach, stressing the emergent and open nature of 
the personality, stands in marked contrast to the mostly deter-
ministic, mechanistic formulations of many of the psychologies 
employed in personal and social engineering. Secondly, and more 
generally, it reminds us that the "professional culture" is by no 
means homogeneous; conflicts, or at the least, differences of opinion, 
may arise over which of the cognitive elements is worthwhile and 
therefore to be passed on to recruits to the profession, or about 
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which set of ideas should provide the impetus for action in any prac-
tical situation. Disputes concerning the intellectual foundations of 
the helping professions, such as these questions about incompatible 
psychological systems, may be between professionals, or between the 
professional and the neophyte. In that sense, the contemporary 
professional scene is characterized by endemic conflict over com-
peting theoretical schemes. Thus, following the Kuhnian usage, it 
may be appropriate to talk in terms of rival epistemic paradigms— 
for instance, when one contrasts stimulus-response with 
phenomenological psychologies and sociologies as intellectual 
systems or as the mainspring for practical activity. 
Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we have not only indicated some of the main faults in 
sociological work on the professions, but, what is more important, 
we have also attempted to sketch the contours of a conflict-oriented 
approach to the field. Basically, our argument has been that an ade-
quate sociology of the professions must come to grips w ith the fact 
that the professions in modern society are in a state of turmoil and 
crisis, involving both their intellectual foundations and day-to-day 
practice. The word "crisis" is not used lightly in this context; rather. 
it describes well the present circumstances of the helping professions 
which are faced with charges of a fundamental character— 
challenges to their intellectual hegemony and evidence that they fall 
far short of success in everyday practice—a situation scarcely 
recognizable from the usual sociological accounts of the prolcssitins 
As well as giving a more balanced picture of the professions today, 
we have endeavoured to be more sensitive to conflict and change— 
the very stuff of life in the professions—than the order and 
consensus-oriented work which comprises the bulk of the 
sociological corpus. Finally, with that in mind, we want to draw 
some conclusions and to mention some important problem areas in 
the sociology of the professions which should be tackled immediate-
ly. 
To begin with, there are two points of a general nature which must 
be made. In the first place, one of the difficulties of macro-
sociological work like theorizing about the professions is the virtual 
absence of any explicit standards for deciding which of a number of 
competing points of view is to be accepted. For a start, what counts 
as "evidence" is not always clear and, moreover, the reasons why 
sociologists favour theory A over theory B are only diml\ under-
stood. Sometimes a point of \iew is accepted because it strikes 
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resonances in the audience, or because of the infrastructure of the 
theory and the domain assumptions held by sociologists (Gouldner 
1970); at other times, perhaps, it is accepted, because of its 
elegance—i.e., according to whether it fits the covering-law model 
(Homans 1970). 
In the second place, it is important to be more precise than we 
have been about what is meant by a "conflict-orientation" to the 
professions. Obviously there are a number of bases of conflict in 
society, such as class or racial and sexual inequalities, and it might 
be that each of these as separate theoretical foci promote different 
empirical preoccupations. It will be the task of theoretically 
sophisticated studies in the future to articulate the premises of a con-
flict approach and to examine the feasibility of a unified conflict 
theory of the professions. 
Perhaps the most neglected point has been a general consideration 
of the methodology of the conflictual perspective in sociology—and 
this applies specifically to studies of the professions. If we are to 
begin to understand the professions, then considerable 
methodological innovation will be necessary, including a willingness 
to tackle the big questions of the macro-sociology of the professions. 
Earlier in this paper we highlighted the need to supplement question-
naire and survey methods—which, because of the way in which they 
are usually employed, yield some useful information within a limited 
range'*'—with participant observation studies to gain first-hand 
knowledge of the social world of the professionals. At the same time, 
two of the exciting developments in the conflict tradition, perfectly 
applicable to research on the professions, have been the "Nader's 
Raiders" and the case-study approach to white collar crime in the 
sociology of deviance (Young 1971; Thio 1973; Pearce 1973). We 
strongly urge sociologists to explore these avenues of research. 
Studies of malpractice suits, shabby practices (such as assembly-line 
psychiatric interviews), intra-professional disputes about ethics and 
techniques, and analyses of professional responses to charges of 
failure or class bias in services, may provide valuable information 
not forthcoming from the usual styles of investigation. 
We have talked about examining the part played by the profes-
sions in society but this is by no means an easy undertaking—all the 
difficulties of macro- sociology, such as the lack of conceptual preci-
sion and the problems of assessing evidence, raise their heads once 
again. An interesting aspect of this issue is that although the data 
from studies on the outcome of therapeutic intervention reveal that 
the helping professions are unsuccessful in reaching their own stated 
goals, in terms of sheer numbers the ranks of the professionals are 
growing evenly and rapidly. At the very least then, this observation 
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provokes the thought that the helping professions perform, success-
fully, functions in society other than their explicit claims would in-
dicate. 
But which functions? Some tentative answers have been proposed; 
it has been argued by some writers that the helping professions carry 
out the functions of "pattern maintenance" and "tension 
management". Pattern maintenance means that the personal service 
professions (and particularly psychiatry, psychology, and social 
work) pass on to and foster in their clients the character traits, 
values, and attitudes (such as the need to achieve, the importance of 
security and respect for property and authority) which are necessary 
for the working of contemporary capitalist society. Tension manage-
ment refers to the "cooling-out" function of the helping professions 
in terms of the management of systematic conflict through the al-
leviation of the more severe effects of the unequal distribution of 
economic resources and political power which exist under capitalism 
(Pemberton and Locke 1971, pp. 100-101). On this account, the role 
of the helping professions—one quite different from their stated 
intentions—is as mediators and dispensers of access to reality, 
because they are the gatekeepers of knowledge and experts in the ar-
bitration of morality, the evaluation of normality, personality in-
tegration, and social competence in the areas, for example, of sexual 
and vocational functioning. We do not wish to suggest that the pop-
ulation reacts in puppet-like fashion to the edicts of the mental 
health professions; such a notion is simplistic, and, as the work of 
Sarbin and Mancuso (1970) indicates, probably inaccurate. 
However, we would contend that broader views of normality and 
morality are certainly engendered by the personnel of the helping 
professions. 
A similar thesis about the social welfare system has been argued 
recently by Piven and Cloward in the United States and by George in 
the United Kingdom. Piven and Cloward (1972, p.xiii) asserted that 
"expansive relief policies are designed to mute civil disorder, and 
restrictive ones to reinforce work norms. In other words relief 
policies are cyclical—liberal or restrictive depending on the 
problems of regulation in the larger society with which government 
must contend." George (1973, p.2) related social security systems ex-
plicitly to the needs of the ruling classes. Recognizing that force or 
the threat of force may in the long run alienate the individuals or 
groups who have questioned the social order, the ruling elite see the 
need to develop less repressive, less obvious forms of domination: 
This is the creation of ideologies which serve the economic interests of 
the ruling classes and the securing of the acceptance of such class 
ideologies as "national" ideologies serving the interests of all sections 
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of the community. Once such class ideologies are accepted by the 
working class as national, they are obeyed and the need for coercive 
measures to preserve the status quo diminishes. 
A critical theory of the professions then, has as its central focus 
the relationship between knowledge and interests, encompassing 
both a macro- and micro- sociology of knowledge. On the one hand, 
the macrd-socioiogy of professional knowledge should be oriented to 
such broad issues as professional ideologies (both particular and 
total, parochial and ecumenic'"), instances in which corporate clients 
(business, military, government) are able to define the goals and 
procedures of the professions, and the implications and conse-
quences of the virtual homogeneit> of the class background of 
professionals. On the other hand, the micro-sociology of knowledge, 
focused on the dynamics of client-professional interaction, should be 
concerned specifically with matters like the social distribution of 
stocks of knowledge, including comparative studies of lay and 
professional knowledge about the problems at hand, the social con-
struction and maintenance of diagnoses and definitions of problems. 
and the use of power in the negotiation of identities and definitions oi 
situations by both parties to the interaction.'" Perhaps the crucial 
theoretical objective will be the articulation of macro and micro 
points of view, for instance, to show the ways in which shared profes-
sional conceptions of normality and realit\—serving the interests of 
the ruling elites and, at the same time, anchored in wider communitv 
legitimation—are imposed on the client or patient in the interac-
tional context by such interpersonal tactics as bargaining and 
manipulation of situational definitions. 
Finally, what of the future? A central issue is whether the intellec-
tual ferment we have described in the helping professions will erupt 
into open and divisive cimflict over moral, political, or 
epistemological issues, or whether the real differences which present-
ly exist will simply be reflected in diversity within the professional 
cultures of the future. In other words, are there centrifugal pressures 
at work for instance, so that radical therapists will soon be forced to 
practise outside the professional ambit? Or will "deviant" profes-
sionals and professional groups be constrained or even encouraged to 
stay within the circle of their occupational colleagues? It may also be 
asked whether clients will become a serious threat to the intellectual 
and cultural hegemony of the professions—or is the very notion of 
client control of professional services a contradiction in terms? These 
are just some of the possibilities and problems for the future raised 
by a critical sociology of the professions. 
In the long run, the sociology of the professions must be judged by 
its explanatory and predictive power. Our view is that a re-focusing 
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of interest on the professions from a conflict rather than a consensus 
perspective will have considerable heuristic value. However, predic-
tion remains a risky business, not least because of the interaction 
between research findings and substantive concern. At the moment, 
critical commentaries have an impact on and influence the develop-
ment of the helping professions in no less than two discernible senses; 
one is that writers like Ivan Illich (1973) seek to "deprofessionalize" 
society and to dismantle the professions in order to halt the swelling 
tide of scientific and technological advancement which subjugates 
more and more areas of personal and social life to the advice and ac-
tions of experts. So far there are few signs of this movement gather-
ing momentum, either among the lay consumers of services or w ithin 
the professions themselves. Thus the demise of the professions seems 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. The other trend is reflected in the 
reformist efforts of those who wish to remedy the present ills by 
providing better services, available to all who wish to use them. This 
is by no means a recent development and, on the evidence available, 
it seems safe to say that the ranks of the professions will always 
number among them those who—in various degrees of anger and 
urgency—desire to correct the worst features of professional ac-
tivity. It seems unlikely, however, that such movements for reform 
will be guided by the broader concern with professional practice in 
an unequal society, an issue which we consider so vital for the future. 
Notes to text 
1. This is not to say that the work of Halmos, and other writers such as Parsons and 
Marshall, is free of critical commentary on the professions. The main thrust of 
their writings, however, is to review the professions in a favourable light. 
2. See Durkheim's introduction to the second edition of The division of labour in 
society (1893) and Professional ethics and civic morals (1937). the latter published 
posthumously. With regard to the other work in the Durkheimian tradition men-
tioned in this section, two papers by Parsons, "The professions in the social struc-
ture" (1939) and "The motivation of economic activity" (1940). are reproduced in 
Parsons (1964), while Marshall's paper "The recent history of professionalism in 
relation to social structure and social policy" (1939) appears in Marshall (1963). 
3. Positivism in sociology has been described by Giddens as based upon the assertion 
"that the concepts and methods employed in the natural sciences can be applied 
to form a 'science of man" " (1974, p.3). Giddens distinguishes three specific is-
sues: that the methodological procedures of natural science may be directly 
adapted to sociology; the goal of sociological analysis is to formulate "laws" or 
"law-like" generalizations of the same kind as those established in the natural 
sciences; and, the findings of sociological research do not logically carry any given 
implications for practical policy or for the pursuit of human values (1974, pp. 
3 - 4). 
4. This point is well made by Harry Throssell in chapter 10 of this book. See also the 
superb piece by Satu Repo in "Therapy and the powerless: memoirs of a social 
work student". 
38 
Alec Pemberton and Paul Boreham 
5. The term "pre-training phase" is taken from Western and Anderson (1968, p.96) 
and it should be noted that when these authors recognize the possibility of some 
discontinuity, it is limited to conflicts between professional values and 
bureaucratic and organizational demands (p.97). To be fair, at least one study ex-
amines the possibility of "pluralism" in professional cultures — that of Strauss et 
al. (1964). 
6. Bob Scholte has written of the difficulties in the assessment of rival epistemic 
paradigms in social science and particularly in anthropology in the case of British 
social anthropology and the continental school of thought exemplified in the work 
of Levi-Strauss (Scholte 1966). 
7. It would not be unreasonable to contend that the crisis in the professions should 
be placed within the wider framework of a modern crisis and questioning of domi-
nant social institutions in Western societies. The notion of a crisis in Western 
societies is discussed by sociologists such as Alvin Gouldner (1970), for example, 
and by others also, as is revealed in "Varieties of political expression in 
sociology", a symposium sponsored by the American Journal of Sociology, and 
in "Recent sociology" an annual publication edited by H.P. Dreitzel. 
8. Some would wish to argue that this charge has little force in the case of social 
work where much of the work is of a practical rather than psychotherapeutic 
kind. Yet much of the professional and educational literature of social work, and 
particularly the basis of its claims to full professional status, rests on its counsell-
ing as opposed to its "hand-out" activities. 
9. Racism and sexism in the psychiatric professions are discussed by Thomas and 
Sillen (1972) and Glenn and Kunnes (1973). 
10. A study by Myers and Schaffer (1954) and one by Kandel (1966) have disposed of 
the argument that class differences in treatment are due to a lack of money to 
purchase the best services for the lower classes. See also the editorial introduc-
tions and some chapters in Riessman et al. (1966). 
11. For example, see the "Radical psychiatry" symposium in the 1970-71 issue of the 
International Journal of Psychiatry. 
12. Weber used a specific term, Zweckrationality, to refer to "instrumentally 
rational" action based on the actor's use of means in relation to specific rational 
ends. 
13. Douglas makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, expertise or 
scientism and, on the other, expert or scientific knowledge: "Expertise or Scien-
tism is distinguished from expert or scientific knowledge by its reliance on the 
rhetoric of science to convince its practitioners and their audiences rather than on 
results. Regardless of the intentions of the practitioners ... the public-felt need 
leads the public to accept the information presented in the symbolic forms of 
science as being science" (1970, p. 17). 
14. Many writers have pointed to the stigmatizing effects of contact with welfare 
agencies (Coser) and psychiatric institutions (Scheff and Goffman). 
1 i. The reader will most probably be familiar with a range of literature — both with 
and without an explicitly radical political theme — including the works of R.D. 
Laing, David Cooper, Thomas Szasz, Rollo May, Timothy Leary, Aaron 
Cicourel, Harold Garfinkel and many others. 
16. We certainly do not wish to deny that traditional research methods have supplied 
important data about the social backgrounds of professionals and about their 
values and attitudes. 
17. The distinction between "particular" and "total" ideology comes originally from 
Mannheim, while the concepts of "parochial" and "ecumenic", applied to profes-
sional ideology, are derived from Dibble (1962). 
18. Some preliminary work has been done on the micro-sociology of professional 
knowledge; .see, for example. Scott (1970) and Freidson (1973). 
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The Professions: Reason and Rhetoric 
DON S. ANDERSON AND JOHN WESTERN 
The way men earn a living is a topic of considerable interest to social 
scientists. For psychologists, the job a man chooses to do and how he 
does it is a projection of attitudes, values and drives, a key-hole 
through which to view a personality. It is said that Freud was once 
asked his prescription for a happy life. The questioner expected a 
much more complex reply than "love and work", with its implica-
tion that there are two basic roles and that happiness depends as 
much on a satisfying vocation as on relations with other people. 
The work a man does is not only a source of self-expression and of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, but also serves to locate him in the 
social structure. Sociologists are nearly unanimous in the view "that 
occupation is the pivot of the stratification system in industrial 
societies" (Broom 1971). Knowledge of a man's job suggests a great 
deal else about him: probable income range, schooling and 
specialized training, wife's education, social prestige, where he lives, 
style of life, political beliefs, and a great deal about the attitudes and 
values he holds. 
Less formally, a man's job is also a means by which his fellows 
sum him up. Strangers seeking a short cut to each other's natures 
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will almost certainly seek the first clue through occupation. "How do 
you do?" is soon followed by "what do you do?", and, as a means of 
getting to know a person, is socially more acceptable and more infor-
mative than, for example, "what's your religion" or "how's your 
love life?" 
A good deal of the community's resources are devoted to the 
preparation of young people for their work roles, and economists 
and educational planners are concerned to predict changes in the 
work-force and devise the best methods of teaching skills. In doing 
so they confront a vast array of questions. For example: what should 
be the relative weights and timing of non-vocational and vocational 
studies in technical or professional courses? Should university stu-
dents be given experiences with clear vocational emphases early in 
their courses, or should specialization be delayed until later years or 
even until after a general first degree or diploma has been obtained? 
Is professional training appropriate to multi-purpose universities 
and colleges or could it be done better in single purpose institutions? 
For that matter, is it necessary to bring students to an institution at 
all when instruction can be given at home or on the job by using 
radio, TV, posted notes and tapes, and by visiting tutors? Or should 
we join Ivan Illich and attempt to do away with formal schooling 
altogether? Are institutional innovations such as the Open Univer-
sity in Britain and the external studies divisions of different univer-
sities, where students spend little time with one another or with staff, 
likely to produce occupational specialization which differs from that 
found among students in a campus community? There are of course 
myriads of other questions as well. 
The emergence in society of clearly defined occupational groups 
called professions and the growth of complex institutional arrange-
ments within an educational system for the proper training of profes-
sionals are relatively recent phenomena, and can be seen as a 
response to certain societal needs: the need for skilled ad-
ministrators, for technically trained experts and service personnel 
with varied skills. 
In their pioneering history of the professions in England Carr-
Saunders and Wilson (1933) show clearly how the emergence of the 
new professions is associated with the application of scientific 
knowledge to problems of production. In discussing the emergence 
of professional groups in the nineteenth century they have the follow-
ing to say: 
The moment when application of knowledge becomes possible de-
pends, in the first place upon the progress of research, and in the se-
cond place upon changes in social and industrial organization, since it 
is sometimes the case that knowledge cannot be employed because 
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organization has not been sufficiently advanced. The rise of the new 
professions based upon intellectual techniques is due to the revolution 
brought about by the work of the engineers and thus indirectly to the 
coming of science. The engineers made possible large-scale industrial 
organization. Large-scale industrial organization creates the need for 
accountants, secretaries, a highly-developed system of banking and in-
surance, and the services of brokers. 
The professions have had a short history in Australia. They were 
first recorded in the 1911 census as comprising 3.5 per cent of the 
work force. These numbers have increased steadily since that time, 
rising to 5.2 per cent in 1921, 5.7 per cent in 1933, 5.9 per cent in 
1947, 8.7 per cent in 1961, 9.6 per cent in 1966. Presently they are 
slightly above 10 per cent. 
Apart from the "recognized" professions, members of some new 
occupations are calling themselves professionals, e.g., computer 
programmers and town planners; furthermore, some established oc-
cupations not formerly thought of as professional are beginning to 
assume the title, e.g., estage agents and morticians. The latter two, 
however, are.not as yet classified by the Commonwealth Statistician 
as professional. F. Lancaster Jones, whose analysis of occupational 
change in Australia provided the above figures, notes that the change 
reflects greater demand for such services as health and education and 
that the increase is mainly in the category he terms "lower" profes-
sionals. School teachers, who are in the lower category, increased in 
numbers five-fold between 1911 and 1966, at about the same rate as 
the total work force. Paramedical occupations, including nurses, in-
creased sixfold, a much greater increase than occurred with doctors 
and dentists (Jones 1971). 
The definition of "profession" is necessarily arbitrary. In 1921 the 
Commonwealth Statistician called professional those persons 
"mainly engaged in the government and defence of the country, and 
in satisfying the moral, intellectual, and social wants of its in-
habitants". The description suggests the importance of education 
and obligation to the community. These two characteristics are 
central to the concepts of profession and professional used in the fol-
lowing discussion. However, these are complex notions and 
numerous attempts have been made to define them. Barry Maley 
(1970), after reviewing much of the literature, lists five main 
characteristics of professions about which there is considerable 
agreement: 
(i) a high level of generalized and systematic knowledge leading to a 
formal qualification 
(ii) work directed towards general community or cultural benefit 
rather than to individual self-interest 
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(iii) large measure of autonomy correlated with recognition of 
responsibility towards clients or employers, and public 
(iv) self-consciousness and measure of corporate control of profes-
sional group through lengthy socialization processes and 
traditional codes of conduct 
(v) money and honours regarded as symbols of work achievement 
and thus as ends in themselves rather than as means to serve 
other self-interests. 
A profession expects a great deal of autonomy both in setting its 
conditions and standards of service, and for the professional in his 
work. Thus the medical and legal professions assert their views about 
recruitment and training, and attempt to protect members from out-
side or bureaucratic interference as they carry out their tasks. They 
also set standards of conduct and have means of disciplining 
members who violate these standards. Whereas in the provision of 
non professional services such as plumbing, taxi driving, and the 
like, government agencies set standards and define the community 
interest, in professional areas the professional associations tend to 
assume this responsibility. Associated with autonomy is the idea of 
"exclusive competence". A profession attempts to ensure that 
persons not trained and not duly certified to membership are not al-
lowed to practise the professional task (Becker et al. 1960). Finally, a 
profession is recognized by its own members and by the society in 
which it exists as having considerable prestige, a fact testified to by 
the numerous studies of occupational prestige in which professional 
groups are consistently rated high. 
In a recent study of the medical profession Eliot Friedson (1970) 
argues that the only truly important and useful criterion for dis-
tinguishing professions from other occupations is the fact of 
autonomy, "a position of legitimate control over work" (p.82). In 
arriving at this conclusion he critically reviews a number of analyses 
which have attempted to identify the criteria to be used in determin-
ing whether an occupation can appropriately be described as a 
profession. He notes that the "most successful and careful of recent 
analysts", William J. Goode, identifies two "core characteristics" of 
professions from which a number of other characteristics are said to 
be derived (Goode 1960). These two core characteristics are "a 
prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and 
a collectivity or service orientation" (p.903). Five of Goode's 
"derived" characteristics bear on the question of professional 
autonomy, and in a carefully argued analysis Freidson claims that 
these precede rather than follow, in some determinate sequence, 
from Goode's core characteristics (Freidson 1970, pp.77-82). 
In concluding his argument Freidson suggests that autonomy need 
not be absolute. It depends for its existence on the toleration, and at 
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times even the protection of the state, and it does not have to exist 
across all zones of occupational activity; where it must exist is with 
respect to "the content of the work itself (p.82). He sees autonomy 
as the outcome of interaction between political and economic power 
and occupational representation, an interaction which "is sometimes 
facilitated by educational institutions and other devices which suc-
cessfully persuade the state that the occupation's work is reliable and 
valuable" (p.83). There is no stable institutional attribute which will 
inevitably lead to a position of autonomy, Freidson argues; it is only 
"through a process of political negotiation and persuasion that the 
society is led to believe that it is desirable to grant an occupation the 
professional status of self-regulative autonomy" (p.83). And, of 
course, the fact that a profession's right to its status is based on 
societal consensus means that the dissipation of this consensus would 
result in the occupation being no longer regarded as a profession. 
We can perhaps see in the present embattled position of some 
professional groups some suggestions of this withdrawal of con-
sensus. The accusations that are sometimes made against the 
medical profession, for example, that it is inherently conservative, 
that it resists change, that its members are often more concerned 
with personal gain that with the common good, that scales of fees are 
quite disproportionate to the skill required for many professional 
jobs may be indicators of this situation. 
Professional cultures and professional socialization 
A major research interest of those concerned with the professions 
has been the manner in which professionals-to-be come to acquire 
the characteristics, orientation, style, or demeanour of professionals 
in the field they have elected to enter. Or, to put it perhaps a little 
less elegantly, but no less precisely. How do neophytes get like that? 
Concern with this issue requires an answer to two basic questions. 
Firstly, to what extent is entry into the professions a self-selective 
process? That is to say, to what extent do professions recruit in-
dividuals who are fundamentally similar in outlook and orientation 
to the existing members and who by entry simply reinforce an ex-
isting state of affairs. Secondly, and more importantly, particularly 
if the answer to the first question suggests that the process is not self-
selection, what is the process by which neophytes are inducted into 
the profession so that they come very shortly to be indistinguishable 
from existing members? 
This interest requires a focus of attention on a socialization 
process, professional socialization and the concept of professional 
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culture. Socialization is the term used extensively to describe the 
"process by which people selectively acquire the attitudes and values, 
the interests, skills and knowledge—in short the culture—current in 
the groups of which they are, or seek to become a member" (Merton 
et al. 1957). Brim (1966), in his essay on socialization through the life 
cycle, describes it as "the process by which persons acquire the 
knowledge, skills and dispositions that make them more or less able 
members of their society". Students of professional socialization 
commonly assume the existence of a professional culture " . . . a body 
of shared and transmitted ideas, values and standards toward which 
members of the profession are expected to orient their behaviour. 
The norms and standards define technically and morally allowable 
patterns of behaviour, indicating what is prescribed, preferred, per-
mitted or proscribed. The sub-culture then refers to more than 
habitual behaviour; its norms codify the values of the profession" 
(Merton et al. 1957). 
The burden of the evidence is that entry into the professions is not 
a self-selective process (Merton et al. 1957; Becker et al. 1960; 
Anderson and Western 1970; Western 1971) although it is clear that 
recruits come in the main from socio-economic levels very similar to 
those of practitioners (Rogoff 1957; Thelens 1957; Anderson and 
Western 1972). The questions of interest, therefore, revolve around 
the socialization process itself, and it is commonly assumed by 
workers in the field that the experiences stemming from this process 
are as profound in their consequences for behaviour and the nature 
of attitude and value patterns as are the socialization experiences of 
early childhood. 
Although the decision to embark on a professional career is an im-
portant point in the socialization process, it does not herald its com-
mencement, for the process neither begins when the student enters a 
professional school nor ends when he leaves, but is continuous, 
capable of being broken down into at least three broad phases. The 
first of these can be called the pre-training phase, and it is in this 
phase that the decision is made. The second is the training phase, and 
the third the post-training phase. 
During the first phase of the process the individual acquires two 
related sets of values. The first are certain general societal values, the 
second some of the more visible professional values. The first set is 
likely to direct attention to certain professional fields rather than 
others and may underlie the individual's decision to enter a par-
ticular field. For instance, altruistic intentions towards one's fellow 
men might not lead to a business career but could quite conceivably 
direct attention to social work, teaching, or the ministry. Once the 
individual has become interested in a certain professional field, then. 
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in a period which is essentially one of anticipatory socialization, 
some of the more visible professional values may gradually come to 
be acquired. 
Two points should be noted about value acquisition in this phase. 
First, as Becker and Gear (1958) suggest, the values acquired at this 
time may represent lay ideas about the profession rather than actual 
professional values. Under these conditions one would expect some 
basic value changes in the second phase of the process. Second, the 
nature and extent of the values the individual acquires in this phase 
are likely to be at least partly determined by the "visibility" of the 
profession. Thus, a student entering medicine is likely to have a bet-
ter idea of some of the responsibilities a doctor is expected to assume 
vis-a-vis his patients than a student of town planning, for example, 
will have of the norms governing the behaviour of town planners. 
The implication for the individual, then, is that during the first 
phase he is likely to acquire what he considers are some of the 
general values of his future profession. If these are simply lay opi-
nions they are likely to change in later phases. If they are accurate 
refiections of professional values they are likely to remain fairly con-
stant throughout the educative process. The extent to which profes-
sional values are acquired at all will be at least partly determined by 
the visibility of the profession. 
The second phase corresponds to the individual's period of formal 
training. Technical skills and substantive knowledge form the basis 
of what is learned now. Particular substantive and technical interests 
develop, and these colour the values the individual brings with him 
and give rise to the development of new and more specific values. 
Gradually the individual comes to see the world in a particular light. 
He is likely to interpret situations and occurrences in terms of his 
technical knowledge and image of his profession, and 
characteristically focus on particular aspects of events at the expense 
of others. In a word, he is acquiring a professional self which not 
only governs his activities in professional situations but will also af-
fect the way he interprets the more general social realit\. 
The third phase begins when the individual leaves the training in-
stitution, and presumably lasts the remainder of his professional life. 
During this phase new specialized technical skills may be learned and 
new values acquired. Finally, removed from the protective environ-
ment of the training institution, the new professional's future is 
largely dependent on how he employs his newly acquired skills. 
From the start he is frequently faced with an interesting dilemma. 
On the one hand his professional values define the limits of accep-
table professional activity, while on the other his personal interests 
express how he would act were there no constraints in his path. One 
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of the important functions of professional bodies is to establish 
regulatory mechanisms through which this potential confiict can be 
contained. 
Professional socialization performs two special functions for the 
professions. The first has to do with the claim by professional 
organizations for "exclusive competence to practise" and profes-
sional ethics. Professions typically claim the right of exclusive com-
petence to practise on the basis of long and involved periods of train-
ing. In addition, as laymen are not well qualified to judge profes-
sional competence, the normal methods of social control, 
bureaucratic supervision, or customer evaluation are inappropriate, 
and the professions themselves also have the task of judging profes-
sional behaviour and establishing codes of ethics. But while they set 
out the rules governing standards of work and the public interest and 
rules prescribing relations with clients and other professionals, 
professional control is only infrequently exercised through the for-
mal apparatus of professional ethics committees, statutory boards, 
etc. Socialization ensures that the rules are internalized, so that by 
the time the recruit has become a fully fiedged practitioner, self-
control is normally sufficient to maintain standards of performance 
and ethical behaviour. 
In addition to developing in members values which put limits on 
self-interest and on the temptation to do shoddy work, effective 
socialization helps the professional to adapt to those aspects of his 
work which often have a latent emotional content. Banton (196.^ ) 
describes how the practitioner separates his professional role from 
roles associated with normal social intercourse, so that there is a 
minimum of interference between the two. A doctor, for instance, 
typically adopts a characteristic demeanour with clients in order to 
preserve the detachment necessary for the effective implementation 
of his professional role. When separation of roles is impossible, as it 
could be in the treatment of a member of his own family, a doctor is 
likely to recommend the services of a colleague. 
Because he is confronted with a succession of clients, many of 
whom are seen in some distress, a doctor must not allow himself to 
become too emotionally involved in any one case. To do so may im-
pair his technical judgment. Furthermore, because he sees a large 
number of patients in a day, he must be able to "switch ofP' after 
seeing one in order to be ready for the next. This professional 
demeanour of the medical man is sometimes misread as cynicism; in 
fact, it is more accurately described as a professional detachment 
which enables him to apply specialized technical skills to the 
problem in hand with the greatest efficiency. It is interesting to note 
in this regard that the motivation of freshmen medical students con-
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tains a large service component—a concern for suffering and a desire 
to relieve it. This outlook is harder to find in later-year students and 
seems to have been replaced, not by a cynical attitude, but by a much 
greater interest in the techniques of medicine. It is as if the students 
who are approaching practice have come to realize that they must 
protect themselves from those emotions which would threaten their 
capacity to make detached judgments and apply professional skills. 
In other professions similar potential confiict occurs. Teachers, 
who must maintain a position of superiority in the classroom, are 
careful not to let relations become too intimate. They may either 
develop a demeanour which is quasi-parental, or become somewhat 
aloof and authoritarian. Lawyers and engineers, too, in the course of 
their training learn to distinguish professional from personal role 
obligations and seldom are both incurred with the same role 
partners. 
The effects of socialization 
We have already noted that one of the functions of professional 
socialization is to make realists out of idealists. This puts the situa-
tion crudely but with a degree of truth. A variety of other functions 
can be identified. In a study in which we have been engaged for 
several years we have attempted to identify and measure two related 
sets of attitudes. The first had to do with some of the non-academic 
objectives which are held to be important in a university education 
and which apply equally well to students in professional courses as 
they do to students in more academically oriented fields. The second 
had to do with specifically professional issues and so were largely dif-
ferent for each of the four groups, law, engineering, teaching and 
medicine, which were our major concern. 
For the first set of attitudes a combination of content and 
statistical analysis led to the definition of seven scales (Anderson and 
Western 1967): 
(i) Intellectual interests: interest in art, literature, etc., and the life 
of the mind 
(ii) Academic activities: interest in having a strong academic and 
research component in one's work 
(iii) Social liberalism: belief that man should be free from con-
straints imposed by the community, e.g., through censorship 
and sexual mores 
(iv) Political-economic liberalism: inclination to the left 
(v) Pragmatism: preference for a practical rather than a 
theoretical approach to problems 
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(vi) Dogmatism: acceptance of authority and a tendency to pre-
judge issues 
(vii) Cynicism: denial of altruism as a motive for men's actions. 
Students were tested at various times during a four-year period, 
including the first week at university. On each of the seven scales 
there were significant differences between the faculties. The dif-
ferences, which have been reported in detail elsewhere (Anderson 
and Western 1969), may be summarized as follows: engineering was 
lowest on intellectual interests, equal highest on academic activities 
and highest on pragmatism and dogmatism. It was also relatively 
low on both social and political-economic liberalism. Law was 
highest on social liberalism and lowest on political-economic 
liberalism and pragmatism. Medicine was equal highest on academic 
activities and lowest on pragmatism and significantly higher on 
political-economic liberalism than either law or engineering. 
Teaching was highest on intellectual interests and political-economic 
liberalism, lowest on academic activities and social liberalism. 
Analysis of variance has shown that the faculty differences are 
much more significant than university differences; that is, a medical 
student at Queensland University is more likely to have a set of at-
titudes similar to those of another medical student at Monash, 
Sydney, or Western Australia than to those of a student in another 
faculty in his own university. 
With time all groups change and generally toward what might be 
regarded as the university ideal. There is a marked increase in 
political-economic liberalism during the first two years at university 
for all groups except medicine; thereafter there is little change. In 
social liberalism, however, the change is marked in all faculties and 
continues over the four years. Dogmatism declines markedly in 
engineering, medicine, and teaching, but only marginally in law after 
an initial increase. The changes in pragmatism are very similar to 
those in dogmatism except that law and engineering reverse posi-
tions. Academic activities declined during the first two years in all 
faculties except teaching and then showed a marginal increase. This 
would seem to suggest that university staff in engineering, law, and 
medicine, where the emphasis in the early years is certainly more 
"academic" and "professional", are not infiuencing students 
towards their own roles. Perhaps this is due to the strong vocational 
orientation which many students have and which contrasts with the 
emphasis of the academic activities scale. The student teachers, who 
are the least profession-centred of all the groups, are the only ones to 
increase in academic activities during the first two years. All 
faculties except law show small but similar increases in intellectual 
interests. With cynicism there are virtually no changes at all from in-
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itial positions. Substantially similar trends have been observed when 
students in the more academically oriented arts and science faculties 
have been tested although they are likely to be initially more liberal 
and less dogmatic and pragmatic than the above groups and main-
tain their initial advantages. 
The general conclusion which it might seem reasonable to draw 
from this data is that during their time at university, even in the 
professional faculties which have been stereotyped as relatively con-
servative, students tend to become more engaged with the problems 
of their society and more socially committed. However, something 
of a paradox arises when one examines the changes that take place in 
more specifically professional attitudes during the same time. 
Prior to the commencement of the study we carried out detailed 
interviews with senior students, university staff, and practitioners, to 
try to identify a number of core professional issues about which we 
could question students as they progressed through their courses. 
For each profession a number of these issues were identified. They 
concerned the professional's responsibility to the client and to the 
wider community, relations with professional colleagues, effective 
delivery of professional services and related issues. We have not 
space to consider the manner in which students' views changed on 
these in detail (more details can be found in Anderson and Western 
1972) but we will present a few illustrative examples. What was most 
striking in the data was a shift to a profession-centred orientation: 
judgments about the effectiveness of professional services should be 
made by the profession, the profession should discipline professional 
misbehaviour, professional training is best carried out in institutions 
run by the profession, government control over professional activity 
is a retrograde step. 
The following two items were put to engineers. Figures in the first 
column represent the percentage of students who agreed with the 
proposal at the beginning of first year, those in the second column 
represent the percentage agreeing towards the end of third year. 
% % 
An engineer should aiuays aim to achieve the utmost reliability in 
his work irrespective of cost 19 4 
An engineer should feel free to criticize the work of another 
engineer if he believes this to be incompetent 27 13 
Somewhat similar questions were put to lawyers and there is a 
similar shift in attitude toward profession centredness. Again the 
figures are the percentage who agreed with the proposal in first and 
third year respectively. 
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'^ c 
The growing tendency for government tribunals to engage in the 
adjudication of issues is a threat to the legal system N 34 
A lawyer should feel free to criticize publicly the work of another 
lawyer if he believes this to be incompetent 20 12 
Under no circumstances should a lawyer allow his own interests to 
outweigh those of his clients 59 47 
A solicitor should always pa\ meticulous attention to detail even if 
this is going to reduce the number of clients he can see 35 23 
A selection of the items put to medical students in their first and 
third years also indicates the changing position the group has with 
respect to questions of professional autonomy. Again the percen-
tages represent the proportion agreeing with the statement. 
% % 
Doctors should take only as many patients as they can thoroughly 
examine and treat 44 '4 
It is an essential feature of the doctor-patient relationship that the 
doctor should receive a fee from the patient for his services 20 38 
The growing tendency for the government to interfere in purely 
medical matters is a threat to the medical profession 35 5S 
The teachers were asked about relations with clients (pupils and 
parents), freedom to make public statements, and independence in 
curriculum planning and examining. Once again the percentages are 
the proportions agreeing with the statements. 
It is inappropriate for teachers to speak out on controversial issues 
in public 71 71 
No matter what the circumstances a teacher should be loyal to the 
headmaster and staff of his school 15 10 
A trained and qualified teacher should be free to design his own 
syllabuses and examine his own students without outside direction 13 20 
Unlike the other three professions, there is no general shift of the 
teachers towards a profession-centred position. The final item is 
perhaps the most revealing and shows that only a small proportion 
were in strong agreement that there should be teacher autonomy in 
the important tasks of syllabus construction and examining. 
Clearly there is something of a paradox when this data is set 
against those relating to general attitude change. We could quite 
legitimately conclude from the latter that one of the effects of univer-
sity education has been to produce a general liberalizing of outlook 
among students in professional faculties. They become less dogmatic 
or close minded, they become more liberal in their views about social 
and political affairs, and they are prepared to place a higher value on 
cultural matters. But, in a sense, this is all going on independently of 
the attitude change that is taking place, particularly in law, engineer-
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ing, and medicine, concerning specifically professional matters. In 
this area the tendency is for change to be away from a more open 
style to a position where the profession has pre-eminence such that 
when the crunch comes it is the profession, not the client or the 
public, that is the reference group for the professional's activities. 
Perhaps this is one of the unanticipated consequences of professional 
training, for one would be hard put to point to a particular course of 
instruction which dealt specifically with the sorts of issues reflected 
in our attitude items. 
Conclusion 
The professions are the glamour occupations of our time. As never 
before societies believe they need them, young people are attracted 
into them, controversies rage about them, they appear on prime time 
television, and social scientists study them. Very clearly one of the 
most noticeable changes in developed societies over the last quarter 
century has had to do with the growth in size, complexity, and power 
of different professional groups and attendant institutions. 
Associated with the growth of professions has come a greater ar-
ticulation of professional sub-cultures. In some fields there have 
been vast changes in an underlying technology, in all the knowledge 
base has expanded with a consequent increased differentiation of 
professional roles, and professional interests and values have become 
more clearly explicated. 
Increasingly in the same period certain professions have come 
under attack. Accusations are made that the profession is both judge 
and jury in matters of professional malpractice and that the 
"distance" between the professional and the public has vastly in-
creased making intelligible communication difficult. It is hard to 
predict what the outcome will be. Arguments that the professions are 
anachronistic are difficult to sustain. There are few "common men" 
who could successfully build bridges, remove inflamed appendices, 
set compound fractures, remove impacted wisdom teeth, and keep 
operational the technological devices on which our developed society 
depends. Indeed, the opportunity to successfully "opt out o f and no 
longer "be a part of' these technologically developed societies which 
have apparently spawned a set of insurmountable technical and 
social problems depends importantly, and paradoxically, according 
to one's point of view, on the viability of their professional in-
frastructure. 
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Professional Knowledge and Social Welfare: 
Towards a Grammar of Possibilities 
RALPH LOCKE 
Since every complete object has an infinite number of 
determinations, we can reach some knowledge of it only 
through the incomplete objects implied in it. Correspondingly, 
the possibilities of complete objects are to be recognised only 
through the pure possibilities of incomplete objects. 
.Alexius Meinong 
The questions to be addressed in this paper are two-fold. Firstly, 
what constitutes an object in fields of consciousness and acts as a 
"problem" defined with respect to a system of welfare relevances? 
Secondly, extending the initial question, what is the relationship 
between theoretical activity, seeking to "know" or "reflect" an ob-
ject, and practical activity, seeking to "change" or "transform" the 
object of concern?' No systematic or definite solution is sought to 
these queries; rather, this is an exploratory excursus emphasizing 
certain critical aspects of knowledge conceptions central to ideas of 
professionalism. 
A convenient exemplification of the essence of these questions is 
provided by Michael Polanyi in his essay "Knowing and being" 
(1969). Polanyi (p. 123) uses an example from medical education 
which concerns an agreement between an eminent psychiatrist and a 
group of students over diagnostic classification of a particular case 
all had witnessed. 
Ralph Locke obtained a Bachelor of Social Studies degree from the L niversitv of 
Queensland and a Ph.D. degree in anthropology from the University of Western 
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The matter was finally decided by the psychiatrist: "Gentlemen", he 
said, "you have seen a true epileptic seizure. I cannot tell you how to 
recognise it; you will learn this by more extensive experience!" 
Polanyi goes on: 
Clinical practitioners call the peculiar indescribable appearance of a 
pathological condition 'ils fades; I call it a "physiognomy", so as to 
relate it to the delicately varied expressions of the human face which 
we can identify without being able to tell quite how we recognise them. 
From this example as an anchor, Polanyi develops a theory of 
"tacit knowing", to which we shall return later in the discussion. 
However, the point of example is to indicate areas of knowing which 
may be undoubted although they are incompletely specifible, and 
which serve as the basis of collective and esteemed action. More par-
ticularly, the limits of specifiability or formalization generic to all 
social science data and theory is our concern here. The focus of this 
analysis, then, is not on the specifics of institutional processes, but on 
the metatheoretical bases of the conceptualization of "problems" in 
social welfare, and their instantiations in specific data or analytic 
forms. 
Our initial task is to delineate the ground structure of welfare ac-
tion. In so doing, that which is of paramount importance is that "ac-
tion" is the subject matter in general while "welfare action" merely 
refers to one particularity of form. Action frames the analysis since 
it allows an examination of that distinctively human dialectic which 
links the level of meaningless acts with the level of act-less meaning 
(Gutenschwager 1970). Significantly, we are not concerned with 
social welfare as a mere set of ideas, a framework of knowledge 
organized in institutional relevance, nor solely as congeries of acts 
with categorical or structural features, but with welfare as a "world 
constructing" enterprise, in Peter Berger's terms (1967, p.45). 
Worlds are socially constructed and socially maintained. Their con-
tinuing reality, both objective (as common, taken-for-granted fac-
ticity) and subjective (as facticity imposing itself on individual con-
sciousness), depends upon specific social processes, namely those 
processes that ongoingly reconstruct and maintain the particular 
world in question. 
These latter processes which Berger refers to are crucial for this 
analysis insofar as they structure the form of social worlds and the 
mode of our reacting in relation to it. 
An appropriate beginning for analysis lies in our attention to the 
domain of these structuring processes. 
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Action spaces 
The domain of human action is self-contained; it sustains its own 
intrinsic orders concerned with acting in relation to the life of con-
sciousness, in a constructed Hfe-world (Lebenswelt). Human or ac-
tion space is the ontological base for social forms: it has the capacity 
or potentiality for structuring experience and acting (Keen 1972, 
pp.65-85). 
Within action space itself, both as object (of attention or analysis 
for me) and subject (framing my action) poles, acting and meaning 
may be organized in different forms and modalities, as discrete 
spaces—technological, aesthetic, moral, emotional, scientific, 
religious, and so on. These discrete spaces have the flavour of "finite 
provinces of meaning" which variously constitute the totality of our 
life-world (Schutz 1967). 
Ordering processes, the essence of action spaces, frame our ac-
tions in a taken-for-granted way in our everyday circumstances, as 
the form of intelligibility of routine object-consciousness. Awareness 
of ordering and its articulation, insofar as it is possible, emerges in a 
process of intentional, abstractive reflection. And it is only within 
highly specialized spheres that intentional reflection of this sort is a 
matter of routine. Nevertheless, whether we are concerned with 
scientific or naive (commonsense) spaces, the idea of ordering refers 
to the same domain—a set of dimensions, which, in constellation, 
serve to give form (objectivate) to our conception of the real and its 
constitution in world construction. Concrete indicators of this do-
main are given in what Susanne Langer (1951) calls "generative 
ideas"—ideas of existence, morality, space, time, inner con-
sciousness, and outer reality which serve to identify our experience as 
memory, belief, fantasm, fact, value, faith, or dream. 
Analytically, we may specify the characteristics of a space-
ordering action in terms of the following components: 
(a) a coordinate framework or manifold 
(b) which may have any number of dimensions 
(c) in relation to which the elements of a form (of action) may be 
ordered 
(d) according to some "ethnorationality" (pre-theoretical or ax-
iological dimension which makes intersubjectivity possible) 
(e) which is always implicit in action (latent, but framing action, 
even when the "action" is the claimed discovery of pre-
theoretical ordering) 
(0 wherein a form (or appearance) may be identified by rules of 
construction and correspondence. 
In keeping with the somewhat technical appearance of this defini-
59 
Professional Knowledge and Social Welfare 
tion, the following example illustrating its features is proposed. Con-
sider the basic manifold of the Cartesian coordinate system, with 
two dimensions—orthogonal axes in one plane. Take any set of 
points in the plane described by the axes. The axes do not represent 
the points but help us to determine their nature by rule of 
construction—formulae for the location and description of points— 
and the relationship between them which follows. In addition, the 
form this relationship takes may be expressed in terms of rules of 
correspondence—some mathematical rule of transformation 
relating to Cartesian geometry which identifies straight lines, curves, 
and points corresponding to some equation or geometric figure. 
The rationality of the procedure—that which renders it sensible or 
intelligible—is that of formal logic, analytic propositions which ap-
peal to reason and stand as the grounds of action in this rather 
specific sphere. 
Social action, encompassing the example given, is far more com-
plex. What is ordered—how acts, objects, and relations are sensibly 
and intelligibly constructed and interpreted—as the grounds of our 
acting is enormously diverse. An examination of recent literature in 
ethnoscience and ethnomethodology is sufficient to point out the 
centrality and difficulty of this problem of the rationality of action in 
diverse and discrete spaces—in cross-cultural situations, and in 
pluralistic societies!^ 
Social scientists have, as one of their most pressing problems, the 
plausible and valid rendition of rationalities of action—of 
ethnorationalities which concern acting as a cultural member. At-
tempts are legion in disciplinary terms, and in their applications to 
social welfare ideology and action. An area where such applications 
burgeon is that part of helping or welfare-professional activity which 
deals with clinical-interpersonal dimensions of defined "social 
problems". 
Early in the history of the helping professions, psychodynamic ap-
proximations of intersubjective, and subjective life were in the ascen-
dant. The ultimate rationality in Freudian psychodynamics lay in the 
balance achieved in the conflict of primal forces detectable in 
systematically distorted communications through the agency of a 
constructed, universal palaeosymbology (Habermas 1970). 
Moreover, the projection of this conflict in the stuff of culture was 
exemplified in the culture against man dialectic, and all objects 
framed in human space had the indelible imprint of basic and ir-
reducible qualities of psychic life.^  
More recently, particularly since 1940, an enormous proliferation 
of "therapeutic" rationales has appeared as the ground-structure of 
organized welfare action. While the range is great, there is an object 
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in common—a systematic set of findings, data, related to theoretical 
propositions which stand, ideally, as the starting point of concerted, 
collected activity—"professionalizing" welfare. 
Game-theory, for example, entered welfare therapy in various 
guises. Most commonly, it has found expression as some form of 
exchange—again as some form of simulation or approximation of 
intersubjectivity." While the formalization of exchange concepts re-
mains quite radically different from that of psychoanalysis, the un-
derlying rationality which is objectivating and productive of action is 
rather similar—a psychic economy based on a hedonistic principle 
(Phillips 1971). 
These brief examples, among many, stand parallel to the technical 
example given above in describing possible human spaces, but differ, 
of course, in the extent that mathematical spaces are non-referential 
or constructive, and not contingent.* Formulations of human spaces 
are necessarily contingent in the fundamental problems of their 
relationship to the constructed life-worlds of their objects (clients, 
subjects, actors) and the contexts of their production and articula-
tion by social welfare "experts".' The question of their relevance is 
always salient, considering that in a more general sense "context" 
refers to the objectifications of formal, social science manifolds, 
predated by the synthetic work of cognition, framed within the do-
main of the Lebenswelt. As Herbert Marcuse reminds us (1974, 
p.232): 
In Husserl's terms: The objective a/?non'of science itself stands under 
a hidden empirical a priori, the so-called lebensweltiche a priori. 
Moreover, as long as this empirical a priori remains hidden and unex-
amined, scientific rationality itself contains its inner and own ir-
rational core which it cannot master. 
These latter points raise the critical focus of this paper: what are 
the possibilities of welfare action, described in relation to formalized 
approximations of client action-spaces, in terms of organized, collec-
tive activity? In addition, we may address the problem of the par-
tiality or incompleteness of technical formulations of human spaces 
in relation to the process of formulating plans, programmes, or 
policies. 
Grammatical conceptions of welfare action 
What remains unalterably and irreducibly the rationale for the 
existence of welfare and welfare professions, especially from within 
this domain, is the expression of positive concern for states of affairs 
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entitled "problems" or "social problems". It has been largely the 
case, moreover, that such entities as the latter are objectified in a 
way which is largely independent of possible clients' or subjects' 
recognition or definition (Blum 1971). Only recently has the pen-
dulum of concern swung away from institutional processes solely 
under the banner of "relevance" in various ideological guises, to 
welfare recipients or possible recipients themselves.' 
Positive concern is expressed in relation to apprehensions of actual 
states of affairs and what could possibly flow on from them— 
poverty, crime, unemployment, and so on, and their exacerbation. 
However, such conceptions are available only in the context of what 
we conceive the society to be, through its partial manifestations in 
welfare terms—cases, incidences, prevalences, trends, and so on— 
and in terms of the additional "pure possibilities" of actual societal 
states of affairs we draw from our experience as cultural members in 
many areas of interaction. Such pure possibilities are constituted in 
our typifications of actors, situations, and acts which alone are the 
only possible grounding of supposedly context-free technical 
knowledge and action—in our organized experience of society. 
Described in this way, pure possibilities are identical with Polanyi's 
tacit knowing (1966). 
What is projected as society and societal relevance then, as an ap-
plied possibility, is rooted in at least these two dimensions of our 
knowing about society. Data available or producible for the com-
prehension of problems takes on a new stature when considered in 
relation to these propositions. 
In the first place, the organization of our experience, our active 
seeing of things, is nothing if it is not symbolic in function.' An in-
teresting and appropriate point is made by Susanne Langer (1951, 
p.29) in relation to the technical space of science wherein knowledge 
is, "as a structure of facts that are symbols and laws that are their 
meanings''. 
Where social science is concerned, the principal paradigmatic ex-
pression of "law" is "law-like" in probabilistic-inductive proposition 
forms.' But in this the general semiotic function lies unabated as the 
context of understanding or seeing what such propositions mean. 
To come to the point, we may take a lead from Derek Phillips in 
his deliberations on the state and future of social science knowledge 
(1971, p.29), "What we know about social behaviour is dependent on 
our methods for studying it, while our methods for studying it are 
dependent upon what we know about social behaviour". Contrary to 
Phillips's suggestion, this relationship does not produce a vicious cir-
cle; rather, it exemplifies the fundamentally interpretive nature of 
social analysis—a hermeneutic circle (Zijderveld 1972). Our expert 
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and technically articulated knowledge has a limit of formalization 
beyond which our comprehension of social things has its expression 
in our idealizations—typifications of actors, situations, and acts— 
drawn from and ordering experience.'" Society, as an applied pos-
sibility, as an actuality or reified object, is sustained only in the pure 
possibilities of formalization and idealization which are mutually 
supportive. Cassirer (1963, pp.413-14) reminds us of the excesses of 
vulgar positivism and rationalism, pointing out that both deny 
polarity and the fundamental dialectic of discovery. 
Empiricism does this by dissolving the constructive concepts in the 
given; rationalism, conversely, does it by reducing every datum to the 
form of its conceptual determination. 
For physical concepts and judgments are always concerned with 
relating two forms of manifold and, one might say, permeating them 
with each other. The starting point is a merely empirical, given 
manifold: but the aim of theoretical concept formation is to transform 
such a manifold into a raUonally surveyable "constructive" mul-
tiplicity. This transformation is never concluded—it is always begun 
anew, with increasingly complex means." 
Idealizations of the order indicated constitute the competence (or 
tacit knowledge) of a cultural member. In this case, sociological and 
social welfare data derive their initial impetus and ultimate 
significance from members' idealizations—their competence, or 
culturally specific knowledge required to specify and produce plausi-
ble and appropriate action. As Nan Blum points out (1971, p. 185) 
both the researcher, in producing social data, and the consumer (ad-
ministrator, welfare professional) of these data are, 
... engaged in formulating a competent, practical actor. Since a com-
petent practical actor is a version of the observer (a sociologist with 
analytic interests), the research subject is the observer's formulation 
of his own sociological competence as the typification of a practical 
actor. Analytically, a research subject is then an observer's com-
petence (knowledge) formulated as a hypothetical other. 
The general symbolic (or semiotic) function is the agency of our 
interpretation of the facticity of states of affairs, and in turn, 
characterizes our competence as cultural members (Habermas 
1970). In other words, the hermeneutic circle indicated by Phillips 
frames human action in general, irrespective of our mode of being in 
the world—as professional, citizen, client, or administrator. A gram-
matical sense of data embodies this hermeneutic process in its par-
ticular form of projection of observer's competence. Again quoting 
from Blum (1971, p.l85): 
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... such procedures involve the sociologist-as-observer in the con-
struction of a type of person; that is, the formulation of a type of 
person serves to exemplify the behavioural record as a typical course 
of action for a possible actor ... Data consists only and exclusively in 
an observer's methods and procedures for accomplishing such a 
production. 
Recognizing the grammatical construction of data becomes a 
paramount concern in social welfare if only because of the problems 
of establishing conjunction between the rationality of welfare action, 
from research data and other knowledge sources, and the rationality 
of actual and possible client perspectives. But, the significance of this 
recognition is even more important considering the latitude which in-
terpretation allows, ideologically, morally, and practically. 
Dimensional analysis of welfare spaces 
Social welfare organized as an expression of positive concern is 
institutionally anchored in relation to some conception of society, 
actors, and acting which allows the definition of "problems". The 
rationality of social welfare in these terms could not be considered 
unitary: the functioning of institutional processes is variously 
couched in administrative, social, psychological, economic, moral, 
ideological, and other partial spaces with varying articulations in in-
dividual and collective action. Conjunction of rationalities is enor-
mously more complex when cultural pluralism is considered. 
In this section, therefore, an attempt will be made to look at some 
of the critical dimensions of social welfare action relating to con-
structions of the social world as organized and socially sustained 
knowledge, and activity related to it. 
1. The limits of formalization. The principal form of expression of 
knowledge, derived from social science activity, is in terms of the 
products of an absolutist or normative paradigm.'^ In this approach, 
the aim of expert or scientific endeavour is to formulate knowledge 
which has validity independent of the perspectival contingencies of 
its producers and users (professionals, experts)." Such knowledge or 
data may be called "actuarial" in that it refers to assumed, actual 
states of affairs in a situation—and agent—independent manner. 
However, actuarial data use denies the polarity and dialectic which 
Cassirer describes in two critical dimensions—the indexicality of 
given, empirical substance and any analytic construction from this, 
and the tacit or pre-theoretical knowing (competence) which allows 
an ordered view of anything which can be considered an instance of 
empirical-social events. 
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Firstly, the meaning or significance of acts, their factuality in 
terms of some objectified social order, lies strongly in the domain of 
the imputed qualities of the producer and the circumstances of the 
production of the act. Indexicality concerns this pragmatic relation 
which suggests that, in the nature of semiotics in human action, 
focus on particulars (in this case "behaviours") destroys the com-
prehensive entity to which any act belongs as a social form, emergent 
individual action, and ground structure for further interpretation and 
acting.'•* Action space in these terms is a complex manifold which is 
exemplified by Polanyi (1969, p. 141): "My definition of reality, as 
that which may yet inexhaustibly manifest itself, implies the 
presence of an indeterminate range of anticipations in any 
knowledge bearing on reality." 
Indeterminacy in the sense intended by Polanyi refers to the 
relationship between pure and applied possibilities of actors and 
action—of societies. Absolutist constructions of data treat indeter-
minacy as "error"—defined as circumstantial variation in logical 
and procedural rigour; the indeterminacy of rhetoric and context is 
ignored or assigned marginal relevance in public and specialized 
communications over the evidence or scientific findings. The former 
indeterminacy (of possibilities) focuses on the limits of usefulness of 
investigations which are concerned with particulars as their primary 
data, in that it is clear that we can know about something, and know 
how to do something without necessarily being able to specify the 
content of our knowing. 
The issue raised here is somewhat analogous to examples of limits 
of formalization discussed in analytic philosophy—for example, 
where I may show you "how to" perform some manual skill without 
being able to specify my knowledge clearly, nor clarify it with 
mechanical descriptions of anatomy and mechanics which underlie 
my physical movements—and the problems of ethnoscience which 
are in some measure concerned with formulations of "what I know" 
as a cultural member (thus partly defining culture), and, hence, with 
the relation between language, convention, and knowledge. 
Tacit knowing is the cultural competence which allows coor-
dinative activity, and the conventional but unspecifiable "solution" 
to individual statements. For example, a rendition of correlational, 
probabilistic-inductive relations concerning homosexuals (as objects 
or individuals) or homosexuality (as object-quality of behaviour or 
action) derives from and refers to some "them" which is instantiated 
in the pure possibilities of an appraiser's competence—from a uni-
que constitution of the Lebenswelt—which is but partly recoverable. 
The sense or intelligibility of such formalized relations lies always in 
this domain of origin and return if it is of social and societal 
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relevance. A disturbing note is added when we observe that limits of 
formalization apply equally to the investigator and his subject. 
An interesting extension of these ideas applies to the day-to-day 
activities of welfare professionals. In most of bureaucratic and 
professional activity, the sense of intersubjective relevance, com-
prehension, and coordination is achieved by formalized rules of 
procedure and communication (including concepts and terms). 
Whatever knowledge may be as a reflecting or transforming device is 
referrable to this and paradigm structures as both social and intellec-
tual cadres. The substance of knowledge is an institutional indwell-
ing which circumscribes, logistically, our bodies and social selves—it 
is the Ideenkleid which obscures or diverts attention from polarity 
and the nature of the relative a priori. Such structures modally have 
supported a naturalistic version of knowing: the constructed and 
contexted characteristics of social reality are ignored or treated as 
opinion, subjective reports, fiction, or cases, a residual category of 
knowing. 
Some of these points may be fruitfully explored in relation to 
some areas salient in present welfare debate—viz., recognition and 
classification of disease entities, production of rational, objective ac-
counts, and images of rational man. 
1.1. In the first place, where concepts of illness are concerned, and 
especially mental illness, as examples of naturalization of con-
sciousness, what is produced as a matter of describing normality and 
illness assumes a theory (and its application) of intersubjectivity 
which is directly applicable in the same way to clinical settings and 
extra-clinical (professional, administrative, lay) settings. In par-
ticular, the problems of the intersubjective detection and com-
munication of mental illness are heightened in the case of reactive 
disorders which are distinguished by their embedding in the social-
psychological nexus. The objectification of such illnesses is not in-
dependent of the communicative (intersubjective) context, nor of the 
physiognomies which may not be specifiable. 
Recognition and classification of disease or disorder entities, or 
other states (need, malfunctioning) proceed, in terms of naturalized 
consciousness, according to an assumed but unexemplified cultural 
and communicative competence which intervenes between 
recognizable behavioural features and clinical diagnosis, report, and 
treatment or action. This is the familiar black box principle where 
the apparent objectivity of inputs (subject behaviours) and outputs 
(professional reports) is extended to what presumably occurred as an 
interpersonal encounter (interview, examination, observation). The 
process of practical reasoning used in the context situation to shape, 
identify, and construct the situation as data is obscured—it is the un-
known input." 
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Emphasis, in welfare action of this and most other kinds, is upon 
the technical logic of reconstruction, rather than on the logic-in-
situation. Diagnostics, assessments, and reports achieve significance 
as ground for action, that is, as legitimating devices for professional 
authority, through the rhetoric of institutional discourse. The 
naturalization of consciousness thesis is not intended to support the 
social correspondence theory of knowledge of Durkheim and Mauss, 
however; rather, it is intended to draw attention to indexicality, ex-
istential determination of knowledge (Mannheim), and Marcusian 
one-dimensional thinking (Marcuse 1969). 
1.2. The indexicality of rational, objective accounts has its essence in 
the phrase "adequate for all practical purposes". The assumed but 
unexhibited competence which underlies the production of official 
documents is that which qualifies the limitations of such reports. A 
competent administrator, good practitioner, and excellent case-
workers, have their commonality in what they can produce in in-
terpersonal negotiation with clients, transformation of this into a 
professional formulation, and their ability to establish the 
significance of these two processes as grounds or possible grounds of 
action as instances of more general actor and situation— 
typifications which are in no way dependent on theoretical constructs 
or technical rules. Herein lies an important distinction between suc-
ceeding professionally and succeeding in clarifying knowledge—the 
first assumes the universality of physiognomies by fiat, the second 
seeks to discover the nature of the physiognomy as a fundamental 
datum. 
Repeating an earlier point, the typifications of actors, situations, 
and action have no significance apart from the conception of a possi-
ble society. But naturalized consciousness, in positivist science, 
which principally serves welfare, transforms the possible societies of 
factual and moral construction by diverse practitioners into a 
legitimized and sustained order of knowledge which, (1) narrows the 
categories and possibilities of experience by normalizing or 
homogenizing social reality; (2) correlatively minimizes the 
problems of intersubjectivity and indexicality; and, (3) consequently 
ignores the problems of the meaning of culture and cultural 
pluralism in its significant extension of how it is possible to tran-
sform one culturally specific ordinary language and knowledge into 
another language and rationality.'^ This latter point is of signal im-
portance in conceptions of normality and disorder." 
1.3. Conceptions of knowledge which are benchmarks for action are 
at once systems of rationality and projections of rationality. The par-
ticular form of such projections as they enter welfare planning and 
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development is in terms of implicit or explicit concepts of social 
structure and order, and what it means to act coordinately within 
such reified conceptions. Early in her analysis of social welfare, 
Audrey Rennison (1970, p.17) notes ideas of social reality, 
A corollary of the division in social life between the external world 
and the field of experience is that people do not always react rationally 
to situations. People do not only go to see the doctor because they are 
sick, but often because they are lonely, bored, or seeking an escape 
from some less desirable alternative such as work. 
Quite apart from Rennison's view of the construction of the social 
world, the version of rationality she uses is an instrumental one. The 
more general perspective which suggests that action may be ordered 
and intelligible according to different sources for its form, and hence 
rationale and accounting, is forgotten: Max Weber's fundamental 
forms of rationality may never have been conceived. 
But, Rennison's view is not an isolated one. Value pluralism is 
defined at many points in welfare thinking. Consider Downing's 
(1968) statement concerning arguments against the means test which 
suggest that such tests discourage thrift. 
There is ample scope left for thrift. Any individual can save enough to 
buy his house and land, car, household and personal effects and, in ad-
dition, can accumulate the equivalent of $9,680 if married, or $5,260 if 
single, without losing entitlement to any of the age pension. Yet very 
few pensioners have taken advantage of this opportunity to save for a 
richer old age. 
Downing's view of pensioner action is measured against concepts 
of opportunity and social structure which have limited value in 
humanistic welfare schemes (Moynihan 1969). The basic error in this 
view is to reify the opportunity-welfare system in such a way as to 
deny alternative definitions of reality, human potentiality, and, 
hence, the very foundation of the welfare system itself. Downing ad-
mits the empirical fact of variance from the idealized form of signifi-
cant proportions, but adheres to the vision of rationality projected in 
his purified image of social possibility (Sennett 1971). One could be 
forgiven for thinking that we are dealing with Azande Magic, or any 
form of magic, which denies counterfactual possibilities or supresses 
them by squeezing them into existing categories of experience 
sustained by commitment and sanction (Polanyi 1962). 
Welfare conception and action has no roots in the social world 
apart from typifications of the rationality of men. First and foremost 
its formulations are grammatical in the sense conveyed above, 
whether we are dealing with Etzioni's attempt to project eighteenth 
century "men of affairs" idealizations as the foundation stone of an 
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active society and active man at a macroscopic level, or dealing with 
the micro-sociological process whereby behavioural descriptions are 
rendered as action oriented to some order—as reasonable and intel-
ligible or otherwise—in law, psychiatry, or social work." 
The limits of formalization as a topic is but a part of the dimen-
sion of relativism in knowledge and action. In addressing problems 
in these latter terms, it is not suggested that an absolute relativism 
prevails, but that the course of human action depends differentially 
on the nature of constructed social worlds—of human states of af-
fairs and potentiality. None of this is grasped in its entirety, but 
through discrete spaces which are often imperfectly articulated—as 
in the relationship between science and ideology—and for which 
rules or processes of transformation into one another remain opa-
que. 
2. Transcendence and transformation. Institutionalized welfare has 
been dominated by a consensual view of social order in society and 
social welfare as applied possibilities (Horton 1966). It seems inap-
propriate however, to attempt to summarize the critiques of such an 
orientation here. It is more useful to suggest some limitations of this 
perspective in relation to the themes developed so far in preceding 
sections. 
2.1. Social structure and policy. If one constructs the idea of social 
structure as independent of human agency, as independent of imma-
nent qualities of human being-in-a-world as an accomplishment, and 
overridingly constant, accessible to all in the same way, then welfare 
clients conceived of in these terms are faced with welfare policies 
whose relevance to their life-worlds is either as an interminably 
receding horizon, or as a capricious bounty which may occasionally 
enter their daily activity. 
On these points. Beck (1967, p.272) has an interesting observation. 
The perspective of the stranger which has sometimes led to fruitful 
conceptualizations, based on ethnography and comparaUve study, has 
been largely absent in the field of welfare. Features which are offered 
as general characteristics of welfare might appear as ethnocentric and 
situation-specific if examined in such a light. 
Beck asserts the primacy of the Lebenswelt as the source of rele-
vant social welfare data, not an a priori conception of social struc-
ture framed in such a way as to be accessible by formal logic, 
methodology, and technical language alone. 
Ethnographic projects of the kind suggested by Beck are attractive 
and significant as sources of data. Studies such as Elliot Leibow's 
Tally's corner 1967 or Sherri Cavan's Liquor license (1966), for ex-
ample, provide in some ways the difficult stranger perspective. The 
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effect has been one of heightening awareness of problems associated 
with how we know something about, and from the perspective of 
others. Assuredly, empiricism and phenomenology (in its various 
forms, the principal impetus for Lebenswelt data) conceive of in-
dividuals as centres of experience, but the former construes few 
problems of rationality in the relationship between experience, or-
dinary language, and scientific constructs and language, while the 
latter holds such concerns to be central and enormously difficult. 
Undoubtedly, assertion of life-world data and significance has 
more than an academic import. It forms a crucial element of the 
client-revolt manifestations and the salience of racially inspired 
counter-welfare movements (Hampden-Turner 1969). One thing is 
clear in the midst of this variegated expression of the denial of 
relevance or reality of a unitary and sanctified social structure, that 
action oriented to an order in its course requires elucidation of that 
order as a fundamental datum. What is the true a priori of welfare 
concern, in conceiving of its clients as persons or agents, is the life-
world itself in the diversity of its categorizations and forms and the 
unity of its theme as the focus of "we-ness"—the transcendent, 
metaphorical, and often opaque order which locates men in a world. 
2.2. Politicization of biography. An important expression of the 
denial of absolutism, consensus and scientism in welfare has been in 
the critical and existential-phenomenological frameworks for recon-
sidering social problems and positive concern. Central to these 
frameworks is the rediscovery of biography—not the mechanical 
biography of Freud which ultimately linked all men in a macabr.-
struggle at the core of human existence, as psyche, but the discovery 
of the meaning and use of the antithesis of alteracion (the nemesis of 
individuality)." 
Alteracion, the surrender to the other, in social welfare terms had 
been largely ignored as an issue until recently. In particular, its 
failure to emerge can be traced to administrators and professionals 
alike who conceived of a society where ideology had run its course, 
and the Utopia of rational mastery and planning was to create man in 
the image of a superordinate system (Bell 1962). 
The question of surrender pervades critical literature. Herbert 
Marcuse, for example, illustrates one-dimensional thinking in the 
function of the human relations officer in industry: his unstated but 
paramount function is to serve capitalist interests by transforming 
biographies surrendered to him, in a climate of legitimate power and 
authority, into organizational and apolitical "cases" (1969ft, pp.94-
98). Politicizing biography means considering the terms and conse-
quences of surrender in ideological terms, rendering the ultimate in-
dexicality of statements and action in terms of power and authority. 
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These questions are not meant to focus attention on the problems 
of "talking past" which exist in the development of dialectically con-
stituted paradigms of social action. Building new forms of scientific 
and humanistic rationalities can only be considered responsible as 
welfare enterprises if they are conceived in terms which admit the in-
determinacies of scientific constructs and assert the source and 
relevance of formalizations to lie in the competences of actors which 
do not depend on the formalizations themselves. Considerations of 
power, ideology, or pragmatics leave this standing. 
Synthesis 
Exploits in theoria concerned with pre-theoretical dimensions of 
welfare action may appear, superficially at least, to be some kind of 
idle titilation. However, a brief survey of the potential data-bearing 
manifolds of social science reveals a distrubing series of lacunae and 
rifts in contemporary paradigms. Moreover, the latent conflicts 
sustained between positivist and interpretive approaches to social 
science have achieved new significance and urgency of late in the 
focus on pre-theoretical knowing in interpretive sociology, 
linguistics, and varieties of hermeneutic philosophy. 
All such manifolds which seek to reflect social reality as a basis for 
its transformation are ways of seeing subject to limits of formaliza-
tion which qualify the nature of recognition of instantiations of par-
ticular theoretical-conceptual entities. Social welfare research and 
action which encompass a range of methods such as data sources and 
vehicles for gathering, interpretation, and acting—as in citizen 
participation-professional agency joint research, policy, and plann-
ing bodies—have not only the problem of achieving satisfactory 
coordinative action, but also adequate accountability of problem 
identification, communication, and solution. Theirs is the problem 
of the inter-translation of action rationality, of elucidation of actor, 
situation, and act typifications which underlie problem formulations 
and which allow the sense of intersubjective congruence to occur— 
that is, in cases not marred by irreconcilable conflict on all levels. 
Problems of knowledge as the grounds of acting are perhaps more 
visible in the perennial death and renewal cycle of therapeutic 
regimes, the idea of professionalism as opposed to amateurism, and 
the various images of these phenomena projected in media. Knowing 
about the world and its relation to intrapsychic stress has long been 
claimed as the domain of the therapist: psychoanalysis, for example, 
reveals the "real" subject of the world through a surrender of the 
patient to a personal myth constructed out of a universalistic, struc-
71 
Professional Knowledge and Social Welfare 
tural interpretation constructed by an "expert" acting without atten-
tion to th'~ political, cultural, epistemic relativity of the theory. Cor-
respondingly, therapies have multiplied in the direction of emphasiz-
ing the cultural pluralism of treatment, the centrality of the 
epistemic subject, and the location of powers of change, of reality 
itself, in various strata of experience—tactile contact (biofeedback 
and encounter), unfettered, collective communication at a verbal 
level (sensitivity, encounter), temporally fixing provinces of meaning 
(Esalen, Gestalt), and retribalization (network intervention), to men-
tion but a few. 
Therapies have increased in number as a cultic explosion: within 
and between the various forms there is development of therapeutic 
style as a parallelism of spontaneities where exponents and followers 
act in parallel, not in concert. To a certain extent, this must be the 
case in any knowledge propagation, as the thesis of this paper out-
lines, but too often there is inadequate attention to the problem of the 
conceptual-empirical dialectic in professional communication and 
action. Just how is it possible to rationalize knowing in the field of 
welfare and social science, where it encompasses differences between 
such crucial domains as legalistic criminology and gut-level sen-
sitivity and insight of some police and laymen {The new centurions, 
for example, highlights these dimensions of knowing about crime), 
and therapeutic milieux contrasted with unreflective, ecstatic 
religion? 
No significant address can be given such a question here, but there 
are a few pointers available. A clue is given in Carlos Casteneda's 
first work. The teachings of Don Juan: a Yaqui way of knowledge 
(1969), wherein Casteneda foresakes ethnography and theory-
formation to produce an account of the iconic, ineffable, but noetic 
experiences mediated by Don Juan, resting on a structural analysis. 
But it is not a structural approach which removes or diminishes the 
knowing subject, as in some French structuralism and positivism 
(Neo-Kantian); rather, it focuses on an idealization of the knower 
which encompasses student (Casteneda) and teacher (Don Juan). 
The analysis falls short in not moving on to problems of constructive 
manifolds derived jointly from the ethnography and the idealization; 
but, of course, this is not Casteneda's aim. For social science data 
production, the message is clear: data themselves must be composed 
coextensively in the tripartite dialectical relationship of idealizations 
of tacit knowing or competence (as in phenomenological program-
mes concerned with the Lebenswelt—a metalanguage of subjec-
tivity), formulations of empirical givens, and mathematical, logical, 
and conceptual manifolds. 
There is no simple way of doing this, and every effort will be sub-
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ject to the limits of formalization. It may be as Wittgenstein 
suspected that beyond the point of elucidation afforded by logical in-
quiry, it may be psychology (in its various forms) which assays the 
meaningful dimensions of object, consciousness, and language, but 
even that assessment must attend to the problem of context-
relevance. Data expressions, nevertheless, must include considera-
tions of the knowing subject (as object and subject) at least in 
idealized form, together with context-specification—two dimensions 
which Mannheim (1960) pursued so fervently. 
Let me conclude by suggesting areas in which such a programme 
may be begun. A convenient starting-point is provided by Polanyi 
(1969, pp. 128-29) in his distinction between physiognostic and 
telegnostic knowing—comprehension by gestalten which fuse par-
ticulars and the general entity to which they (synthetically) belong, 
and comprehension by vectorial or signifying relations which link 
our bodies to space outside, and discrete elements to each other in a 
directional sense. In the latter case, connections made ultimately de-
pend upon the former to sustain comprehensive meanings. We may 
also consider the recent work of Arthur Deikman (1973) concerned 
with "deautomatization". Essentially, Deikman is interested in the 
phenomenal composition and correlates of routine object-
consciousness (automatization) and its radical transformation by 
various means—drugs, encounter, hypnosis, meditation, trauma, 
and so on (1973, p.221): "deautomatization may be conceptualized 
as the undoing of automatization; presumably by reinvesting actions 
and percepts with attention''. 
Deautomatization, then, concerns re-constitution of that nexus 
between particular, directional significances, and the more general 
cognitive-cultural dimension of knowing. If we consider Deikman's 
and Polanyi's dimensions as the binary delimiters of a 2x2 property-
space, we derive a crude approximation of areas in which dialectical 
knowledge-construction could begin. 
(a) physiognostic-automatized: Here, we are concerned with the 
routine object-consciousness as pre-theoretical, but active seeing. 
This is the axiological domain of synthetic gestalten, of the typical 
form of things considered statically—i.e., in an idealized space of 
non-dynamic, typified relations—as connotation and pure pos-
sibility. Here Lebensform conceptions fuse with individualistic 
cognition where particulars, and their aggregate or field (gestalt) 
significance is coextensive. 
(b) telegnostic-automatized: This "cell" contains Lebensform con-
ceptions given dynamism, both locating the self in relation to the 
body, and in both physical and social space. The general range of 
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denotative relations is encompassed with the specific features of 
biographical relevance, and the functional relationships of symbolic 
(appresentational) connections. The significance of tools, skills, 
operations for specifying, elaborating, and inventing particulars in 
relation to physiognomies is paramount. 
(c) physiognostic-deautomatized: Disruption of routine object-
consciousness in deautomatization involves the development of new 
systems of relevance and salience in defining the typical, fundamen-
tal gestalten. What we must ask here includes what are the natures of 
force, salience, mobilization, action which sustain conceptions in a 
self-body—social and physical order matrix? In other words, we 
must address the problem of security of constitution of the 
Lebenswelt as suggested principally in varieties of existential 
philosophy and sociology, Lewinian field-theory, and the broad 
sweep of ego-psychology. Of importance here are concepts of ex-
periential location (consciousness, self, body, soul, group, society), 
and transformation. 
(d) telegnostic-deautomatized: Telegnostic knowing frames the 
applied possibility of the world of conception—the investment with 
authenticity, reality, solidity, and capability of sustaining the action 
of typical forms of typical actors. Deautomatization concerns 
relocation, or reordering in terms of significance and awareness, of 
experiential locations which frame such an applied possibility—from 
revelationary visions to creative insight. 
All of these cells, particularly the first two, have had the attention 
of philosophical anthropology, and depth psychology. But, the 
means of relating the characteristics of (a) and (d) in their ineffable 
but noetic dimensions remains only partially explored, despite recent 
efforts in cognitive anthropology. Certainly, paradigmatic al-
legiance, an irrational component in knowledge development, re-
mains a stumbling block to such an effort. Further barriers exist in 
the dynamics of work, status, and prestige demands and pursuits 
which curtail extended examination of theoretical and practical ac-
tion, defining problems as a matter of rectitude in some applied pos-
sibility of social being. 
But, action space can only be addressed in a dialectical mode, and 
the tripartite composition of data holds even for the most elaborate 
mathematical scheme which "works". The existential determination 
of such schemes is a pressing concern but not one opposed to humane 
works. 
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Notes to text 
1. The differentiation between theoretical and practical action is made by John 
Macmurray in his Gifford lectures (1954) on instrumental philosophy. The self 
and the other. London: Faber and Faber. 
2. See H. Garfinkel (1967). 
3. See H. Marcuse (1969a) and S. Freud (1965). 
4. This point has been in an earlier paper. See A. Pemberton, P. Schacht, and R.G. 
Locke (1972). 
5. The position of constructivism contradicts the Neo-Platonist stance on this. 
However, the problem of contingency is not to be dismissed so lightly; problems 
of context-boundedness and "determination" must be considered. This is the do-
main addressed initially by Mannheim in the sociology of knowledge. See M. 
Turner (1967). 
6. "Experts" is not intended pejoratively; it is designed as a precautionary measure 
relating to the nature and function of "expertise" — viz., ideological dimensions 
of knowledge and the problems of indeterminacy of social data. 
7. See A. Pemberton and R.G. Locke. 1971. Towards a radical critique of social 
work and welfare ideology. Australian Journal of Social Issues 6: 95 - 107. 
8. This point is made by several leading philosophers of symbolic form. See, for ex-
ample, S. Langer (1951); L. von Bertalanffy (1965); E. Cassirer (1953). 
9. An excellent overview of this position is given by G.H. von Wright (1971). 
10. A brief description and application of Godel's thesis is given in J. Piaget (1971). 
11. These ideas are developed significantly in relation to sociology in Aaron Cicourel. 
1964. Method and measurement is sociology. New York: Free Press. 
12. See Jack D. Douglas (1970). 
13. "Perspectival contingencies" is a term used by A. Blum (1971) which has 
relevance to the problem of de-contextualization of knowledge. 
14. On indexicality, see H. Garfinkel (1967) and Y. Bar-Hillel (1954). 
15. See M. Roche (1972). 
16. This problem is dealth with extensively in B. Wilson (1970). 
17. See M. Roche (1972) and P. Alexander (1973). 
18. See T.J. Scheff (1968). 
19. Alteracion is a term used by the existential philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset 
(1952) referring to the surrender of the self to the defining other. 
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The Universities and the 
Academic Professions 
BILL JONES 
.. . many of the militants are not with us for our sort of 
education. 
Emeritus Professor Sir Zelman Cowen 
The notion of a university was originally taken to mean formal in-
struction in what this book calls the "helping" professions so that of 
the first three universities in mediaeval Europe, medicine was taught 
at Salerno, law at Bologna, and theology at Paris. Though the un-
iversities at many times in their history have shown little interest, at 
least directly, in vocational instruction, they are nowadays central to 
the development of professional ideals and are largely dominated by 
the demands of professional training. The typical university teacher 
is not someone who pursues possibly esoteric knowledge for its own 
sake (whatever that may mean), but an instructor and frequently a 
practitioner in some applied discipline: law, medicine, engineering, 
architecture, agriculture, and so on. 
Probably the most significant aspect of the modern university, one 
which has developed only in the last hundred years or so, is the com-
bination of undergraduate teaching with research work. There is lit-
tle doubt that the dual requirement of teaching and research abilities 
(assuming for the moment that most academics actually possess such 
skills) has considerably raised the social standing of the academic 
professions. Universities in nearly all capitalist states have a 
privileged position in the educational system, privileged in the sense 
of receiving a disproportionate allocation of educational spending 
relative to the number of people who are able for one reason or 
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another to attend a university. The universities can be seen both as 
training grounds for the large pool of relatively skilled labour, which, 
so it is argued, a technological society requires, and as containing in 
themselves a large group of people who hopefully increase the store 
of knowledge. In many capitalist countries, state financing of the un-
iversities has grown as a means of obtaining military research. In 
Britain, at the start of the First World War, the universities con-
tained almost all the people with expertise in explosives, aeronautics, 
and other militarily valuable skills. By World War II the university 
domination of military research in Britain was practically complete 
(see, for example, Sanderson's interesting book The universities and 
British industry. 1850-1970). In the United States, as the conser-
vative sociologist Daniel Bell candidly admits (1965, p. 107): 
... it is not only the fantastic onrush of science but the linkage of 
science to public policy that has brought intellectual skills to the fore. 
Within the past twenty years there have been perhaps three distinct 
revolutions in military technology ... which arose out of government 
and university based laboratories. Equally important the revolutions 
in the concepts of strategy, revolutions that have affected the posture 
of the United States in relation to world political forces have come out 
of university halls. In the past twenty years, military technology and 
foreign policy have been the fulcrum on which have turned all the 
major social changes in American life.' 
In Australia, the universities have been closely tied to local profes-
sional, industrial, and agricultural interests and in consequence have 
heavily emphasized vocational training. This pattern of development 
at least avoids a sterile Oxbridge gentility but the danger is the 
perversion of education by a narrowly utilitarian spirit. It would be 
foolish to deny the many strongly anti-intellectual tendencies of 
Australian society and equally foolish to deny that the universities 
have mirrored rather than evaluated the societies on which they de-
pend. The general society is remarkably thin-skinned about criticism 
and the universities have not been much of an irritant: (Partridge 
1968, p.226). 
... there has been no strong tradition of educated and reflective 
political and social inquiry, discussion and criticism, and Australians 
including Australian educational administrators have not felt that an 
introduction to the tradidonal methods and resources of political and 
social discussion may be an important part of a liberal and democratic 
education. 
Partridge is thinking not merely of universities but of the 
educational system in general. Academics in Australia as elsewhere 
are often wholly indifferent to the sort of education the student has 
received before university. Yet it is little use in our complaining that 
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the majority of students are passive, do not have particularly free-
ranging (or even particularly well-instructed) minds, when we ignore 
the determining infiuences of the rigid and authoritarian school 
system. The average first-year undergraduate cannot think in-
dependently because he has no tradition of being expected to do so. 
To take one example, Connell (1970) surveyed political education in 
Sydney elementary and secondary schools. His main conclusion was 
that the schools serve to indoctrinate an attitude of conservative 
nationalism (1970, p. 104). 
The infants school or primary school child who is taught to love the 
Queen, reverence the flag, and admire the Anzacs, is obliged to submit 
himself to persuasion, is not in a position to evaluate and criticise the 
opinions presented and is not encouraged to do so. 
Connell argues that political education in the schools, if it is to 
develop persons capable of independent initiative, must be built 
around the students by the students. He suggests, correctly I think, 
that such a programme "would be highly subversive of the es-
tablished political order: potentially revolutionary". (See also David 
Holbrook's scathing English in Australia now, which demonstrates 
how imagination and creativity are ground out of Australian 
schoolchildren.) 
If it is the dual role of the academic as teacher and researcher 
which largely determines the high status of academics, there is often 
in practice considerable tension between research and teaching. 
Many academics regard teaching as actually interfering with what 
they call their "real work". The vice-chancellor of the University of 
Queensland, for example, has complained that "Too often senior 
and distinguished university teachers disengage themselves from 
significant undergraduate teaching duties" (Cowen 1970, p.11). To 
some extent this situation may arise because academics, almost un-
iversally, are completely untrained in teaching methods. Yet 
teaching ability probably can be acquired without any formal train-
ing ("teaching methods" are often no more than manipulative "man-
management" techniques in any case) provided that the teacher can 
count on useful student comment and a reciprocal teacher-student 
relationship being developed. As Chester (1969, p.82) put it, the 
academic faces 
... the problem of what sort of teacher he is to be, whether an instruc-
tor or a sage, or a Socratic mentor. Many students seek to press upon 
him a combination of instructor and sage, and this is likely either to 
clash with his academic ideals or to reinforce any tendency he may 
have to regard his teaching as a mechanical chore to be dealt with in 
minimal fashion, in the case of the former possibility, there may 
result either a corruption of the ideals, or the development of in-
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tolerance toward the general run of undergraduates for their failure to 
live up to unrealistic expectations. 
University teachers often seem little aware of such implicit 
relationships and how they influence education. If, for example, the 
teacher adopts the role of instructor and sage how many students will 
feel the need to question what he says? If, on the other hand, he pur-
sues a Socratic or dialectical role, there will be in large classes at the 
least a contradiction between the value placed on critical reason and 
the simple fact that students, partly because of numbers, will be 
faced with a multiple choice memory test. The overwhelming student 
demand for some sort of accreditation must also conflict strongly 
with the attempt to question received opinion. King (1974) found 
that well over 50 per cent of students in higher education in Western 
Europe saw their priority as a good job. Nor was the job an end in 
itself, but rather the life-style that went with it. Such an attitude is 
likely to encourage the student to passively accept and follow what 
he is told, if only because his real interests lie elsewhere and critical 
thinking is hard work. 
If academics see teaching as a mechanical chore it is also 
debatable whether they are trained or intended to do creative 
research.^ The Ph.D. system and the need to publish for the sake of 
promotion both tend to produce the attitude that research (which is 
often wrongly identified solely with experimentation) had better be 
very short-term. Graduate education often seems little more than an 
elaborate exercise in conformity. The North American system, 
rather more than the British which is typically followed in Australia 
(though things are changing), usually requires a considerable amount 
of course work and associated exam-passing. Perhaps it is felt that 
the postgraduate will not learn by himself or perhaps there is simply 
no intention of leaving him or her the time and energy for the at-
tempt at self-inquiry (consider, for example, the overburdened 
course loads, compared to those in British universities, forced upon 
the Australian undergraduate). Frequently the North American 
postgraduate is funded from a faculty research grant. He becomes, 
in a way, a rather poorly paid employee doing the routine work of 
running another person's experiments. According to Tucker (quoted 
in Rudd 1969) 30 per cent of American graduate students felt that 
their supervisors had exploited them as a source of cheap labour and 
Rudd believes that such feelings are shared by many British 
postgraduates. 
By and large, the system tends to produce researchers who have 
mastered a narrow methodological practice and have learned to use 
a particular conceptual framework, but who do not and are not ex-
pected to see the value of questioning basic assumptions, of creating 
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alternative concepts. Most disciplines now have an enormous array 
of professional journals' many of which are little different in content 
or basic approach. It is hard to believe that this proliferation stems 
from the amount of major research which needs to be published. 
Many academics would probably admit that the majority of publica-
tions range from the mediocre to the trivial. For example, is anyone 
really impressed by Professor John Cohen's empirical demonstra-
tion that in soccer it is easier to score the closer you are to the goal? 
Or by Professor Jack Adams's experiment published in the highly 
prestigious Journal of Experimental Psychology which shows that 
the more a simple movement is repeated, the more accurately it will 
be remembered? 
It is at least arguable that the more critical and creative thinkers 
drop-out before the end of postgraduate training. Postgraduate 
drop-out rates are by now enormously high" and only matched by 
academic complacency. Last year, for example, every first-year 
postgraduate student in psychology at the University of Toronto 
dropped-out. No member of the senior staff to whom I spoke sug-
gested that this should give them cause to question their aims in 
postgraduate teaching. The drop-outs were "militants" not in-
terested, as Professor Cowen puts it, "in our sort of education", or 
perhaps "indoctrination" would be a better word. 
Very broadly, I believe that educational institutions can escape in-
doctrination only if it is possible to challenge those institutions (and 
the social concepts they embody). Indeed, only if those who are 
taught are encouraged to make some serious attempt at appraisal, 
can education escape indoctrination. If universities have a general 
principle it is that they should be committed to the exercise of the 
critical intelligence. No idea should be (nor in the long run can be) 
preserved from rational evaluation, least of all those ideas and myths 
by which we organize our own social conduct. For the way in which 
we organize our lives generally will surely influence how we think 
about particular subjects. Primary school teachers have begun to 
realize that how a school system is governed can have a very real in-
fluence on what is taught in the classrooms and that the implicit 
features of the system, whether it is authoritarian or relatively free, 
for example, can influence what is learned as much as anything 
teachers may say (see Easton 1956). Academics, on the other hand, 
have scarcely begun to ask whether there is any relationship between 
teaching and research and the typically hierarchical and 
authoritarian local government of most universities, though this 
question is probably central to the sociology of knowledge in our 
culture because of the universities' educational position. Sociologists 
like Mills have been interested to show how the social scientist's or-
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dinary political opinions influence typical research but there has 
been astonishingly little sociological examination of the institutions 
in which sociologists themselves work. 
Polyani, more than anyone, has emphasized that the scientific 
tradition cannot be understood if we do not see how the social in-
stitutions of scientific education actually work.^ He emphasizes con-
stantly "that such freedom of the mind as can be possessed by men is 
due to the service of social institutions, which set narrow limits to 
man's freedom and tend to threaten it even within those limits" 
(1959, p.68). It follows that the continued development of the scien-
tific tradition requires a cultural system which does not indoctrinate, 
a scientific education in which it is possible to challenge basic as-
sumptions and dialectically counterpose one theory against another. 
The scientist and philosopher-historian Herbert Dingle once 
remarked that a critical or dialectical tradition has always been 
necessary for the development of any kind of artistic practice, in part 
because any arrangement, however idiotic, of words, of notes, or of 
colours, could otherwise be acclaimed a work of genius. Science, he 
argued, has failed to develop a critical tradition because of the as-
sumption that theories can be critically evaluated "against the 
facts". What this assumption avoids are the questions. Which 
theories are the important ones? and Is this hypothesis worth 
testing?, questions, that is, of value.^ 
The academic obligation to think critically fairly obviously carries 
with it the implication of tolerance and the right to voice dissenting 
opinion. At bottom critical reason means the ability to imagine 
alternative possibilities; it implies that the categories which we 
employ to organize our experience are historical in nature and so 
subject to change. Now the belief in tolerance does not require that 
the academic be detached or dispassionate in his commitment to his 
own view of things. The notion of detachment would imply, for ex-
ample, that scientific theories which predict discrepant observations 
should be rejected because they don't fit the facts. In practice, this 
rarely happens. The theory may simply be modified, some new no-
tion invented to take care of the discrepant facts. The value of a 
theory lies in any case not merely or even largely in its predictive 
power, but in its conceptual grasp. The concepts employed in a par-
ticular theory open up a particular world of facts and inevitably close 
others. Laing's theory of schizophrenia and any medical theory of 
schizophrenia do not explain the same set of facts; they reflect 
radically different assumptions, radically different ways of seeing the 
person labelled "schizophrenic", at bottom radically different con-
ceptions of human relationships. The rational thinker needs to avoid 
detachment if he is to explore to the fullest the concepts by which he 
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organizes experience. I have argued elsewhere that many social and 
psychological theories are self-contained categorical systems which 
are immune to attack from detached observation. Instead they can 
be challenged by the invention of an alternative conceptual 
framework.' 
Yet some quality of detachment is often taken as the defining 
characteristic of academic thinking (Martin 1969, p.3): 
The monastic insistence on contemplation and the academic's com-
mitment to objectivity are analogous both in the nature of their aims 
and in the claim to a specialized detached role. In the case of the 
academic his role requires a respect for the criteria of objective 
validity, a careful sifting of evidence and a disinterested stance vis-a-
vis the world of man and nature. 
Unfortunately this passage is itself without much objectivity. 
Anyone who has tried to publish anything which questions basic as-
sumptions in any discipline will have encountered ordinary academic 
standards of objectivity. You will be told that no one of any conse-
quence holds the theory you are criticizing (often at the same time as 
the theory is reiterated), it will be assumed that you don't really 
mean what you have said, i.e., that you share everyone else's 
preconceptions. The most common ploy is to insist that only a very 
narrow methodology is adequate to test any given theory.' Perhaps 
the best documented case of the absence of academic objectivity is 
Dingle's book Science at the crossroads? Briefly, Dingle has argued 
that there is a logical flaw in Einstein's general theory of relativity 
(he is an acknowledged authority on relativity physics) and, since the 
theory is a basic guide for potentially extremely dangerous experi-
ments in high energy physics, he has attempted to have his argument 
discussed. The book is a record of his failure. 
The objective response of the scientific community ranges from 
personal abuse ( a French physicist describes as psychopathic anyone 
who questions the theory) to a deliberate attempt on the part of the 
Royal Society and the leading scientific journals Nature and Science 
to ignore the matter. In other words, the scientific community is 
closed to any basic questioning of the central theory in modern 
physics. (One famous physicist suggested that debating first princi-
ples was something he left to undergraduates since it was hardly the 
business of a practising scientist.) Now what is wrong is not that cer-
tain scientists are far from detached but that opportunities for debate 
and evaluation have been virtually closed by the scientific power 
structure. 
The belief in objectivity is frequently espoused by liberal 
academics so as to avoid, as they say, "politicizing" the university. 
Conservatives from Newman to Minogue trot out the meaningless 
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phrase that "the pursuit of knowledge is for its own sake". I give 
here the apparently thoughtful opinions of two liberal academics. 
First Professor Sydney Hook (1970, pp. 121,171): 
The university is not a political community. Its business is not govern-
ment but primarily the discovery, publication, and teaching of the 
truth. Its authority is based not on numbers or the rule of the ma-
jority, but on knowledge. 
and 
Imagine a situation in which the university is called upon to take a 
position on Vietnam. On the one hand are fanatics... who assert that 
those who support the American presence in Vietnam are abetting 
murder. On the other there are his colleagues especially fanatical on 
the opposite side, who hold that those critical... of our presence there, 
... are traitors. 
In Australia, Professor Zelman Cowen has written in much the same 
way (1970, p.7): 
... the central task of a particular academic organisation is to keep 
itself intellectually dispassionate, institutionally objective, so that its 
students and staff can best make the value judgements which are part 
and parcel of cultural thought. 
In the same paper he too commented on Vietnam (p.6): 
On an issue like Vietnam, the University has no politics and no posi-
tion, though unquestionably individual members may have strong 
views. 
Now in a pedantic way Professor Cowen is right. Institutions can't 
be said, except metaphorically, to have views. Only people can hold 
views and pursue the truth. (It is surely hopelessly inconsistent of 
Hook to talk about the university's pursuit of truth if it is held back 
from the pursuit of the truth about Vietnam because this is a political 
matter and there is no faculty consensus.) Yet Cowen ignores the 
fact that many academics must hold some opinion on issues like 
Vietnam precisely because they are academics. They ought to hold 
some opinion as social scientists on the depopulation of the Viet-
namese countryside and the enforced movement of people to the 
towns (a triumphant piece of university-planned social engineering), 
as ecologists on the defoliation of huge areas of countryside, as 
lawyers on the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which contained provision 
for elections to unify the two Vietnams, and so on, and so on. It is 
difficult to think of any political issue on which some academics 
would not have opinions as academics. 
Both Professors Hook and Cowen would probably agree that 
there are certain issues, educational matters for example, on which 
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the university as an institution can have an attitude. Yet, educational 
matters are profoundly political. It is a political matter in the first 
place just who is likely to be educated at a university.' In part, the 
social and racial biases of the sample of the population who attend 
Australian universities reflect a set of active political decisions (e.g., 
the intense discrimination against Aborigines which has been from 
time to time built into the legal code; the requirement of a fee for un-
iversity tuition which until very recently has encouraged only the 
well-off to attend university). Just as importantly, there are political 
decisions which have not been taken (we could decide, for example, 
to allow all school-leavers to attend university). Once an academic is 
faced with the issue of whom he should teach he may decide to accept 
the divisions of an unequal society and do nothing. He could hardly 
then claim a disinterested stance for, having presumably examined 
the question, he has made a choice in favour of the status quo. 
Moreover, he could hardly claim that he is 'keeping out of polities'. 
The political choice which governs whom he should teach has simply 
been assigned elsewhere. The academic may, on the other hand, 
decide that there are no rational grounds for educating in the main 
only those whose parents have high incomes. Any attempt on the 
part of the academic to change the situation immediately reaches 
beyond the narrowly educational to the political and moral 
framework of the society. 
It is hard not to see in the cry to avoid 'politicizing" the university 
the desire to maintain existing political controls. Legally the univer-
sities in Australia are political entities defined (with the exception of 
the Australian National University created by federal legislation) 
by acts of the various state parliaments. If the universities have to do 
with the development of culture, the states and the Commonwealth 
have to do with the allocation of resources to various ends. Since 
part of this allocation concerns the funding of the universities, the 
prior value judgments of the political system determine in part the 
general conceptual framework of university (and other) education. 
Things should not be otherwise. The problem of a radical strategy in 
education is not a specifically educational one; it is one of creating 
rational democratic political institutions, not how to keep politics 
out of the university but to define how politics does and should relate 
to the universities and to education in general. Profound educational 
changes require alternatives to the concepts and institutions by 
which we organize the totality of our experiences.'" 
The central problem of our culture is not so much how to pursue 
knowledge but how to apply knowledge, particularly our 
technological capacity, to rational human ends. Solutions presup-
pose value judgments and will inevitably have political consequences. 
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And any solutions will probably involve giving up some academic 
freedoms. We can no longer accept the assertion that the public good 
is best served only when individual scientists and academics are en-
tirely free to pursue their own private aims. Curiously, this sort of 
rationalization of privilege often goes unchallenged. It is perhaps the 
strongest indication of the absence of any deeply democratic political 
tradition that a group of self-perpetuating experts can abrogate to 
themselves the right to determine public goals. Kennedy's space 
program was hardly an example of the rational allocation of 
resources but it has demonstrated unequivocally that successful 
research can be directed toward politically determined ends. The 
comparative ease with which scientific resources can be obtained for 
the irrational purposes of the military and industrial elites may in the 
end prove the most vitiating contradiction and the ultimate downfall 
of modern capitalism. It may demonstrate to most people that the 
goals of science are socially and politically determined, so that a 
democratic determination would allow the rational and constructive 
use of technology. 
Notes to text 
1. The absence of any critical tone in this passage is as important as what it (cor-
rectly) says. When the realities of the situation are so clearly described by a sup-
porter of the status quo, it is useless to try to turn aside criticism with the asser-
tion that the universities play the role of "detached" moral leadership. The fol-
lowing encomium from a liberal sociologist is typical (Rasmussen 1972, p.392). 
He is discussing student activity: 
Virtually every piece of social legislation, program for economic reform, effort 
at moral rejuvenation germinates from the academy. 
Clearly, such self-praise is, to say the least, overdone. Does not art, literature in 
particular, have a moral intent and how much serious art is produced by 
academics? Perhaps significantly, the greatest English novelist of our century, 
D.H. Lawrence, whose overwhelming purpose was the moral regeneration of 
social relationships, was not educated at a university. Of course a good deal of 
critical social inquiry does go on at universities but surely we tend to take people 
like Chomsky seriously to begin with because they are willing to criticize the in-
stitution which supports them. 
2. What I have to say about research concentrates on the social and physical 
sciences. The parallels with the humanities are fairly obvious. 
3. For example Psychological Abstracts, which publishes brief summaries of 
research in psychology, draws from more than eight hundred journals. 
4. Rudd (1969) gives postgraduate drop-out rates for Britain of 50 per cent in the 
sciences and technology, and 24 per cent in the social sciences and humanities. 
Though no comparable data are available for the U.S.A., Rudd gives reason to 
believe that drop-out rates there are substantially higher. I have not seen any 
figures for Australia. It is also worth noticing that undergraduate enrolments are 
generally falling in most advanced capitalist countries. See, for example, King 
(1974). 
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5. The development of scientific ability does not necessarily require a university 
education, Michael Faraday never attended a university and Einstein published 
the special theory of relativity while working as a patents clerk. We should should 
remark also that despite the "professionalization" and specialization of scientific 
training, major discoveries are made with fair frequency by non-specialists (Ben-
David 1960). 
6. There are good grounds for thinking that the physical sciences, in the last four 
centuries, have not developed any method which guarantees the rejection of false 
or useless ideas (in all probability no such method can be developed) but have 
simply made a lucky bet in choosing the physics of Copernicus, Kepler, and 
Galileo, rather than, say, continuing the Ptolemaic tradition. The human sciences 
have not been quite so lucky. They combine, as Wittgenstein put it, "experimental 
methods" and "conceptual confusion". I would argue that academic social think-
ing, particularly in the English-speaking world, by ignoring or watering down 
Marxist notions has rejected the only available set of concepts with a socially 
critical "cutting-edge". 
7. My thinking here is strongly influenced by Feyerabend (1968). 
8. An acquaintance of mine had her work on speech perception in infants turned 
down by several journals on the grounds that she had not used mechanical speech 
as a "stimulus" and so could not control all the relevant variables. It seemed 
beyond the capacity of any of the editors to see that infants never listen to 
mechanical speech. 
9. Roughly 60 per cent of undergraduates in "professional" courses are drawn from 
the professional and managerial classes compared with only 20 per cent from the 
working class (Anderson and Western 1967). Karmel (1966) found that, as late as 
1960, only 2 per cent of children with unskilled or semi-skilled fathers were enter-
ing university. It scarcely needs saying that the number of Aborigines educated at 
university would not rate a footnote in any history of Australian education. 
10. Nothing I have said implies an opposition to vocational training in the univer-
sities. Vocational training itself requires the exercise of critical rationality if it is 
not to become the mere rote indoctrination of practical rules of thumb. It is, in 
any case, an arbitrary and scarcely "objective" psychology which insists on a dis-
tinction between "practical" men and "theoretical" men. Just how arbitrary may 
be seen by comparing applied engineering courses in universities or institutes of 
technology in Australia or Britain with equivalent courses at the French 
polytechnics or the German Technische Hochschule. While the former con-
centrate largely on the acquisition of techniques, the latter commonly centre prac-
tical training around a critical grasp of theoretical ph\sics. Unless students in 
vocational courses acquire the means to test critical!) the value of what they have 
been taught, they have been effectively indoctrinated rather than educated. 
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The Professions in Australia 
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The Clergy and Organized Religion 
EDWIN DOWDY AND GILLIAN LUPTON 
Editors Jhe increasing secularization of society has produced what 
Notes might well be described as a crisis in one of the most traditional 
of the professions—the clergy. Symptomatic of this crisis is the 
decline in numbers of those wishing to enter the profession and 
an increase in resignations from those established in religious 
occupations. However, as the following chapter by Edwin 
Dowdy and Gillian Lupton suggests, the tensions which are 
besetting the church may be much more intrinsic to the very 
nature of the traditional services it offers. 
The priest's special professional competence and the ser-
vices which are derived from it contrast with the practices of 
most other professions in that they eschew rational-scientific 
explanations and rely instead upon the rituals and symbols of 
the esoteric. These spiritual services are currently undergoing 
significant changes which have, to some extent, taken their ad-
ministration out of the exclusive control of the profession. 
Furthermore, in attempting to provide people with a more 
tangible demonstration of help and guidance, the clergy have 
taken on a range of counselling and welfare activities. However, 
the priest who wishes to undertake these activities comes up 
against the competition of a growing body of professionals who 
may have more legitimate claims to expertise in the social 
welfare arena. 
Edwin Dowdy is reader in sociology at the University of Queensland. His present 
research interests are the sociology of religion in Australia and current European 
theory, particularly some neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian aspects. He is also author of 
Japanese bureaucracy (Chesire 1973). 
Gillian Lupton is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Queensland and a 
graduate of the University of New South Wales. She is currently doing research on 
various aspects of medical sociology and on the sociology of religion in Australia and 
is working with Edwin Dowdy on a study of the ministry in Australia. 
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The clergy are thus faced with the dilemma of having to 
fall back on their more narrowly defined spiritual services 
which seem, however, to be becoming less acceptable in an in-
creasingly secular society. Perhaps more than any other profes-
sion, the clergy are finding that not only is the institutional 
structure of their occupation of questionable relevance to the 
directions in which the profession seems to be heading, but also 
that there is an increasing disinclination on the part of the laity 
to accept the traditional perspectives and solutions proffered. 
In general, it would seem that there may be a less than adequate 
basis for the continuation of this profession in its present form. 
This chapter focuses on the problems of change en-
countered by the priesthood and the church in general in 
Australian society at the present time. However, this is not to 
obscure the traditional role of religious ideology which proffers 
alternatives to the development of a critical perspective on an 
unequal, exploitive social order—alternatives which serve the 
interests of ruling elites. 
The general problems faced by the church in attempting to 
retain such a role and the conflicts generated by those who may 
have a more altruistic view of their professional activities runs 
through much of the crisis which is facing organized religion in 
Australia. 
For a long time it must have seemed that the clergyman was the 
arch-professional. For fifteen hundred years in the West, from 
Augustine to Sydney Smith, the cleric was widely regarded as pos-
sessing abundantly the classical characteristics of professionalism: 
he commanded an abstract and esoteric body of knowledge and had 
the casuistic skills to expound and justify it; he typically sought no 
exorbitant profit, indeed no emolument beyond a "living"; and his 
efforts, supposedly assisted by divine grace, were devoted to the good 
of others. 
An ideology of indispensability has occurred in many occupations, 
but perhaps most strongly of all in religion. This gratifying self-
image is fading. While other professions are on the crests of their 
respective waves, organized religion of the traditional sort appears to 
be in decline. Congregations are thinning, ritual celebrations such as 
baptism are sought less often proportionately to population 
numbers, churches are attracting fewer recruits to the clergy, and the 
clergy itself is rent by unprecedented divisions in attitudes, beliefs, 
and values. While it is true that some radical, fundamentalist! 
magical, and pentecostalist movements are still increasing theii" 
numbers, most if not all of the traditional churches and denomina-
tions are declining and they are faced with problems of fundamental 
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reorganization. Recently, a spate of articles and books has appeared 
questioning the widely accepted service orientation of the profes-
sions, on such grounds as the exclusivity and selectivity of the ser-
vices they offer, the possibly dubious quality of these services, the ex-
tent to which their widely accepted altruism actually exists, and the 
part they may play in supporting an unjust social order. The clergy 
have largely escaped these attacks, perhaps because they are not seen 
as a sufficiently significant and powerful group to warrant attention, 
perhaps because sociologists and other writers still hesitate to 
criticize the churches in our supposedly secular society, or perhaps 
because no such criticisms could be sustained. Whatever the reason, 
critics of the professions rarely make more than passing reference to 
the clergy, and though newspaper reports of unorthodox or rebel-
lious behaviour do occasionally appear, the implications of these oc-
currences seem to arouse little interest among those most eager to at-
tack other professional groups. Yet this particular group has 
traditionally wielded a degree of power over the lives of ordinary 
people probably unequalled by any other "service" profession, and 
the churches still remain a significant force in society. 
One of the basic difficulties in the analysis of the clergy lies in the 
recognition of the wide variety of occupational situations within the 
profession. The contemporary churches in countries such as 
Australia cover such a range of institutional styles, that to consider 
the clergy as though they formed a homogeneous category must in 
many respects be naively superficial. These differences exist quite 
apart from those of doctrine or dogma usually noted, and their ex-
tent and significance may become apparent if the work situation and 
local community involvement of the minister are examined. 
The traditional celibate Roman Catholic priest, residing in a 
presbytery with his colleagues, officiating regularly at highly 
ritualized religious ceremonies, totally occupied by the duties of his 
church, receiving a very small emolument but with his basic needs 
catered for, may provide one side of the picture. But the clergy also 
include a multiplicity of other types, ranging from Anglo-Catholics, 
with many similarities to the Catholic priests, to such groups as Bap-
tists and the Churches of Christ. The latter are free to pursue a ful-
Itime profession outside the ministry, are largely dependent on their 
congregations for continued employment as ministers, and are 
representatives of an organization with practically no hierarchy and 
very little centralized authority. Indeed, between the rigid 
hierarchies of the Anglican and Catholic churches, and the localized 
organization of the Churches of Christ, there is an enormous gulf. 
Yet these organizational structures to a large extent determine the 
professional roles the clergy play, since the centralized hierarchy of 
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some denominations controls appointments, promotions, and career 
possibilities of their members, while for other denominations the 
local congregation may be a far more powerful influence. These two 
extremes, complicated by many variations between, may afford 
freedom and exercise restraint of a conflicting nature. 
The minister involved in an organization in which the voice of the 
hierarchy is important, must follow relatively distant dictates which 
he may find difficult to accommodate to local problems and chang-
ing situations; but at the same time his authority over his 
parishioners is sustained by this very structure, which may be seen as 
a higher authority validating his views. 
On the other hand, for the minister dependent on his congregation 
for continued employment, the power of the local laity may be great. 
Dempsey (1973), for example, has described the way in which con-
servative influential individuals in a New South Wales country town 
inhibited the behaviour of Methodist ministers. Against this, 
however, may be set the relative freedom from official doctrine and 
decrees enjoyed by Protestant ministers of some denominatins such 
as the Churches of Christ, and more particularly such unin-
stitutionalized groups as the Assemblies of God. Yet even such 
generalizations as these are misleading, as the range of ministries 
and situations increases for members of most denominations, and 
such movements as pentecostalism cut across all denominations. 
Although the clergy are dissimilar in terms of work situation, they 
are rather similar with regard to social background and other 
demographic factors. Data obtained from a survey of the clergy in 
Queensland' suggest that this professional group is distinctly un-
representative of the population from which it is drawn in at least 
two important respects. 
Firstly, the age distribution of the clergy in that state at least, with 
the exception of the Baptists and the Churches of Christ, is greatly 
under-represented in the younger and over-represented in the older 
age group compared to the adult male population (1971 census). It is 
perhaps not surprising to find that those denominations with the 
older age distribution are also those which have admitted most con-
cern about declining recruitment rates and increasing resignations. 
In addition, these denominations are the ones with the highest 
educational level among their younger members and therefore are 
most directly in competition for recruits with other professions. 
Secondly, most denominations appear to have relied to some ex-
tent on the father-son tradition for recruitment, as all, except the 
Roman Catholic church and the rather recently expanding Churches 
of Christ, had significant proportions reporting their father's oc-
cupation as "minister of religion".^ In fact, this occupation and that 
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of "farmer" accounted for anything from one-quarter to three-
quarters of the occupational background of the sample, which alone 
should be sufficient to suggest the operation of a rather unusual 
selection process. 
In this chapter we are mainly concerned with clergy of those 
denominations (the term includes "churches") which traditionally 
have formed and continue to form the major part of organized and 
institutionalized religion: their organization, in the main, continues 
in the traditional mould. The religious profession is unusually com-
plex in terms of emotional impacts on its practitioners and pervasive 
influences on their lives and thus some definition of what religion 
means in this context seems to be required, though we do not intend 
to postulate here any supposed universal essence of religion which 
would hold good in all times and places. It seems better to adopt 
provisionally a definition which will constitute in some measure an 
ideal type of the situation to which the established denominations in 
the West have been traditionally geared, and in which they per-
formed with at least apparent success into the twentieth century. 
A satisfactory definition of religion for our purposes is offered by 
Geertz (1969), and in much of the following discussion we shall use 
this to examine some salient features of the profession. Geertz claims 
that institutionalized religion consists of: 
(1) A system of symbols which acts to 
(2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by 
(3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 
(4) clothing those conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. 
The symbolic paraphernalia of churches — ritual, vestments, 
jargon, architecture, dogma, etc. — have at times in the past been 
resonant with a corresponding grandeur and esteem. Bishoprics of 
the Eastern Empire in the fourth century enjoyed considerable local 
popularity; the faithful were proud of the traditions of their see, 
elected their bishop, trusted his justice and referred disputes to him 
for decision, and took an active interest in the most abstruse points 
of theology. In the Middle Ages the power, if not the local prestige, 
of churches increased further. By the nineteenth century their posi-
tion was consolidated to the degree of apparent indestructibility, 
despite a considerable diminution of their political power and, in 
some places, community influence. Religious symbolism has now 
dramatically declined. Not only are there multiple and competing 
systems of symbols, including especially "scientific" orientations, 
but even the clergy themselves manifest the most profound profes-
sional disagreement about referents of symbols. This ranges from 
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the adoption of lay dress and the rejection of any badges or dis-
tinguishing marks to the widespread "God is dead" movement and 
other questioning of traditional dogma. Whatever the reasons, it 
seems that many clergymen wish to merge with the environment 
rather than stand out from it in appearance. It may well be that 
today more subtle symbols are required, that the traditional raiment 
is found to be old-fashioned, and that clergymen desire to appear to 
be "with it". It may also be best as a strategy to comply with pres-
sures to conform to non-distinctive apparel. In doing so, however, 
the clergy are implicitly advertising their areas of sameness with the 
world rather than their difference from it. A systematic non-use of 
symbols is directly contrary to our adopted definition, and provides 
an immediately observable example of the conflicts in the traditional 
structures. This symbolic dilemma, moreover, while deriving from 
profound factors, is especially acute in a profession which 
traditionally has celebrated its symbols publicly and regularly. 
The second part of Geertz's definition, the establishment of 
"powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations", 
seems more difficult to realize today than ever before. A person liv-
ing in a modern society must adapt to conditions of increasing 
specialization and mobility, both social and geographical, so that in 
some important ways there may be a need not to establish such 
moods and motivations. We pass the day serially in a succession of 
institutions, familial, economic, political, recreational, and so on, 
each of which demands a specific if superficial conformity to its own 
set of relatively autonomous norms. We switch our responses and 
even our motivations on and off according to the situation, not being 
totally committed anywhere and being less than a "whole person" 
everywhere. For advancement or even security a quick-witted ap-
proach is needed. To be a "stable" person of strong principles is now 
to be left behind in the race; one must be flexible, agreeable, quick to 
adapt — in a word, opportunist. 
The traditional church organized on a parish basis cannot readily 
cope with so profound a change in the social definition of the respec-
table character. Community and church no longer cohere and rein-
force each other as they did previously. People now change their area 
of domicile more frequently, and moreover, they also change 
themselves with occupational progression, behaviour, and expecta-
tions change. Movement into a new social situation may influence 
religious practice even more effectively than doctrinal considerations 
or clerical exhortations. With a change of location or of a friendship 
group people will also change their denominations or shift from 
belief to agnosticism. Being adaptable is, in the cant phrase, "the. 
name of the game", and the clergy has to communicate with the laity 
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in a situation where the latter cannot afford to respond with anything 
more than nostalgia to the evocation of long-lasting moods and 
motivations. 
In such a situation, the formulation of conceptions of a general 
order of existence becomes problematical, since these must not only 
provide an intellectually satisfying cognitive system, but must also 
engage the emotions and provide a normative pattern, "a workable 
set of ethical criteria" (Geertz 1969, p.661). The problems of evil and 
suffering, of how the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper, the 
seeming impossibility of reconciling what ought to be and what is — 
such matters are usually referred in traditional religion to a wider 
sphere of significance where they take on a perspective which enables 
people in pain and bewilderment to accept or at least accommodate 
them. 
But now it becomes ever more difficult to make plausible such a 
general order of existence. One difficulty is the scepticism 
engendered by changes in official formulations of churches' at-
titudes. It is a sign of vitality and a matter for congratulation when 
an institution so massive as the Roman Catholic church is able to 
adapt to social changes, but then also any claims to infallibility may 
become ludicrous, or at the very least, unvonvincing. For instance, 
there has been an embarrassing shift in one century from the state-
ment of pope Pius IX in 1864 that "the Roman pontiff cannot and 
should not be reconciled and come to terms with progress, 
liberalism, and modern civilization". If the church does not change 
its attitudes and pronouncements on social issues, only very conser-
vative or passive people will remain in it; but if it changes too readily, 
it must lose its validity for many. The minister trained in one set of 
beliefs may well find it impossible to reverse his stand on particular 
issues, such as abortion, divorce, or even warfare; otherwise it may 
seem that what he holds sacred is only expedient. This is precisely the 
situation in which he will find himself in a rapidly changing society. 
Almost of necessity, the institutional churches must uphold 
traditional values, even if this has the unfortunate connotation of 
condoning an inequitable social system, because to renounce them is 
to renounce doctrine enshrined by long usage. 
There are today, of course, considerable counter-claims by rival 
conceptions of a general order, including those of "science" and a 
range of belief systems under the general title of "humanism". The 
comparatively new and still somewhat amorphous "religion of in-
dividualism", commented on by Durkeim in connection with the 
Dreyfus affair, calls attention to ideas such as the dignity and in-
dependence of the person in the face of any and all institutions, and 
personal responsibility for one's life-style in consideration of the 
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needs of others (Budd 1972, p. 135). Luckmann's concept of the 
religion of individualism is further removed from Christian princi-
ples; here the person is superficially engaged in a series of institutions 
of which traditional religion is a shrinking compartment (1967). 
Schelsky (1957) reminds us of how established religious organiza-
tions must now take account of the conceptions of other disciplines 
such as those of anthropology — we might say of the psychological 
and social sciences in general — and of how the accommodation to 
such information necessitates "continual questioning" by the clergy 
of their own presuppositions. He asks if any institution can endure in 
that condition, and his considerations imply a negative answer. In 
this connection it is most significant that challenges to the traditional 
conceptions of a general order of existence come from within the 
profession. There are indications that some thinking clergymen are 
less content than ever with the traditional closed system of thought, 
or even with any closed system of thought. 
The aura of factuality in which Geertz's scheme suggests religious 
conceptions are to be clothed is apparently more difficult to attain 
than ever. Susan Budd (1972, p.90) reports on the relevant evidence 
from the U.S.A. in these terms: 
Religious knowledge seems extraordinarily limited. This is surprising 
since, although there is little religious teaching in schools, nearly half 
the population regularly attends church, and virtually all identify 
themselves as members of a religion. Nevertheless, only two-thirds of 
all Americans who were Christians knew where Christ was born ... 
and less than a third knew who delivered the Sermon on the Mount... 
Even among the actively religious, knowledge of the Bible is very 
limited, and many responsents accepted as authentic statements com-
pletely opposed to Christ's teaching, but couched in biblical language. 
This type of behaviour has long been recognized. The reason for it, 
on the level of an immediate motivational syndrome, is connected 
with the distinction between associational and communal religion, 
developed by Gerhard Lenski (1963), in his studies of religion in 
Detroit, U.S.A. Budd's report of the findings from a sample of 
Congregationalists is very significant. In that denomination 
eminently characteristic of the upwardly mobile, it was found that, 
" . . . those joining the suburban churches are the parents of young 
children who wish to commit themselves as a family to a nearby 
church congregation which will emphasize 'belonging' generally; 
they are relatively indifferent to issues of belief. (1972, p.92). 
Relative indifference to issues of belief seems characteristic not 
only of congregations but even of denominational officials (Wilson 
1969, pp. 96 - 97). 
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Without usually becoming expert in such disciplines, theologians have 
recognized how vulnerable is their discipline to infiuences from out-
side — of which archaeology, comparative religion, anthropology, 
psychology and sociology are perhaps the most relevant... It has been 
more difficult for the Churches to reconcile their traditional claims to 
wisdom and the increasing acceptance by the clergy of modern 
branches of knowledge which cast considerable doubt on what the 
Churches have for centuries been teaching. 
There is no doubt that in all civilizations, including our own, some 
people have experienced and expressed religious moods and motiva-
tions which seemed to them to be uniquely realistic. In the past it has 
often been possible for such moods and motivations to be reflected 
from most of the social institutions and life situations. In a contem-
porary Australian type of society this is far more difficult, due to at 
least two types of process. The first of these is structural differentia-
tion, the process through which many specialized agencies have been 
developed to accomplish tasks which previously were performed by 
fewer and more generally oriented agencies. For instance, in some 
societies the family has provided its members with a wide variety of 
services which have now been removed from its competence and 
taken over by schools, insurance companies, political movements, 
hospitals, and so on. The church previously had a plausible claim to 
provide types of emotional adjustment and individual orientation 
which now must be shared with other groups. Even in the sphere of 
pastoral care there are provinces of expertise in which the clergyman 
c^n maintain his position only as an "amiable amateur" and must 
refer certain problems to specialists such as social workers and psy-
chiatrists. 
The second process, noted by Luckmann (1967), might be called 
that of increasing institutional autonomy and is related to our 
previous discussion of specialization and mobility.^ Economic, 
political, educational, recreational, familial, and other institutions 
all have sets of values and beliefs, and expectations for role playing, 
which impinge on at least part of the consciousness and behaviour of 
a person during the time that he finds himself within a relevant situa-
tion. It is true that, in a sense, only a part of the person is engaged in 
each successive institutional situation, but he must switch off one set 
of responses and switch on another with considerable dexterity. Each 
institution seems reasonable and right in its own sphere perhaps, but 
largely different from the others, and none is likely to seem worthy 
of absolute loyalty. The religious institution has come to be one 
among others. 
There is an argument that these processes tend to purify and 
strengthen religion, by removing non-essential activities into which it 
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has been drawn in the course of time. However, this argument does 
not seem to be cogent for religion in its present institutional form. In 
any event, the processes mentioned above must tend to diminish the 
number of those for whom religion illuminates and informs all 
aspects of life, or even for those whose consciousness is not entirely 
pervaded by religion, but who regard it as operating at some higher 
level of truth. 
Much of the foregoing would tend to support the notion of 
traditional religion today being not the Truth but merely a counter-
truth, one which is not self-evident but requires justification. This we 
would generally expect to be the case among the uninvolved laity and 
in part among the involved laity, but it also affects those who have 
committed themselves to the vocation, especially the young. Among 
churchmen the young manifest a strong desire for change. 
In July 1973, in an address of greeting to the pope, the leaders of a 
West German priests' seminar showed concern that on the average 
more than half of the candidates for priesthood discontinue. Many of 
the participants of the seminar declared that they could not identify 
with the church to the degree required by the profession of priest. In 
the light of this, it is not surprising that a survey, carried out by 
Siefer (1973), provided additional evidence of uncertainty and dis-
satisfaction among the Roman Catholic clergy in that country. 
Table 1 shows some of these findings, and illustrates the striking dif-
ferences between the oldest and youngest intake groups. 
Table 1 
All % Oldest % Youngest % 
FuUy identify with the church 11 25 4 
Believe that parish councils are 
absolutely necessary 39 11 70 
Believe that the church should pursue 
reforms more energetically 33 13 57 
Desire more influence of priests in 
the election of bishops 56 22 79 
Desire more influence of parishes 
in the selection of priests 52 28 77 
"Not particularly satisfied" and 
"quite dissatisfied" 5 1 n 
The figures in table I suggest a wide-ranging disenchantment with 
traditional structures in the most rigidly hierarchical of all 
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denominations. Siefer, however, also investigated the priests' percep-
tions of the sources of support and direction they experienced in their 
duties. These again illustrated a dichotomy between the oldest and 
the youngest, and provide some interesting comparisons with data 
from the Queensland survey previously mentioned. For example, if 
we compare two variables which seem to illustrate widely divergent 
bases for their work. Catholic priests in West Germany and 
Queensland show very similar patterns of response (table 2, 
Queensland responses in brackets). Such comparisons could be made 
over a fairly wide range of topics, and similarities can also be found 
across denominations in the local study. 
Table 2 
The call of Christ 
(The call of God "very important") 
Service to the community 
(Service to the community "very important") 
Youngest % 
44 
(58) 
56 
(50) 
NOTE: "Oldest" refers to those over 50, "youngest" to those 30 and under. 
The empirical information obtained from this Australian study, as 
well as confirming generational differences, also supports a number 
of the contentions made earlier in this chapter about the nature of 
religion, and about the position of the professional within the church 
in an increasingly uncertain religious "order of existence". Several 
questions were designed to reveal the image respondents carry of 
their own church, its organization, teachings and responsibilities. Of 
these perhaps the most important were those in which the ministers 
were asked to state how much emphasis they thought actually was, 
and ideally should be, placed on certain activities by their denomina-
tions. By totalling the numbers suggesting a "great deal" of 
emphasis is placed on particular activities, the data can be arranged 
to show the respondents' perceptions of the stress placed by their 
respective churches on particular items, and which ones they think 
ought to be stressed (see table 3). 
Perhaps the most striking features of these figures are the 
widespread downgrading of formal services of worship as activities 
on which the church should place a lot of emphasis, and the rise in 
ranking of propagating the teachings of Christ, missionary activities 
gaining converts and (less strikingly) attracting new ministers. These 
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four are obviously connected activities. Raising money is the most 
strongly downgraded item of all, but the stress on such activities as 
social welfare, and social and political problems, also drops. We 
might say, therefore, that the respondents generally would like less 
stress on formality, and on involvement in strictly non-religious af-
fairs, and a more evangelistically-oriented church. These three 
findings fit closely with what we have said about the difficulty of 
maintaining religious symbols in contemporary society, with the 
highly trained competition the clergy face from other professionals 
in secular matters, and with the concern over falling numbers and 
non-religious world views. 
Another group of questions sought to discover how much concern 
the respondent saw his church as having with the social problems 
facing the world, the local community, and the individual. It was 
found that for all but the Roman Catholics, most concern is seen 
with the individual's problems, and in most cases, the Christian 
churches were viewed as showing little interest in world problems. 
When asked whether they thought that as ministers they could con-
tribute "considerably", "moderately", or "hardly at all" to these 
same problems, the respondents generally replied that they felt of 
"hardly any" help in the social problems of the world, "moderately" 
helpful in the local community, and "considerably" helpful in the in-
dividual's problems. 
These questions concerning the minister's own ability to help, led 
to the next series of questions, those concerned with the minister's 
work and his relations with his church, his congregation, and the 
public. 
The ministers and priests were asked whether they felt that in 
furthering their aims as ministers they were restricted by the church. 
About one-half of the Anglicans (48 per cent), Methodists (49 per 
cent), and Presbyterians (47 per cent) felt at least "moderately" 
restricted, but no more than one-third of the other denominations 
felt so. We investigated the respondent's image of himself and his 
work, particularly the emphasis placed on various aspects of his 
daily work, and compared this to the way he would "ideally" divide 
his time. The results are shown by rank order of choice in table 4. 
The most striking feature of the table is the emphasis on private 
prayer by all denominations, its lowest "ideal" ranking being fourth 
for Roman Catholics. For several denominations this represents a 
large change from the "actual" emphasis the respondents feel is 
placed on it. "Providing an example of the Christian way of life" was 
generally seen as highly stressed by all groups, but dropped in ideal 
rankings by the Methodists and Presbyterians. As in the case of the 
perceived emphasis on church activities, there was a general 
104 
Edwin Dowdy and Gillian Lupton 
V> «_( 
< 
— — _ I ) , 
Ch
ris
t 
Id
ea
l 
R  
%
 
<*« o 
- C " " ^ 0 3 ° 
L- Z-
J= < Oi 
0 
1> 
1 ^ - = ^ 
.—• cx 
ffl g ^ 
1^ 
• c 2 ^ 
!> 
>. 
a> 3 ° 
L . -«-• 
' ^ , ^ a : 
ho
di
st 
1 
Id
ea
l 
R  
%
 
u 5 ^ 
< ^ 
0 . — t p 
• : : ; CO e ^ 
0 iJ 
•s2Qi 
CO 
U 
C — 
Ei^° 
<s<-^ 
•5 ^ 
= 2 a: 
CO ~ " • lie
 
0 0 _ _ 
^ 3 ^ 
<'^ 
r*^ 
r*-) 
0 
u^ 
•>3-
0 0 
vO 
>/-> 
r-
0 
>v^ 
VO 
^ 
VO 
w-1 
0 
1 ^ 
< N 
r-, 
VO 
r f 
VO 
r o 
Cvl 
0 0 
yr\ 
OV 
r-, 
— 
vO 
vO 
^r\ 
0 
r-^  
— 
(U 
D -UIBX 
ea
di
ng
 
pu
bl
ic 
iv
or
sh
ip
 
ro
v
id
in
g 
an
 
e:
 
_i a. 
n- i 
O v 
_ 
0 
OV 
•^  
r-
•» 
t n 
vO 
r*^  
OV 
«-^  r-
vo 
vO 
rr\ 
0 0 
vO 
vO 
•^  VO 
m 
0 0 
0 0 
— 
r-
r-
< N 
r-
r--
( N 
00 
VO 
rs 
>> 
CO 
o
ft
he
ch
ri
st
ia
 
o
fli
fe
 
Pa
st
or
al
 
w
o
rk
 
w i 0 0 v ^ 
0 0 0 0 ' ^ 
• ^ r s ) ON 
0 rn 0 
0 0 NO r n 
m i / ^ 0 
— 
r - f*~i NO 
NO 0 0 r s i 
NO r s j ON 
ON r- — 
NO v - i T j -
rs* *o 00 
ON 0 rn 
NO r - T t 
r f m ^ 
f*^ T f -^a-
• O r n NO 
i r i O N - ^ 
r v j r - 0 0 
r- r- -^ 
yr\ r^ <X> 
r^  m r^  
w^  -^ r^  
i r j O N r s ] 
r-- lo rn 
00 00 r-
rsi Tf ^ 
0 0 0 
r^ r- i^ 
r*^  r*^  r*^  
0 *r^  *0 
r-~ 00 v-i 
m — oc 
• ^ rs^ 0 
N D ^ ^ 
m T t V-) 
c= 
at
io
 
ho
m
e 
vi
sit
s 
Pr
iv
at
e 
pr
ay
er
 
Re
lig
io
us
 
ed
uc
 
v-» \r\ 
i / ^ 0 0 
0 0 - ^ 
i r i m 
r - 0 0 
a^- rs) 
r s j i r ^ 
r s | 0 0 
0 — 
— TT 
-^ r--
0 0 — 
ON — 
— 0 0 
0 — 
r*-| -rj-
yr\ 0 0 
r- — 
NO ON 
rsi r-~ 
0 r^ 
i r > 0 0 
*<j- r-
r^  — 
r- 1^ 
m 00 
0 r^ * 
Tf r-
m NO 
O N N O 
0 «^ 
rn NO 
0 I^ 
i n — 
^ -^  NO r-
GO 
C 
'55 
rt 
UO
I 
JDU
! 
et
ai
ni
ng
an
d 
.
he
 
co
n
gr
eg
at
 
re
ac
hi
ng
 
o
u
n
se
lli
ng
 
a: cu u 
»n >/~i 00 0 
00 r- «/-) 
-rj- "O t^ m 
<:Z> ^-r^ \r\ \r\ 
\0 yr\ -rf 
NO r— 0 0 r s ) 
1 — r 
NO Tf ro 0 
r~ r^  TT 
ro TT 00 r*^  
— — - ^ NO 
NO r«-i • ^ 
- ^ 0 r-~ rv) 
0 T j - r o _ 
0 0 NO » r i 
r^  i/-^  00 22 
ON t ^ NO NO 
• ^ r s i i r i 
0 0 0 NO m 
u o — ^ m 
t ^ 0 0 CO 
rr — ON — 
• ^ — r s i 0 0 
Tt ro »/-i rs] 
0 0 — NO r s ] 
- ^ 00 *n ro 
NO ^ »n 
00 r- ON ro 
00 ro — — 
fo ro Tt r^ 
00 0 r- — 
r^  0 0 00 
NO T t T f 
' ^ ON ON 0 4 
^— r o O"^ ON 
• ^ ro rs] rs) 
r~ ON 0 0 
u
dy
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
Re
ad
in
g 
a
n
d 
st
 
Y
ou
th
 
w
o
rk
 
Ra
is
in
g 
m
o
n
ey
 
W
or
ki
ng
 
o
n
 
0 0 
— 
r o 
— 
— 
-^  
 
r^ 
— 
-
T f 
-
0 
rs) 
-
r s ) 
r s ) 
yr\ 
f O 
0 
NO 
— 
r -
rs) 
• ^ 
T j -
CTN 
r s ) 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
At
te
nd
in
g 
lo
ca
l 
DO 
— 
r o 
CO 
•« 
rs) 
r g 
rs) 
r o 
r o 
rs) 
r -
r-i 
r o 
r-
r o 
T t 
r^ 
NO 
r o 
N D 
r o 
T j -
r o 
^ 
u
n
ct
io
ns
 
S o c 
- Ic 3 
wj ^ l y 
^ :s GO 
U 1) ' 
CJ v_ ( 
CO 0 0 < 
^ CO 
,— c -* 
CO U ;2 
O0T3 
CO C >v 
U g -
" a. c 
" s a 
ro •- .2 
i i O c 
2 O " 
CO 
(/)&.*-• 
a . I 
a. ^ •^. 
E.S 
U 00 
^ IS 
CO CO 
3 i» 
•^  -2 
CO T3 
'.> E 
S E 
,^  "^^  -
1; u y 
E H 
H £• 
105 
The Clergy and Organized Religion 
tendency to consider that less emphasis should be placed on formal 
services of worship. 
The thirteen items on this table may be grouped together as compo-
nents of six major roles of the minister, as follows.'' 
1. priest — (leading public worship) 
2. preacher — (preaching) 
3. administrator/organizer — (raising money, retaining and in-
creasing the congregation, working on committees, attending 
local functions) 
4. pastor — (counselling individuals, pastoral work and home 
visits) 
5. teacher — (religious education, youth work) 
6. exemplar — (private prayer, providing example of the Christian 
way of life, reading and study). 
Using this breakdown it is possible to build up a picture for each 
denomination of how the respondents tended to see themselves in 
terms of the alternatives offered.* For most groups (Roman 
Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, Churches of Christ), the 
exemplar role stood out as the most significant ideal, followed by the 
role of pastor. The exception is the Presbyterians, who tended to 
place the roles of pastor and preacher on a par with that of exemplar. 
For Catholics the exemplar role was the dominant one, but in second 
place the roles of preacher and pastor were equally valued. When 
these ideal roles are compared with the actual emphases the respon-
dents considered exist in their daily work, there are considerable dif-
ferences for the Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, and 
Presbyterians, for all of whom the role of teacher is rather impor-
tant, and the ideally dominant roles (exemplar, pastor, and preacher) 
cannot be placed in order. For the Baptists and Churches of Christ, 
however, the fit between the perception of ideal and actual roles is 
rather close. This might be expected. Although in the larger 
hierarchical denominations there may be an overriding and possible 
mechanical prescription of role behaviour by the institution, in 
denominations such as the last two there is less central control, and 
greater local autonomy for the individual, who may thus be more 
likely to see his work as being organized the way he thinks it ought to 
be. 
The final group of questions of relevance here was that concerning 
the minister's relationships with his congregation and the public, an 
area mentioned as unsatisfactory by respondents more often than 
any other. On the whole a majority of all denominations agreed there 
was a declining interest on the part of the community in religious 
matters, and about half of all but the Roman Catholics (21 per cent) 
and Baptists (37 per cent) saw this as typical also of their congrega-
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tions. While one-quarter to one-third agreed that the congregation is 
not interested in the minister's advice, the respondents disagreed 
overwhelmingly with the suggestion that the parish minister is irrele-
vant to the solution of problems facing people and that he does not 
attempt to influence the everyday lives of his congregation. A ma-
jority of all denominations considered that there has been a decline 
in the social prestige of the clergy in this country. 
As well as problems of social standing and of acceptance by the 
public, there appears to be some suggestion of discontent about the 
structure within which the minister works. Perhaps in no other 
profession is the individual so completely dependent on the approval 
of his employing organization, having no inter-denominational 
"professional" association to turn to, and little chance of changing 
"employers" without a major personal re-orientation. We found that 
about one-third of Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, and 
Presbyterians, and smaller proportions of the other groups, con-
sidered that length of service rather than ability is the important fac-
tor for high positions in their denominations, and about onethird to 
one-half agreed that they do not have adequate opportunity for ad-
vancement.' 
The overall picture presented here is one of considerable diversity, 
and sometimes inconsistency, of attitudes between various groups 
and within them. It is a picture altogether consistent with a profes-
sional group facing a changing world in which their own roles and 
standing are uncertain, and which appears to demand a redefinition 
of the very bases of their claim to legitimacy. 
So far we have indicated some of the major difficulties ex-
perienced by clergymen in their professional work. These have in-
cluded aspects of religion and organized churches in conditions of in-
creasing social change, doubts about the traditional self-image of 
clergymen, and divisions of attitude according to age-groups. Final-
ly, we should turn our attention to areas in which many other profes-
sions have become subject to criticism, areas such as the criteria of 
success, quality of service, and exclusiveness. 
The success of an occupational group depends among other things 
on the extent to which its potential public is prepared to accept the 
practitioners' definition of a problematical situation. Thus, engineers 
are accepted because they apparently provide the most useful 
answers to the problems of machine operation, the construction of 
bridges and other structures, the design of communication and 
electronic systems, and so on; the medical profession seems to do 
better than other people at arresting and curing diseases and injuries; 
the litigant expects to do better if he employs a lawyer to represent 
him in court; and social workers must convince their clients that they 
are capable of helping them to solve their various problems. 
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But a group whose claims to expertise are open to question by its 
clients is under great pressure to justify its continued existence. In an 
era when traditional religious teachings are less readily and widely 
accepted, and where, in addition, the immediate benefit of advice 
from competing professional groups is more apparent, the minister 
is under just such a pressure. As we have seen, many Queensland 
clergy themselves admitted a disturbing lack of congruence between 
their own perceptions of their aims, and the attitudes of the con-
gregation and community in general. 
There is in addition a difficulty about making any assessment of 
the quality of service rendered in this profession. Typically, the 
quality of service offered by a group might be judged by practical 
results. The clergy, however, have no immediate means of 
establishing their success beyond the possible happiness obtained by 
someone who has been helped to "come to God". This rather vague 
surmise of success has often been associated with the attitude "God 
will provide"; a typical example is the population policy of the 
Roman Catholic church. Missionary activities of various churches in 
Australia have tended to question and disrupt the traditional way of 
life of the Aborigines. Such activities have been legitimized by 
clerical attitudes of bringing people to God and of God providing, 
but those attitudes themselves are increasingly being seen as 
carelessly optimistic and potentially harmful. To the question. What 
tangible benefits have the churches achieved for Aborigines?, there 
appears to be no convincing answer. 
The clergy may be considered by many to be redundant when their 
intangible benefits are set against the apparently real advantages to 
be obtained from the services of the other professions mentioned 
above. Perhaps some effect of this is evident among those 
Queensland ministers discussed previously, those who appeared to 
yearn for a withdrawal from church involvement in the mundane 
matters of social welfare and politics. By isolating themselves from 
competition in these areas and emphasizing the central purpose of 
the church, they may hope to re-establish a clear area of expertise. It 
is one which can scarcely be challenged by other professions but de-
pends on the continued existence of a public prepared to accept its 
importance. 
Another frequent criticism of professions relates to their selec-
tivity or exclusiveness in providing benefits. In some areas of 
Australian religion this criticism has perhaps a modified validity, 
derived for the most part from historical circumstances. In the past, 
churches and denominations were widely perceived as "sectarian" in 
the sense that they took an uncompromising stand on lay response to 
the Christian message. Basically, only the believer could be saved; no 
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greater exclusiveness could be found in any other profession. Unless 
the individual was prepared to accept the professional set of beliefs 
and values, he was led to believe he was lost. He was denying himself 
the full benefit of the professional's services; he might make use of 
the ritualistic trappings and the respectable social forms, but ul-
timately it would do him no good. More than this, some religious 
groups, and hence many of the clergy, were prepared to suggest that 
among competing versions of the truth, only theirs was valid. This 
still applies among some fundamentalist sects and to some extent 
among other clergy, but the official line of most established 
denominations is now opposed to any narrow interpretation of 
eligibility for salvation. Nevertheless it is likely that some degree of 
credibility has been forfeited by the circumstance that such claims 
have been made in the name of religion, and have not until recently 
been conscientiously repudiated by the institutions concerned. 
People have always sought hope, guidance, and reassurance con-
cerning their personal fates. Traditional church organization 
emerged for a situation in which this seeking expressed itself in a 
concern for personal salvation beyond the grave, for the assuaging of 
grief, and often for the gradual improvement of society toward a 
condition acceptable to God. These hopes are now weakened. Many 
active and dedicated ministers concentrate on helping people in this 
world, here and now, without much reference to the organizational 
needs of churches. Worker priests, for instance, have in a sense been 
trying to catch up with society. Members of groups such as the 
House of Freedom actually talk of "ripping off the churches for 
Christ". It is very possible that many churchmen in Australia will 
come to regard even their tangible, personal help as inadequate, as 
simply adjusting disadvantaged people to a rigid social order. 
When fundamental improvement of this social order is seen to be 
slow, we may expect many clergymen to become ever more sensitive 
to its imperfections, and ever more anxious to remove them. Taking 
into consideration the impatience of some, the conservatism of 
others, especially older people, and the inflexibility of in-
stitutionalized churches, increased division and disagreement must 
be inevitable. 
A radical reorganization of traditional church structures seems 
imperative. These structures are already changing unofficially under 
force of circumstances such as wastage from theological colleges, 
resignations of respected and dedicated clergy, and the development 
of such movements as the worker priests. Unless the established 
churches can adequately reorganize to cope with contemporary 
situations, the position of the professional clergy must become in-
creasingly strained. 
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Notes to text 
1. This research is being carried out at the request of the Australian Council of 
Churches, covering ministers in New South Wales and Queensland. The sample 
referred to here consisted of 519 ordained ministers throughout Queensland who 
returned mailed questionnaires sent to them as part of a stratified probability 
sample drawn from current (1972) denominational lists of ministers and priests. 
In these and later results quoted, only the subgroups from the Roman Catholics, 
Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and Churches of Christ are refer-
red to, as either response rates or numbers for other denominations were rather 
low. In these six categories response rates varied from 63.5 per cent for Roman 
Catholics to 87 per cent for the Churches of Christ, with the others being around 
80 per cent. 
2. It may be worth noting that nearly 10 per cent of Roman Catholics also reported 
"family tradition" as at least "fairly" important in their decision to enter the 
priesthood. 
3. See page 90. 
4. The first five of these are adapted from Samuel W. Blizzard (1956). The examplar 
role is added to cover the private aspects of the minister's behaviour generally ex-
pected of him but not covered by his formal activities. For another recent 
Australian example of a modified use of Blizzard's categories, and some data 
highly relevant to those reported here, see N.W.H. Blaikie (1974). 
5. We recognize that there may be other aspects not covered which could change the 
overall picture; e.g., administering the sacraments is not specifically mentioned. 
6. It must be noted that some of these respondents stated that such advancement was 
completely irrelevant to them. 
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The Law: Professional Autonomy 
and the Public Interest 
ROBERT ANGYAL AND SUSAN PAYNE 
Editors' j h e knowledge base of the legal profession, in contrast with 
Notes that claimed by the more "scientific" professions, is derived 
from human evaluations of, and decisions about, social 
behaviour. Furthermore, these decisions and evaluations are, to 
a large extent, in the hands of the profession itself through the 
law societies and bar associations and through individual prac-
titioners in their roles as legislators, judges, legal writers, and 
academics. The value orientations of members of the legal 
profession are, however, closely tied to those of the upper and 
middle classes and may be representative of only one of a 
number of discrepant conceptions of what constitutes justice in 
any particular situation. The societal implications of the large 
measure of autonomy that is accorded to the legal profession in 
Australia becomes, then, an important question which needs to 
be raised and discussed. 
Those who ought to be most aware of how the law 
operates, what its deficiencies are, and where it is in greatest 
need of reform are the lawyers themselves. However, a 
thoroughgoing re-evaluation of the outcomes of the processes 
of the law seems unlikely to emerge from within the legal 
profession. Indeed, overall reforms have met with considerable 
opposition from the profession which has seldom embarked on 
a course of action which has done much more than to dampen 
criticisms of some of the grosser inequities. Perhaps this 
resistance to change results from the lawyer's intellectual in-
vestment in an existing body of knowledge; to some extent it 
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may also derive from the intrusion of financial self-interest, as 
the reception given to less costly forms of land transfers would 
seem to attest, in many cases the profession's resistance to 
reforms is argued to be in the public interest, although it would 
be naive to suggest that an element of self-interest does not 
enter into some of the altruistic claims of the profession. 
Despite tbe concern which some have expressed about the 
legal profession's relative insulation from the full impact of 
societal value dissensus and about its demonstrated reluctance 
to look favourably on any but the most limited reforms, the 
profession in Australia has nevertheless been accorded a con-
siderable amount of power and autonomy to manage its own af-
fairs. In the following chapter Angyal and Payne suggest, 
however, that even in dealing with more limited internal 
reforms of the profession, the law societies have scarcely exer-
cised the power and autonomy available to them in order to 
benefit the public. 
In many ways, the legal profession is self-governing; it makes and 
enforces rules controlling the conduct of its members. Notable ex-
amples are the rules banning advertising of legal services and those 
preventing the offering of cut-price legal services. The usual reply to 
any questioning of the function of these rules is that they are 
designed to make sure that the profession serves the public in the 
best possible way. In this chapter we examine four areas where the 
profession controls its member's conduct, and in each case ask. Does 
the rule benefit the public, or merely make the lives of lawyers more 
comfortable? Another way of putting this question is in terms of 
professional autonomy: granted that the profession has the power to 
control, in significant ways, the cost and availability of legal services, 
does it exercise that power to benefit the public, or merely to benefit 
the profession? 
To illustrate how this question can be asked we will confine 
ourselves to four areas — advertising, price competition, profes-
sional negligence, and the handling of trust monies. These are not by 
any means the only areas in which the profession has considerable 
autonomy. 
1. Advertising, or, how on earth can I find a lawyer? 
If a client wanted to find a solicitor he might, by wandering along the 
streets of a town or city, spot a sign indicating a solicitor's office. But 
in New South Wales, the Law Society (the solicitors' professional 
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body) has ruled that a sign should only be as large as is reasonably 
necessary to enable a client who already knows the name and address 
of the solicitor, to find his office.' In Victoria, the Law Institute's 
council does not allow the individual letters in the word "solicitor" 
on a sign to exceed three inches in height or width.^ These rulings 
seem to be based on the complacent middle-class assumption that 
everyone knows a solicitor, or knows someone who does. But is this 
correct? 
In such circumstances, we can only assume that people who do not 
already know a solicitor go to the one whose sign they see first, and 
rules being what they are, they may have difficulty finding the sign.' 
A potential client might decide to use the classified telephone 
directory rather than tramp the streets. He would find, in Sydney, 
wedged between "solenoids" and "souvenirs", more than seven 
pages of names of solicitors in small print. To find one in his suburb, 
he would have to work through the list. When he found one, he 
would have no idea whether he handled the sort of work for which he 
needed him. Nor could he know, from the "Pink Pages", whether 
the name he picked was that of a one-man firm operating from a 
pokey back-room office, or a huge partnership occupying three 
fioors of a high-rise office block, with twenty partners and fifty 
employed solicitors, replete with telex facilities and magnetic-tape 
typewriters. 
Alternatively, he may pick a name at random from the "Pink 
Pages". Firms that are listed close to the beginning of the 
"solicitors" classification do tend to receive calls from people who 
merely run down the list — the legal equivalent of the "donkey 
vote". 
Why is it so? 
Why is this the situation? It results from the very strict regulation of 
advertising by lawyers. For instance. Regulation 29 of the Solicitors' 
(General) Regulations, made by the Council of the New South 
Wales Law Society, says: 
29( I). A solicitor shall not directly or indirectly apply for or seek in-
structions for professional business or do or permit in the carrying on 
of his practice any act or thing which can reasonably be regarded as 
touting or as calculated to attract business unfairly. 
(2). A solicitor shall not except with the consent in writing of the 
council, publish any advertisement ...* 
* There are four minor exceptions to this rule; the only one of significance 
allows a solicitor to insert his name and address in a recognised 
almanac. 
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This regulation has the force of law, and the penalty for breach of it 
is a fine of up to $400 in addition to any internal disciplinary action. 
The position in all other states is much the same. 
But the council of the law society has also issued rulings in-
terpreting Regulation 29, with the result that its already sweeping 
terms have been extended yet further. For instance, the council has 
ruled that objection will be taken to "illuminated signs, unusually 
gaudy signs not in good taste, multiplicity of signs, signs unneces-
sarily large, and signs suspended over a footpath"." 
The Victorian Law Institute regulates not only the maximum al-
lowable size of the letters on a sign, but also the relative size of the 
word "solicitor" and of the solicitor's name: if the word is larger 
than the name it is considered to be advertising!^ 
The regulation of lawyers' conduct goes further than control of 
signs and telephone book entries however. For fear of allowing 
advertising a solicitor in New South Wales is not permitted to sign 
his name to a letter to a newspaper if it is revealed by the letter that 
he is a solicitor.* Nor may he give an interview or express opinions to 
the press unless he expressly stipulates that his name not be 
published nor his identity revealed in any report of the interview or 
of the opinions expressed by him. 
The position of a solicitor in New South Wales wishing to appear 
on radio or television is even more restricted: all appearances on 
legal matters have to be approved first by the council of the law 
society: 
The Council will be guided by consideration as to whether such ap-
pearance will involve self-advertisement, the attraction of business un-
fairly or derogation from the dignity of the profession, on the one 
hand, and the good of the profession or benefit to the public on the 
other.' 
How the council balances these competing criteria is not known. 
These rules create a large intrusion into the freedom of expression 
of members of the profession. They are simply not free to express 
themselves in public on issues about which they are best qualified to 
speak — legal issues. Thus a New South Wales solicitor anxious to 
press for law reform cannot do so on radio or television without the 
council's approval. Whatever incidental benefit this may be to the 
profession must surely be outweighed by the loss to the public of the 
opportunity to witness properly-informed debate on legal matters. 
The net effect of the present interpretation of the rules forbidding 
advertising can only be to stifie debate about the law, and thus to 
protect the legal system from criticism and defence. 
In 1962 there was a disturbing illustration of the extent to which 
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the rules dominate the public conduct of solicitors in New South 
Wales. A solicitor considered it necessary to ask the council of the 
law society whether it was permissible for a solicitor to take part in 
community activities. The council ruled that, although the rule for-
bidding advertising always had to be borne in mind, "it is erroneous 
to infer that a solicitor should not in any circumstances join in the 
life of the community".* 
Professor Ronald Sackville has commented that "It may be 
justifiable for a learned profession to prevent its members from 
openly advertising their services. But when members are deterred 
from public criticism of rules, institutions and practices in need of 
reform the profession has lost sight of its social responsibility."' 
H^hy ban advertising? 
Why should members of the legal profession be prevented from 
advertising their services? 
The most common argument against advertising is that it is un-
professional. This is certainly a correct assertion if one defines a 
professional as a person who does not advertise, but this begs the 
whole question. The vehemence with which the proposition that 
advertising is unprofessional is asserted leads to the suspicion that 
there is a question of status at stake. Indeed, one commentator in 
New South Wales has said that the regulation forbidding advertising 
is "the rock upon which the whole status of the profession must 
stand or perish"'" 
There seems to be a deep-seated and extreme distaste for "com-
mercialism" among members of the profession." This aversion must 
have its roots deep in the profession's conception of its status relative 
to that of those who indulge in commercial activities. The conception 
may be a little insulting to the businessmen who form a large part of 
the clientele of many solicitors. And why should consumers have to 
pay the social costs involved in allowing professionals to maintain 
their status? 
A second common argument against advertising is based on the 
claim that professional services are, in significant ways, different 
from other services. From this, it is asserted, it follows that profes-
sionals must not advertise. 
Now why should it be thought that professional services are dif-
ferent from others? 
The reason has been summarized by Mr. Justice Barry thus "A 
profession has as its essential characteristic the giving of a service 
which, because it cannot be precisely prescribed or examined in ad-
vance, requires a relationship of trust between the practitioner and 
client or employer."'- But it is a complex world, and there are many 
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instances when we must place ourselves in the hands of specialists 
and rely entirely on their judgments. Thus we are likely to know no 
more of the intricacies of the interior of a colour television set than 
of the obscurities of litigation. In each case we trust that the 
specialist — be he television repairman or solicitor — can com-
petently do his job. But does it follow that neither should advertise 
his services? One frequently heard justification for the ban is that, 
because legal services are so complex that consumers cannot unders-
tand them, they will be misled by advertising. Two rejoinders can be 
made to this. The first is that exactly the same objection might be 
taken to ordinary commercial advertising; yet here the fact that the 
bad might drive out the good has not led to the banning of advertis-
ing though it has in some cases led to its regulation. Secondly, the 
claim is incompatible with another frequently used argument against 
advertising — that the only rational basis for choice of a legal ad-
viser is through personal recommendation by a satisfied customer or 
through personal experience. But if legal services are so complex that 
the consumer must be protected from his lack of comprehension of 
them by the banning of advertising, what is the value of such a 
recommendation or of such experience? 
There are yet other ways in which lawyers seek to differentiate 
their services from those engaged in "trades". They claim that they 
are not "selling" anything, but providing a service; that the welfare 
of their clients comes first, money-making later. The short answer to 
these claims is that lawyers are selling something — their services. 
And while it may be true that professionals give high priority to their 
clients' welfare, so too does any producer of goods or services in a 
competitive situation who does not want to lose his share of the 
market. 
Yet another claim purporting to establish the difference between 
legal services and others is that a lawyer is "bound by strict rules of 
conduct in his relations with his colleagues and his clients (rules 
which may require him to stand out against his client's wishes) and 
... recognises a higher duty than that of mere compliance with his 
client's wishes whatever they may be".' ' Barristers, in particular, 
emphasize that their duty to the court may conflict with their duty to 
their clients. But, of course, lawyers are not the only people whose 
desire to serve their clients to the utmost must be tempered by the 
limits of what can permissibly be done. A cinema ticket-seller who 
turns away an under-age customer from an "R" certificate movie is 
in exactly the same position (except that the barrister still gets his 
fee; the cinema loses a sale). 
In any event, even if these attempts to differentiate some profes-
sional services from others were more firmly founded, we cannot un-
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derstand how it follows that advertising is undesirable. 
A third argument commonly used by lawyers against advertising 
is that, if they were to advertise, the confidence of the public in the 
quality of their services would be reduced, and the demand for them 
correspondingly diminished. But how can it be said that advertising 
would lower the demand for legal services? Advertising is a major 
device for supplying information to consumers; it increases con-
sumer choice; it can increase demand for the products of an industry 
as a whole, as well as for those of individual producers.'" 
What best points up the extraordinary illogicality of the argu-
ments advanced against advertising is that solicitors, as a group, do 
advertise. If advertising reduces the demand for their services, why 
this masochistic activity? The solicitors' professional bodies in 
England, New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia, for 
example, have all undertaken "public relations" campaigns, in some 
cases with the professional (!) assistance of public relations con-
sultants." 
The form of campaign has normally been the issue of pamphlets 
and press releases. Thus in 1967, it was reported that the English 
Law Society had spent £14,000 in that year on producing three mil-
lion leaflets on buying a house, making a will, taking a job, starting a 
business, spending money (consumer credit), and paying taxes. The 
New South Wales Law Society has issued pamphlets on wills, motor 
accidents (third party claims), and buying a house. The Law Institute 
of Victoria has also issued pamphlets on the same topics. The aim of 
the English scheme is to counteract "the notorious reluctance of 
many members of the public to avail themselves of solicitors' ser-
vices".'* 
Thus it is abundantly clear that, by group advertising, solicitors 
are seeking both of the classic benefits of advertising: to raise total 
demand for their services (by attracting people who would not 
otherwise make a will, for instance) and by trying to draw clients 
away from other sources of supply of services (in the case of wills, 
from home-made wills and those drawn by trustee companies). 
Group advertising is apparently considered by the profession to be in 
the public interest, yet advertising by individual practitioners is con-
sidered heinous. The cynical onlooker might by tempted to conclude 
that the function of the advertising ban is to prevent internal com-
petition in the profession, rather than to produce the best services for 
the public. 
A final argument used against advertising by individual prac-
titioners is that it is pointless, since all solicitors are selling the same 
product. 
A variant of this was used by the English Law Society in its sub-
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mission in 1967 to the Prices and Incomes Board. It argued that no 
professional man is entitled to claim that he is better than any other, 
because all are qualified to practise law." It seems to us that this is a 
complete non-sequitur. The fact that all lawyers are qualified to 
practise provides a measure of protection for their clients, but it does 
not follow that all lawyers provide services of equal quality. There 
are competent and incompetent lawyers, fast and slow lawyers, ex-
perienced and inexperienced lawyers, specialized and non-specialized 
lawyers, and practitioners themselves are acutely aware of such dis-
tinctions. Again, the use of such arguments lends force to the suspi-
cion that the ban on advertising is designed primarily to prevent 
competition within the profession. 
2. Price competition, or, how much will it cost? 
Having located a solicitor a client's next question might be. How 
much will it cost? A client is faced with two types of legal costs — 
costs for contentious business (which is business concerned with 
court proceedings) and costs for non-contentious business (such as 
conveyancing and probate). Owing to the complexity of legal costs 
we will consider only some aspects of the fee-fixing procedure. 
Fees in non-contentious matters 
In this section we consider some of the issues involved in 
conveyancing costs. These include costs for transferring property, 
preparing mortgage documents, and preparing leases. 
The client who inquires about the legal costs for buying or selling a 
house will be faced by a fee which varies according to the value of the 
property. He may feel that the fee is too high but there is little he can 
do. He is forced (except in South Australia) to employ a lawyer to 
handle the work and he will find that all lawyers will charge the same 
fee. Why is this so? 
Firstly, solicitors have a monopoly over conveyancing which is a 
carry-over from the English tradition. It is only in South Australia 
that this monopoly has been broken. In 1861, when the Torrens 
system of land transfer was introduced to that state, the lawyers 
refused to co-operate with the new system so landbrokers in that 
state were given licences to handle land transfers. This situation has 
persisted to the present day although in recent years there has been 
pressure from the legal profession in that state to "tighten control of 
legal work done by unqualified persons for reward whether direct or 
indirect"."* 
In the other states the monopoly is conferred on the profession by 
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the various Legal Practitioners Acts. In New South Wales, for ex-
ample, the act provides a fine of up to $400 for anybody other than a 
solicitor who handles documents relating to real property for fee, 
gain, or reward." This is not an absolute monopoly because any 
person can do it himself, and for anybody else provided that he does 
not charge for his services. 
One argument for the solicitors' monopoly is that it protects the 
lay client by ensuring that the work is done (or at least supervised) by 
qualified persons subject to the professional codes of conduct. 
However, the monopoly also deprives the client of the right to choose 
to have the work done by less skilled persons who will charge less. 
Although the Legal Practitioners Act may operate to protect the 
public it also operates to protect lawyers from competition from out-
side the profession. 
This monopoly situation is the historical reason why conveyancing 
costs have been fixed by an "independent" authority. Thus the 
Economic Council of Canada in its interim report on competition 
policy made the point that, if the profession is not to be subject to 
normal market mechanisms, its charges should be regulated by a 
public body, rather than by lawyer groups.^" The situation varies 
between states but in New South Wales conveyancing fees are set by 
a committee which is set up under an act of parliament. This com-
mittee consists of the chief justice, the chief judge in equity, the 
master in equity, the president of the law society and one or more 
practising solicitors.^' Thus the committee consists entirely of past 
and present members of the legal profession with no representatives 
of the users of legal services. The committee, however, should not be 
confused with a committee in the accepted sense of that word 
because it "does not meet or make decisions in that sense. There are 
no voting rights or majority decisions. Proceedings are in the nature 
of negotiations; and, if the judicial members are against a proposi-
tion, that is an end to it."'- This is typical of the procedure for fixing 
legal fees. Fees are changed when the law society feels it is ap-
propriate to ask the committee for an increase. There is no represen-
tation of the users of legal services and there is little attempt to deter-
mine fees according to any reasonable economic criteria. In recent 
years the New South Wales "committee" has merely recommended 
a percentage increase to the previous scale. Any sound reasoning 
which may have been the basis of the original scale, set in 1920, 
would have been drastically altered by economic conditions. "If 
there are any records of the Committee's deliberations going back to 
the original scale of 1920, no-one has ever produced them."-' 
It would seem extremely reasonable that the public should be 
protected from the abuse of a monopoly situation by the setting of 
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maximum fees but the profession has ensured that the maximum fees 
are also the minimum fees. Thus Rule 4 of the Victorian Solicitors' 
(Professional Conduct and Practice) Rules states: "A solicitor shall 
not hold himself out or allow himself to be held out directly or in-
directly as being willing to perform work for a fee less than that fixed 
by the appropriate scale of costs for that work." This rule effectively 
eliminates the possiblity of price competition in the provision of legal 
services. 
Why ban price competition? 
A prominent text on the legal profession puts the solicitors' 
viewpoint by saying, "It is the duty of the solicitor to the public not 
to overcharge, and to the profession not to hold himself out as being 
prepared to undercharge; and the latter part of this proposition is 
also in the interests of the public." The Queensland Law Society 
takes a similar view in its discussion of the conveyancing scale. This 
scale, unlike those in N.S.W. and Victoria has no statutory sanction 
but is determined by the Queensland Law Society. The scale is to be 
"regarded as a scale of minimum charges" and it is considered that 
"it is in the interest of the profession and the public generally that 
every solicitor and conveyancer will observe this as a scale of 
minimum charges and only depart from it where a lesser charge, or 
no charge at all, is justified"." 
The arguments that price-fixing is in the public interest usually 
come under three headings: (i) maintenance of professional stan-
dards, (ii) certainty, and (iii) equity. 
As Teece puts it, the professions' first argument is that the public 
will suffer because 
the effect [of competitive fee-cutting] will be to attract an undue 
amount of business to the less able practitioners who are the ones who 
stand to benefit by fee-cutting, and in part it will lead to less conscien-
tious work by the abler men who unwillingly have been compelled to 
cut their fees by reason of the competition. Many clients will find, 
when it is too late, that it is not good business to buy legal services in 
the cheapest market. The public will benefit most if relative ability is 
the sole basis of competition within the profession." 
There are no a priori grounds why price competition would be any 
more destructive to quality in service markets than in goods 
markets. The Prices and Incomes Board in the United Kingdom re-
jected the proposition that price cutting would lead to lower quality. 
It said, "We see no reason why there should be a guarantee of 
quality inherent in a fixed charge which is absent in a competitive 
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Spokesmen for the profession have also suggested that the func-
tion of the rules is to protect new entrants to the profession but we 
cannot see how they can have this effect." Advertising and price 
competition are the normal methods by which new entrants to a 
market attract business to themselves. It is more likely that restric-
tions on such activities would favour established members of the 
profession at the expense of new entrants.^* 
At least one commentator has argued that members of the profes-
sion ought not to compete with each other. The author of the New 
South Wales Solicitor's Manual has written, with reference to the 
rule banning advertising: 
The younger members [of the profession] may feel, at times, that it 
prevents their establishing themselves in business but eventually the 
boomerang (sic) effect must be apparent to them as their practices 
grow. Even that critic of the established order of things, John Ruskin, 
could say "government and co-operation are in all things the laws of 
life; anarchy and competition the laws of death."-' 
If, indeed, the older members of the profession fear the impact 
upon their incomes of the entry of younger members, then that is 
sad. But the problem is not unique to the legal profession. We cannot 
see any particular reason for allowing the profession to protect its 
older members' incomes if it does so by methods that operate at the 
expense of younger members, and if they bolster price levels at the 
expense of the public as a whole. 
There is also the argument that the lack of price competition 
provides incentives for lawyers to compete in terms of quality. This 
argument might be more convincing if there were some means by 
which clients could compare the quality of legal services. The 
public's ability to judge quality depends not only on their existing 
knowledge of professional services but also on the extent to which 
they have information about the range and nature of the professional 
services generally available. Legal services as compared with, say, 
medical services, are purchased infrequently. This means that the 
consumer has little knowledge of the service, let alone any ability to 
judge the quality of the service. In fact, the nature of legal services is 
such that the client may not be a good judge of the service even after 
the transaction is completed. 
There is also an argument that price-fixing protects small clients 
from being overcharged relative to large established clients (to whom 
solicitors could offer cut rates). This is not valid because the rule 
does not expressly say that a solicitor must not charge less than the 
scale fee; rather, it says he must not "hold himself out" as charging 
less. This means that established clients can be charged less than the 
scale fee. In this case the smaller client may actually be subsidizing 
the larger client. 
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The second main argument for fixed fees is that they provide the 
consumer with the certain knowledge of how much a transaction will 
cost. This was one of the arguments used by the law society in the 
United Kingdom when a recent government enquiry proposed the 
abolition of scale fees for property valued above £10,000, that 
charges be maximums rather than minimums, and that reduced rates 
operate when the solicitor acts for purchaser and vendor. The United 
Kingdom Law Society became rather impassioned at these 
proposals, claiming that it was time some deep thought was given to 
the humanity of the proposals because property transactions are car-
ried out "on behalf of individual families, creatures of flesh and 
blood whose dreams and hopes are most often centred around the 
bricks and mortar reality of owning their own home". It went on to 
say that the removal of scale charges would remove the certainty of 
conveyancing costs which could "in the long run bring about sheer 
human misery".^" 
This is a fascinating response to an attempt to introduce an ele-
ment of price competition into the determination of legal costs. 
If none of the arguments against advertising or price competition 
are convincing, what is to be said for them? In general, their benefits 
would be those associated with free competition. In some areas fees 
could drop dramatically, implying that they are at present artificially 
high.^' The major evidence in support of the claim that conveyancing 
charges could be reduced if price competition were engaged in comes 
from South Australia, where it is clear that landbrokers can handle 
property transfers under the same system of land transfers as is ad-
ministered by solicitors, for a fraction of the cost. Some examples of 
solicitors' and brokers' fees are presented in table 1. 
Another benefit of free competition would be an increase in the ef-
ficiency of procedures such as conveyancing. The present system of 
fixed scale costs certainly does not encourage practitioners to strive 
for greater efficiency, since there is no way that the benefits of extra 
skill or efficiency can be passed on to the client through lower fees. 
Certainly an examination of the conveyancing procedures in 
Queensland would suggest that there has been little attempt to im-
prove them, even in small ways such as standardizing forms. There 
seem to have been few changes since the introduction of Torrens title 
in 1861. Thus competition could shake up the whole profession either 
by driving out the inefficient solicitor or by forcing him into greater 
efficiency. 
Likewise, competition would encourage innovation and 
technological change. By contrast, the converse of these benefits flow 
from restrictive practices such as bans on advertising and price com-
petition; that is, in general, prices will be higher, resources will be 
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Table I. Comparison of solicitors' and landbrokers' conveyancing fees 
Solicitors' costs (New South Wales) 
Sale price 
Mortgage 
Transfer — vendor 
Transfer — purchaser 
Cost of mortgage 
Total legal costs 
Legal costs as percentage 
of sale price 
Landbrokers' costs (South Australia) 
Transfer — vendor 
Transfer — purchaser 
Cost of mortgage 
Total landbrokers" costs 
Landbrokers' costs as 
percentage of sale price 
$20,000 
$15,000 
132 
176 
210 
518 
2.6 
10 
50 
45 
105 
0.5 
$30,000 
$20,000 
165 
220 
243 
628 
2.1 
10 
60 
48 
118 
0.4 
$50,000 
$35,000 
231 
308 
333 
862 
1.7 
10 
80 
55 
145 
0.3 
SOURCE: General Order, Conveyancing Act 1919-64. 1971. Government Gazette, 
no. 103 (17 September): 3626; Land Brokers Society Incorporated, "A 
Minimum Scale of Conveyancing and Charges", May 1973, 
less efficiently used, and the structure and methods of the profession 
will tend towards rigidity. The pressures to reduce inefficiency are 
diminshed, the introduction of new forms of services is delayed, and 
the elimination of inefficient practitioners is made difficult. 
Fees for contentious matters 
In matters relating to court proceedings the public may have to 
make a positive decision whether they will purchase a particular ser-
vice. For example, many people do not consider divorce proceedings 
because they fear the cost. This concern is enhanced by newspaper 
and television reports criticizing high legal fees. The profession's 
reply to this criticism is that legal fees are set by an independent 
authority and that a client can submit his lawyer's bill for taxation. 
In this section we want to examine briefly how legal fees for court 
proceedings are determined and what protection is provided for the 
client against overcharging. 
Charges for contentious or litigious work are regulated by rules of 
court made by the appropriate rule committee. For example, in Vic-
toria the scale of costs which govern divorce and the more serious car 
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accident injuries are determined by a committee of judges of the Vic-
torian Supreme Court. These scales for contentious business consist 
of a list of the charges which a solicitor is entitled to make for par-
ticular steps in the proceedings. Thus there is a fixed charge for issu-
ing a writ, serving a summons, taking instructions, drawing 
pleadings, writing a letter, and so on. 
The situation is made much more complicated because different 
courts have their own scales of costs. In Victoria, for instance, as 
well as the Supreme Court scale there is a County Court scale and a 
Magistrate's Court scale which apply to contentious business in 
these courts. A similar situation exists in the other states and ter-
ritories so that there are about twenty different sets of legal fees for 
contentious business which is under state jurisdiction. To complicate 
the situation even further there are three additional scales of costs 
for contentious business which occurs under federal jurisdiction. 
These are the High Court scale, the Bankruptcy scale, and the Com-
monwealth Industrial Court scale. 
There are several criticisms of the bodies which fix solicitors' 
charges for both contentious and non-contentious business. Firstly, 
the committees which set the fees consist almost entirely of past and 
present members of the legal profession. There are no represen-
tatives of the users of legal services. Some lawyers are also dis-
satisfied with the composition of the committee but for rather dif-
ferent reasons. This dissatisfaction is expressed by a Victorian 
solicitor: 
With the greatest respect to the Judges of the State ... it is an affront 
to deposit with them the responsibility of what costs a solicitor should 
charge ... The refusal of Judges to permit the Law Institute to fix the 
scale of costs for solicitors is an insult to a responsible and respected 
Institution and the time has come when the Institute must make 
strong representations to the Judges to have the responsibility of fee 
adjustment transferred to it." 
This in fact, illustrates the general feeling in the profession — that 
law societies should press for power to fix solicitors' charges. The 
Tasmanian Law Society, for example, managed to have the ap-
propriate act of parliament amended in 1971 to give the society 
power to set conveyancing fees, instead of a committee consisting of 
the solicitor general, the recorder of titles, and a member of the law 
society. 
A second criticism is that there is a lack of machinery for adjust-
ment of legal fees. The present procedure is by way of submissions to 
the judiciary by the appropriate law society so that increases in legal 
fees are influenced by the pressure which the law societies can bring 
to bear. A solicitor in New South Wales summarized this machinery 
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for up-dating scales for contentious costs in the following manner: 
"The present procedure for up-dating scales of costs can hardly be 
said to be based on any method at all; it is only when some move is 
initiated by the profession that any activity is shown towards any 
change."" 
One disgruntled lawyer, writing to the Victorian Law Institute 
Journal, expressed some dissatisfaction with the frequency of adjust-
ments in legal fees compared with that of medical fees. He criticized 
the law institute's negotiating ability and suggested that the profes-
sion might be better served if the institute brought in the Australian 
Medical Association to negotiate increases in fees." 
We favour regular adjustments to legal fees in line with economic 
conditions. The existence of increasing overheads is a perfectly valid 
argument for increases in fees, provided the fees are set at a fair and 
reasonable level to begin with. The difficulty here is to determine a 
fair and reasonable level. This brings us to our third criticism of the 
fee-fixing bodies: that they lack information on the costs involved in 
legal work and lawyers' incomes. None of the numerous committees 
which determine solicitors' charges is equipped with adequate infor-
mation about the total earnings of the profession or the share of 
solicitors' remuneration which comes within their scope. Hence they 
do not have any means of ascertaining the effects of any changes that 
they make on solicitors' earnings. 
It may be that the charges currently made for legal work are no 
more than fair, but in the absence either of price competition or of 
detailed information about solicitors' incomes, there is no way of 
proving this to be true. 
The fourth criticism is that the scales of costs are so numerous and 
so complicated that they provide the client with little useful informa-
tion on how much legal work will cost. 
The method of charging by individual item is carried to incredible 
lengths in cases where perusing documents is charged for on the basis 
of so much per folio. A typical charge for perusing is 35 cents per 
folio, which the unitiated might take to mean 35 cents per page. But 
this would be far too simple because a folio "comprises 72 words, 
every figure comprised in a column being counted as one word"." 
There is a similar method of charging on a per folio basis for typing 
and engrossing (typing on parchment). This system of charging ac-
cording to the number of letters, the length of documents, and other 
crude ways hardly seems suitable for a professional service. It ap-
pears to be a continuation of a practice which originated in the days 
when a large part of legal work involved writing out documents by 
hand. 
The scales had their origin in the United Kingdom in 1729 when 
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solicitors were first required to be enrolled. At that time it was 
thought necessary to prevent the abuse of the solicitors' monopoly by 
introducing legislation "to prevent extortionate charges by 
solicitors". The legislation of 1729 also introduced a procedure cal-
led "taxation" which was designed to ensure that solicitors could not 
overcharge their clients. This procedure, which is handled by the tax-
ing master (in New South Wales the prothonotary) of the ap-
propriate court, involves the taxing master going through a 
solicitor's bill item by item to see if the work is justified and if it has 
been charged for at the appropriate rate. 
This procedure for protecting the client suffers from a few dif-
ficulties, which is hardly surprising since, as the New South Wales 
Solicitor's Manual reminds us, the procedure has not been changed 
since 1849 and still carries the hall-mark of 1729.^ * The first dif-
ficulty is that few people know about the procedure. The second is 
that neither lawyers nor the courts provide any written information 
on the current procedure. The third difficulty is that it may lead to 
additional costs. 
The costs of taxation are borne either by the solicitor or the client 
according to the rule that if the original solicitor's bill is reduced by 
the taxing master by more than one-sixth then the solicitor pays, 
otherwise the client meets the solicitor's costs of taxation. The costs 
of taxation comprise the amount paid to the court to have the bill 
taxed plus the solicitor's costs. The client may handle the taxation 
himself but, because of the complexity of legal costing, he will 
probably have to employ another solicitor to handle the taxation. So 
there will be the costs of the original solicitor to appear before the 
taxing master and the costs of the second solicitor. This poses no 
problem for the client provided he has his bill reduced by more than 
one-sixth on taxation. For example, the client will still have to pay 
the costs of taxation when a solicitor's bill for (say) $700 is reduced 
to only $600. In this case even though the client has been 
overcharged by $100 the client has to pay the solicitor additional 
costs for appearing at the taxation. 
This complicated procedure for disputing legal costs can be un-
favourable compared with the method used to handle disputes with 
tradesmen using the Small Claims Tribunal in Queensland. There 
both parties appear before the referee for a cost of $2.00. This 
procedure is widely advertised, there is adequate printed information 
on the procedures involved, and it is simple and inexpensive. There 
seems to be no practical reason, save the reluctance of the legal 
profession, why legal fees cannot be handled in a similar manner. 
The current limit of $450 used in claims of this nature would have to 
be relaxed to handle legal fees adequately. In the interim, the profes-
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sional organizations could require all solicitors to provide informa-
tion on a client's rights to taxation. 
3. Clients' money 
The law societies have been given powers to control the individual 
solicitor's handling of a client's money. Solicitors hold clients' 
money while a transaction is in progress. For example, they may 
hold a deposit on a house until the final transaction is completed or 
hold money from an estate until it is distributed. They also hold 
money for legal fees when solicitors insist that fees by paid in ad-
vance. Solicitors should hold this money in trust accounts rather 
than in their personal accounts. Until a few years ago banks did not 
pay interest on any portion of these accounts but then appropriate 
changes were made to the respective legal practitioners acts. Now a 
proportion of a solicitor's trust account is kept in a special account 
with the law society of his state which earns interest. 
This poses three problems: (1) what controls are there to protect 
clients? (2) should the legal profession earn interest on clients' 
money? and (3) if the legal profession does earn interest what should 
the interest be used for? In Victoria a solicitor has to keep 40 per cent 
of the lowest daily balance in the previous twelve month period with 
the Law Institute of Victoria. In 1973 this gave the institute control 
over $31.8 million of assets which earned interest of $1.96 million." 
In the first instance this interest is paid into the Victorian Guarantee 
Fund. This fund reimburses the clients of those solicitors who misap-
propriate trust funds, that is, put their clients' money to their own 
use. Individual solicitors do make a token contribution but the ma-
jority of the claims are paid from interest on clients' money. Vic-
torian lawyers, for example, contributed only $11,810 to the 
Guarantee Fund; whereas New South Wales lawyers contribute a 
greater proportion to the Fidelity Fund. 
In 1973 claims on the Victorian Guarantee Fund amounted to 
$314,000. In New South Wales claims against the Fidelity Fund 
amounted to $498,000 in the same year. In 1972 solicitors in 
Queensland were also in trouble with claims totalling $221,000. 
From three states alone $1 million of "clients' money" had to be 
paid out to cover misappropriation of trust funds." 
The law societies in New South Wales and Queensland have 
recently introduced spot audits to reduce the temptation for 
solicitors to misappropriate clients' funds or, if they are misap-
propriating funds, to find out about it earlier. By this method it is 
hoped to avoid cases such as the recent one which occurred in New 
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South Wales of a single solicitor allegedly misappropriating 
$700,000." The efforts of the law societies to prevent the occurrences 
of such events can be explained in terms of the protection they 
provide for the public. The law societies are also conscious that 
misappropriation of trust funds by a few solicitors can affect the 
public's confidence in the profession. 
In Queensland what the law society prefers to refer to as "a series 
of regrettable events" has led to the complete overhaul of the Trust 
Accounts Act. The new legislation, introduced in April 1973, allows 
for closer supervision and spot checks on solicitors' trust accounts. 
The new spot checks are routine matters in contrast to previous 
checks which were regarded as a preliminary to other action and 
hence as a black mark against a solicitor. The present Guarantee 
Fund provides the public with some protection after the event but 
legislation which dissuades solicitors from misappropriating funds 
should be beneficial to both the profession and the public. Under the 
present system it may take several years for the claim to be met and 
the associated inconvenience, even to the extent of having to employ 
another solicitor to handle the claim, should be avoided at all costs."" 
In Victoria, after claims against the Guarantee Fund have been 
met, the remainder is allocated in the ratio of 50 per cent to finance 
legal aid and 50 per cent to the Victorian Law Foundation. The foun-
dation provides finance for legal education, legal research, and law 
libraries. Other states have similar arrangements. For instance, 
Queensland solicitors pay two-thirds of the lowest daily balance in a 
twelve-month period into their law society account. Half the interest 
ori this fund is allocated to the Guarantee Fund, up to a maximum of 
$600,000, and the other half to Legal Aid. New South Wales 
solicitors deposit one-half of the lowest balance in a twelve-month 
period. The interest on this account is allocated to the Guarantee 
Fund, Legal Aid, and the New South Wales Foundation in such 
amounts as the council of the law society, with the consent of the 
attorney-general, determines."' 
We believe that, if possible, changes should be instituted so that 
clients receive the interest on their money at least in cases when the 
money was held for an appreciable period. But if trust account 
regulations and accounting procedures cannot ensure that the in-
terest on trust accounts is paid to the client it is certainly more 
satisfactory that it be used to finance legal aid than be paid out to 
clients to cover the activities of dishonest solicitors. Under the pre-
sent system the amount of money available to finance legal aid will 
be affected by the the extent of fraudulent activity by solicitors. The 
more controls which are placed over solicitors to ensure that there is 
little or no misappropriation of clients' money, the more money 
there will be to be released for legal aid. 
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Apart from the fact that law societies control solicitors' trust 
funds rather than a body such as the Attorney-General's Depart-
ment, the handling of trust monies has other implications for the 
autonomy of the profession. Not only is the use of clients' money to 
finance legal aid "an ingenious way of taxing the wealthier clients of 
the legal profession for public purposes.""^ it also allows the profes-
sion to determine how legal aid funds will be allocated. 
An analagous situation might be a health scheme with doctors im-
posing a levy on their wealthier patients to finance poorer patients 
and the Australian Medical Association having complete control of 
the scheme. The association would determine who could obtain 
"free" medical services, what illnesses could be treated under the 
scheme, and how much the doctor should receive for his services. No 
doubt there would be a public outcry. 
The control of large amounts of money by a law society gives the 
legal profession greater autonomy than any other profession. The 
latest development in this area is the foundation of the New South 
Wales College of Law. This is under the control of the New South 
Wales Law Society and is designed to provide a practical training 
course to replace the articled clerk system, and to provide a 
programme of continuing education for lawyers. The college is 
funded through the New South Wales Law Foundation which ob-
tains its funds from interest on trust monies. We fail to see why 
lawyers should be able to tax their clients to provide education for 
future lawyers. 
4. Negligence, incompetence, and delays 
What is the law societies' role in maintaining the quality of legal 
services? What redress is available to the client for poor quality ser-
vices? 
The client who loses money through the dishonesty of a solicitor 
may be able to obtain redress through the Fidelity or Guarantee 
Funds. However, the client who loses money through the negligence 
of incompetence of his solicitor is faced with difficulties. The nature 
of legal work is such that a negligent solicitor can impose large losses 
upon his client. There are also many instances in which, although no 
actual monetary loss is incurred, a client can suffer considerable in-
convenience and even hardship through unnecessary delays. The 
most widely spread examples of this problem seem to be delays in 
settling car accident claims, and delays in obtaining probate on an 
estate. 
There is only one recourse for a client who has problems with a 
129 
Law: Professional Autonomy and Public Interest 
solicitor and that is to find another solicitor. However, before 
resorting to this, a client can attempt to get some satisfaction by 
complaining to the appropriate law society. His prospects are well il-
lustrated by a comment by the president of the Queensland Law 
Society in reply to a question on the means of redress against a poor 
quality lawyer. Thus, "He can complain to the Law Society, 
although we are tied down to definitions of unprofessional conduct, 
professional misconduct and to malpractices. But you can change 
your solicitor at any time, and you have your common-law rights." 
The New South Wales Solicitor's Manual expresses a similar view 
with regard to solicitors who fail to answer correspondence, fail to 
follow instructions, or are generally incompetent in their duties."' 
The Law Society is not concerned with matters of mere negligence on 
the part of solicitors. Gross negligence, accompanied by something 
more, may amount to professional misconduct; but incompetence is 
something over which the Society has no control, not being the body 
by which admission was granted; and mere negligence is not a matter 
within its powers to exercise disciplinary sanctions however much the 
Society may be concerned about the effect on public relations; 
therefore the client must rely on his common law rights. 
A client's "common-law rights" means that if his solicitor is 
negligent the client can sue him. But this very right has two 
problems. First, he must find another solicitor to act against a fellow 
solicitor, and second, he must prove that the solicitor was negligent. 
This involves considerable risks because proving negligence through 
the courts is an expensive exercise. The problem of proving 
negligence is compounded by the fact that it may be many years 
before it is discovered that the error has occurred. For example, an 
error in a will may not be discovered until after death or, in the case 
of a transfer of property, until the owner is trying to sell the 
property. Many people are under the misconception that a solicitor's 
professional indemnity insurance provides protection for the public 
but it is still first necessary for the client to prove negligence. There is 
a movement in the profession towards making indemnity insurance a 
condition for the issue of a practising certificate, which would be in 
the interests of the profession and the public. 
A client who is dissatisfied with his solicitor's delays can complain 
to the law society but there is probably little he can achieve except 
additional cost to himself. For instance, a solicitor's bill in the 
authors' hands shows that a client who complained to the 
Queensland Law Society about delays in the handling of a divorce 
action was charged $3.00 by his solicitor for reading the letter from 
the society, $3.00 for the solicitor to reply to the law society, $1.50 
for the solicitor to send a copy of his reply to the client, and $1.50 for 
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reading a letter from the law society stating that the client had 
withdrawn the complaint. However, the collective complaints of a 
large number of clients may have some effect. The statutory commit-
tee of the New South Wales Law Society has confirmed this in its 
annual report in the following ruling, "a multiplicity of complaints, 
not individually mounting to professional misconduct, can, by 
reason of the multiplicity thereof, be deemed to be professional mis-
conduct"."" In plain English this means that if there are enough com-
plaints the law society may take some action. 
The client can also complain to the law society about overcharging 
but he will be informed that the law society has no jurisdiction over 
the bill of costs of the individual solicitor. The client's avenue of 
redress against overcharging is the taxation system. 
The problems faced by dissatisfied clients are evidenced by the 
large number of people who have taken their complaints to the 
Divorce Law Reform Association, rung open-line radio program-
mes, and written to newspaper columns. One of the problems of legal 
services is that it is difficult for the client to judge if the matter is 
proceeding satisfactorily or not. This produces problems in deciding 
at what stage to change solicitors. Additional problems are 
presented because a solicitor can retain a client's documents until 
legal costs owing to him are paid. 
There is little that the law societies will do to maintain the quality 
of legal services. Under present conditions the client's best protec-
tion appears to be to ensure that all the instructions are given in 
writing or, if given verbally, confirmed in writing. He should also 
keep notes of relevant dates and details of consultations as well as 
copies of all documents and correspondence so that, if he does com-
plain to the law society or sue for negligence, he will have adequate 
supporting evidence. In Victoria a client might remind his solicitor 
of Rule 3 of the Solicitors' (Professional Conduct and Practice) 
Rules: "A solicitor shall at all times use his best endeavours to com-
plete any work on behalf of his client as soon as is reasonably pos-
sible." 
Conclusion 
The legal profession in Australia has a large degree of autonomy, 
and there is every indication that it would like a larger one. Unlike 
other professional bodies, the law societies have considerable funds 
at their disposal, and this gives them powers far greater than those of 
other professional organizations. 
Yet, in all the areas we have examined, the performance of the 
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profession is, from the point of view of the public which uses legal 
services, dismal. On the questions of advertising and price competi-
tion the profession indulges in restrictive practices which certainly 
make life more comfortable for it, but probably make the supply of 
legal services more expensive and less efficient. The profession does 
not provide sufficient protection for the public with respect to 
overcharging, negligence, or misappropriation of funds. The profes-
sion uses interest on clients' money to make up defalcations by its 
members, and spends some of the balance on legal aid, most of 
which ends up in the solicitors' pockets in the form of fees. We have 
expressed grave doubts as to the propriety of the expenditure of 
clients' money in this fashion. 
If all the foregoing is correct, it seems to us that the profession is 
abusing the autonomy that it has by using it for its own benefit rather 
than for that of the public as a whole. A profession that behaves in 
this way is inviting greater control by government or by independent 
bodies on which consumers of legal services are represented. Either 
of these possibilities would substantially reduce the profession's 
autonomy. It is surely time that the profession realized that it is only 
when it acts for the public benefit that it can justify preserving, let 
alone extending, its autonomy. 
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The Medical Profession 
and Minority Groups 
JOHN MacKAY 
Editors' j h e medical profession in Australia has attained almost ex-
Notes elusive jurisdiction over determining which particular forms of 
behaviour constitute illness. These evaluations are believed to 
rest on objective, scientific criteria and to be subject to em-
pirical validation. Such a belief, however, neglects the social 
consequences of labelling behaviour which deviates from some 
biologically or socially defined norm as illness. Illness then, 
becomes socially constructed and is encompassed by the social 
and cultural expectations which surround it. For example, 
persons who exhibit certain forms of behaviour may be con-
sidered to have enhanced psychic powers and be greatly 
elevated in status in some cultures whereas they may be con-
sidered to be mad and locked away in others. Clearly the per-
sonal and social implications of defining the same objectively 
verifiable behaviour as illness or not illness is extremely impor-
tant when groups which accord legitimacy to diverse forms of 
behaviour come into contact. 
Despite its neutral, scientific facade the medical profession 
is largely engaged in evaluative activities that are concerned 
with determining what is normal or proper or desirable. In its 
concern with such activities, medicine is a moral enterprise 
comparable with religion or law in its determination to identify 
and to treat behaviour which it considers to be undesirable. The 
medical profession's right to be sole arbiter of what constitutes 
illness and how best to deal with that illness is supported by of-
ficial sanctions even to the extent that medical diagnosis and 
treatment may be imposed by the state. In the following chapter 
MacKay questions the validity of allowing the profession on 
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the basis of its claims of technical expertise and welfare 
orientation—to extend its normative regulation of the social 
behaviour of cultural groups who may not share the profes-
sion's criteria for evaluating cultural practices. 
The Australian medical profession, according to popular reputation, 
is a body of men (and a few women) who, because of their experience 
with those aspects of existence which are abnormal, unusual, or ex-
ceptional, are sublimely necessary for society's wellbeing. For not 
only does the medical profession have an almost mystical under-
standing of the very essence of life and its manifold variations, but, 
somehow, due to its superior knowledge, it is capable of virtually any 
modification of existence — short of trans-substantiation. 
This exclusive order of scientists has, it appears, changed the ac-
tual course of Western man's history, dragging him out of a 
quagmire of plagues, pestilences and scourges to his present Amazo-
nian salubrity; an almost immortal, Nietzschian superman, free 
from starvation and malnutrition, immune from the capricious 
brutality of infectious diseases, and virtually on the threshold of im-
munity from the ravages of cancer and the common cold. 
The belief goes that, compared to 100 years ago, Australians are 
liberated from most pestilences, and it is therefore only a matter of 
time on the part of medical researchers before the experience of ill-
health will be as obsolete as gas lighting. 
Yet none of the breakthroughs of medical science, such as surgery, 
antisepsis, anaesthetics, insulin, vitamins, antibiotics, and the like, 
are the main reason for society's supposed robustness. Changes in 
housing, sanitation, food supply, transport, and communication 
have been fundamental to this development. While medical science 
has contributed to this transformation, it has not generated it. The 
exalted status of medical practitioners detracts from the important 
contributions to public health made by engineers, agriculturists, and 
legislators. Without the engineering accomplishments of sanitation, 
water supply, transport, and communication, or the implementation 
of mass cropping techniques by agriculturalists and even the collec-
tion of mundane wastes by council-workers, infectious diseases could 
not have been conquered, and the significance of antibiotics would be 
marginal. 
Because doctors have always existed, medicine has always had a 
certain value, although this has been difficult to estimate in the past. 
But now, the investigations of sociologists have revealed that in the 
last century there has been a radical change in status in medicine. 
Nowadays the medical profession, at least in Australia, is singled out 
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as the most prestigious profession of them all. There is more kudos 
in medicine than in law, academic posts, science, or engineering, and 
the position of teachers, nurses, or social workers is, by comparison, 
lowly indeed in the eyes of the society. 
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with status, it is — for 
better or worse — always associated with the exercise of power. 
Thus, those professions with most status in society — namely 
medicine, law, and business — each have a certain power to which 
ordinary members of the public have no access. This privilege of ac-
cess to power need not necessarily be in terms of crass influence such 
as money, as in business, nor legislative and political infiuence, as in 
the case of law. It can exist in subtler ways — such as the power to 
decide what is abnormal, unusual or exceptional, or to infiuence how 
such decisions are made. This is the domain into which medical opi-
nion is so often called and where public expectations of the objec-
fiveness of medical science is higher than it would be for that of law 
or business, to say nothing for that of criminology, sociology, or 
anthropology. 
It could be argued that medicine is more highly esteemed now 
than it was 50 years ago because it appears to be producing more 
practical results. Certainly this is a plausible statement if one looks 
at the history of infectious diseases over these years. Where the ex-
istence of popularly conceived change is attributed to a profession, 
such as the eliminating of diseases, it is likely that such a profession 
will be given more popular credit in interpreting other phenomena 
related to human behaviour and experience. Even though doctors 
may not actually have this power of discrimination, the popular sen-
timent is such that doctors are "less likely to be wrong" than, say, 
lawyers or businessmen, and "far less likely to be wrong" than 
sociologists or criminologists. 
Yet it is naive to assume that doctors are sociologically impartial 
in their judgements. The doctor's years of upper-class social con-
ditioning is far more likely to influence his thinking than a few lec-
tures on social science in medical school. The doctor's educational 
background limits him to a restricted experience of class value 
systems from which to form his opinions. That his opinions are 
derived from upper-class environments is shown by a consideration 
of his educational background — viz., private primary or secondary 
school, university, training hospital appointment, and professional 
practice. At no stage need a medical student interact with lower 
socio-economic classes — for instance factory workers — during his 
training. 
The selection system for medical school entrance is also important 
— strengthening the homogeneity of the potential doctor's class 
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background since, although the stated criterion of entrance is 
academic ability, an important determinant is the social class of the 
applicant. This selection of doctors predominantly from a particular 
social or economic stratum has repercussions on other members of 
the community who do not share the doctor's background, and in 
spite of a constant rhetoric of social and humanitarian concern by 
the medical profession, an analysis of how doctors treat minority 
groups makes this rhetoric sound somewhat hollow. The following 
paragraphs will take up this point in some detail. 
Homosexuality 
We will start with a consideration of doctor's treatment of 
homosexuals since this, superficially at least, involves attitudes or 
judgments about one single attribute. Here we find that doctors, 
despite their limited experience of society, and their virtual ig-
norance of the findings of social sciences such as sociology, have dis-
proportionate powers in defining normality in their own terms — 
typically dressed up in terms such as "psychosexual immaturity". 
Yet sociologists find that there are no distinctive behavioural or 
social characteristics of homosexuals apart from their sexuality that 
give any basis to the belief that homosexuals are "different" (despite 
popular stereotypes to the contrary). In spite of this, doctors are 
trained not only to view homosexuals as different, but also to see 
them as "disordered" (jargon for "sick"). In this case, a judgment is 
made in spite of lack of any medical research data (hormone levels, 
chromosomal abnormalities etc.) to verify it. Thus, there are strong 
preconceptions within the medical system itself which are held to be 
correct in spite of the inability of its researchers to substantiate these 
judgments. The attitude, "if we're not correct, then we ought to be", 
is the categorical imperative that the populace allows doctors to 
hold. 
This applies to other areas where controversial issues are involved. 
In the case of homosexuals the imperative operates for medical prac-
titioners and for the public who ignore such scientific data as cannot 
provide them with an objective basis, and yet who behave as if it did. 
(In the case of cannabis the imperative takes even more liberty. Not 
only does the imperative demand that scientific data which doesn't 
substantiate its preconceptions be ignored, but further, it demands 
that scientific data be "manufactured" as if its existence were 
beyond question.) Not only do doctors treat homosexuality without 
guidelines of pathological or biochemical evidence (as well as 
without objective signs or symptoms) but, because of the profession's 
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credibility with the public, their treatment requires no justification. 
This is exercizing considerable, (if not arbitrary) power, since no 
other scientist has the legal prerogative to treat human beings in this 
way. The profession overrides the findings of social science and acts 
as if they were non-existent. The public gets fobbed off with state-
ments such as "we don't know enough about it" or "we need more 
research into the topic" when what is actually meant is "we know a 
lot about it, but we don't agree with it" or "we intend researching 
further until we can show we are right". 
One indisputable scientific fact about homosexuals is their ex-
istence — and on a larger scale than had been previously thought. 
The Kinsey surveys indicated that 4 per cent of the population are 
exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, while 6 to 10 per cent 
are at least predominantly homosexual in orientation throughout 
their lives. This figure is a minimum estimate, and the incidence of 
predominant homosexuality could be twice that again. Thus, 
between at least 10 and 15 per cent of adult men and women prefer 
sexual relations predominantly with members of their own sex. In 
other matters of behaviour and character the homosexual is no dif-
ferent from the heterosexual. Yet, instead of emphasizing the essen-
tial sameness of the so-called homosexual "subculture", the profes-
sion isolates this sexuality as an artificial category. 
Undergraduate medical syllabi classify homosexuality as a "per-
sonality disorder" (along with drug addiction and various neuroses). 
The emphasis is on treatment by uncovering "pathology", reinforc-
ing "heterosexuality" by persuasive techniques, or by a variety of 
physical therapies. No regard is taken of the sociologists' findings 
that the homosexuals show the same spectrum of behaviour as the 
community as a whole. Upon graduating, the doctor has a virtual 
arsenal of anti-homosexual "treatments" at his disposal. Any 
homosexual reckless or foolish enough to discuss his sexuality with a 
physician is virtually throwing himself to the lions, since the doctor is 
trained to view the homosexual as a deviant in the same way as he is 
trained to regard the presence of sugar in the urine as indicative of 
disease. This classification of homosexuality as "personality dis-
order" is not only destructive, but, unlike diseases such as diabetes 
or multiple sclerosis, is based on no observable physical, biochemical 
or behavioural abnormalities. Regardless of this, textbooks and 
medical schools push psycho-pathological or physio-pathological 
theories of no scientific value as explanations for this disorder. In 
spite of the lack of convincing evidence, they insist on theories about 
possible causes, but never question their fundamental assumption 
that is, are they dealing with an "illness" in the first place? In 
adopting such attitudes, the medical profession is not only 
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propagating biased, prejudicial attitudes, but, even worse, it is ac-
tively reinforcing them. 
Psychotherapy, behaviour therapy, aversion therapy, hormonal 
treatment, brain surgery, and chemical castration: these are some of 
the methods of "treating" homosexuality at the disposal of any 
member of the medical profession. In a recent article in the 
Australian Medical Journal, a psychiatrist advised that how the doc-
tor managed a patient with a homosexual problem "depended on the 
personal conviction of the doctor" (McConaghy 1973). This could 
hardly be interpreted as an impartial or objective recommendation. 
Yet, if the doctor has a personal conviction that homosexuality is 
evidence of illness (and there is no reason why he shouldn't, consider-
ing his training), the homosexual can be treated at best with con-
descending toleration and at worst (and more usually) submitted to a 
sophisticated form of brain-washing (psychotherapy or behaviour 
therapy), aversion therapy or physical molestation (hormonal 
therapy and aversion therapy) and even "chemical castration" — 
cyproterone acetate which effectively turns its subjects into eunuchs. 
Davidson's Textbook of Medicine, read by all undergraduate doc-
tors in Australia, recommends treating homosexuals with the hor-
mone stilboestrol even though gynaecomastia (enlargement of the 
male breasts) and testicular atrophy are common and often irreversi-
ble "side effects". Aversion therapy, which has been employed more 
extensively in Australia than elsewhere in the world in recent years, 
often involves a series of electrical shocks being given to the con-
scious patient, yet evidence of the effectiveness of this treatment is 
lacking. Compare this with such statements about marihuana as: 
"Too little is known about the pharmacology of this drug to warrant 
its use in clinical medicine at this stage." How then, can another 
equally unproven form of treatment be applied elsewhere? The 
answer, of course, is that such treatment is concordant with the 
cultural ideology of those in power. 
Although the present federal minister for health has denied 
knowledge of brain operations being performed on homosexuals, the 
Campaign Against Moral Persecution in Sydney claims to know of 
several recent cases. Chemical castrating drugs, however, were sup-
ported "in principle" by the minister when they were provisionally 
introduced into Australia early in 1973. There were, at the time of 
writing this, no indications for believing that such castration therapy 
would not be used in treating homosexuals. Several psychiatrists 
have already expressed their intention of using chemical castration in 
the treatment of homosexuality as soon as it becomes available. 
They justify this stand on the grounds that the homosexual patients 
beg them for these treatments — implying that the psychiatrists em-
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bark upon such treatments only reluctantly. That such treatments 
should even be considered is extraordinary. 
Although there has been enormous expenditure — in terms of 
money, materials, and manpower — on medical research to "cure" 
homosexuality in Australia, there has been no actual support from 
within the medical profession for pro-homosexual organizations. In 
the A ustralian Medical Journal article referred to earlier, doctors 
were exhorted to support such organizations yet the author then 
went on to disparage them himself. 
Of the three pro-homosexual helping agencies currently operating 
in New South Wales, not one has been recognized in any way by the 
Australian medical profession, although various practitioners and 
psychiatrists refer patients to them individually. Although the Col-
lege of Psychiatrists feigns concern about this issue, it has never 
acknowledged the existence of these agencies despite the shortcom-
ings of its own establishment. The College of Psychiatrists has sup-
ported homosexual law reform, but this can hardly be interpreted as 
"sticking its neck out", since all mental patients have basic legal and 
civil rights. A consideration of the logic behind many "pro-
homosexual" statements reveals gems of tautology such as, 
"homosexuality is probably a genetically inherited disorder, or due 
to intra-uterine abnormalities. Therefore, to legally penalise 
homosexuals is unfair, since their orientation is due to factors 
beyond conscious control." Those psychiatrists who use these 
mechanistic or physical arguments as evidence are often the ones 
who advocate mechanistic or physical therapy, such as chemical 
castration. And at least two members of the college consider that ac-
tive support for homophile organizations would be akin to "en-
couraging" them — believing that encouraging homosexuals to ac-
cept themselves as they are is synonymous with "making it spread". 
Apart from this fear being contrary to experiences in Scandinavia 
and in the United Kingdom, the sentiment implies that homosex-
uality is wrong or evil, which begs the question. 
It is the dominant cultural prejudice which creates the problems 
not the various minority groups. 
Some cynics say that those who support homosexual treatment 
have more than just a scientific interest in this subject. The popular 
logic of such sentiments brands anyone who argues for homosexuals 
as being "one of them himself and those who most vehemently 
argue the case for homosexual treatment by therapeutic punishment 
as being latent homosexuals. Although the latter has a specious logic 
about it, it confiates the issue and is a form of ad-hominen argument. 
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Cannabis (Marihuana, Indian Hemp) 
While the medical profession ignores important information about 
homosexuals and thus reinforces social bias, it grossly misinterprets 
"factual" information about cannabis, and concocts scientific argu-
ments to mystify and deceive the public into believing that cannabis 
is as toxic and as dangerous as the doctors want to believe it is. 
There have been two editorials on marihuana in the Medical Jour-
nal of A ustralia in the last three years and both have argued strongly 
against its legalization. Although the editorials "do not necessarily" 
express the view of the Australian Medical Association or of doctors 
in general, in the mind of the public they do; to the community the 
Australian Medical Association and the Medical Journal of 
Australia are the profession's voices. 
On 18 December 1971, the Medical Journal of Australia gave a 
resume' of more than three pages of "medical studies" on the drug. It 
stated that "pharmacologically, marihuana has no therapeutic use in 
modern medicine". It then looked at the effect of marihuana in a 
variety of animal experiments (where the animals became aggres-
sive), and quoted "well documented" evidence which showed that 
marihuana led to "acute psychotic episodes". Furthermore, it at-
tributed the "amotivational syndrome" to its "heavy chronic use in 
Western and Eastern Cultures". "One can always recognise a pot 
smoker of any duration", the article stated, "by the fact that he will 
have been admitted to hospital on many occasions suffering from 
'bronchitis'". One case of birth deformity was "suggestive" that 
"repeated doses of marihuana could cause foetal damage". Liver 
damage, reported from "workers in South Africa", was described as 
"similar" to descriptions of "two Indian users who died after large 
over-doses of marihuana". "The L.D.50 for T.H.C. in humans", the 
editorial went on, "has not been ascertained, but is quite high in all 
experimental animals". This led on to statements that "it is clear 
that cannabis is a potent drug" and the editorial agreed with other 
"Medical Authorities" that "cannabis is dangerous". It argued 
against legalization on the grounds that "marihuana can easily be 
adulterated with other forms of addiction" and that "adulteration of 
legally available supplies would be difficult to control", without 
stating how or why in either case. 
It seems almost incredible that, having said all this, it went on to 
conclude that "the major issues are not medical or biological but 
social and political ones". The writer thus deflected attention from 
the distortions and half-truths that the article had spent three pages 
elaborating, by proposing that the "real" answer lay in the social and 
political arena. This may be so, but when these arenas need factual 
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evidence to draw upon to vindicate their arguments — to whom do 
they turn? A magistrate or judge, having read the editorial, would 
surely be quite reckless to advocate leniency towards a defendant 
pleading on the grounds of the relative harmlessness of marihuana 
especially in view of the editorial statement (not opinion) that it is 
"potent" and "dangerous". 
But let us examine the "evidence" put forward by the Medical 
Journal of Australia. To say that marihuana "has no therapeutic use 
in modern medicine" is true in as much as marihuana is not used 
today in treatment. Yet, until the 1930s, "ticture of cannabis" was a 
normal part of a doctor's bag, and was used for an extraordinary 
spectrum of physical complaints from tetanus, analgesia (pain relief) 
during labour, to control of convulsions, rheumatic pain, asthma, 
and chronic bronchitis! That marihuana fell into medical disuse with 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 in the U.S.A. is no coincidence, 
since the act was accompanied by harsh, complex administrative 
edicts that made it virtually impossible to use, prescribe, or experi-
ment with hemp or its derivatives. In spite of this, some limited 
research was done. In 1949, for example, Davis and Ramsay showed 
that marihuana derivatives were significantly effective in the treat-
ment of epileptics (Grinspoon 1973, p. 10). Other fields in which 
marihuana is at least potentially effective are in analgesia (pain 
relief), antihypertension (lowering blood pressure), and psychophar-
macology (e.g., opiate withdrawal, the treatment of alcoholic 
withdrawal, and sedation). Thompson and Proctor, in the North 
Carolina Medical Journal of 1953, described clinical alleviation of 
post-alcoholic symptoms ("delirium tremens") in 84 per cent of 
seventy cases using parahexyl, a synthetic cannabis derivative. 
Stockings, in the British Medical Journal of 28 June 1948, described 
the use of synhexyl, a synthetic derivative of marihuana. He showed 
that in fifty depressive patients, thirty-six showed a definite improve-
ment in mood, and other parameters of positive response. The ex-
periment had shortcomings in terms of lack of controls, but one of 
the ironies of modern medicine is the failure of subsequent in-
vestigators to follow-up experiments such as this, as well as those by 
Davis and Ramsay and by Thompson and Proctor, since they in-
dicate unequivocally that marihuana is a potentially useful drug. 
To say then that "marihuana has no therapeutic use in modern 
medicine", as do the M.J.A. editors, is not to say that it could not 
have therapeutic use, which alters the situation entirely. To go on to 
quote negative animal experiments implies that no beneficial human 
experiments are known which, as has been shown, is not the case. 
The "well documented evidence" of marihuana intoxication 
leading to "acute psychotic episodes" is "well documented" only in 
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the sense that the material written on this topic has had wide publica-
tion — hardly surprising in this day and age. To appeal to the 
"amotivational syndrome" is, however, proposing a paper-tiger, 
since the syndrome is not a physical reality but a descriptive entity 
meaning a "lack of interest in the pursuit of the normal goals of in-
dividuals in society". To attribute complex social attitudes to the use 
of a particular drug is simplistic and implies that the description of a 
syndrome is sufficient to impute its factual existence. Even if one 
were to accept the reductionist logic of this thinking as valid, its ap-
plication to reality is so vague as to render its interpretation tenuous 
— since it could be said to apply with equal, if not more, validity to 
heroin, alcohol, or barbiturates. The statement that a "pot smoker 
of any duration" is "recognisable by the fact that he will have been 
admitted to hospital on many occasions suffering from bronchitis 
and considerable emphysema" is so blatantly untrue that one 
wonders how desperate the M.J.A. editors were in scraping together 
their material. For example, if we hypothesize the lower limit of 
marihuana consumers in the community to be 8 per cent, then one 
million regular pot-smokers in Australia will have had "many ad-
missions" to hospital for bronchitis — that is, many millions of ad-
missions annually. If this were true, the public hospitals in Australia 
would be so full of "bronchitics" as to warrant declaration of an 
epidemic of such proportion as has not been known since the Black 
Death. Further, if the weak amounts of marihuana available in 
Australia were smoked to the point of "chronic non-productive 
cough", the effect on the foolish experimenter would not be 
"bronchitis" so much as a state of temporary anaesthesia. 
To cite one case of birth deformity as "suggestive" that 
marihuana ""could cause foetal damage" is so outrageously unscien-
tific and unwarranted as to raise the question of whether the article 
was not written by trained medical scientists but by students as a 
joke — and one in poor taste at that. 
The reference to the "two Indian users", who are compared to 
"cases of liver damage reported from South Africa" and who "died 
after large overdoses of marihuana", comes from a description by 
G.F. Ewens, superintendent of the Punjab Lunatic Asylum, Lahore, 
India in 1898. He reported seeing two instances of charas (cannabis) 
addiction whose victims were compelled to give up the use of can-
nabis on committal. Each was said to have suddenly obtained posses-
sion of a large amount and taken a greater dose than he had been in 
the habit of taking before confinement. The reference to death fol-
lowing a "larger than usual dose" clearly suggests that the actual 
drug leading to death may have been opium. In any case, the poor 
documentation of this report, its occurrence in the last century, and 
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the doubt about the actual nature of the drug, make one wonder why 
a more reliable record was not cited as evidence in the M.J.A. Such a 
puzzle is quickly resolved by the realization that no such records 
have been published. For thousands of years, all over the world 
where marihuana has been used, people have stubbornly refused to 
die from its use. There is not one accurately documented case of 
death due to cannabis use — a remarkable fact when one considers 
its use by countless numbers of people for a very long time. If the 
cases of liver damage in South Africa are "similar" to those of the 
two Indian users, one wonders how far the point may be stretched. 
Now, the term "L.D.50" is a shorthand and general way of 
determining the toxicity of a drug. The editorial said, quite correctly, 
that "the L.D.50 for T.H.C. [Tetra-hydra-cannabinol] in humans has 
not been ascertained, but it is quite high in all experimental 
animals". To a non-medically trained reader, this statement is in-
comprehensible. To a medically trained person it is amazing; more 
so because the editorial could then go on to say that "cannabis is a 
potent [and] ... dangerous drug", when the evidence given indicates 
the opposite conclusion. 
The dose of barbiturate needed to kill half the number of people 
taking it (i.e., the L.D.50 of barbiturate for humans) is 1,000 - 5,000 
mg. The "effective dose" of barbiturate, i.e., that dose required to 
produce its medicinal effect, such as sleep or sedation, is 100 - 300 
mg. In other words, a dose of barbiturate which is only 3 to 50 times 
the effective dose is fatal for half the patients who take it. In the case 
of alcohol, a dose that is only 4 to 10 times its "effective dose" will 
kill half the people who take it. For T.H.C. there is no known lethal 
dose for humans. No matter how much T.H.C. is given to volunteer 
subjects, they simply fail to succumb to it. The L.D.50 of T.H.C. for 
animals is 2,160,000 mcg/kg. Comparing this with the effective dose 
of 50 mcg/kg (for humans) we can, by extrapolation, postulate that a 
dose of marihuana that is forty thousand times the dose needed to 
obtain a "high" might be lethal for those subjects taking it. This 
omits the consideration that the only way that this could be achieved 
would be to stuff the gut so full of highly concentrated hash that the 
greater danger would be from stomach perforation. Thus, to the ex-
tent that the most extreme toxic effect is considered a parameter of a 
drug's toxicity, marihuana is an extremely safe drug. 
To say, on this evidence, that cannabis is a potent drug is mis-
leading, since aspirin is also a potent drug. To say that cannabis is a 
"dangerous" drug is incredible, since, on the only criteria given, the 
L.D.so of aspirin is infinitely more dangerous, as is that of alcohol 
and that of barbiturates. There are hundreds of deaths recorded from 
aspirin and barbiturates annually in Australia and the toxicity of 
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alcohol need hardly be expanded upon — except to comment that 
half the fatal road accidents are associated with its consumption. In 
the light of this can the M.J.A. seriously talk about keeping 
marihuana illegal on the grounds of its "clearly dangerous" nature? 
The argument that legalization of marihuana would not only fail 
to "stop illicit trade" but would also make "adulteration of legally 
available supplies difficult to control" is curious logic indeed. The 
example of legalizing heroin in the U.K. can only be seen as a red 
herring, since there has never been a large heroin problem in that 
country (there are only several hundred opiate addicts in the British 
Isles), and since heroin is also a narcotic, which by definition, means 
it is addictive. To talk of "soaring sales of illegal heroin" in this 
deliberately alarmist fashion is like talking about soaring sales of 
original Picassos. The number of consumers having possession of 
either commodity is exceedingly small. 
For heroin addicts not to get their drug is life-threatening, since 
heroin is a narcotic. Failure to maintain its intake leads to dangerous 
withdrawal symptoms such as muscle cramps, hallucinations, con-
vulsions, coma and often death. Even if the "illegal sales" were as 
large as the M.J.A. implies, the number of customers would only be 
several hundred at the very most — hardly epidemic proportions. 
And marihuana is not, in the medical usage of the word, a narcotic. 
It doesn't have one characteristic of a narcotic drug. To compare 
marihuana with heroin is ludicrous. One is a narcotic taken in-
travenously, the other a dried-out plant that is ignited and inhaled. 
Thus, the Australian medical profession has washed its hands of 
social responsibility towards a million or so members of the com-
munity by distorting available knowledge into quasi-scientific 
propaganda. By using such special jargon terms as "LD", 
"emphysema", "amotivational syndrome", and the like, the profes-
sion has ensured that its authority is unchallengable by the non-
medically trained community. For the M.J.A. editors to attack 
marihuana in technical language and then smugly say "the major is-
sues are not medical or biological, but social and political", is to con-
fuse the issue deliberately. Thus, the profession makes itself the only 
authority by mystifying the argument, and thereby protecting itself 
from criticisms of failure to fulfill its social responsibility. Because 
the language of the profession's authority is clothed in medical ter-
minology, it is impossible for a non-professional to judge how the 
profession in coming to its conclusions about the "toxicity" of 
marihuana. 
And so the medical profession has ceased to use an erstwhile com-
mon drug of potentially high usefulness, has joined forces with fear 
and ignorance, and has in fact abused the social responsibility that a 
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trusting community has vested in it. By emphasizing the "toxicity" 
and "potency" of marihuana, the medical profession has not only 
openly urged the continuance of criminalization of possibly one mil-
lion Australians, but has also directed attention away from research 
and development of a potentially beneficial drug. The bulk of con-
temporary research into cannabis is directed towards uncovering 
possible harmful side-effects (and such research is invariably funded 
by government grants). A survey of the current literature on 
marihuana reveals a preponderence of esoteric titles such as 
"Electrocardiographic abnormalities of marihuana smokers". Of 
hundreds of projects such as these in Australia and overseas not one 
has been initiated to continue the work of the pioneers of the late for-
ties and early fifties into the drug's therapeutic usefulness. 
Aborigines 
Unlike its attitude towards homosexuals and cannabis smokers, the 
Australian medical profession's attitude towards Aborigines has 
changed from indifference or hostility to curiosity over the last 
decade. Medical researchers were able to establish that the diseases 
and illnesses experienced in the aboriginal communities were not es-
oteric entities but mundane infections and the like, which resulted 
from a change in life-style rather than from genetic susceptibility. 
These illnesses were not only treatable using orthodox knowledge 
and techniques, but were, by European standards, entirely preven-
table. Thus, gastroenteritis — a common problem in aboriginal in-
fants — is not due to the infant's aboriginality, but to his living con-
ditions. If only the gastroenteritis is treated the "cure" is piecemeal 
and the problem will continue recurring at the same rate. Alter the 
infant's environment, however, by providing adequate sanitation, 
garbage collection, and hygiene instruction and the disease disap-
pears. In fact, it is cheaper in the long run to alter the environment, 
since the cost of hospitalizing children debilitated from gas-
troenteritis from a given community over the span of a year could 
rehouse a quarter of the families over the same period. 
This is not to imply that, because the medical profession has ex-
ploded some social myths, it hasn't continued to propagate others. 
Indeed, the very criterion by which the medical profession judges 
"acceptable health", i.e., by using middle-class standards, assumes 
that these are worth emulating. This plays right into the hands of 
those who believe in racial superiority and assimilation, since it is 
hoped that the aboriginal race will merge genetically and 
behaviourally with the white race and that somehow, as a result, the 
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aboriginal "question" will fade away. Such attitudes and assump-
tions are expensive, however, as Professor Tatz has pointed out 
(1971). During the decade of the 1960s millions of dollars were spent 
in the Northern Territory on aboriginal health without any ap-
preciable result. 
Such failures to innovate meaningful changes have a cultural 
basis. No attempt was made by the Northern Territory health ad-
ministration to work within the social framework of aboriginal 
culture. 
This cultural myopia is shared by the Australian medical profes-
sion, which has never recognized the existence of an aboriginal 
system of medicine, even though this flourished for tens of thousands 
of years prior to European settlement. Western-orientated 
Australian doctors have always assumed that their system is 
superior, and have expected Aborigines to regard Western medicine 
as automatically preferable to their own. This has not happened in 
the Northern Territory, where traditional aboriginal culture still ex-
ists. The doctors' attitude is similar to that of the early explorers of 
the Australian interior, who, while travelling on camel trains heavily 
laden with food, clothing, and water supplies, looked down at half-
naked blacks wandering around with spears and little else, and called 
them primitives and savages. That the Aborigines' survival in such a 
harsh environment required so little in the way of physical parapher-
nalia was never considered to be a manifestation of intelligence. 
Such oversights still operate today. The Australian Medical Associa-
tion would hardly be likely to concede that traditional aboriginal 
medical systems should have equal status to its own — in spite of 
their effectiveness for survival. 
There is evidence that prior to white occupation. Aborigines en-
joyed a standard of health that in many ways was higher than that of 
contemporary black or white Australians (Basedow 1932, p. 198). 
Most, if not all, major infectious diseases (such as tuberculosis, 
hepatitis, syphylis) were introduced by white colonists, and the 
Aborigines were free of the two major killers and maimers of con-
temporary Western society — clogging of the arteries and machine 
accidents. The life-style of the Aborigines was the basis of their 
relative freedom from ill-health. Because they were hunter-
gatherers, and lived in small groups often to twenty-five, they were a 
mobile people and this probably accounted for the fact that infec-
tious diseases were rare. Accumulation of excreta and wastes is only 
problematic to static communities. Even if infectious diseases did 
break out, the number of people affected was small and the 
"epidemic" was self-limiting. Because food was gathered from roots, 
shrubs, and trees, physical exercise was a necessary component of 
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existence, and obesity was virtually unknown. Likewise the absence 
of food processing, preserving, and refinement, plus the need for 
strong chewing action, accounted for a remarkable absence of 
decayed teeth. 
To attribute the Aborigines' lack of enthusiasm for Western 
medicine to "ignorance" or "lack of education" is, even at the most 
superficial level, grossly ethnocentric. Why should the Aborigines be 
amazed at "cures" for diseases that the white man brought into the 
country in the first place? Why ought Aborigines be impressed by the 
white doctor's proposed solution to overpopulated aboriginal 
families when birth control was practised for thousands of years 
before the missions prohibited it, causing the very "problem" that is 
now to be "solved"? How can integration into the white community 
be seriously thought of as a "solution" to aborginal health problems 
when over a century of conscious effort to do this has produced one 
of the sickest races on earth? The health problem of the Aborigines is 
a direct result of cultural domination and conquest. A race of 
agriculturalists, whose method is to dominate nature with 
technology, literally annihilated the natural environment which was 
the spiritual and physical basis of hunter-gatherer existence by 
throwing the aboriginal tribes into concentration camps, and letting 
them rot. White "experts" were then sent into aboriginal reserves to 
study the causes of this decay and they attributed it to ignorance of 
hygiene, poor sanitation and inadequate washing facilities. Having 
explained the rot in white man's terms, the solution is to educate the 
Aborigine to see the "advantage" of the white system. 
This social monotheism, this intolerance of the dominant culture 
towards pluralism and its coercion to conform to its own uniformly 
rigid "standards", is reinforced by the medical profession. Instead of 
recognizing the validity of traditional aboriginal health systems, the 
medical profession posits a white life-style as the only solution. It 
does not even consider that Westerners were part of "the system" 
that created the problem. The myth that "white is right" is rein-
forced by attributing lack of white-European habits as the cause of 
aboriginal ill-health. The belief that white is right is perpetuated by 
attributing aboriginality as the reason for there being a health 
problem. 
Failure to acknowledge the existence of another medical system 
cannot be taken as indicative of a positive interest in well-being. 
Thus, the improvement of intelligence quotients of pre-school 
reservation aboriginal children by taking them from their environ-
ment and parental control and placing them in Western institutions, 
implies that institutionalized Western intelligence is the most 
desirable form of "intelligence" if not the only manifestation of it. 
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To take a child away from its parents "for its own good" ("good" 
equalling "improvement in intelligence") is the old assimilation 
policy in a scientific guise. It operates on the same principle that 
aboriginal culture is inherently inferior. The implication that white 
culture must be learned if the aboriginal race is to survive assumes 
that Westerners alone hold the answer to the problem of existence. 
But physically or mentally annihilating other cultures and replacing 
them with one single culture is a crass solution, and the kindest thing 
one could say of this is that it is a manifestation of cultural ar-
rogance, and different only in degree from "final solutions" which 
have been applied to other minority groups. The advocates of the 
ne-A- "final solution" are medical practitioners who perform the same 
magic tricks as the shamen of old — except they prescribe penicillin 
instead of chanting a magic formula. The spectre of a professor of 
medicine instructing his students to improve the Aborigines' con-
fidence by giving them penicillin is the historical outcome of the 
merchants who tried to dazzle them with matches and trinkets, and 
of the missionaries who tried to instil a sense of shame by enforcing 
coverage of genitalia. Treatment for "emotionally disturbed" tribal 
Aborigines carries these supremacy beliefs to the extreme. How can 
descriptive entities such as schizophrenia and depression, which de-
pend on language and its interpretation for their very existence as 
"disorders", be said to exist in a culture that does not even use the 
same language? Yet recommendations for using electro-convulsive 
therapy and phenothiazine (anti-psychotic) drugs on disturbed tribal 
Aborigines have been submitted by white experts to the federal 
government as serious solutions to these "mental illnesses", and are 
likely to be implemented — or rather imposed — on aboriginal com-
munities because such "treatments" are culturally acceptable to the 
white power-structure. 
The same white experts go on tours of northern tribal reservations 
and, writing them up in the Medical Journal of Australia, interpret 
the sighting of an aboriginal cave-drawing painted over with the 
word "jonatan" as an example of "aboriginal vandalism". No men-
tion is made of Comalco and its complete annihilation of the Yir-
rkala tribe and its sacred ceremonial grounds to build an alumina 
works. Nor is a word said about the Vesteys company which, along 
with government advisers, has been waging a war of attrition against 
the Gurindji tribe to deprive them of a few acres of land for the sake 
of the pastoral industry. Nor is there any hint of the exploitation of 
the Pijatjintjara tribe by the substitution of alcohol for pitjari. Even 
if one believes the definition of the etymology of a mis-spelt name on 
^ cave wall, the consideration of officially approved white vandalism 
hardly leaves one gasping for breath at the description of a possible 
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act of aboriginal iconoclasty. Yet what could be more iconoclastic 
than this white expert's recommendation that future aboriginal in-
itiation ceremonies be performed in public hospitals? 
There exists in New South Wales a pcTwer clique of medical prac-
titioners — mostly academics — who have an enormous influence on 
government decisions on aboriginal health, and who have direct 
access to government policy and economic machinery. They initiate 
research into aspects of aboriginal existence that is riddled with 
white value-judgments about mental illness, intelligence, and 
education. This research is published in the Medical Journal of 
Australia, whose editors eulogize its humanitarian and social 
content. Because these "experts" are not answerable to, directed or 
guided by aboriginal communities, they have no onus to justify their 
existence in terms of aboriginal aspirations — as seen by Aborigines. 
The white power-structure is their only reference point. The 
aboriginal community itself is rarely consulted in the design and 
execution of these "research" projects. Aborigines don't control 
government machinery, including the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs in Canberra which is run by white bureaucrats. These men 
account for the expenditure of most of the funds made available for 
such things as aboriginal health, education, and research. Because 
the experts recommend answers to the problems they research in 
terms of the white system, it is they, not the Aborigines, who actually 
generate integration or assimilation policies. Thus Professor 
Nurcombe's pre-school experiment at Bourke (1973) has shown an 
"improvement" in intelligence quotients of aboriginal children. This 
was hailed by the M.J.A. editors as going "very close to the core of 
the (aboriginal) problem" and having "practicality", "commonsense 
appeal", and "obvious beneficial effect". This implies that 
Aborigines must conform to Western concepts of literacy, since this 
was "necessary" for integration and the latter was seemingly 
"inevitable". No question was raised about the function of education 
as another form of white oppression and domination — imposing 
alien philosophies on minorities with quite different concepts, social 
organization and, if one bothers to ask them, different ideas about 
their own future. It is no solution to concentrate on education — as if 
this could work in a vacuum — without attending to environmental 
handicaps, and the effect of these on the inhabitants. To educate pre-
school or school age Aborigines with Western education techniques 
smacks of paternalism and self-righteousness. To fail to involve 
other members of the aboriginal community in the education process 
is implying that they are incompetent, ignorant, and inadequate as 
parents, relatives, or people. 
Until the white power structure realizes that whatever "answer" it 
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throws up to the "problem" of aboriginality, without consulting or 
receiving direction from the Aborigines involved, whatever policy 
the power structure cares to dream up, will by its very nature simply 
perpetuate the existence of a repressed, oppressed minority. 
Aborigines are oppressed because of the white power system. To 
alter the form of oppression from that of decimation and direct 
genocide to "necessary" and "inevitable" education is only altering 
the type of oppression. Thus, the protests of black power groups 
continue, since it is the white experts and bureaucrats who actually 
make important decisions in aboriginal affairs. The paradox is that 
there is no "black power" — only "white power". Until Aborigines 
run their own affairs, there will always be an aboriginal "problem". 
Women 
Although women as patients do not constitute a statistical minority, 
they are in effect treated as if they did. Indeed, the deliberate or un-
conscious policy of witholding the knowledge and practice of 
medical science from women is one of the greatest factors mitigating 
against their liberation. The medical profession's attitude towards 
women, even those from upper middle-class backgrounds, is to 
relegate them into submission. The situation of childbirth in modern 
Australian society clearly indicates this—in fact, it puts the 
Australian medical profession in the dubious position of being one of 
the most sexist groups in the world today. In less than four decades 
Australian doctors have come to a position of virtual absolute power 
in the domain of childbirth. 
Since the 1930s, Australian women have been led to accept the 
necessity of hospitalization as the only way to proceed with a natural 
bodily function. The process of childbirth holds the distinction of 
having become something that the human race in its most civilized 
state is incapable of carrying out by itself — requiring the interven-
tion of institutions and specialists. The services of these experts (GPs 
and obstetricians) have become indispensable prerequisites for the 
continuation of the species, They will not even allow midwives to 
practise autonomously in the area of childbirth. Naturally, home 
confinements are impossible when even trained midwives have legal 
sanctions operating against their participation in domestic deliveries. 
The doctors, with their total autocracy over childbirth, insist on 
hospitalization of maternity patients on the grounds of expediency 
and poorly rationalized health arguments. The latter are untenable, 
since World Health Organization statistics indicate that infant and 
maternal mortality and morbidity are no different in the U.K. and 
Canada, where home confinements by midwives are carried out 
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regularly. While the reasons for this extraordinary development in 
the power of the medical profession are not entirely clear, their effect 
on the identity and role of the female is that of total subjugation. 
A woman thus conditioned to accept one of her most fundamental 
biological activities as equivalent to being a major illness, is an easy 
target for whatever subsequent authoritative powers the profession 
may attempt to exercise over her — for instance in matters of sexual 
conduct and domestic activity. Today, the most mutinous request a 
woman can make of her doctor is to ask for him — or worse, to ask a 
midwife — to deliver her infant at home. The doctor will be 
astonished at the woman's ignorance of her current role in history. It 
is "good" to be in hospital because the doctor says so; and for the 
same reason, it is "bad" for a woman to expect home confinement. 
This power of the doctor to decide on the normality and goodness 
of his treatment of other human beings is absolute. If the woman 
does not submit to the doctor's judgment, she cannot turn anywhere 
else for instruction or assistance during her pregnancy since the doc-
tor holds a monopoly in this field. She is in a complete bind. If she 
refuses medical counsel, not only is she, for all intents and purposes, 
"bad" in the eyes of the doctor and the maternity hospital, but "evil" 
(negligent, incompetent or ignorant) in the medical establishment's 
judgment of her intentions and attitudes towards the unborn child. 
The woman cannot decide for herself whether her feelings are valid, 
since the very knowledge she requires to make this judgment is not 
within her access — legally or medically. Only the doctor has access 
to both the scientific knowledge and institutional facilities from 
which his judgments are culled. 
Yet, even if a woman is "good" and submits herself to the mater-
nity hospital, this very act undermines her role in the birth process. It 
is not just that the woman is made completely dependent by having 
to submit to the medical personnel's interpretation of how her body 
is working. From the very moment of her admission to the hospital 
other non-verbal messages from the institution's routine activities 
begin to act on her. She is submitted to such things as compulsory 
showering, pubic shaving, and enemas, for example, even though, ac-
cording to medical science itself, showering, pubic shaving, and 
enemas are of dubious hygenic value. They are, however, certainly 
effective in implying that the woman is smelly, dirty and full of shit 
as the anthropologist Dr. Annette Hamilton points out (Hamilton 
1972). 
Whether the "messages" of the hospital's routine procedures are 
intentional or not is beside the point, since it is the woman's reaction 
to them that makes her doubt her own existential validity. What is 
important is that women are not only made to feel incapable of bear-
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ing children of their own volition, but that they are also incapable of 
actually being women. 
Summary and conclusions 
Leaving aside the seven million Australians (no longer a "minority") 
who, for various cultural, social, or economic reasons are mis-
managed by the medical profession, what of the objective treatment 
of physical disease into which 95 per cent of the doctor's training has 
been directed? The two commonest causes of ill health or premature 
death in Australia are accidents (predominantly motor vehicle, in-
dustrial, and domestic) in the young, and cardiovascular diseases in 
the middle and elderly age groups. 
Unlike the major diseases of the past, such as smallpox, diptheria, 
or plague, there are no possible miracle drugs that could solve these 
problems, since accidents and cardiovascular diseases are a product 
of our life-style — of our technology, dietary habits, senescence, and 
affluence. We cannot expect antibiotics, vitamins, or immunizations 
to prevent or cure dietary indiscretions, or our dependency on 
machines. 
The incidence of cardiovascular disease is increasing in relative 
and absolute proportion as well as decreasing in its age of onset in 
Western cultures, while it remains a rarity in non-Western societies. 
The underlying feature of the disease — fat deposition in the walls of 
blood vessels — has been shown to be present in half the male pop-
ulation of the U.S.A. by the age of 21 years (and this was 30 years 
ago) and it is not uncommon to find it in the 6 to 8-year-old age 
bracket. These fat deposits consist of cholesterol and "saturated" 
fatty acids which are derived from a dietary intake of animals and 
their products, such as meat, milk, butter, cheese, and eggs. Other 
factors such as a high intake of refined sugar, lack of physical exer-
cise, stress, smoking, and obesity also contribute to the deposition of 
these fats in vessel walls. 
The association between eating animal fats and their deposition on 
vessel walls (called atherosclerosis) is understood well enough to im-
plicate cholesterol and saturated fats as substances toxic to humans 
when eaten regularly (Framingham Studies, U.S.A., "Lipids and 
Heart Disease") as they are in the West. The association is certainly 
as well documented as that between cigarette smoking and ill health 
— which is, by comparison, a much smaller problem. The problems 
are similar in that like smoking, animal fats are cumulative in their 
effect. It now seems obvious that weaning is the time when the need 
for animal fats (in this case milk) is outgrown. After weaning, there 
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is no obvious requirement for animal fats or animal products; all 
necessary requirements can be obtained from vegetable sources. 
Why this knowledge has not been propagated by the medical 
profession is interesting. While doctors discuss the "toxic" proper-
ties of marihuana based on highly equivocal evidence, they remain 
almost silent on the far wider issue of the toxicity of animal fats, now 
a well-documented issue. 
Perhaps this is due to the threat to vested economic, political, and 
social interests, since to rationally argue for the eradication from our 
society of its number one maimer, infirmer, and killer, means to im-
pinge upon and to threaten the interests of the meat, dairy, egg, and 
sugar industries. 
Naturally the medical profession, which, as we know from the 
spectre of the Australian Medical Association fighting against 
nationalization is itself a great believer in vested interests and is 
reluctant to make such a drastic recommendation. Instead, it offers 
half-baked compromises, such as heart transplants, surgery, 
elaborate "coronary care" units and now, from Dr. Nestle in 
Canberra, "polyunsaturated" cows. Yet none of these innovations 
have made the slightest impact on the overall problem, and never 
will, since they are attempts to close the stable door after the horse 
has bolted. They are astronomically expensive, wasteful of resource 
personnel, and, at the most, only patch-up parts of the end process of 
a lifelong progression. 
Yet the hospitals persist in dishing up high animal content meals 
at every opportunity to their patients and staff alike — contribufing 
to the very process that fills up more than one-third of their beds. 
Health department posters still hang from walls advocating the con-
sumption of the old meat-butter-milk-cheese-egg formula, often in 
ironic juxtaposition to posters emphasising the dangers of pot. 
If the medical profession were consistent in its attitude towards 
"dangerous drugs" it would insist on the complete prohibition of 
alcohol. Similarly it should be arguing for a complete ban on human-
operated machinery and on animal fats. 
Because such current health problems are so intimately related to 
the Western life-style, of which doctors are a part, their alleviation 
warrants serious consideration for a change in the very basis of most 
commonly believed social assumptions. While doctors have led the 
field in changing smoking habits, this barely scratches the surface of 
possible preventative measures, and can only be taken as a token 
gesture. Again, if the profession were serious about its humanitarian 
example it would be actively exploring alternatives to our present 
dietary habits and transport needs in a way that had positive effects 
on the community's health. Instead, it treats groups such as 
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Aborigines who, after all, had the answer to both problems, with 
condescension — as if there were nothing at all to gain from cross-
cultural exchange. 
As I have attempted to show, the mere fact of doctors "doing 
something" — be it for homosexuals, pot-smokers. Aborigines, 
women, or the general public — by no means guarantees that the ex-
ercise will benefit those groups concerned, particularly when the 
operative assumption is that the doctor knows best. In fact, the op-
position of the Australian Medical Association and of the G.P. 
Society to the National Health Scheme may have at last made the 
Australian population aware that the medical profession puts its own 
self-interests ahead of the welfare of society as a whole. 
I hope that this paper has shown that the Australian medical 
profession's outbursts about the threatened injustices of nationalized 
medicine is by no means a coincidental manifestation of its insular 
concepts of social order, but rather, is consistent with all its other 
views; it actively assists in the suppression of minority groups; it un-
dermines the role and identity of women; and it tacitly suppresses 
communication of important knowledge and the exploration of 
alternate life-styles. 
While medical practice has always been a social discipline, today 
it is also a practice of disciplining society. 
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The Profession of Teaching 
DOUG WHITE 
Editors' Teachers not only make up the largest professional group in 
Notes Australia but also claim an almost comprehensive monopoly 
over the education of aspirants to all occupations, involving a 
right to guide the social imagination of their students and to set 
standards of legitimacy and feasibility for their actions. Most 
societies provide controls in order to exclude those who would 
misuse their claims to be educators in order to realize their own 
interests. It is somewhat doubtful, however, if the form of 
knowledge certification provided for teachers in our society 
provides such a safeguard. It is certainly unclear how increasing 
demands for autonomy on the part of the teaching profession 
and the consequent removal of community involvement im-
proves this position. 
The following chapter by Doug White examines the in-
creasing tendency toward professionalization by teachers, in-
cluding demands for autonomy in classroom situations, control 
over education policies together with exclusion of external in-
tervention, and the establishment of strict criteria for admission 
to the profession. These actions seem to evidence a primarily 
defensive stance toward both the administration and the com-
munity. As a result of this the teaching profession in Australia 
places itself in a conservative role. Suspicious of "outside" in-
volvement and hostile toward the administration it has become 
resistant to community demands for change and are thus less 
able to meet social needs or to provide a service to all sectors of 
the community. 
It seems clear that, in moving toward full professional 
status, teachers are acting in their own self-interest. It is equally 
clear that teaching is likely to become increasingly isolated 
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from the needs and values of many members of the community 
in which it is practised. This may not be a surprising conclusion 
for educational attainment is a major criteria determining ac-
cess to the upper levels of societal hierarchies. Educators are in 
a powerful position to influence this process and, whether they 
acknowledge it or not, are thus engaged in a political activity. 
The stress on special expertise and exclusive jurisdiction, 
however, obscures the political nature of the role of the profes-
sion and diverts public attention from the social outcomes of its 
activities. The following chapter examines the role of the 
teaching profession in transforming the political outcomes of 
class divisions into the professionally constructed reality of dif-
ferential opportunity for entry into social roles through such 
objective criteria as levels of expertise and knowledge of 
procedures. 
Teachers provide a service to others which must be supplied per-
sonally. In that sense teachers are a variant of the oldest of profes-
sions. But teachers have only a qualified right to claim links with 
prostitution as an ancestral profession. Teachers are different in the 
sense that, in carrying out what is apparently a personal service, they 
act in a way to enhance their own position and that of others who 
stand in power over both teachers and their clients. Furthermore, it 
is not at all obvious what it is that the professional teacher has to of-
fer. From what appear to be reasons of natural intellect, a fortunate 
upbringing, or hard work, the professional claims and is given the 
right to develop certain kinds of relationships with others. The 
knowledge which is the professional's trading stock has a less ob-
vious origin than that which was the source of gain for earlier profes-
sionals; the apparent individuality of the act of gaining that 
knowledge lays little basis for the professional activity of 
manipulating personal relationships. Much of the mystique of the 
professional arises from the professional's own lack of under-
standing of the source of his knowledge, and it is in his interests to 
further confuse his clients. 
In a society like ours, in which abstract knowledge plays such an 
important part, the specialization and subdivision of knowledge pos-
session into the hands of the various professional categories lends an 
atmosphere of independent authority to the foundations of everyday 
life. Another line of descent of the professional, a line beginning with 
the ancient priests, is evident in the manner in which the absolutes 
behind social life are maintained by a separate group of persons. But 
again there is a difference between the professional and his predeces-
sor. Today no total belief is consciously maintained, merely that part 
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which is the special expertise of the various subdivisions of the work-
ing professional. The professional teacher, with a particular claim to 
a narrow authority, concedes that other professionals also have their 
authority. It must also be conceded that an overall government is 
necessary. Neither the possessors nor the knowledge they possess are 
sufficient by themselves to do more than determine what is to be 
done over a small area of life. The whole is in the hands of others. 
The final parallel for the professional teacher is that of the 
mercenary soldier, who does his job for an authority which is only to 
be criticized on the grounds of its failure of responsibility in 
providing the conditions for the efficient and self-advantaging ac-
tivity of its employed experts. 
In short, the professional teacher is at the nexus of a three-way 
relationship, all of which the notions associated with professionalism 
obscure. Professional, as an ascription of expert knowledge, ob-
scures the relationship with others in the acquisition and making of 
that knowledge. In so far as a notion of independence is pretended or 
believed, the relationships of teachers with authorities is hidden. 
Further, when a teacher is said to be offering that which only a 
professional person can give to a child, the nature of the peculiar 
characteristics of the relationship of a teacher, as distinct from any 
other adult, with children is obscured. The confusion has its social 
uses. The belief in professionalism is a cement which holds some 
potential disparate pieces of our society together. It is not surprising 
that "professionalism" is appealed to when there is a strike or other 
ill-feeling about, as it is no accident that leaders of education depart-
ments and teachers' organizations both call upon the sacred name. 
For professionalism is a reminder of what holds teachers together 
among themselves, and of what limits there are in the degree to 
which they will associate or have nothing to do with others in the 
community. A professional organization, for example, keeps its dis-
tance from the trade unions. But professionals, while they divide 
themselves from each other and from the non-professionals, also un-
ite. The basis for their differential status appears to be knowledge, 
skill, and ability, not political or economic power. One can feel ex-
cluded from or resentful of the status of the professional, but the 
arguments for their overthrow seem unrealistic. In any case the 
modern professional is coming to take on more and more the role of 
the community activist and involver. The modern welfare-oriented 
society stresses increasingly the service and social relational aspects. 
It does so while maintaining the authority of class and state power, 
under the appearance of skill, knowledge, and expertise; yet it in-
creases the participation of those on whom authority weighs. The 
authority is obscured by its natural and inevitable appearance, and 
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its divisions. The relationships of participation are given freer rein 
and encouragement, within the necessary truncation by the seeming-
ly natural and therefore apparently non-existent limitations. The 
generation of the participation is largely in the hands of the profes-
sionals; an added touch to the earlier service activities. 
In this article I will try to show what it is that professionalism ob-
scures, and the reasons involved in this process. A study of some of 
the actions taken in the name of professionalism shows some of the 
characteristics of the professional. The ordinary descriptions of the 
characteristics of the professional are generally made from an ad-
miring and involved position, though they may have the language of 
the social scientist. As description they provide material for analysis. 
Following some discussion of the work of those who have discussed 
the teaching profession, we shall return to our own analysis. In con-
clusion, some comment will be made on the recent upsurge of in-
fluence of professionalism associated with the development of the 
socially evolving welfare state; a widespread phenomenon, and of in-
terest to Australians since the coming to government of the A.L.P. 
The Victorian Secondary Teachers Association (VSTA) is one of 
the most militant—in a non-political use of the term—teachers' 
organizations in this country. It is certainly nowhere near the norm 
of teachers' unions, but it shows in clearest fashion the 
characteristics of the modern professional teacher. In breaking with 
the larger Victorian Teachers' Union more than twenty years ago, 
and with the basis of the break and its internal solidarity that of the 
qualifications, the VSTA has had opportunity to develop a modern 
teachers' organization; a kind clearly distinguishable from that of 
the older public service organization, which in other Australian 
states remain part of the belief and organization of teachers' unions. 
As the name implies, professionals associate, not like workers (or 
even those teachers identifying themselves by their association with 
an employer) who unite. Within Victoria, strikes of secondary 
teachers are an almost daily occurrence and receive not much more 
newspaper space than the frequent and minor stoppages on building 
jobs and in engineering factories. One difference is that when 
teachers at a school or group of schools in Melbourne stop work, 
there is no expectation that every teacher will strike. In fact, one of 
the celebrated victories of the VSTA in the early stages of its entry 
into action was that following the initiative by one member, the high 
school teacher Jim Evans, who refused to sign the time book. It ap-
pears that the result of that campaign was highly significant in mak-
ing a break with the respectable teacher unionism of earlier days, 
when the attention was almost exclusively devoted to passing resolu-
dons and presentation of sound arguments at deputations. 
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Union militancy in the old terms meant, as it often does in the 
trade unions, left politics. This is possible when one considers that 
the only opponent is the class enemy or bourgeois governments; even 
a militancy about a purely economic matter is likely to have as part 
of its motivation or consequence some feelings against the natural 
enemy. The association between workers is not hidden; its necessity 
is obvious. Action may lead to greater knowledge and confidence; 
political understanding hence may follow the experience of industrial 
struggle. Professional association militancy has more specific oppo-
nents. Political left-wingers sometimes still make the wrong assump-
tion that militant action will increase class consciousness. Yet most 
professional action is aimed at asserting status for the professional 
based upon "autonomy"—but an autonomy which can be granted or 
extracted from the authorities because it is based upon particular 
skills and responsibilities. A militant professional makes no claim to 
have views on the state of the world which others should take 
seriously; a class-conscious proletarian, on the other hand, has no ex-
pectation for particular autonomy or other differential rights on the 
basis of skill, but does assert and claim a right to views and practices 
affecting the whole state of affairs. The association of professionals 
is one of convenience, and is individually oriented; the basis for a 
deeper-going association is not obvious, and theoretical analysis 
necessarily precedes political action. The unusual limitation of the 
political framework of the professional, as professional, is a dis-
tinguishing characteristic which needs some investigation. 
A special issue of the VSTA journal, The Secondary Teacher 
(January-February 1974) was devoted to the year's planned action. 
The issue, entitled "Professional Action", is a handbook and guide 
for VSTA branches for the year, and superficially appears as the 
kind of guide that any active union might produce every now and 
then. The kind of issues about which action is planned is informative. 
In first place is "control of entry". 
One of the fundamental requirements for professional status is that 
the profession itself lays down the minimum qualifications for prac-
tice in the profession. And those of us who avoid the term "profes-
sional" because of its elitist overtones still agree that the employee 
and not the employer should control a matter of such fundamental im-
portance. 
Allied with this issue of control is the one which is currently the main 
source of industrial action, that of inspection. The second arm of 
teachers' professional action is the VSTA's campaign to rid secon-
dary teaching of its inspection bureaiicracy. There is no place for in-
spection in the secondary teaching profession, the VSTA declares. 
The other issues set out for action are those of conditions, notably 
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class sizes and teaching loads; teachers' rights, particularly with the 
procedures to be followed when a teacher is accused of incompetence 
or misconduct; and curriculum. The basic curriculum policy is that 
"the responsibility for decisions concerning the curriculum should 
rest with the school, not with statutory bodies or organizations set up 
under the regulations of universities". The statement goes on to 
describe the school, in this context, "as being made up of the parents, 
students and teachers as a group, which might be more accurately 
described as the local school community". The inclusion of parents 
and students seems, superficially, to indicate a position at variance 
with the usually accepted notions of professionalism; in practice it is 
no exception, for parents are rarely consulted, let alone encouraged 
to take part in the making of decisions. 
The general direction of VSTA policies is towards an independent 
profession; one which makes its own decisions about those matters 
affecting the work of its members. The one important area over 
which the profession does not seek control is the qualifications of its 
members; rather, it insists that these be of a kind which are 
recognizable publicly, and in the "control of entry" policy the VSTA 
demands that universities and similar bodies certificate those enter-
ing the profession. The phrase "control of entry" is, however, not 
often seen as ironic; and it does have value as a rallying cry in the 
memories of the many teachers familiar with the old Education 
Department policy of employing almost anyone who applied for a 
job. The employers now insist on the registration of teachers on the 
basis of the same qualifications as those demanded by the VSTA; 
this has not led to a change in VSTA demands. The "professional ac-
tion" guide makes no mention of salaries; although secondary 
teachers are interested in money, there is no evidence to suggest that 
this is a major concern. Independence—or professional autonomy— 
is much more commonly a burning question. 
Direct action, involving large numbers if possible, is a 
characteristic of the VSTA in pursuit of its policies. Stage I action 
on "control of entry", if a teacher not meeting VSTA registration re-
quirements continues to teach in a school, is a half-day stop work. If 
Education Department inspectors enter a school to assess any 
teacher, all teachers are asked to leave their classrooms. If teachers 
are asked to work beyond the maximum agreed to by the VSTA, 
staff members will stop teaching. And so on. The VSTA is an active 
and militant body, with a rather large proportion of its members 
planning and taking part in actions. Some people are tempted to see 
parallels between militant professionalism and the behaviour of cer-
tain trade unions. Sometimes it is hoped that a left political view-
point will emerge from the struggle against bureaucracies and con-
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servative governments. That possibility should not be entirely ex-
cluded, but the differences are more important than the similarities. 
The militancy is for a special position for the professionals, for the 
rule of abstracted knowledge and status based upon its usage, rather 
than the older bureaucratic forms of control. For this action to 
become a basis for a different conception of the relationship between 
persons on a society-wide basis, some understanding of the social 
relationships in the acquisition and distribution of knowledge would 
be necessary. If, for example, the production of general ideas were 
seen as the distillation of practice through the cooperative effort of 
many, and if it were seen that these general ideas were then often 
used to control others, teachers might think and act differently. To 
argue for such a viewpoint would take considerable space, and it is 
mentioned here for only two reasons; firstly, that the beginnings of a 
different theory are necessary for a different practice among profes-
sional teachers; secondly, that the nature of the stock-in-trade of the 
professional is not usually considered. It is taken for granted as a 
qualification, not even as knowledge, and seen as giving rights and 
privilege which go to make it desirable and therefore advantageous 
for it to be thought of as a scarce resource. 
Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to think that VSTA support 
hangs only on the somewhat elitist self-conceptions of the profes-
sional teacher; the belief in autonomy and against bureaucratic 
authority is widespread among young teachers, and represents 
another side of the making of a teacher to that normally meant by 
professional. The long-haired, tieless and untidy young teacher who 
wants to do his own thing is the radical alternative of the career-
oriented, suited, correctly-mannered professional teacher; they have 
far more in common than either probably realizes. Both treat the 
source of their position as something gained and to benefit from in-
dividually. 
Dr. L.W. Shears, director-general of the Victorian Education 
Department, has described what he calls the paradoxical position of 
the industrial-professional groups. They are forces for change, which 
he seems to imply is a good thing, and the changes which profes-
sional teachers might bring about, he suggests, are in the areas of 
curriculum, in-service education, improvements in buildings and 
teacher-pupil ratios. These groups are also conservative, in that they 
seek to retain the older methods of promotion by seniority and ex-
perience, a closed-shop approach, and a pre-occupation with salary 
differentials and maintenance. The professional teacher is paradox-
ical, it appears, because as a professional he is expected to maintain 
his expertise and assert and expand the area over which he expects 
personal control through this expertise. But the essential thing about 
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this expertise is that it is individually held, and the professional is 
personally responsible for its use. Yet professional teachers often 
combine together and act in a manner which appears to contradict 
this. "Why don't they leave administration to the professional ad-
ministrator and get on with the activities appropriate to professional 
educators?", is Dr. Shears's implied question. He is asking too much 
of professionalism if it is required to obscure the social relationships 
of a government bureaucracy. 
The VSTA is perhaps not a typical example of a teachers' profes-
sional organization, but this is only because it is ahead of others hav-
ing blazed the way in making professionalism the major basis for its 
action. In its policies it shows more clearly than other teachers' 
organizations the character of professional action. Nor is Dr. Shears 
a typical administrator of education, having himself rather more 
professional knowledge, and respect for it, than has been the case in 
the past. The situation of the professional teacher in relation to 
government authority often appears as one of confiict, yet nothing is 
intrinsic to the positions of either authority or teacher to make this 
conflict permanent. While professionalism holds sway, the conflict is 
with the bureaucracy; with professional administration, the conflict 
will be less significant. The contradictions between the two are not ir-
reconcilable. 
So far I have been largely interested in examining the nature of the 
actions of the militant professional in an attempt to understand the 
social basis of the professional teacher's character. We turn now to a 
consideration of the explanations made by professional social scien-
tists, using their accounts as further material for analysis. Professor 
Myron Lieberman's Education as a profession (1956) is still 
regarded as a standard work on the subject. The characteristics of 
the profession, he says, are that it offers a unique, definite, and es-
sential social service, an emphasis upon intellectual techniques, a 
long period of specialized training, a broad range of autonomy for 
the individual practitioners and for the occupational group as a 
whole, an acceptance of responsibility, emphasis upon the service, 
rather than the economic gain, a comprehensive self-governing 
organization of practitioners, and a code of ethics. With the excep-
tion that no one strongly advocates a code of ethics, one could almost 
assume that VSTA leaders formulated their policies after reading 
this book. Steps seem to have been taken to achieve professional 
status, such as the attempts to give the impression of a distinct offer-
ing by teachers, which requires the exclusion of the non-qualified 
teacher, the moves to prolong training, the attempts to achieve 
autonomy by the abolition of external examinations and inspection, 
and the emphasis given to self-government in such ways as the es-
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tablishment of a registration board. All this probably makes 
teachers no different from such well-established professions as law 
and medicine, whose practitioners go to a great deal of trouble to ex-
clude others. As with other professions, teachers are able to claim 
that everything they do for themselves is done in the interests of their 
clients. The height of success for the professional movement will be 
reached when parents speak in as reverential tones of the skill of 
teachers as they do of that of the brain-surgeon. The almost envelop-
ing mystique associated with the life and death side of medicine is, of 
course, more difficult to produce in such an everyday act as teaching. 
No doubt as medicine becomes more and more a matter of pill-
popping it will be necessary to stop parents giving their children 
aspirin; and a powerful professional teachers' lobby could reduce 
confidence in the ability of parents to teach their children anything. 
The now well-known criticisms by Ivan Illich of the professions are 
relevant here; but some care is needed. The abolition of schooling, or 
the abolition of a separate group of people who may reflect upon 
society as a whole, may do away with the whole activity, not merely 
its possession by a separate group. However much it is obscured, the 
intellectual training of the professional does have intellectuality 
behind it. 
Other writers add little to Lieberman's descriptive catalogue. 
Some different thoughts are provided in a discussion of the profes-
sional in developing countries (Benveniste and Ilchman 1969). 
Foreign professionals in an underdeveloped country, the authors say, 
bring rational approaches to the solution of problems. 
The case of the role of agent of a superior world power is confidence 
that one is right and technically more competent because the political 
dominance of one's country or regime has as premise the superior 
ability of its members. The wealth and political influence of the West 
or the "Modernized" could only come, it is thought, from these 
manifestly superior qualities. 
This can often be seen in the way professionals treat their counter-
parts in low-income countries. Somehow "the natives never get it 
right", regardless of the standard of performance. It is often the con-
fidence born of this role that impels the adviser abroad to expand his 
work to that of planner-cum-political-entrepreneur. 
Professional teachers often act as agents of foreign power and modes 
of thought, bringing rationality and progress to migrant and 
working-class children. The teachers are imperialistic within their 
own country, in a sense destructive of class and minority culture in 
the interests of decultured technology. And it is not unknown for 
teachers to engage in semi-political enterprises which aid the 
destructive and assimilative process. 
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The descriptive catagories of the social scientists and the activities 
of professional organizations are the material which allows a for-
mulation of the nature of the professional teacher. Teachers have es-
tablished themselves, or at least they are attempting to do so, as peo-
ple with a skill which is, artificially or really, in short supply. The 
skills of teaching are not particularly rare; everybody does it all the 
time. What is rare are the means by which young people can be led to 
believe that expertise based upon abstract knowledge is prized, can 
be obtained if certain paths are followed, and should be respected. 
Teachers are the agents of this viewpoint, and hence of some impor-
tance to the social system. Professionalism, while it leads to conflict 
with older bureaucratic control of education, enhances this social im-
portance. It is only in the short run that professional teachers' 
organizations have an out-of-step and militant form. Teachers are, if 
professional, change-agents, transforming the social world of class 
divisions into the socially constructed world of differential status 
based upon level of expertise and knowledge or rational procedures. 
In this sense professionalism is a means of reinforcing the existing 
social hierarchies through changing their appearance from class to 
status, from ownership of the forces of production to possession of 
skills. Professional teachers themselves accept this by acting to im-
prove their own status on this scale, that is, by demanding an in-
creasing length of preliminary study required to enter teaching. The 
professional teacher is the agent of modernization among children 
whose parents may have different beliefs. As a social system de-
mands change, the teacher takes on slightly different tasks, such as 
the present trend towards the management (socialization) rather 
than the education of children, as seems to be advocated in the recent 
Karmel Report (1973). But this is not an important variation in this 
argument; for the young people in the school the teachers become the 
models for aspiration, for those who wish or are able to enter the 
race for social mobility, or they become the prototype managers of 
the welfare of those in their care, in the more recently propounded 
approaches to schooling. 
The professional teacher can scarcely fill this role in the authority 
structure, while at the same time proclaiming his autonomy, unless 
there are severe limitations to this autonomy. The ideology of 
professionalism creates and justifies a belief in personal autonomy 
based on knowledge; the knowledge is limited to a certain sphere, so 
therefore is the autonomy. The limited range of action of the expert 
is the logical and social outcome of the fractionation of the world 
consequent upon the scientific revolution and the gradual extension 
of rational procedures. The teacher claims a priestlike superiority in 
his field; yet unlike a priest he has no consciously possessed world 
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view to maintain. Of course he maintains one, but it is not one within 
his knowledge, if he accepts the professional ideology. The key to un-
derstanding this peculiar limitation of view lies in the relationship of 
the teacher, as professional expert, to the sources of his knowledge. 
The teacher depends upon the sources of production of intellectual 
knowledge but does not take part in it. The usual courses in teacher 
training rely, in an applied fashion, upon a knowledge produced by 
others in psychology, sociology, philosophy, and in the subjects 
which are the teacher's speciality. Postgraduate courses in teacher 
education are not, normally, research oriented; that is, although they 
often occur chronologically after a first degree is gained, they do not 
have the atmosphere of a research department. The world view 
embedded in a lively intellectual culture is not made available to 
teachers; rather, they distribute the results of the work of others, and 
are expected to apply these in other fields. The teacher is thus the 
recipient of intellectual expertise, not the maker of it. 
There are of course exceptions to this; for some years, for exam-
ple, in the Latrobe University School of Education an attempt has 
been made to give the Diploma of Education course some of the 
character of the production of knowledge. The association between 
theory and practice, and the association between persons in the 
course, has been based upon well-known principles of the production 
of knowledge. Latrobe graduates are, perhaps as a consequence, 
rather less accepting of knowledge as a private possession and rather 
less accepting of the limited beliefs of professionalism; they are also 
not particularly welcomed by school principals and education 
department authorities. There are other examples of this kind. 
Nevertheless, it remains the normal state of affairs that in the train-
ing of teachers knowledge is distributed, and the activity of the 
teacher is restricted to its usage in particular situations. Being un-
aware of the manner of production of knowledge, the teacher can see 
this not as a social relationship but as a commodity; like other com-
modities, it can be privately possessed, and its owner can achieve 
status and power. The mode of distribution of knowledge has, neces-
sarily, inequality established within it. The relationships of the 
production of knowledge remain unknown; indeed its very social 
character is obscure. Etzioni (1964, p.76) notes the highly in-
dividualized principle of the professional's work. It is this which puts 
him in conflict with the bureaucratic organization of education 
departments and schools; it also obscures the essential cooperation 
which lies behind the production of the knowledge which is part of 
the content of his work. The individual autonomy and cooperation of 
the intellectual become the individuality of the professional. This in-
dividuality, without a social statement, leaves the teacher at the 
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mercy of regularly established social organizations, provided they do 
not infringe too strongly on his apparent individuality. 
The professional teacher, with a limited view of the social struc-
ture in which he works and of the alternate social relationships upon 
which he depends, does however make in a powerful fashion 
relationships with others. One of the attractions of teaching is that it 
is not a wholly bureaucratized activity. Even in conditions of a well-
entrenched administrative structure the relationships between a 
teacher and his students are to a considerable degree of his own mak-
ing. There are no clear guidelines on what to do in this situation any 
longer. Earlier distribution of knowledge models—of the kind 
criticized by Freire (1970) as the banking concept of education— 
meant that the teacher's activity was largely confined to the best 
means of putting into the students' minds what he knew was best for 
them. This is perhaps still the most widely accepted notion, and leads 
to essentially authoritarian classroom relationships, although the 
authoritarianism may be physically coercive, manipulative, or pater-
nalistic. It sometimes appears nowadays that teachers seek to es-
tablish within the classrooms and schools some kind of communal 
relationships which are missing in the conceptions of the individually 
separated teachers. In some conditions this may take the form of a 
move towards the members of the school working out a situation 
where those in it produce or reproduce knowledge for themselves of 
the way the world is constructed—that is, the constructing of a 
world. When this happens, strains develop in the notion of profes-
sionalism because the sources of the teacher's own knowledge and 
relationships with others must be examined. That is, the mystifying 
character of professionalism is pushed away. More often the trend in 
educational reform is towards the managed community. The teacher 
attempts to establish some greater totality of interchange in the 
classroom—with some of the limitations to interchange of the sub-
ject divisions and of the rational/emotional division removed—but 
does not examine his own position. He retains power, but does new 
things for the children. Here we have one more characteristic of 
professionalism; the professional teacher enhances his status while 
declaring that what he does is for the good of others. Profes-
sionalism, we might say, is authority with a human face. 
The manipulation of the social relationships of others, admittedly 
generally only within the confines of the classroom, is central to the 
work of the teacher. He does not confine himself to the doling out of 
pieces of information as laid down by others, which is of course the 
model of teaching to which such hoary conservatives as the members 
of the Australian Council of Educational Standards find desirable. 
The professional teacher demands and gets the right to do more than 
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this. Yet, as professional teacher, he knows rather little of the social 
relationships behind his own position. The professional teacher, we 
might say, has some of the characteristics of the free floating in-
dividual or of the rootless cosmopolitan. In the absence of a class 
position, an understanding of his own origins, or of the existence of a 
large scale movement the teacher can live in the solipsist world of 
small group construction of reality. While an agent of general ideas 
he can engage in situational constructions. Here the professional 
teacher becomes a person who helps his students participate in a 
more freely constructed situation, giving the appearance of freedom, 
while by-passing the difficult necessity, for real freedom, of under-
standing and struggling with the social environment. The con-
structed world of some recent educational experiments is treated 
favourably in the Karmel Report, for instance; not surprisingly, for 
such education allows the general order to be maintained while giv-
ing the appearance of freedom and making a world of one's own. 
That is, in essence, the attempted message of this chapter. Profes-
sionalism is a development arising from a shift in the appearance of 
society from an obvious dependance upon the labour of some in the 
productive processes, to a dependance upon scientific and 
technological processes which have a less obvious association with 
real human activity. A status structure obscures the corresponding 
social classes. Professionals are at the top of the status structure, and 
are the agents for the extension of belief in this structure. Since this 
social arrangement exists in a culturally-socially constructed form, 
participation and engagement have its own peculiar characteristics. 
Teachers, as professionals to whom the basis of their own social 
position is obscure and who engage in activity which further obscures 
their origins, thus take part in the propagation of the techniques and 
of the modes of cultural manipulation necessary for the apparently 
new society. 
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Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 
ROBIN WINKLER AND UNA GAULT 
Editors Practitioners in the fields of psychiatry and clinical psychology 
Notes do not deal with physical disability or illness in the ordinary 
sense but are concerned with altering individual behaviour 
which they consider to be inappropriate for orderly and produc-
tive functioning at work and for harmonious domestic arrange-
ments and so on. Members of these occupations act as judges of 
what is normal and abnormal in society, while at the same time 
seeking, and often claiming, the sole right to determine what 
should be done to persons who come to the attention of such 
social control agencies as psychiatric hospitals, welfare agen-
cies, counselling services, and even the courts. 
Some of the most serious threats to individual freedom are 
posed by the contemporary movement toward community psy-
chiatry programmes. Not content to wait for "patients" to be 
brought to them, advocates of this approach seek to intervene 
in the life of the community and to become involved in large-
scale social planning in order to foster social and political 
ideals. Unfortunately there is little understanding of the causes 
of the conditions which the psychiatric professions wish to 
"treat" and there is undoubtedly considerable danger of the ex-
tension of essentially political interventions under the aegis of 
medical science. 
The social, economic, and political problems with which 
the psychiatric professions deal are derived, in large measure, 
from the conflicts generated by the exploitive nature of modern 
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industrial society. By advocating medical solutions to these 
problems the psychiatric professions are not only obscuring the 
underlying social issues, but are forestalling alternative ap-
proaches to the solution of these problems. In the following 
chapter, Robin Winkler and Una Gault describe the character 
and direction of the psychiatric movement and its relation to 
social and political life in Australia. 
The mental health professions have for some years now been under 
direct attack from various sources. People concerned with the need 
to change society and with a different idea of what constitutes a sane 
world have felt, often quite intuitively, that mental health profes-
sionals are part of the society which needs changing because their as-
sumptions about what constitutes a sane world are dangerous or 
harmful in some sense. This general view has in most areas been ar-
ticulated by dissident health professionals themselves who have at-
tempted to demonstrate ideological assumptions on which mental 
health theory and practice are based. To a lesser extent, this 
reanalysis of assumptions has been accompanied by attempts to for-
mulate new ideological bases, derived from alternative views of the 
world, and to implement new ways of acting with people labelled 
"crazy". 
The critiques have come from many different contexts. Laing's 
notions of schizophrenia and of the politics of experience have been 
seen as the major basis of radical critiques of mental health, so much 
so that Laing (1967) and Cooper (1967) have had their views labelled 
as anti-psychiatry. But the writers associated with anti-psychiatry 
have still retained many of the concepts of treatment of individuals, 
professional helping, and psychoanalytic theory. Women's groups 
have written about and researched extensively the degree to which 
prevailing sex-role stereotypes are built into mental health theory 
and practice. Gay Liberation is most directly affected by mental 
health professionals and has prompted much reanalysis and develop-
ment of alternatives. The third world has produced influential 
theorizing on the necessity of anti-colonial revolutionary movements 
to deal with the crippling psychiatric consequences of colonial rule. 
American blacks have consistently analyzed and provoked analyses 
of the radical assumptions underlying psychological assessment and 
the psychological effects of being black in a white-dominated 
society. European Marxists have explored the class bases of mental 
health theory and practice and developed alternative structures. The 
international youth counter-culture has turned to the East and in-
wards to develop ways of being in the world that can provide a better 
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fit with the feelings that do not allow adjustment to the world they 
were encouraged to accept. 
The strong counter-culture emphasis on personal experience and 
relationships places the mental health professions more in the 
limelight than perhaps the power of those professions might indicate. 
As we shall see, mental health professionals do not have a great deal 
of effective knowledge about changing people. The power of mental 
health professionals lies more in the way value-based assumptions 
about ways to behave are translated into apparently fact-based ill-
nesses. One of the purposes of this paper will be to explore some of 
the ways the mental health professions reflect ideological beliefs and 
to look at what effects this has on people, be they in a psychiatrist's 
hands or not. 
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that these attacks on 
mental health "practice" have been generally shared. Mental health 
professionals are still viewed with considerable ambivalence outside 
what loosely is called "the new left", but, not surprisingly, most peo-
ple still generally support status quo beliefs about deviance, and tend 
to reject many of the activities of mental health professionals as too 
threatening and "radical". A consistent mistake of new left groups 
concerned with psychiatry is that they assume they speak on behalf 
of patients who are potentially revolutionary because of their ex-
periences while being oppressed by therapists. Most psychiatric 
patients find it difficult to relate to alternative ideologies, particular-
ly when expressed in arcane dialectic, accept what has happened to 
them because in many ways it is what their broader beliefs could in-
tegrate, and, even if angry, find it hard enough to personally survive 
let alone undergo the heavy stresses of direct action. Attempts to 
develop new ideologies and new practice need to grow not only out of 
the changing consciousness, spearheaded by movement groups, but 
out of an analysis of the present situation of those who are affected 
by mental health practices but not into alternative world views. For 
this latter purpose, some knowledge of the existing mental health 
system is required—where the patients are; who they are; where and 
who the staff are; what the structures and organizations are and how 
they operate; what community attitudes are; and so on. A complete 
account of this basic information is beyond this chapter but at least 
some basic information will be presented. 
Mental health professionals generally see themselves as more 
liberal in their outlook than the patients they see, and in many ways, 
they have been. Freud was vilified for decades for his revolutionary 
ideas on sexual experience. In many areas, for example, alcoholism, 
sexual deviance, and crime, mental health professionals have fought 
to reduce legal concepts of deviance, replacing punishment and "lack 
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of understanding" with treatment. Attitudinal surveys indicate that 
mental health professionals are generally more liberal in their views 
on issues such as homosexuality, abortion, and marihuana than are 
samples of the general public. It is a novel position for mental health 
professionals to be in when they are described as agents of the status 
quo. Their daily experience with patients is very often one of urging 
more "progressive" attitudes and experiencing frustration at the per-
sonal conservatism of patients. You often hear a psychiatrist saying 
that he wishes he had more revolutionary patients—it would be more 
"interesting", "challenging" and, paradoxically, there would be 
more common ground. A common story of patients with articulate 
alternative beliefs is that psychiatrists almost line up to "interview" 
them. When the professional, however, finds out that it is he who is 
now seen as the agent of the status quo, he finds it difficult to handle 
and to understand. 
Psychiatrists particularly have become comfortable in labelling 
themselves as "progressive" in handling conservative arguments. 
They find it far more difficult to understand the new attacks and fre-
quently resort, as will be discussed below, to the argument-"you are 
simply expressing some pathological process"—which is not seen to 
be a defence against a criticism but a statement of professional ex-
pertise about a misguided unfortunate. Characteristically, psy-
chologists react with a different defence—"what evidence have you 
for that"—implying that their arguments are rationally based and 
that more radical arguments are not. As we shall see, much of 
clinical psychology is not empirically based, but, as is familiar to 
sociologists of knowledge, where an observation is consistent with 
prevailing beliefs, it requires less empirical support (if it needs any) 
than an observation inconsistent with prevailing beliefs. This view 
would entail that, (1) there is a public mandate for their services; (2) 
there is a specialized body of knowledge which psychiatrists and 
clinical psychologists require for their work to be effective; and 
therefore (3) a lengthy period of training is required to be a 
legitimate and effective psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. 
Professions are a relatively recent historical development but com-
pared, for example, with medicine and law, psychiatry and especially 
clinical psychology have only recently been accorded professional 
status. Psychiatry and clinical psychology, however, do have suf-
ficient mandate to operate as public services and have developed 
their own body of knowledge with associated training and selection 
systems. 
The mandate which helps define psychiatry and clinical psy-
chology as professions comes in large part from their ability to con-
vince the public, and themselves, that they indeed have a specialized 
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body of useful and effective knowledge. This process of convincing 
the public has been greatly aided by: 
(1) the close association between medicine and mental health—the 
definition of behavioural difficulties as illnesses, the labelling of 
intervention systems as hospitals, therapy, and health services, 
the requirement of a medical degree to practise psychiatry; and 
the organization of theory and practice around the medically 
qualified psychiatrist which all allow the public prestige and ac-
ceptance of medicine to be transferred to mental health. 
(2) the ability of psychodynamic theorists to convince the public 
they do not really understand themselves and that such under-
standing is fundamentally important—psychodynamic theory 
has been extremely influential in establishing in the public's 
mind the idea that they are incompetent to judge and interpret 
their own behaviour. If you believe you are unable to assess 
yourself (because of unconscious motivations) and if you are led 
to believe (psychodynamic) insight is essential for satisfactory 
living, then you are on the way to believing that you must seek 
the help of a person who convinced you of these beliefs before 
you can know what is true about yourself. 
(3) the development of assessment techniques for ability and per-
sonality testing—clinical psychologists, not being medically 
trained, grew in acceptance because of the need to assess military 
inductees in the Australian forces during World War II, a need 
which applied psychologists felt able to fill. Following World 
War II, clinical psychologists found their place in mental health 
practice largely through their claims of being able to use devices 
such as the Rorschach and ability tests to make "better" assess-
ments of patients than assessments made by two people talking 
together. The Rorschach, with its arcane terminology and com-
plex scoring systems, was touted as the "X-ray of the Per-
sonality" and welcomed by clinical psychologists as an oppor-
tunity to match the mystique of medical psychiatry, obscure 
term for obscure term. 
It is striking that the acceptance of psychiatry and clinical psy-
chology was not based on its demonstrated ability to help people 
with behavioural problems. In a fundamentally important paper, 
H.J. Eysenck (1965) reviewed the empirical evidence on the effects of 
psychotherapy. He concluded that psychotherapy was no better than 
any service offered by helpers (such as GPs) who have minimal 
therapeutic training, but in whom clients seeking help believe i.e., 
therapy could do no better than general placebo-type expectancies 
and the "specialized body of effective knowledge" which rationalized 
psychotherapy was, according to the evidence, non-existent. 
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Sometimes hysterical debates raged for years over Eysenck's paper 
but it would be fair to say that what Eysenck had shown up was, a 
remarkable absence of evidence that the therapeutic services for 
which the public had given their mandate were in fact "a specialized 
body of effective knowledge". People receiving the service did im-
prove but there were very dubious grounds, if there were any at all, 
for assuming that this showed therapists had a specialized knowledge 
requiring many years of professional training. However, the above-
mentioned factors and others had convinced people that therapists 
did have specialized knowledge and this attitude, with its expectancy 
of help, was by itself quite capable of making the positive expectancy 
self-fulfilling. 
Since Eysenck's earlier papers, more research has been done 
which has separated special processes from overall expectancies, and 
new techniques, new theories and new services have been developed. 
There are now empirical grounds for asserting the existence of some 
effective specialized knowledge in which psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists might be trained. 
But, also since Eysenck's papers, more research on patient expen-
tancies has indicated just how difficult it is to show that mental 
health services in many diverse areas are more effective than the 
results of simply convincing the public they are effective. 
Thomas Szasz (1970), a psychiatrist, has also been a most ar-
ticulate critic of mental health practice. The major thrust of his argu-
ments is that much of what is defined as psychiatry, i.e., treating the 
mentally ill, is not psychology at all but penology. The committent 
of people to mental hospitals on an involuntary basis is a practice he 
places on a historical continium with what Daniel Defoe described in 
1728. Today, in Australian hospitals, which Szasz would rather call 
prisons, there are thousands of people committed on an involuntary 
basis. It has been pointed out for example, that the existing New 
South Wales Mental Health Act, regarded as one of the more 
progressive, violates due process of law in so many ways that a 
murderer has more legal rights than a person classified as mentally 
ill. 
The history of psychiatric hospitals shows their continued use as 
places where people who are unacceptable to society may be 
removed under the guise of treatment. There is little doubt that this 
process has been considerably truncated in recent years by reducing 
the number of institutional beds, developing community based alter-
natives to institutions, and adopting a policy that makes being ad-
mitted to institutions more difficult. However, there are still many 
thousands of involuntary residents of these institutions. In areas 
where there are minimal alternatives e.g., country areas, elderly and 
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poor people are still sent to psychiatric institutions because they are 
a "nuisance" outside. Peonage or hospital-maintaining labour paid a 
pittance is still widely practised, though recently recognized as 
slavery and unconstitutional in the United States. 
Another way of stating Szasz's argument is that much of what 
psychiatry has called "illness" is in fact inappropriately labelled. 
R.D. Laing has made a more extensive attack on the labelling 
processes of mental health professions. In Politics of experience 
(1967) he argues, amongst other things, that it is insane to call a 
person insane when they are sane enough to be out of step with an in-
sane world. Psychiatric theory has tended to assume that the absence 
of adjustment to what is regarded in the community as acceptable or 
normal standards of behaviour is a failure of adjustment. On the 
basis of a tacit assumption that the community standards are worth 
adjusting to, the non-adjusted person becomes an appropriate target 
for the attempts to change him so that he will become adjusted to the 
prevailing society. By interpreting the absence of adjustment 
behaviour as a failure of adjustment, the fault or weakness or 
problem is located in the person who does not adjust, and so atten-
tion is drawn away from the possibility that there may be a fault or 
weakness or problem in the standards to which the person is not "ad-
justed". These processes are often implicit and presented as psy-
chiatric fact or principle. 
Psychiatrically phrased value judgments have an important social-
control function. Dissidents who not only do not wish to adjust to the 
established order but work to change it are, following the above 
beliefs, described as having some psychiatric weakness. This process 
can be used by people in power, regardless of ideological connec-
tions. Detective Sergeant Arantz, following his disclosure of false 
records kept by the New South Wales police, was referred to North 
Ryde Psychiatric Centre by his supervisors in an attempt to discredit 
him. In the Senate hearings on the activities of Croatian terrorists, 
government politicians attempted to discredit two Croatian witnes-
ses by referring repeatedly to their past brushes with psychiatry. The 
Russian incarceration of Medvedev in a psychiatric institution is a 
more extreme example, indicating the continuing pertinence of 
Szasz's arguments. 
Most psychiatrists and clinical psychologists would, however, re-
ject these more obvious uses of political "psychiatry". It is the more 
subtle way in which implicit value judgments are built into mental 
health theory that are either unrecognized or believed to be "fact". 
Homosexuality provides perhaps one of the clearest and better-
studied examples of this process in Australia. The history of 
homosexuality shows that in various times and places, homosex-
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uality was regarded as acceptable, if not desirable, behaviour. 
The concepts delineated by theoreticians such as Laing (1967), 
Halleck (1967), Szasz (1970) and others have, in the last five to ten 
years, been accompanied by the development of new research and 
practice in clinical psychology and psychiatry. A brief account of 
this research and practice can sketch out a process taking place in 
which a new type of clinician is beginning to define a viable alter-
native to what has just been criticized. 
Research is now more explicitly considering the sociological con-
text of problem behaviour, and considering the extent and nature of 
the ideological assumptions hidden in clinical practice. For example, 
instead of assuming that whoever was labelled "mentally retarded" 
was, in fact "sick" and then investigating "aetiological" factors, 
Jane Mercer, in an American study (1965), conceptualized mental 
retardation as a label used by society and studied the social processes 
by which the label came to be applied to an individual. The vast ma-
jority of individuals labelled retarded are not in institutions but out-
side. Only a small fraction of severely retarded are inside. She found 
that the label "mentally retarded", although professionally defined 
in terms of IQ level and behavioural functioning, was very much af-
fected by racial status and income level. Children who were 
Mexican-American or Negroes, and children from poor families, 
were more likely to be labelled retarded than other children with the 
same IQ and behavioural functioning scores. She also found that the 
disproportionate representation by race and income did not appear 
in the labelling process at school, or even in referrals for special 
testing, but only once the children had been tested by the heavily 
culture-bound psychologists. She then developed assessment techni-
ques which could define individuals referred for testing relative to 
their own ethnic communities, both in terms of IQ and behavioural 
functioning. In Australia, such research is, as yet, rarely done, leav-
ing unscrutinized the possible operation of class and ethnic biases in 
what seems so "medical" a problem, that of mental retardation. 
Similar research studies are examining the possibility of double 
standards for men and women. Broverman and his colleagues (1970) 
have shown that practising clinicians (who are mostly male), when 
asked to define "normal adult", "normal male", and "normal 
female", show considerable overlap between their conception of nor-
mal adult and normal male, but a discrepancy between normal adult 
and normal female; to be a normal adult one must be male—to be a 
female is not to be a normal adult. Identical case histories presented 
to clinicians, except that one is about a male and one about a female, 
have more often than not shown that the woman is defined as more 
disturbed. 
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At the University of New South Wales psychology department, a 
number of research projects have attempted to develop research-
based information pertinent to an alternative concept of clinical 
practice. For effective action dealing with the use of professional 
therapy as a social control system for homosexuals, it is essential 
that "inside" knowledge of professional practice be communicated 
to homosexual movement groups, so action is taken on a fully in-
formed basis. With this in mind, a critique of aversion therapy for 
homosexuals based on a knowledge of behaviour modification, the 
aversion therapy professional literature, and the history of psy-
chiatry, was written to be part of actions against aversion therapy. 
The critique was distributed not through professional journals but by 
Gay Liberation. Sexual liberation movements see professional 
therapists as having attitudes about sex roles that conflict with their 
own and, as such, are wary of endorsing professional assistance for 
behavioural problems. Therapists, however, often consider 
themselves as being more "radical" than their conservative clients 
and often fail to see what the sexual liberation movements are on 
about. Accordingly, a survey was carried out of New South Wales 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists to obtain a more extensive, 
empirical picture of the situation. One hundred and fifty clinicians 
(110 psychiatrists and 40 clinical psychologists), 150 members of the 
Campaign against Moral Pursecution, 150 recipients of the women's 
liberation "Newsletter", and a comparison group of 150 non-
academic and academic university staff were sampled. Return rates 
were between 60 and 70 per cent. The results showed, not surprising-
ly, considerable discrepancy between the clinicians and both CAMP 
and women's movement respondents on attitudes and therapeutic 
goals for both homosexuality and women's sex role. Interestingly, 
for both homosexuality and women's role, the clinicians became 
more conservative when expressing attitudes on therapeutic goals for 
homosexuals than when expressing general attitudes to homosex-
uals. Only 5 out of 67 clinicians endorsed a therapeutic goal of help-
ing a person obtain maximum satisfaction from their homosexuality. 
Part of the shift to conservatism in therapeutic goals may have 
been due to lack of knowledge about and availability of systems to 
facilitate such a goal. Homosexual guidance and support agencies 
have been established by homosexual groups but have had little im-
pact on professionals who still "treat" the majority of homosexuals 
seeking assistance. Professionals need to be convinced of the value of 
working towards a goal of maximum satisfaction as a homosexual 
and there is also a need for evaluating the effects of non-professional 
homosexual agencies. Accordingly, a study was carried out which 
compared a programme of assertive training with homosexual 
178 
Robin Winkler and Una Gault 
guidance service groups, both of which were designed to promote 
confident satisfaction with giving a homosexual life. Assessments in 
behavioural test situations and self-report measures were obtained 
according to the methodologies used to assess therapy with 
"straight" goals, and both the "radical professional" and non-
professional agencies were found to be approximately equally effec-
tive in producing real attitudinal behavioural changes towards self-
acceptance as a homosexual. Similar programmes are being es-
tablished and researched to promote confidence in alternative sex 
role behaviour for heterosexual women, with the aim of broadening 
clinicians' goals in therapy and demonstrating the viability and ef-
ficacy of non-professional groups in achieving such goals. 
In another general area, research has shifted focus from seeing 
patients as the primary target of study to seeing the professionals as 
the target of study and of change. Professionals are accustomed to 
being free to study clinical problems, i.e., patients, but not so ac-
customed to having their own behaviour scrutinized by researchers. 
A series of studies has been concerned with studying the behaviour of 
health professionals providing service to patients by having 
simulated patients receiving treatment without the professional 
knowing at the time that he is being studied. Such a technique, in-
evitably involving unobtrusive observation and deception, has been 
recognized as essential and valuable when using patients as subjects, 
for example, in clinical trials for drug treatment. The professionals' 
responses to controlled, standardized experimental situations 
presented by the simulated patient can provide valuable information 
about what happens to real patients in therapy. 
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A Critical Appraisal of Social Work 
HAROLD THROSSELL 
Editors' j ^ e values and activities of professional social workers deserve 
Notes the closest scrutiny for social work practice appears to be 
demonstrably guided by the need to help clients adjust to the 
value system of welfare capitalism. One of the major political 
implications of social work might be seen as its reinforcement 
of consensus values and its management of the potential for 
conflict. It gives the appearance of alleviating some of the gros-
ser effects of the unequal distribution of social and economic 
power and resources while leaving the basic structures responsi-
ble for these injustices unaffected. 
In the following chapter on social work, Harry Throssell 
claims that "there are important actions on which social 
workers should be engaged. The basis should be a firm commit-
ment to the structural changes which lead to diminution or 
eradication of oppression, injustice, and suffering. They should 
agitate—whether quietly or loudly—in this cause." In this 
description Throssell is describing a set of practices far removed 
from the daily work of most of his colleagues. Basically, he is 
demanding that professional social workers recognize the ex-
plicitly political nature of their occupation and work towards 
different kinds of goals. This can be done by drawing attention 
to the key role played by the process of "problem definition" 
whereby the profession turns "inequality" into "poverty" thus 
defusing it of its socio-political implications. 
Harold Throssell received his social work training at Birmingham University, the 
London School of Economics, and the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, He 
has worked as a child welfare officer in Yorkshire and as a psychiatric social worker 
in clinics and hospitals in and near London before coming to -the University of 
Queensland as lecturer in social work. His interests are in the areas of the philosophy 
of social work, psychiatry, and the mass media and he has published articles in 
newspapers and journals in various countries. He is the editor of the recent publication 
Social Work: Radical E.%says (University of Queensland Press, 1975). 
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In this chapter the attempt is made to identify some of the 
features of professional organization—at both the structural 
and symbolic level—which serve to forestall or dampen down 
the charges against it. Equally importantly, the premises on 
which a real agenda for change might be based are described 
and some coherent, concrete steps to be taken towards new 
welfare goals are set out. Thus, Throssell's critique fits aptly 
into many of the themes we have attempted to develop in this 
book: power, conflict, and inequahty are intrinsic features of 
the setUng of professional practice. It is essential that not only 
these matters but also the place of the social work profession in 
the ideological weaponry which is employed for the purposes of 
broad social control be debated and discussed urgently. 
Ours is a society in which it is still all too easy to fail. A society 
in which the State, while appearing to offer a helping hand to 
those who get in a mess, instead too often administers a sharp 
kick in the crutch. 
Those who fail we do not always help. Instead, we punish them. 
Down and Out in Britain. 
Mystification in social work obscures serious ideological differences 
amongst its practitioners. Too often the attempt ot clarify this basic 
question is itself mystified by the argumentum ad hominem: trying 
to invalidate an opponent's argument by finding fault, or pathology, 
in the opponent. In this chapter I want to examine several issues 
which are rarely discussed openly but which are fundamental to the 
existence, nature, and development of social work. 
Ideology 
It is frequently stated that social workers share a common body of 
principles and values. Basic goals are phrased in extremely general 
terms such as, "Professional social work is primarily concerned in its 
philosophy and skills with the optimum welfare of the individual and 
the community."' The assumption is then made that the routes to 
this goal are also shared by all social workers, and there is a strong 
implication that to be truly professional means accepting the domi-
nant view. 
The actions of social workers, however, reveal great differences in 
priorities, in view-of-the-world, and in personal moral philosophy. 
One can even question whether some social workers are ultimately 
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really concerned with the optimum welfare of individuals and com-
munities other than of their own professional and social group. 
These ideological differences affect how "problems" are defined, 
how they are analyzed or explained, and what action is taken on 
them. These three areas are discussed further below. 
The dominant world-view in the social work profession is the ac-
ceptance of capitalist society, with its values of materialism, ac-
quisitiveness, competitiveness, and rationalism. Education and work 
are compulsory even though their fruits are ultimately for the owners 
of capital, a small proportion of the population, more than for those 
who do the work. Other features of western social philosophy are 
ambition, status-seeking, authoritarianism, elitism, class and race 
conflict, sexism, and oppression of the weak. The welfare system os-
tensibly channels resources to those who cannot acquire them for 
themselves. Welfare clients are grouped, or diagnosed, into 
categories so that they can receive the "treatment" considered ap-
propriate. Inability to cope with the demands of society, or deviation 
from the norms (of producing and consuming enough goods, for ex-
ample, living in families, or going to school) are accounted for in 
terms of "personal problems", i.e., inadequacies. In this view, social 
norms and demands are not questioned, and "treatment" consists of 
making changes in individual behaviour. There is very little evidence, 
however, that the enormous resources poured into welfare services 
have had much influence on economic inequality and oppression in 
its many forms. 
An alternative view is that the welfare system serves to keep 
clients in their bottom place in the social hierarchy, to punish them, 
and therefore use them as a reminder to others of the dire conse-
quences of not conforming to the wishes of the most powerful in 
society.^ Pensions do not take the poor out of poverty but trap them 
in it; categorization into the "mentally ill" or "the aged" is 
stigmatizing and therefore punitive; admission to an institution has 
strong elements of exclusion from society; casework is mostly inef-
fective.' As Gans (1971) pointed out, the poor have definite func-
tions. One is to do the dirty work no one else wants to do; another is 
to make the not-poor feel superior; another is to provide employ-
ment for social workers (and others) and justification for their years 
of education, relatively high salaries, and consequent membership of 
the middle class. 
The welfare system, therefore, helps to obscure the fact that 
clients are not primarily suffering individual personality problems 
(in the main), but are the victims of political, economic, or social 
praxes." While it may be true that social welfare helps people to sur-
vive, and even marginally improve their circumstances, it also pre-
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vents at the same time the recognition of the fundamental changes 
that are necessary in society if circumstances are going to change 
substantially. Social casework, with its emphasis on the individual, 
disguises the total class nature of social conflict. 
In simple terms, if the poor are going to get more, the rich are 
going to get less. In order to prevent this, the rich, through govern-
ments, city councils, voluntary organizations, and perhaps now also 
through councils for regional development, invest in the employment 
of social and other welfare workers in order to give the appearance 
of providing services and redistribudng resources in favour of the 
poor. However, they are in fact channelling very little to the poor 
themselves, and certainly not developing power—control over the 
activities of welfare clients rarely passes to the people themselves. 
On the contrary, such a system enlarges the number of professionals, 
uses up welfare money in salaries, and creates a large bureaucracy 
for "clients" to struggle against. The poor, grateful for small mer-
cies, cannot afford to rebel (Klein 1967). The status quo is kept in 
place. And by acceptance of the dominant ideology, social workers 
ensure the continuation of the very problems they are supposedly 
trying to solve. Their true role is that of social policemen, preventing 
change from taking place. 
Definition of problems 
There are two aspects of the definition of problem. First is the 
question of whether a given piece of behaviour is ipso facto a 
problem or whether other factors make it into a problem. For exam-
ple, some would consider homosexuality as inherently a problem for 
the person and would assume that he/she wanted help to change to 
heterosexuality even if the person was not aware of any need to 
change.' Others would argue that homosexuality is not in itself any 
more of a problem than heterosexuality, and that in either case the 
person himself would decide if he had a problem or needed to 
change. 
In the first approach, which has elements of positivism about it, 
the behaviour of the person out there is "objectively" measured 
against a given standard of normality defined by the observer. While 
the question of norms and deviance from norms is very complex, suf-
fice it to say that the observer has a conception of what the norms are 
determined by a combination of factors: the behaviours explicitly 
(e.g., in law) and implicitly accepted in society as a whole, and sub-
cultural variations of these; and personal experience, which in turn 
leads to the perception of the norms and their acceptance or rejec-
tion. The most commonly accepted norms—which also carry labels 
like "healthy", "mature", and so on—are functional to society. 
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They produce the kind of person the society needs. In this context, 
"problem" means behaviour which needs changing back towards the 
normal. This kind of change has traditionally constituted social 
work "treatment". 
The second approach is more existential. Instead of a subject 
measuring an object against some kind of standard, a person makes 
his own decision as to whether or not he has a problem. In this con-
text, "problem" means awareness of discomfort or disadvantage. 
Whether to change from this state is decided only by the person, and 
so is the direction of change. While any change bears some 
relationship to norms, the change itself may be independent of the 
norms. That is to say, the "deviant" person might decide to behave 
in a way which is more "deviant" because it relieves some kind of 
discomfort. He might be escaping from family or social pressures. 
These two approaches hide a political difference. The "positivist" 
is acting on the assumption that the social structure is benign and 
deviations from the norms are undesirable. The "existentialist" does 
not assume the sanctity of what already exists and may, in fact, be 
helping to work out new behaviours which are more satisfying to the 
individual. In turn, these new patterns can lead to change in what are 
perceived and accepted as norms. Thus, this approach is part of a 
social change process. 
The second aspect of definition is in terms of the nature of the 
problem. For example, a social worker presented a case of a boy 
stealing. She saw this as symptomatic of his "real" problems—his 
inner psychological malfunctioning due to emotional deprivation in 
his early years and his mother's similar deprivation in her early 
years. It was only in discussion that it was revealed that this was an 
aboriginal family, the mother was on a pension, and they were living 
in extreme poverty. It could be argued, therefore, that far from 
behaving in a dysfunctional way, the boy was behaving in a healthy 
way, functional for survival. The problem was not in the boy, but in 
his lack of food or money, which is an economic and political 
(including racial) problem. By following the traditional ideology, the 
social worker was blind to the real nature of the situation. 
In many cases, a person does not have a problem, he is a 
problem—to other people. Positivist social workers are likely to 
change this real existential situation into their own terms by an in-
terpretation that the person only is a problem because he has a 
problem. They then feel justified in "treating" (changing) the person. 
For example, the homosexual might have the problem of oppression 
by others. The help needed is not to bring about change in the 
homosexual, but in the attitudes of others. 
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A nalysis 
How a given problem is explained is closely tied to what is defined as 
a problem and to the perceived nature of the problem. The client has 
already gone through a whole process of definition by other people 
before he confronts the social worker. The social worker then 
perceives what is going on according to the diagnostic theories domi-
nant in his profession, mediated through training, and these theories 
are in turn determined by the political stance of the profession as a 
whole (i.e., the most powerful section of the profession). 
The traditional social worker has learned to see problems as 
phenomena existing in individuals, theoretically akin to physical il-
lnesses (and this remains true when family relationships or other 
micro-social systems are used as the cause). If the client accepts the 
explicit or implicit explanation of the social worker—as he is likely 
to do, given his lower position in the status hierarchy and his need to 
remain on good terms with the social worker in the hope of improv-
ing his situation—he will get approving labels like "mature", "gain-
ing insight", "reality-based". As long as the client believes that his 
difficulties are unique he is not likely to join with others to overcome 
his oppressors. The client who feels angry about his predicament— 
and may therefore take social action—is cooled down by the ex-
planation that anger is part of his problem. Anger is seen to be un-
necessary in the "healthy" or "adjusted" person. The view that 
social action arises from psychopathology is clearly a conservative 
strategy, first of all because it assumes that society does not need 
changing, and secondly because it puts pressure on the activist to 
give up political work.' 
Looking at the person or his family as a neutral system of in-
teracting processes, whilst in a sense correct, has certain negative ef-
fects. It creates reification, i.e., treating people as impersonal ob-
jects. In social work, the precept of treating the client as a human 
with individual worth is itself often no more than a technique, and is 
therefore still part of a method which takes people apart like motor 
engines. Two consequences follow. First, the client believes that his 
misfortune just happened to him due to impersonal processes for 
which neither he nor anyone else is responsible. The "cure" is 
therefore likely to be out of his hands also, his autonomy is 
diminished, and he is more likely to be manipulated by the profes-
sionals from whom he seeks help.' Secondly, the fact is obscured 
that most problem situations are created by the decisions of people 
and don't just happen. People are placed in institutions by others; 
poverty is caused by selfishness and economic policy; many doctors 
pursue money instead of health; parental harshness makes children 
miserable or "mad".' 
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To understand what is happening in and between people is not 
wrong in itself. It is, however, misleading when it is the sole focus of 
attention. It makes sense when placed in the context of the large 
social forces over which the individual has little control, especially on 
his own. Social work explanations need to show how personal confu-
sions and frustration are linked with these wider forces in order that 
action can be relevant. 
Action 
Two main types of action follow from the dominant definition, and 
explanation of, social problems. Because the social structure is con-
sidered benign, special services—the welfare state—are set up for the 
deviants, thus categorizing and emasculating those who might 
otherwise be an embarrassment. This is discussed further below. 
Secondly, clients of these welfare services are dealt with almost en-
tirely as individuals. When child welfare clients in Queensland 
grouped together to put pressure on government departments' under 
the banner of client power, the few social workers who supported 
them were strongly criticized by some of their colleagues. 
Client groups are in fact beginning to recognize their political 
position and are organizing themselves into self-help and pressure 
groups without benefit of professionals. Such groups are Socialist 
Patients Collective in Germany, Mental Patients Union, Claimants 
Union and PROP (prisoners) in U.K., Gay Liberation, the Women's 
Movement, racial groups, and tenants' organizations. Action alter-
native to social work could be aimed mainly at supporting grassroots 
organizations in their struggles against blatant and subtle forms of 
oppression, including analysis of the ways this oppression is carried 
out. Within this context, counselling or casework can be relevant. 
With counsellor and counsellee clearly sharing political values and 
goals, sorting out confusion or anxiety in the individual can become 
a cooperative venture, with the two parties acknowledging that at 
another time they may change roles. 
I am arguing here not for pseudo-objective neutrality but a clear 
commitment to a political position which in the present spectrum is 
likely to be socialist. It is not possible here to be definitive about all 
that this means, but some of the features being sought are: an 
economic system which distributes material resources equitably over 
the whole society, with only a small ratio (say 3:1 or 4:1) of the 
highest paid to the lowest paid; public ownership of the large-scale 
means of production and distribution, in order to avoid the profit 
motive arid competition; knowledge shared equally throughout 
society; a political system which allows as much local decision-
making as possible; emphasis on co-operativeness rather than on 
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competitive hostility. It seems that only thus will institutions and 
resources be organized for the benefit of the majority of people 
rather than the minority. Welfare clients are at the bottom of the 
competitive hierarchy in capitalist society. 
The social welfare system 
I have summarized elsewhere'" information from research in the 
1960s and 1970s which shows that the highly-organized welfare state 
in the United Kingdom has had little effect on poverty, the distribu-
tion of educational resources, housing the homeless, family break-
up, institutionalization of the mentally retarded and the aged, and so 
on. Jeremy Sandford (1971) supports his portrayal of the homeless 
in Britain with statistics. 
In 1966 ... there were 12,411 people in hostels for the homeless. In 
1969 there were 18,849 ... The total is over 20,000 ... in 1966 there 
were 150,000 families on local authority waiting lists in London. In 
1969 these (sic) were 190,000: The 1971 total is over 25,000. 
In Australia, with its massive resources and very small population, 
more than 10 per cent of the people live in poverty." Many thou-
sands of children, old people, mentally ill, and mentally retarded live 
in institutions of nineteenth century vintage.'^ Individual workers are 
dedicated but the system as a whole is often barbaric. One section of 
the population—the Aborigines, the original residents—have one of 
the highest infant mortality rates in the world (Moodie 1973). A 
single pensioner in Australia at present (May 1975) receives $36 per 
week. The Labor government's policy aim is merely to raise pensions 
to one-quarter of average weekly earnings. The individual pensioner, 
therefore, can hardly extract a subsistance amount from the Depart-
ment of Social Security. Meanwhile, social workers in the depart-
ment can earn anything from $150 to $400 per week! Social welfare 
commissioners receive $35 per day (plus expenses) for attending 
meetings in Canberra—on top of their ordinary salaries. 
Who is it who benefits from the social welfare system? Is it a 
professional rip-off? The welfare system is mystifying because it 
makes it appear that something is being done when there is really no 
change. The very fact that people are helped merely to survive makes 
substantial changes less likely. 
Not only is the welfare state ineffective, it is frequently positively 
harmful, although again usually in the guise of benevolence. Ap-
proaching a welfare agency is usually humiliating, because of the 
stigma, because of the explicit attitude of staff, because of the im-
plicit structure; that is to say, teachers, doctors, nurses, secretaries 
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and social workers can easily communicate a sense of their having no 
problems, which emphasizes the failure of the supplicant. Physical 
condifions in many hostels and hospitals contain an age-old at-
mosphere of being society's scrap-heap. Physical abuse and 
degrading procedures are quite common. R.G. Thurston has written 
about the loss of identity in prison. His work adds further to the 
evidence that closed (as well as many open) institutions are destruc-
tive of persons—even when the inmate is supposed to be receiving 
treatment, help, or care. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the underlying purpose 
of the system is to punish those who have not conformed and to 
provide a deterrent against not working, not consuming, not being 
rational, not going to school, not confining sex to marriage, and so 
on. We can easily see this punitiveness in Dickensian accounts of the 
nineteeth century, in Foucault's descriptions of institutions in the 
seventeeth and eighteenth centuries, in medievel stories about knock-
ing the devil out of witches. It is about time we grasped the fact that 
similar conditions still continue, even though in more sophisticated 
form. 
What is the alternative? First, to cease arguing that the system will 
work well when we have more workers on higher salaries. One 
hundred years of experience shows this to be a bottomless pit, using 
up resources without altering the basic problem. Professionals ob-
viously have a vested interest in maintaining such a rewarding 
system. The basic philosophy needs to change away from seeing 
society's victims as individually pathological and as the respon-
sibility of professional, impersonal services, and towards their being 
regarded as the responsibility of local communities or grassroots 
organizations working on the principle of reciprocity. This would 
also mean that there would be a greater likelihood of unity and 
strength in bargaining with other groups in society, including govern-
ments, for justice and greater participation in the management of af-
fairs. A good deal of public education is needed to explain how those 
currently perceived as deviants are used as scapegoats, and in order 
to encourage social acceptance and community responsibility. It is 
difficult to see how personal suffering will cease without 
revolutionary changes in the social philosophy (the system of values) 
upon which political and economic decision and actions are founded. 
Social workers have a responsibil'ty to make this clear. 
Professionalism'' 
On my return to Britain in 1972 after seven years away, one of the 
overriding impressions of the welfare state was the enormous ad-
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vance in numbers, career prospects, and status of social workers. 
Following the Seehohm Report,'" social workers in the U.K. are now 
grouped together in local authorities in departments of social service, 
instead of separate departments for child welfare, mental health, ger-
iatrics, and so on. This has rationalized the previous system, but at 
the same time has created vast bureaucracies. This can be, and 
sometimes is, overcome by having small local area teams, but it 
often means that the service is much more distant from the public, 
and more forbidding. A great deal more time and effort is used in of-
fice administration. In one department it is very rare for the social 
workers on the second floor of the office block to see (let alone speak 
to) the director on the fourth floor. The top echelons in such big 
organizations are increasingly divorced from the clients, except 
perhaps as represented on paper. 
The larger groups of social workers could be a useful pressure 
group for social change, and sometimes are," but much of the fime 
this means pressing for higher salaries for themselves. Social 
workers are in the same gainful game as other professions. Doctors 
want to arrogate to themselves knowledge of health and medicine in 
order to sell it to the public, instead of putting more of their efforts 
into spreading this kind of information to the users of it. (The United 
Nations has concluded that in South East Asia, although 90 per cent 
of health problems are in rural areas, 90 per cent of doctors are in 
towns "where the rich people are".'* Here, and in other parts of the 
world, it is becoming necessary for lesser-trained workers— 
equivalent of the Chinese "barefoot doctors"—to do the bulk of the 
work of reducing disease and saving lives.) 
According to a news item" a number of doctors running abortion 
clinics in England stated that a girl was pregnant, with estimates 
ranging from six weeks to sixteen weeks, when it was known that she 
was not. Some doctors, following internal examination, claimed to 
have felt the baby in the womb. To cap it all, a male researcher then 
sent a urine sample and this was found to reveal that he was pregnant 
too! It would be difficult to find a more blatant example of using 
medical knowledge for private gain. 
Lawyers monopolize knowledge about undefended divorce, house 
conveyancing, and other matters when they could decrease or ob-
viate the cost of consulting a lawyer by making the information more 
widely known. Social workers are increasingly playing the same kind 
of game. They are saying that personal problems cannot be sorted 
out by ordinary people and their friends, but require professional 
techniques which can only be acquired with years of tertiary training. 
There are demands for more post-graduate diplomas, master's 
Ph.D. degrees, and so on. This does nothing to spread relevant infor-
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mation through the community, to those who need it, but it does a 
great deal to enhance the career prospects of the educated. 
Social work recruits are for the most part from the middle-class 
(Pavlin 1970) like most university students.'* They are therefore, 
already, socially distant from most clients. Social work training en-
sures that those from the middle class stay in it, and that those from 
the working class move into it. Increasingly sophisticated 
educational programmes will only remove them further from those 
they are supposed to be serving. The poverty, sickness, and loneliness 
of the lumpen proletariat are exploited by the professionals for their 
personal gain. 
Socialization 
By this term I mean the praxis of changing the neophyte into the 
qualified professional. In social work training there is an official 
agenda and an unofficial agenda. On the official agenda, the 
educators, representing the profession as a whole, and also 
representing the agencies who employ social workers, present a set of 
skills which the graduate needs to learn to do the job as approved. 
The student is assumed to need only to copy senior workers, to ac-
cept their definitions, goals, explanations of events, and methods of 
taking action. Although on this agenda is the notion that students 
can query, discuss issues, make up their own minds, the main 
procedure is a passing on of information from those who have suc-
ceeded to those starting off. Self-determination for the student is 
presented as a right, just as it is presented as a principle in relation to 
clients. 
On the unofficial agenda, however, the student is allowed very lit-
tle room to develop his own ideas. He is expected to accept a par-
ticular world-view and to conform to the "methods of intervention" 
of his superiors. Some areas of knowledge are excluded from con-
sideration, however relevant they appear to be to the student. Efforts 
to take more control over course content or direction are met with 
resistance. Implicitly, some political views are acceptable, others are 
not. 
We have seen above that the dominant political stance is conser-
vative. There is another linked process. Students are selected by one 
criterion only: academic success. As the school system ensures that 
those from higher socio-economic groups succeed better in the com-
petitive educational process, this means that social work recruits are 
mostly middle-class people who are academically competitive. The 
competitive feature is increased further by quotas and honours 
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courses. The underlying assumption is that the academically more 
successful will make better social workers, or alternatively, have the 
right to be social workers. As most clients are working class and not 
academically successful, built into the system is a huge social^ gap. 
The implication is that people with problems need "helpers" who 
have not experienced life in the same way as themselves but who 
have nevertheless acquired a lot of "knowledge" about it. The argu-
ment that one of their own number would be easier to identify with, 
and would have a much more real understanding of the situation, is 
ignored. Socialization into the profession is entirely eliUst. (A 
breakthrough is coming in the aboriginal field, where it is now 
becoming accepted that whites cannot do social work among 
blacks.) The selective procedure ensures that new entrants are likely 
to be politically conservative." But what happens to the person who 
is different? Who either has an alternative ideology or who seriously 
questions what is going on at present? 
Tom O'Brien is a social work student who, in 1973, took a year off 
from his course at Queensland University to act as secretary to the 
Northern Freeway Protest and Compensation Committee. Because 
of his political inclinations and activities he has a well-developed 
political philosophy. In a placement at the beginning of 1974 he 
found his assumptions were so different from his supervisor's that he 
asked to be transferred to another agency. O'Brien's experiences 
over the next two weeks were such that he wrote a pamphlet called 
It's like breaking up a marriage. This was a phrase used to describe 
the supervisor-student relationship by one of the members of staff 
who held discussions with him for a total of four hours. He was 
described as "vulnerable", and as having authority problems. It 
would appear that psychotherapy was attempted. 
The total implication seemed to be that the simple situation aris-
ing from changing a placement was caused by the student's internal 
psychic problems, and pressure was put on him to gain "insight" by 
accepting this view himself. The supervisor presumably was as-
sumed, by definition, not to have any authority problems, nor the 
staff members who implied that succumbing to authority is good 
("mature" etc) in itself. As O'Brien argued, "It [social work] tries to 
get people to focus on themselves, their feelings .. . It tries to focus 
attention away from an understanding of the whole society". In such 
quasi-scientific ways political differences or criticisms of the course 
are invalidated by the suggestion that they arise from pathology or 
personality problems. 
There is not the free, open atmosphere that is often claimed. One 
student carried out a viva voce with two members of staff She 
received a high mark, presumably meaning that she was considered 
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to have learned a lot, that she discussed ideas intelligently, etc. In 
fact, as she told others, the ideas she presented in this session she did 
not believe, she had merely told the examiners what she felt they 
would like to hear. This is a common feeling amongst students. They 
often feel that if they discuss certain ideas, e.g., "anti-psychiatry" or 
arguments against casework, in essays, they will not be taken 
seriously and may well receive low marks. On many occasions it has 
seemed important that one member of the teaching staff mark a 
paper rather than another; on occasions an idea for a thesis has not 
been approved because of its radical implications. 
This kind of manoeuvring of the staff-student relationship will 
reinforce the ideas that support the status quo and discourage those 
supporting change. As Tom O'Brien said: " . . . who determines what 
learning is? ... The staff do ... We can believe that we have learned 
from a situation, e.g., a placement, but they can reject this and say 
that we didn't learn because we didn't 'learn' what they wanted us to 
'learn'". 
Students do not necessarily give up their less conservative ideas, 
but they often feel very frustrated and waste effort worrying that 
their main problem might be a psychological one, not ideological dif-
ference. It makes it all the easier for them to be swallowed up by the 
system when they take a job after graduation. Like the welfare sup-
plicant, the student is told that he has a right to self-determination 
but somehow or other it never quite seems to happen. Some students 
give up the idea of making changes, or cease to work issues out any 
more. There is rarely direct opposition to new ideas; it is much more 
common to meet a refusal to acknowledge that they exist or are 
worthy of discussion. 
The way difference of opinion is dealt with in the educational set-
ting is well within the casework ideology model. That is, those in 
power tend not to perceive views other than their own as serious and 
potentially correct. Rather, they see their own as correct and the 
others as deviant. The deviance is treated with "respect" but as a 
form of pathology or immaturity. There is no real debate (often no 
debate at all) because this could only happen if both sides were open-
minded enough to risk being persuaded. It is bad enough that non-
conformist staff feel they are being humoured rather than being 
taken seriously; it is worse when students feel that complaints about 
the course, or different ideological opinions, are treated as if they 
were symptoms of personal problems rather than intellectual ques-
tions. Even though each camp might view the other in the same way, 
it should also be clearly recognized that the camps are structured in a 
power hierarchy. 
Social work education is hierarchical and elitist. Students are as-
192 
Harold Throssell 
sumed to be empty vessels waiting to be filled with the right answers 
by the cognoscenti, the staff. In fact, it is a political praxis: the cor-
rect line about welfare philosophy is mediated through the profes-
sion, through the educators, to the students who will go into action in 
the system and carry on the same ideas. Any revolutionary spirit is 
squashed, not by honest argument, but by benign liberal trickery. 
Let us make no mistake about the political action on which social 
workers are engaged. During the Springbok tour of 1971, there was a 
move in the Queensland branch of the Australian Association of 
Social Workers to hold a ballot on the question of whether there 
should be a token strike (say one hour, or at most one day) in sup-
port of the trade unions, university students, university staff, and 
many other concerned groups who were carrying out the protest. The 
suggestion brought a panic reaction from many members. Although 
the move gained a majority vote, the ballot was never held for purely 
technical, legalistic reasons, and the branch took no action on this 
racial issue. There were, however, frightened speeches about how the 
move was really an attempt to subvert the association and indeed 
society as a whole, by violent means.^^ This as a response to the 
violence done to Negroes in South Africa and Australia! 
Conclusion 
There are important actions on which social workers should be 
engaged. The basis should be a firm commitment to the structural 
changes which lead to diminution or eradication of oppression, in-
justice, and suffering. They should agitate—whether quietly or 
loudly—in this cause. Daily activities should be within a framework 
of fundamental change: reforms which preclude such change should 
not be furthered. 
"Clients" should be discouraged from being satisfied with charity 
and their legitimate claims against authorities supported. Social 
workers should advocate for the people who cannot represent 
themselves; those who do not need this help should be given informa-
tion and encouraged to join collectives in order to gain mutual sup-
port and stronger bargaining power. Social workers could act as 
resource people for collectives. 
Social workers in the public service should play their part in 
reducing the hostility between the service and the public, and play 
their proper role of serving the public who pays the bills. In par-
ticular, the secrecy of the public service should be broken down. 
There is absolutely no justification for information about welfare 
services being withheld from the public. Social workers and others 
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have a duty to spread the information which the public needs to 
claim their rights and to ensure that the services meet their needs. 
A former British prime minister, Clement Attlee, early in his 
career published a book called The social worker {\92Q) based on his 
own experience. He said: 
Every social worker is almost certain to be also an agitator. If he or 
she learns social facts and believes that they are due to certain causes 
which are beyond the power of an individual to remove, it is impossi-
ble to rest contented with the limited amount of good that can be done 
by following old methods ... 
The word "agitator" is distrustful to many; it calls up a picture of a 
person who is rather unbalanced, honest perhaps, but wrongheaded, 
possibly dishonest, troubling the waters with a view to fishing in them 
for his own benefit. This is mainly the point of view of the person who 
is on the whole contented with things as they are. 
It is still true that in social work, in the professions generally, we 
do not like to see ourselves as agitators. It is not cricket. But the 
realities are these. We live in a violent society, violence continues in 
spite of technological advance—perhaps increases because of it. 
Social work training and practice are a long way removed from the 
violence. While people are destroying each other both within as well 
as outside the social services, social workers are trying more than 
ever to be respectable scientists, intellectually distancing themselves 
from real problems, not knowing what is really going on. 
Social problems are political. Actions we take are political. Until 
we grasp that fact, much social work activity will continue to be ir-
relevant. 
Notes to text 
1. Australian Association of Social Workers, Constitution and Rules. 
2. M. Foucault, in Madness and Civilisation (London: Tavistock, 1965), shows how 
welfare institutions in Europe have been punitive since the seventeenth century. In 
the films Cathy Come Home and Edna, the Inebriate Woman, and in the book 
Down and Out in Britain (London: New English Library, 1971), Jeremy Sandford 
shows how the contemporary, highly organized welfare state in Britain is still fre-
quently punitive, 
3. J. Fischer. 1973. Is casework effective? A review. Social Work 18, no. 1 
(January). It is interesting that in the debate following Fischer's article, no one 
could produce evidence to support their argument against Fischer. Some said 
that, whatever the evidence, they knew casework was effective and he had no right 
to knock it; others criticized the methodologies of the research quoted — but did 
not explain why the consequent errors were all in the same direction! 
4. Dr. Ingleby, 1970 Ideology and the human sciences. The Human Context 11, 
no. 2 (July): "While process describes the behaviour of inanimate objects, 
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praxis is the medium of the specifically human: it implies behaviour which is 
purposive ,,." 
5. The American Psychiatric Association announced in 1973 that homosexuality 
was to be deleted as a type of mental illness. 
6. Dr. Neville Parker, a Brisbane psychiatrist, told the Australian Medical Congress 
in 1971, "Demonstrators and social reformers had a common background of 
emotional unrest and psychological distress" (Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 28 August 
1971); "Many psychologically disturbed people had forsaken the psychiatrist's 
couch for the demonstration march" {Australian, 28 August 1971). See also the 
section by J. Wilder in The New Poor, ed. I. Henderson, Peter Owen, 1973); and 
S, Halleck, The Politics of Therapy (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), 
7. In relation to mental illness, see R.D, Scott, "The treatment barrier", British 
Journal of Medical Psychology, March 1973. 
8. The film Family Life showed how the decisions of parents and hospital personnel 
helped to destroy a normal adolescent girl. 
9. See "Client power manifesto". Social Work: Radical Essays, ed. H. Throssell 
(St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1975), 
10. H, Throssell, "Social work overview", in Throssell, Social Work: Radical Essays. 
B, Abel-Smith and P. Townsend, in The Poor and the Poorest (1965) found that 
poverty had been increasing in Britain during the 1950s. See also R. Titmuss, M, 
Meacher. 
11. Poverty in Australia, interim report of the Australian government's commission 
of enquiry into poverty, March 1974. 
12. In spite of talk of community care, there are still psychiatric patients hospitalized 
1,000 miles from home in Queensland, 
13. For a full discussion of professionalism in social work, see K, Laursen, "Profes-
sionalism", in Throssell, Social Work: Radical Essays. 
14. Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Ser-
vices, Grand, 3703 (H.M.S.O., July 1968). 
15. Case Con, a journal produced by radical social workers in Britain, carried ac-
counts of social workers giving support to tenants in their struggles with housing 
authorities. The editorial collective also advocate demands for higher pay. 
16. Professor M. Carstaire, U.N, Consultant 1973, in private communication Oc-
tober 1973. 
17. "A.M.", A,B.C. Radio, 29 April 1974. 
18. Karmel Committee report to the Australian government 1973, 
19. F, Pavlin, in his Master of Social Work thesis, "A Study of Attitudes and Per-
sonality Traits Change During a Course of Professional Education for Social 
Work", found that the background of social work students was "firmly into the 
upper middle-class range" (75 per cent of fathers in occupational brackets 
labelled "managerial", "professional", etc.) — the same as most university stu-
dents. Although they scored relatively high on radicalism (as against conser-
vatism) and political economic liberalism, Pavlin did not in fact question final 
year students on political issues, and himself commented: 
Yet when one observes these students in action on the campus, one would not 
classify them as valid radicals. Indeed, if they feature among the radical 
leaders, this is generally a short and somewhat disappointing experience. They 
are concerned far more often with social issues which identify a specific depen-
dent group in the population than they are with broad philosophical issues, 
20. See N. Kerkin, "Change or revoluUonT', Australian Social Work 24, nos. 3 and 4 
(September and December 1971). 
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11 
The CounseUing Profession 
BRIAN HAZELL 
Editors' in many respects counselling is a difficult profession to criticize 
Notes for, probably more than most other professions, it is presented 
almost entirely under the aegis of doing what is most helpful for 
the individual client. Furthermore, counsellors generally claim 
to respect the client's right to self-determination and to be 
guided by the client's needs. These values are stated explicitly 
by Anthony Ryle {New Psychiatry, 3 October 1974, p. 120) in 
answering criticism of some of the grosser forms of misuse of 
the counsellor-client relationship; "As regards the more angry 
ideological critiques of some left-wing sociologists, these seem 
to be based in large measure on misunderstanding. The 
emphasis in counselling ... is upon voluntary association of 
helper and helped, aiming to enlarge autonomy and choice, not 
upon adjustment or compliance". 
It could be argued that this emphasis placed on self-
determination may act only as an idealistic goal which has 
ideological importance for counselling but which obfuscates 
what really goes on in counselling practice. 
The conceptual infrastructure of counselling is largely 
oriented toward the problems of the individual. While offering 
help to victims of the system's injustices it may be defusing the 
potential for confiict with the power arrangements of the total 
society which underlie those injustices. 
Brian Hazell, in reviewing the work of Australian counsel-
lors, confronts some of the most serious criticisms of counsel-
ling practice. He outlines a rationale for counselling which seeks 
to extend some of what he considers to be its good features. He 
includes such aspects as the low power and prestige of counsel-
lors, which ensures that they are not in a position to do any real 
Brian Hazell is a counsellor at the University of Queensland. He has been a primary 
school teacher, a school counsellor, a clinical psychologist, and a counsellor at three 
very different universities. He was also foundation counsellor at the University of the 
South Pacific in Fiji. 
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damage to their clients, and their operation within an in-
stitutional framework, which insists their activities be con-
ducted only on a voluntary basis (and thus can't be imposed 
upon unwilling clients). 
Clearly, however, not all of Hazell's colleagues would 
share his views. Many Australian counsellors are actively striv-
ing to extend the boundaries between those who have attained 
membership of professional bodies and those who have not. In 
extending the power and autonomy of the profession in this 
way, counsellors are largely concerned with their professional 
self-interest. They are weakening the position of those people 
whom they claim to be helping by seeking to remove those 
features of counselling which decrease its potential for abuse. 
Counsellors in Australian universities are not threatened by such 
works as The manufacture of madness by Thomas Szasz or The 
politics of therapy by Seymour Halleck. These works serve to con-
firm what counsellors have always believed in their hearts to be true, 
that counsellors are the "goodies" in the helping professions, and 
that psychiatrists and their paramedical accomplices are the "bad-
dies". Indeed, those counsellors who are refugees from the 
paramedical world of "resisting treatment" and "we're only trying 
to help you", would see counselling as the alternative society of 
professional helpers, offering a relatively value-free, non-judgmental 
and accepting form of counselling. And to some extent this percep-
tion is true. In many ways counsellors are an attractive (if somewhat 
ineffectual) group of people; both attractive and ineffectual because 
of the strong Rogerian tradition that permiates counselling in 
Australia. They are attractive in their permissiveness and the non-
directive legacy of seeing the world through the eyes of the client and 
in their belief in the innate goodness of the human organism. They 
are ineffectual because of the impact that such a philosophy has on 
their therapy techniques and because of the self-effacing quality such 
a life style has on the personality of the counsellor. If not actually en-
couraging the liberation movements, counsellors are at least tolerant 
of the alternative society and the drug culture. Their reservations 
usually lie in their scepticism of "isms", which seek to fit individuals 
into moral, religious, or political systems, basically because they 
emphasize the "personal growth and development" of the individual. 
They share much of the ideology of their consumers and, to steal a 
mystic word from the "baddies", Australian students probably find 
the basic philosophy and approach of counsellors "egosyntonic". 
Implied in much of their stand is that counselling is based on a warm 
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empathic relationship with the client, and, as such, is not the sole 
prerogative of the professional. 
Tlie "goodies" 
Most Australian university counselling services advertise a service 
that is "free, voluntary, and confidential". They emphasize that the 
service is staffed by qualified professionals with a social science 
background. 
Counselling is free. The student does not have to pay money for 
the counsellor's time and attention. Two important consequences of 
this (which Szasz overlooks in his rush to endorse the free enterprise 
system of psychiatry), is that any help that may be sought by a stu-
dent should not be dependent on his ability to pay, and that the 
counsellor, in turn, is freed from the contaminating infiuence of the 
small business ethic that casts such suspicion on the medical world. 
The counsellor is not encouraged for financial reasons to maintain a 
client in therapy. Theoretically he is able to give the client a clear 
message; however, it is not just financial factors that encourage a 
counsellor to maintain a client in therapy. Many counsellors still see 
maintaining a client in therapy as a measure of their competence as 
therapists. The counsellor's own needs, particularly with attractive, 
intelligent, "normal" members of the opposite sex, often leads him 
to give ambiguous cues that encourage the client to return. 
Counselling is voluntary. Counsellors would not have a bar of 
compulsory counselling in spite of the fact that other university staff, 
often with good motives, occasionally try it on. Counselling han-
douts usually include statements as explicit as, "Members of staff 
are free to encourage a student to use the Counselling Service, if he 
feels this to be in the student's interest, but it is up to the student to 
decide whether he wishes to act on this advice. In any case no feed-
back will be given to any member of staff MvV/zowr the written permis-
sion of the student". This is usually associated with "special con-
sideration" for any uncharacteristic performance by a student for a 
specific examination or poor class work, and only includes a 
minimum of detail. It can, of course, be argued that no counselling is 
voluntary, that there are forces in society, like society's very concept 
of "abnormal" or "deviant" behaviour, that force certain people to 
seek counselling, but in so far as any act is voluntary, counselling is 
voluntary. In those cases where it is obvious that social pressure is 
the main impetus for seeking counselling, it is conceivable that 
therapy might well take the form of helping the person to cope effec-
tively with those social pressures, or "debunk" society's concept of 
deviance. 
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Generally, counselling is very voluntary and this is in the client's 
interest. But it is also true that the insecurity of counsellors 
sometimes leads them to turn away would-be clients who are escap-
ing from high status therapists because they are dissatisfied with the 
quality of their help, or who simply feel they need a change. This is 
because the counsellor has been overexposed to the medical model of 
professional ethics which is usually justified by such notions as 
"resistance" or more recently "renegade reinforcement". These 
clients are occasionally referred back to their own therapist and 
often cannot escape from that professional's (perceived or very real) 
incompetence. Worse still, there is often confirmed in the mind of 
the "victim", that "resistance" is in some way pathological or part 
of his "illness". Some counsellors believe that a public commitment 
to voluntary can be broken if the counsellor believes that it is in the 
client's best interest to refer him on to more specialized help. These 
referrals are more in the nature of persuasive involuntary rather than 
forced involuntary and become less frequent as the counsellor 
gathers confidence. However, it leaves a loophole for the "goodies" 
to deliver up the client to the "baddies", and represents a serious 
weakness in the voluntary nature of counselling. In any test 
programme emphasis is laid on the voluntary nature not only of the 
whole programme but also of any individual test in the programme, 
and even then the test results are used strictly for counselling pur-
poses and remain confidential to the counselling service. 
Counselling is confidential. In practice, much information re-
mains confidential to the whole counselling service rather than strict-
ly confidential to the individual counsellor, not that all staff would 
know much about an individual client. It means the counsellor does 
not have to do his own typing or file his own correspondence, but it 
also means, and often in a very real sense, that the helping activity of 
the counselling service can be extended to the whole counselling 
staff. In counselling services where some personal information is 
available to the whole counselling staff, such staff are called on to 
give an undertaking not to reveal such information outside the 
counselling service. Office staff are exceptionally good in this regard 
and handle even importunate enquiries from academic staff quite 
firmly. Even in those cases where it could help the student's applica-
tion for some special consideration for some uncharacteristic or poor 
performance in examinations or class work, the receptionist would 
encourage the lecturer to contact the student himself to see if there 
were any mitigating circumstances associated with his poor perfor-
mance or suggest he discuss his difficulties with a counsellor. In any 
case she would make it clear that the counselling service cannot com-
ment without the written approval of the student. There are counsel-
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lors who have not only not discussed or written a word about a stu-
dent without his written permission, but have upset deans of faculties 
by giving the student concerned a copy of the counsellor's "confiden-
tial" report. Again there are limits on confidentiality. Usually 
criteria as nebulous as "dangerous to self or others" are intuitively 
used by counsellors (to employ the patois of the medical world) to 
"stuff off a disagreeable client or one who is a threat to their com-
petence. When this limit is reached, it is possible that the mechanism 
for referral for more specialized help will be set in motion and the 
client will be delivered up. To be fair, in the very rare occasions when 
this happens, the counsellor, always uneasy about handing a student 
over, keeps contact with his client and has a moderating effect on the 
"treatment" meted out to the "victim". 
Not only is counselling free, voluntary and confidential (essential 
checks to the power of the counsellor), but the counsellor really has 
no power other than the persuasiveness of his personality, his attrac-
tiveness as a person, or ocassionally his skill as a therapist. He has 
no real power to insist that the client do certain things. Lacking 
power and status the counsellor even lacks persuasiveness. Unlike 
the psychiatrist he cannot punish a recalcitant client by forcing treat-
ment on him, by scheduling him, prescribing harmful or addictive 
drugs, or even retreat to the omnipotent doctor stance. The dis-
satisfied client can drop out of therapy not only unharmed in any 
way but hopefully innoculated by this experience against the psy-
chological mystique and so not fall into the clutches of those who 
have power. He might even innoculate his mates so they are not 
"sucked in by the bullshit". This innoculation or debunking may be 
the ultimate strength of counselling. If by his incompetence or by an 
active demystifying process, he could make would-be-clients or 
patients sceptical and not threatened by psychology, then he may 
protect not only that individual from the ravages of the helping 
professions, he might even by some pyramid selling effect, bring a 
much needed check to the imperialism of the helping professions. 
Counsellors know that what they are doing is not particularly effec-
tive in changing or ameliorating behaviour, they are not even sure 
that is what their counselling is all about. Generally they would see 
themselves as listening non-judgmentally or even sympathetically, 
and they would hope that the client (and perhaps the counsellor) 
would go away glad of the experience. 
The counsellor in Australian universities has a publicly stated 
policy or philosophy which is not unattractive to students and which, 
in fact, students have helped to shape. The counsellors have a public 
stance which they cannot but adopt because,unlike most of the other 
professions, they have an eager watchdog in the form of student as-
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sociations which will see that not only are student rights adequately 
protected but that the counsellors' ethics are not being circumvented. 
At a time when Australian universities are quietly shunting counsel-
lors from lecturers with academic status, (and the consequent protec-
tion of academic freedom), to non-academic professionals or ad-
ministrative officers, this must be a great consolation to counsellors. 
As members of the administration or as non-academic professionals, 
they become vulnerable on questions of where their loyalties lie and 
are open to charges of being "agents of the administration", and are 
now in an invidious position. 
In brief then, the goodness of the "goodies" lies in the kind of peo-
ple who have found their way into counselling, people basically con-
cerned about students, who have perhaps "identified too much with 
the students", who have no power or authority or the will to resort to 
power or authority, who have adopted a public stance and sur-
prisingly won acceptance for this stance from university administra-
tions, and who are well aware of the limitations of their wares. But 
whatever goodness they have would be subject to deterioration if it 
were not for the checks on their enterprise by relatively sophisticated 
consumer organizations called student associations. 
It is not that counsellors are by nature more altruistic than their 
paramedical equivalents. They are simply less professionalized. They 
have a different educational background and are products of and 
work in a very different social climate. They deal with subjects who 
are articulate and critical of bourgeois ideologies. By contrast, even 
the most libei'al arts/social science-educated sceptic, once sur-
rounded by a gaggle of specially trained medically oriented profes-
sionals (nurses, social workers, occupational therapists, physicians, 
pyschiatrists, cooks, cleaners, and people who "play" at being men-
tally ill) must either conform or escape from this nineteenth century 
model of the helping professions. 
A rough guide to measure the professional helper's openness to 
alternative life styles is contained in the formula: 
The fiexibility of a professional helper is directly related to the 
amount of non-professional education and inversely proportional to 
his temporal and spatial proximity to the medical world. 
A counselling service founded at a university that has not been ex-
posed to a medical service and/or has no faculty of medicine (New-
castle University Counselling Service, for example) will be more 
"ideologically correct" than one founded with or subsequent to a 
medical service. It also follows that the counselling service that is 
physically separated from the medical service will also maintain this 
stance. 
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The Newcastle University Counselling Service also provides an 
excellent example of the salutary effects of the student watchdog. In 
1969 an underground anonymous weekly, the Weekly Rat, appeared 
that took the counselling service to task on its bourgeois ideologies, 
compulsory testing programme, confidentiality, and a variety of is-
sues in a debate that went on for months. The counselling service was 
probably innocent of many of the charges but responded by clarify-
ing their ideology, dropping compulsory testing, and engaging in ac-
tive dialogue with the vocal students. 
What then for the individual student who feels he might benefit 
from a visit to a counsellor, particularly if traditional practice has 
not been shown to be particularly effective in any statistical sense 
(Rachman 1973) and there is some suggestion that intensive psy-
chotherapy has negative effects (Bergin 1971). Let it be known that 
the counsellor will probably do him no harm and might even do him 
some good. There are clients who express a great deal of satisfaction 
from their encounter with a counsellor. The vast majority of stu-
dents, however, hardly know that they exist and have even less idea 
of what they do. Then there is the growing number who have seen a 
counsellor and who say that it was a waste of time—they solved their 
own problem anyway, and will solve their own problems in future. 
This last may be the counsellor's real contribution to the student's 
education. 
The origin of the "goodies" 
The counsellor made his official appearance in Australian 
universities as recently as the late fifties and early sixties. There had, 
of course, always been staff members interested enough to become 
involved with the students' personal problems, staff who, as well as 
their normal duties, have taken on the function of counsellor. In fact, 
formal counselling services have generally grown out of an individual 
or group of individuals responding to the needs of students, 
responding initially to the need, as they saw it, to help students who 
had personal difficulties, adjust to the demands of university life. 
With the growth in size of universities, the proliferation of courses 
and the increasingly impersonal nature of university education, 
many of these counsellors became self-conscious of their lack of 
training and have worked to create a counselling service. In many 
cases this meant that many counsellors, whose concern and personal 
qualities led them to be involved with students have, unfortunately, 
handed over this function to the professionals. In other cases they 
have taken further training and moved from teaching or academic 
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work to counselling. It would grossly misrepresent the integrity of 
these early counsellors or teachers to see them as responding other 
than to the needs of the students and the individual student in par-
ticular (at least as they saw these needs). Early counsellors in univer-
sities were as much a product of their times and educational 
background as anyone else and if their theories of adjustment were 
part of the popular and traditional model of adjustment, this in no 
way discredits their concern for the individual in society. 
Solzhenitsyn, himself a victim of the "organs" he so vividly ex-
poses, has this to say (1973, p.130): 
And just so we don't go around fiaunting too proudly the white 
mantle of the just, let everyone ask himself "If my life had turned out 
differently, might I myself not have become just such an ex-
ecutioner?" 
It is a dreadful question if one really answers it honestly. 
So let us not denigrate the integrity of early counsellors, as we see 
the political implications of the ideology of adjustment. Let us make 
sure that these social conditions do not continue. Clearly "good will" 
or integrity can not exonerate counsellors for doing harm, they must 
be aware of the social determinants of their behaviour. 
There are fashions in psychology as in all academic disciplines, 
and the fashion at the time of the origin of counsellors, was very 
much the traditional medical model of behaviour, and concepts of 
normalcy were still very much infiuenced by concepts of intra-
psychic determinants of behaviour, personal responsibility, and the 
need to adjust to society. Both the clients and counsellors lived in a 
world where society's concept of "adjustment" or "abnormality" 
determined the roles that both counsellor and client would play. This 
is still true, but the fashions have changed, and both client and 
counsellor can play very different roles and bring different expecta-
tions to their meeting. 
In early days the causes of maladjustment were rooted in the in-
dividual and therapy consisted of setting a climate whereby the in-
dividual could come to terms with his problem, adjust to his 
problems and in rare cases even change his behaviour. In the late six-
ties, under the infiuence of the behaviour moderators, definite at-
tempts to alter behaviour were made, to change maladaptive 
behaviour into adaptive behaviour. Now the fashions have changed 
again, the client is the "victim" of discrimation, of an inappropriate, 
archaic, and oppressive education system. There has not only been a 
refreshing swing to examining the role of the institution as a very real 
source of stress to students but, more importantly, to examining the 
political act of labelling certain behaviour as problem behaviour as a 
counter to social change. But counselling did not begin by counsel-
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lors seeing themselves as agents of the administration, the tame psy-
chologist fitting students back into an inflexible system; it began by 
very real concern on the part of involved staff members for in-
dividuals who were either casualities of the system or whose personal 
problems, whatever conceptional framework you use, came to the at-
tention of staff who were concerned that their "case required special 
consideration", or "basically a good student but needs help." 
However patronizing or ill-informed we might see these philosophies 
of man, or how passe this function, counselling originated out of con-
cern for the individual student who, for whatever reason, was seen as 
"at risk" of failing in the academic situation for other than academic 
reasons. 
Indeed, whatever their limitations, counselling services have con-
tinued to develop along these lines. If housing is perceived as a 
problem for students, then counselling services have employed hous-
ing officers; if poor study skills are seen as the problem, then 
remedial programmes were seen as appropriate for study skills; if 
reading is a source of failure, then speed reading programmes were 
advocated. If isolation and loneliness in the university setting is seen 
as disrupting the students' progress, then human relations groups or 
sensitivity training has been developed. Careers counselling, 
vocational literature, scholarship information, visits by industry, and 
many other aspects of counselling have been generated by counsel-
lors responding to what they perceive to be the needs of the students. 
Counselling service activities are as diverse as are the counselling 
services. Each service responds to what it perceives to be the needs of 
students: one counsellor has a gliding club, another has a bush walk-
ing club, and another has a traditional medical concept of counsell-
ing. Whatever the programme and whatever the human failings, it 
must be emphasized that, like all new pre-professional helping ac-
tivities, counsellors have responded to what they have perceived to be 
the needs of students. But counsellors can only do what they can do. 
If they feel that a political activist is needed in their ranks, they are 
capable of finding such an activist. If they advocate that others 
should "do their thing" they must be allowed to do what they can, 
not what ideally we might want them to do. If we insist otherwise, 
then nothing is done. No counsellor wittingly "fucks-up" a student, 
no counsellor allows himself to be used as an instrument of the status 
quo. All counsellors are guilty of fiogging their own values, their own 
attitudes and, implicitly, their own philosophical model of man, even 
if it's simply by being what they are. Modelling cannot be prevented 
and perhaps it should, at least for certain counsellors, be encouraged. 
Hopefully, counsellors in the university setting are perhaps less 
guilty of cultural imperialism or of being agents in the class struggle 
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because the university culture is more homogenous at least in its 
tolerance of other ideologies and the counsellor comes from the same 
"permissive" environment. 
So the early counsellors, whatever their ideology, were individuals 
whose concern and personal qualities led them to take on the extra 
activities involved in helping their fellows. Now there are moves to 
have them specially trained and to form the profession of counsell-
ing. Areas of competence are defined and the role and function of the 
counselling specialist is being increasingly accepted. The new profes-
sion emphasizes the value of special training, the risks involved in the 
untrained getting into the counselling act. Yet counsellors claim 
rather inconsistently that counselling requires a certain type of per-
sonality, and counselling consists in the quality of the relationship 
rather than in specific skills and techniques. Counsellors are born, 
not made. Counsellors are seeking to monopolize basic human 
relationships. It would be tragic if all other staff surrendered their 
human involvement to the professionals. Already the professional 
role of the counsellor is emerging to the point that a student who 
seeks out a staff member, often a tutor who is close to him in age, 
race, cultural background, and other variables important for a close 
relationship, will be "stuffed off by the staff member to the counsel-
ling service. It happens because the staff members has come to 
believe that it requires special skills and special training and that he 
should not get involved in his students' problems. Staff members are 
even censored for getting too involved with their students. So unin-
volvement becomes a virtue in the university setting and the deper-
sonalization of education is encouraged. Not all staff are capable of 
personal involvement, but many are and these are the very people 
that students seek out. So education gets restricted and a solution to 
personal life questions, or any education for personal growth and 
development can be ignored by university departments (because the 
counselling service is the place to take these questions). Students, of 
course, do not take these questions to counsellors, "It's not that 
serious", and in many cases the university department forces the stu-
dent's personal growth and development to stand still while the stu-
dent is preoccupied with the staffs meaningless but safe educational 
assignments. Far from educating the whole person, universities tend 
to tie up students in a way that prevents the normal educational 
process taking place—and counselling services by their existence 
abet this situation. 
At a time when the counsellor should be attempting to disseminate 
to as wide an audience as he possibly can, whatever skills he may 
have, he is actively working to form an "elitist" group of counselling 
psychologists within the Australian Psychological Society. This may 
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seem a reversal of the trend to widen the Counsellor's Association 
and to change it into an interest group that took place with the for-
mation of the NAZ Student Services Association at a conference in 
Canberra in January 1973. The whole idea of that association was to 
include people who were interested in students regardless of 
background or qualifications. Now just when the counsellor should 
be striving to deprofessionalize the helping professions, demystify 
the process, and get rid of the humbug associated with psychology, 
he is instead actively forming an exclusive union so that demarcation 
lines can be laid down to protect his professional interests and 
counselling will go the way of all the other professions. Just when the 
counsellor and the society should be working to take away or under-
mine the awesome power of the psychiatric world to deprive a citizen 
of his liberty, force him to take dangerous drugs, punish him with 
electric shocks, and worse still force him to act out the role of mental 
patient, just when they should do all they can to have power taken 
from other helping professionals, they are actively seeking power 
and status themselves. In the best tradition of the aid culture, they 
are moving to meet the needs of the counsellor, and this typically 
makes life harder for people they claim to aid. 
The politics of counselling 
It would do counsellors and counselling in Australia an injustice to 
fully endorse the position so clearly stated and illustrated by Banks 
and Martens (1973): 
Traditionally counsellors have functioned as agents and apologists 
for the established system. Current counselling theory and practice 
place the onus for change on the individual. The existing social order 
is absolved of all responsibility for individual and group problems, 
that exist within the structure of its institution, and persons and 
groups who express attitudes or who demonstrate behaviour inconsis-
tant with the prescribed norms are labelled "deviant" or "abnormal". 
If counsellors are to become more responsible to their clients' needs, 
they must acknowledge the negative effects that society and its institu-
tions can have on individuals and begin to effect changes at the in-
stitutional level. 
They continue with this telling example of the political background 
and object of founding a counselling service: 
In 1969 the House Special Sub-Committee on Education held hear-
ings to examine the causes of campus unrest during the years 1967 and 
1968. Among the witnesses appearing before the Sub-Committee was 
S.I. Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State College His 
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analysis suggested that the problems occurred because immature stu-
dents were acting childishly and naively to the situations surrounding 
the war, poverty, and other social problems facing the country. 
Congressman Roman Pucinski of Illinois agreed that the unrest was 
caused by deviant and immature students. He reasoned that since the 
government and society were functioning normally, the disruptions 
must have been caused, to use his words, by "mentally sick" in-
dividuals who have difficulty adjusting and relating to the established 
order. Additional strong support for Congressman Pucinski's line of 
reasoning was provided by a prominant child pyschiatrist, Bruno Bet-
telheim, who testified that the individuals involved in the unrest were 
immature and indeed ill. 
As a result of this and other testimonies. Congressman Pucinski 
told a Newsweek reporter of his intention to sponsor legislation that 
would provide mental health personnel for campuses. He proposed 
making federal funds available to hire psychiatrists and other mental 
health workers to "counsel" students away from disruptive behaviour. 
As a direct translation from Halleck (1971) to counselling, this 
theme and this example are both, on the one hand, telling indict-
ments of counsellors yet,on the other, too simple an analysis of the 
interaction between counsellor, institution, and students they serve. 
It is true that the counsellors are appointed as instruments of society 
but in practice they also become instruments for change in society. I 
would like to think that when these mental health services started, 
regardless of what Bruno Bettelheim or Congressman Pucinski 
thought counsellors were doing, they would be doing something very 
different. I would be surer of this if they were non-medical counsel-
lors and were operating in the Australian context because in this 
country counselling originated basically from within the university, 
because it had educational rather than medical origins, and because 
historically early counsellors were not a profession. Whatever the in-
stitution might think counsellors are doing (and I separate counsel-
lors rigorously from paramedical psychologists), they are currently 
concerned for the forward movement of the student even in a repres-
sive institution. This may take the form of teaching a client how to 
manipulate the system or may concentrate on "educating the in-
stitution"; the latter is a long term activity and it is important that in 
the meantime the student and counsellor not only survive, but sur-
vive with idealism relatively intact. Whatever senior administrators 
might publicly claim they want, for whatever politically expedient 
motive they might say they want it, the bulk of university staff would 
support counsellors in what they are really doing, if they knew what 
they were doing. 
Let me quote at length from an article written by a counsellor to 
effect a change in the institution and which reflects the attitude of a 
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growing number of Australian counsellors: 
The young in all societies have been a force for change, and the old 
have always resisted change. The young and old are in a constant state 
of conflict. The old have the power, they have the wisdom, and have 
always been concerned that the young today are morally inferior, ir-
responsible and generally lacking all the "old virtues". And this in 
spite of a vast store of evidence to the contrary which suggests that the 
young have never been better educated, so involved in social and 
moral issues, and more permissive of other cultures, religions and 
social mores. The endless struggle for the old to prevent change leads 
to the proliferating of rules, and concern for discipline and control. On 
such control is the process of labelling some "disturbed" behaviour as 
abnormal. Such a person so labelled will be sent for treatment and 
hopefully he will be "cured" or made to conform and accept this label 
that was put on his "deviant" or "disturbed" behaviour. All theories 
of counselling oppose the use of counselling expertise to fit someone 
willy nilly into a system that may be "faculty" or inimical to the per-
sonal growth and development of the individual. Always included in 
these philosophies is concern for the personal growth and develop-
ment of other individuals. Some may recall that in my maiden talk at 
this University I congratulated the University for having the good 
sense to employ a counsellor ... employing a counsellor implies a 
dramatic change in the development of the University—it represents a 
sort of maturity. It represents a change from control to tolerance of a 
wider range of student behaviour. However enlightened those 
members of Senate who worked to have a Counsellor appointed, in 
practice, it appears that the underlying concept is one of control. 
Hence the proliferating of student welfare personnel. 
Somehow the University, instead of being an agent for enlightened 
academic and social change, has oriented itself to winning the esteem 
of the old and in so doing has impossed on the young a set of middle-
class controls that are inimical to the best interests of the students. 
These are not the words of a counsellor maintaining the status 
quo, although in the event such a political approach failed, the 
backlash would have had that very effect. As it was, the article was 
not badly received by the university administration and in some 
quarters was welcomed as a counter to pressure from the community 
to tighten control on the students. Ultimately, counselling services 
and counsellors can offer more by surviving in the political game and 
progressively effecting change in community attitudes, than by un-
dermining the growing acceptance of the ombudsman type function 
of the counsellor. This is not an isolated example of the counsellor 
intervening at the institutional level on behalf of students, but it is an 
attempt to answer Banks and Martens's single and dramatic exam-
ple with an equally dramatic one. 
Counsellors are actively leading the debate on their role and func-
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tion and have been concerned about the political implications of 
their activity. In New South Wales the school counsellors have an 
elaborate promotion system independent of the high school system 
so that they can maintain their independence in the face of school 
principals and not have their motivation to work for the individual 
student undermined by the school system. The recent Queensland 
counsellors' conference issued this guideline for a public debate 
"Counselling—conformity or change?" Again let me quote at length 
because these concepts are central to this book. 
Counselling has traditionally been viewed as a one-to-one 
relationship-oriented process aimed at helping clients solve problems 
or change behaviour; such problem-solving or behaviour change has, 
at least implicity been assumed to be in the direction of greater 
adherence to social norms. However, an emerging view of counselling 
that has appeared lately is that when counsellors view problems as ex-
isting only within the individual, they are accepting and reinforcing 
the validity of existing social conditions. In concentrating on the in-
dividual and striving to bring him to adjust to society, the counsellor is 
condoning the existing social order and refusing to confront the 
abuses of society which are producing individual frustration and dis-
tress. In the field of vocational guidance, it is often assumed that a 
responsibility of the counsellor is to steer clients into occupations es-
sential for maintenance of the current economic order. In this way, 
counsellors are seen as upholders of the status quo. However, we have, 
in recent years, seen many young people opting for alternative life 
styles outside the economic mainstream. Life in communes, sub-
sistence farming, operation of small craft industries all have appeal to 
youth who question the work ethic as we define it. Counsellors must 
be prepared to work with an increasing number of clients who will be 
seeking alternatives to the current economic structure. 
Few issues have received such widespread attention in recent years 
as has the changing status of women. Counsellors are frequently 
blamed for having participated, albeit unknowingly, in the relegating 
of women to constricted roles, not only in vocational life, but in other 
areas as well. The challenge to a profession committed to the proposi-
tion that individuals should be encouraged to develop and utilize their 
full potential is clear. We can either continue to subtly discourage our 
female clients from entering traditionally male vocations and societal 
roles, or we can help them widen their horizons to become aware of in-
creased opportunites for full participation in society. 
If young people are questioning tradidonal work roles and sex roles, 
they are also raising doubts about other institutions, most notably 
marriage and the nuclear family. Nearly every counsellor, working in 
university counselling centres, has dealt with clients who freely admit 
to living in a de-facto marriage relationship that both parties view as 
being impermanent, or at least not morally or legally binding on 
either party. Frequently they put forth very convincing arguments for 
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such arrangements. Can counsellors actively encourage clients to 
enter into such a relationship as a means of meeting sexual and 
emotional needs, or must we maintain a stance in favor of traditional 
marriage and the nuclear family? 
One answer to the above questions is that far from being a reac-
tionary force (as it has often been defined) the counselling profession 
should be highly flexible, critical of its own social and cultural as-
sumptions and actively meeting the challenge of the contemporary 
situation. Skills and approaches in working with individuals are vital, 
but attempts at change should also be directed at the institutions that 
create problems of individual adjustment, the schools, hospitals, 
professions, the legal system, industry and trade union organizations. 
Counsellors should work in the field to change attitudes in 
educational, administrative and community groups. 
The debate was to the point and it provoked both hostility and 
anxiety and in some senses demoralization. For who wants to believe 
that our function is adjusting people to a system? But clearly this ad-
justing function is still being done by many counsellors, perhaps the 
majority, but the emerging view of counselling is rapidly becoming 
the dominant ideology. 
The "goodies" before the revolution 
It is hard to gauge what Australian counsellors as a group consider 
counselling to be, let alone their role and function. There has been a 
harmonious disagreement, each able to allow another to do what he 
can do, and be what he must be. But even in this there has been a un-
ifying philosophy of concern and while it may be a politically naive 
concern, the concern has been there. As counselling becomes a 
profession, as it gains exclusive rights to certain areas of expertise 
and competence, it may be that this concern will go. What is con-
cerned in role and/or function is well stated by Leona Tyler (1973, 
pp.7,8,10), whose writings have formed the basic text of many an 
Australian counsellor's introduction to counselling psychology. 
... a sincere desire to help individuals use the resources they have 
within themselves and in their social and cultural environments to 
make their lives work out well, 
or: 
While a coun.sellor may be a political activist in his off hours, what 
he does as a counsellor is search for existing channels of forward 
movement that are open to his client, 
or again: 
To sum up, then, what 1 consdier to be the present responsibilities 
of counselling psychology, the first major task is to help individuals to 
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reduce the confusion they find in their lives by organizing vaguely-
sensed possibilities into feasible alternatives and choosing the life 
styles that meet their needs, the causes they wish to serve, the kinds of 
experience they want their lives to include. For some, the core of this 
commitment will be a career choice, but for others it will not be. The 
second major task is to help people counteract isolation and confusion 
by providing personal interest and support and showing how collec-
tions of strangers can be transformed into close groups of brothers, 
sisters and friends, and belongingness can grow out of work on com-
mon tasks. 
Perhaps this is what counsellors see themselves as doing. A gliding 
club or bush walking club is working on the "second major task"; 
the groupee-groupee movement more clearly so; but it's the first role 
or task that worries some counsellors most. What in practice does 
this role or function or task mean? Leona Tyler (1973, p. 8) states 
one view: 
Joe Jenson cannot postpone his life until after the revolution comes. 
He needs to get started on a career or some alternative plan for his life 
right now ... This is what I mean by saying that it is the function of 
Counselling in any society to represent the "individuals" who are 
members of it ... to see what can be done to counteract harm that has 
already been done to the person, to create opportunities he has not 
discovered for himself, to put him in touch with others who are similar 
to him, to help him acquire useful habits and discontinue kinds of 
behaviour that handicap him. In an era like ours when there is much 
talk of social reform, even of revolution, it is more essential than ever 
that this counselling orientation be maintained. 
It is clear that the counsellor has been and will continue to be con-
cerned about the individual. When the individual is in conflict with 
his society, the Australian counsellor will be more than likely to take 
his part and work for that individual. But if they do this well, there 
will be no revolution. 
The "goodies" counter the revolution 
Institutions responded to the growing demand for counselling by 
appointing counsellors but they were too few and not very well 
chosen or, as I wrote in another place: 
Traditionally counsellors have been so heavily committed to 
providing service, that they have had little time to research or evaluate 
their function, to develop alternatives to traditional time consuming 
techniques of doubtful efficiency, to research the very subject of their 
attention namely students and indeed, to protect their own academic 
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status or working conditions. It is not unusual for them to be housed 
in inappropriate and temporary premises often reflecting the low es-
teem in which they are held by their fellow academics and academic 
institutions. It is not unknown for them to be assigned a professional 
status that could be described as patronising or even downright dis-
couraging or demoralising. In the present situation, counsellors stand 
with one tenuous foot in the academic world, one foot rather uneasily 
planted in the administrative structure, occasionally with unfortunate 
consequences, and perhaps another foot withering away with student 
desuetude and/or disenchantment. 
They were clearly chosen for their concern and dedication, they 
were generally steeped in the Rogerian self-effacing philosophy, the 
ethic of service, and were politically naive. But the ungracious suspi-
cion lingers that the institution or administrators wittingly or unwit-
tingly wanted safe, if not reactionary, and certainly non-threatening 
if not tame psychologists. They were assigned low status and 
minimal power to do other than counsel in the most restrictive sense. 
In most cases they were appointed as non-academic or progressively 
had academic status taken away from them. This has obvious im-
plications for their function. It is not just a question of status, it 
means they are vulnerable. They are not protected by a tradition of 
academic freedom, and, as servants of the administration, 
theoretically they owe their allegiance to the administration. Clearly 
the institution's acceptance of counsellors' public stance offers some 
security, but the institution could be in a difficult political situation, 
e.g., abortion issues, "to let the counsellor go". Often, for ad-
ministrative purposes, they are lumped with the medical services, 
making it more difficult to break with the traditional obsolete 
medical model of human behaviour. This also perpetuates the view 
that counsellors are agents of the status quo. For many institutions, 
counselling is a kind of window dressing, the icing on the cake, which 
they do not take too seriously; after all, "I didn't need counselling 
when I was a student" and it would not be unfair to say, they really 
do not want to know what they are actually doing. 
While they do what they do, and do it well and quietly, the univer-
sity or institution can sweep all those social issues, important to what 
counselling is about, under the carpet. The warmth and concern of 
counsellors is unquestionable, but their naivety and very dedication 
are manipulated by institutions to avoid any upset. 
While counsellors do what they do and do it well there is no pres-
sure on the institution, or indeed society, to come to grips with the 
real social issues. While the counsellor does what he does, there will 
be no pressure on the university to change. While the counsellor's 
personal charm can be used to find forward paths for the student, or 
can teach the student how to manipulate the system, the system need 
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not change. The counsellor is the unwitting perpetuator of the per-
nicious aspect of the system and the society. Leona Tyler might talk 
about the revolution, but the revolution will never come, or if it does, 
the counsellors will probably be the first to go. 
Irrelevant and inappropriate academic courses that almost totally 
ignore the needs of students will continue. Courses aimed at the per-
sonal growth and development of the student, his general awareness 
of social issues, and his involvement in these issues will never be 
mounted, because these issues are personal problems and are becom-
ing the area for the professional counsellor. The basic dishonesty of 
courses will continue. A student should have a reasonable expecta-
tion that, a psychology course, for example, might give him some in-
sight into his own behaviour, meet some of his own needs, or at least 
touch on some of the social issues of the day—particularly if it is an 
introductory course. Like the school system, the university studious-
ly avoids any of the real social or educational issues, and while 
counsellors periodically, and even in some cases consistently in-
tervene on behalf of students, even departments that have some af-
finity with counsellors can ignore the counsellor's intervention 
because counselling has been created to the formula of "low status 
and a minimum of power" at least at the institutional level. 
Much as I dislike Banks and Martens's statement, "Because of 
this orientation, the reactionary need never acknowledge, let alone 
confront, any of the problems that exist in his society: it is always the 
individual who needs help", in practice it is almost true, not because 
the counsellor is reactionary, and not because he doesn't realize the 
situation, but because he has been appointed on a formula of too few 
and with low status and minimum power. "Persons and forces out-
side the therapeutic dyad have used the counsellors as their agent to 
change client behaviour so that it will be acceptance to the larger 
society, however unacceptable it is to the client." The last line is just 
not true of Australian counsellors. It is more likely that the counsel-
lor does the right thing by the client, e.g., arranges an abortion and 
then covers up this social issue, or pretends it was indicated for psy-
chological reasons. The individual is protected from the society's 
hypocritical attitudes, without the hypocritical and irresponsible at-
titudes being threatened. In every sense of the word the counsellor is 
doing the institution's dirty work, from a position of vulnerability 
and is ultimately expendible. And by doing it well, because they are 
concerned for the individual, there is no pressure on the institution or 
the society to change. 
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"Adjusters" and "liberators" 
Just as counselling has gone through very marked changes in its 
development from adjusting the individual to liberating the in-
dividual, so it seems to me that the individual goes through definite 
stages from adjusting to the society to liberating himself. The 
counsellor has to respond to the expectations of the client, to his 
stage of development. If the client sees himself as adjusting and 
wants "adjustment" then the counsellor cannot impose "liberation". 
To impose liberation is to create that anxiety or tension, which 
counsellors are sought after to allay. It's as if the client is forced to 
deviate too rapidly from his social programming. There are univer-
sities and their students at different stages of development. Some un-
iversities and their students seek liberation, others seek adjustment 
and institutions tend to employ counsellors at that stage of develop-
ment; counsellors who will best facilitate their students and the in-
stitution along this continuum of adjustment to liberation. 
One university mistakenly employed a "liberating" counsellor 
who distressed not only the university and local community by his 
liberating philosophies but also the students themselves. He argued 
that this tension, this liberating aspect, was vital to their develop-
ment; they argued that it was alien to their culture and that by 
liberating them, he alienated them from their people and made them 
outcasts in their own culture. 
There is no simple division between liberating and adjusting. To 
even get a student to accept that his problems are not due to his "in-
nate, evil tendencies", his "weak", "biological", or even 
"biochemical" predisposition is often as not impossible. Brought up 
in our society he believes there are born "unstable individuals". The 
counsellor often cannot shift this basic philosophy. Because he can-
not even begin to shift it, in many cases, he cannot make the client 
optimistic that it can be changed or indeed convince him that this is 
not the whole story. The counsellor, whatever his philosophy, is 
reduced by the client to consoling him for his misfortune of being 
"born with a weak character", or for being deficient in some way. As 
for getting him to consider the remote possibility that he may be a 
casualty of the system, or that the system is wrong and needs to 
change, such is his faith in the benevolence of the system that he can-
not act other than to make the counsellor an "adjuster". At another 
stage in such a man's development he may seek out another counsel-
lor, or even the same counsellor and expect a different role from the 
counsellor, at that stage he may have the counsellor play "liberator". 
The very terms "liberator" and "adjuster" are value judgments 
depending on your ideology. A "straight" counsellor can be seen as a 
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"liberator" if he liberates a student from the "tyranny" of the alter-
native society. The alternative society counsellor can be an "ad-
juster" if he "adjusts" a straight client to the alternative society. In 
practice each counsellor sees himself as a "liberator" and the 
counsellors who are opposed to his ideology as "adjusters". Hopeful-
ly, both "straight" and "alternative" counsellors can play both roles 
in response to the needs of the client. Minority groups with high 
cohesiveness may demand greater conformity than the dominant 
culture, and so make it harder for any counsellor to play liberator 
with an individual. A counsellor does well to pay close attention to 
the "expressed" needs of the client if he is to minimize the impact of 
his own "cultural imperialism". 
Free will and responsibility in a democracy 
Kurt Vonnegut sums up this dilemma for the counsellor most 
succinctly in Slaughter House 5 (1969, pp.88-89): 
America is the wealthiest nation on Earth, but its people are mainly 
poor, and the poor Americans are urged to hate themselves... It is in 
fact a crime for an American to be poor, even though America is a na-
tion of poor. Every other nation has folk traditions of men who were 
poor but extremely wise and virtuous, and therefore more estimable 
than anyone with power and gold. No such tales are told by the 
American poor. They mock themselves and glorify their betters .,, 
When a dashingly clad officer addresses such a frumpishly dressed 
bum, he scolds him, as an officer in an army must. But the officer's 
contempt is not, as in other armies, avuncular theatricality. It is a 
genuine expression of hatred for the poor who have no one to blame 
for their misery but themselves. 
Free will can be just as handy for the counsellor. It means he does 
not have to feel guilty for doing nothing. He can sit in his office and 
wait for those students who, in a democracy, have willed to be poor 
on psychological resources. He can attack other counsellors who at-
tempt to do anything for "cultural imperialism". 
The dilemma for the counsellor is clear. If he does anything it is 
cultural imperialism, if he does nothing he is maintaining the status 
quo. If he sets out to improve the psychological or social lot of his 
client, he is guilty of imposing his values and attitudes; if he accepts 
the values and attitudes of the client he is maintaining the client's 
status quo. If he changes the individual to fit into society; he main-
tains the society's status quo. If he confronts a client with his bigotry 
or racialism (or counsels a student to martyrdom), he is clearly 
acting as an agent for individual and ultimately social change. His 
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action to change an individual is clearly a value judgment based on 
some notion of social reform. But the notion of social reform comes 
from the counsellor, not the client, and like all crusaders such a 
counsellor ultimately ignores the needs of the individual client. A 
social scientist counsellor can solve this dilemma by accepting an in-
dividual's racialism as he would his homosexuality. He cannot, at the 
individual level, act unilaterally as an agent for social reform. If he 
accepts that he can challenge a man on his racialism, he must accept 
the counsellor who challenges a man on his homosexuality. You can-
not advocate selective tolerance. 
It can be argued that cultural imperialism is what we do as part of 
the class struggle, but social change is what we bring about as social 
scientists. With all its limitations, it seems to me too dangerous to 
abolish free will, self-determination, and democracy even if this 
means social irresponsibility. The revolutionaries can be as 
doctrinaire as the reactionaries. This dilemma explains, in part, the 
vacillating nature of this chapter. In practice it is the other counsel-
lor's activity which is cultural imperialsim, what we are doing is 
enlightened individual or social change. 
Counsellor for the revolution 
It is incontrovertible that the counsellor is the agent of the institution 
and ultimately of society. But just as clearly there is, in that function, 
mandate for the counsellor to be the agent of enlightened social 
change. Counsellors are not alone in their total failure to accept this 
mandate. They share this failure with all the social sciences. Only in-
termittently and often from pressure outside the helping professions, 
e.g., students of the social sciences have drawn society's attention to 
much needed changes in society itself. Counsellors as agents for 
social change should identify, for their institution, the sources of 
stress to students. Where an institution's rigidity or conservatism 
leads it to mount courses which satisfy the needs of teachers, ad-
ministrators, or outside employment agencies, but fails to meet the 
needs of the students, the counsellor as an extension of his role of 
ombudsman should actively be involved in drawing the attention of 
the institution to the problem, and should do this insistently. He 
should alternatively consider mounting his own credit point courses, 
that are specifically aimed at meeting the students' personal needs, 
of setting a climate where students can explore alternative life styles, 
and be involved with the current social issues. He should actively 
counsel staff who may be unaware of the students' needs. He would 
have to be much more involved in the educational issues in the in-
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stitution and extend the ombudsman role from negotiating for in-
dividual students who are casualties of the system, to seeing that the 
system ceases to produce these casualties. As an agent for social 
change the counsellor should work not to adjust individual students 
to the system, but to alter the system to meet as far as possible the 
needs of the student. 
Ideally the traditional labels of "deviant" or "abnormal" should 
not exist, and nor should the shaping effect of such labelling con-
tinue. Society should be able to tolerate a variety oflife styles and a 
diversity of behaviour and even appreciate these different 
philosophies for their contribution to society as a whole. All repres-
sive laws that relate to civil liberties or personal moralities would be 
abolished. Laws that "protect" the individual from himself by 
depriving him of his liberty would be seen as absurd. A man would 
have the same right to refuse treatment for so-called schizophrenia 
as he has to refuse treatment for cancer. Legislation that protects 
drug users and other minority groups from harming themselves by 
harming them more outrageously should be replaced by education, 
and not propagandizing education but factual and relatively value 
free education. 
People should be free to do whatever they are able to do, providing 
they do not interfer with the civil liberities of their fellows. 
The counsellor as an agent for social change should actively work 
towards these objectives. He should counsel the society to be more 
tolerant, not to be afraid of different subcultures, and to appreciate a 
diversity of life styles. The counsellor should also be a disseminator 
of whatever counselling skills he might have to the university popula-
tion. Instead of sitting in his room hoarding his skills like a profes-
sional miser with his pot of gold, he should leave the protection of his 
room and distribute his skills to the masses. He might run program-
mes for the staff, demonstrate his skills on audio-visual material for 
the students, actively train students as counsellors or human relators, 
and even set himself up as the model of a successful helper. He 
should actively work towards the destruction of the medical model of 
human behaviour, based as it is on all the prejudices of the middle-
class christian ethic. Concepts such as "bad" and "evil" that have 
been enshrined in psychiatric folk lore which (in turn) lead the in-
dividual to label himself "bad" or "weak" and to be so labelled by 
society, must be exposed for what they are, forces to create unifor-
mity and conformity in society, and hangovers from more autocratic 
times. The counsellor should not only abandon these medieval no-
tions himself, he should seek at all times to destroy the mysticism 
that the helping professions have allowed to grow around and to ob-
scurate the simple function of helping another human being. 
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If this mystic mumbo-jumbo worked we might persist with it, but 
as Ivey (1973, p. I l l ) puts it: 
We have known for years that what we have been doing is not par-
ticularly effective .,, Traditional approaches simply don't deliver, 
there are also new techniques, such as those discussed by Carkhuff 
that do deliver. Yet what do we find in our counselling centres ... [is] a 
predominance of the same sloppy, inefficient treatment methods that 
Eysenck exposed so clearly twenty years ago. 
Later in this hard hitting article (p. 114) Ivey demolishes the 
traditional approaches to counselling but concedes that "Relatively 
few psychologists are able to function effectively at all three levels of 
personal, programmatic, and institutional change." He might have 
added, "and at the wider level,of working for social change". 
If we look at a typical quotation from Careers Weekly, we need 
not be too pessimistic about counsellors' potential for acting as 
agents for social change. 
The professionalization of knowledge has many dangers, as we 
pointed out in an article published more than a year ago (C H .^35/74) 
entitled "Conspiracies Against the Laity", The unique facility for self-
regulation which society has, unwittingly or otherwise, permitted at 
least the more ancient and influential professions to assume, is at the 
root of most of these dangers, and our previous article discussed some 
of them. In our conclusion we forecast that "the structure and objec-
tives of professional associations as we have come to know them will 
need major modifications to enable them to survive". 
But counselling services everywhere must take a stand on social is-
sues, and united condemn all discriminatory counselling, and even 
counselling that helps an individual beat an unjust system, if that 
system itself is not also being worked on. He must operate as an 
agent for social change. Even after the revolution there will be in-
dividuals who seek out other individuals for help and encourage-
ment, but if the counsellor acts as a disseminator of helping skills, 
and deprofessionalizes his function, it may not be a counsellor, who 
is sought out. Indeed, the counsellor as such may have ceased to ex-
ist. 
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Industrial Psychology 
and Sociology in Australia 
ALEX CAREY 
Editors' Some of the gravest implications of the uses of professional 
Notes knowledge occur in the field of industrial psychology and 
sociology. Practitioners in these disciplines have been able to 
achieve a large degree of public approval for their activities 
through the extension of "objective", scientific methods. 
However, social science activities in industry are substantially 
controlled and directed by managerial elites through the direct 
employment of social scientists by corporations and through 
the dependence of practitioners in professional bureaucracies 
upon corporate clients. Furthermore, there has developed 
within the professional associations in Australia a hegemony of 
practitioners associated with the more powerful corporations, 
either as employees or consultants. The utilization of social 
science professionals by corporations has little to do with the 
development of social responsibility espoused by some com-
mentators; rather, it derives from a desire to apply the most 
sophisticated techniques to the "problems" of productivity and 
worker loyalty. 
In total, we are faced with a situation where not only the 
methods of social science are employed in the service of 
management in a manipulative fashion but where the pursuit of 
knowledge and the development of theory themselves are 
specifically related to the goals of corporate elites. 
Of major significance in the integration of social science 
techniques into the aims of managerial elites are the conclu-
sions of the major research projects associated with Elton 
Mayo and, more recently, Frederick Herzberg. The conclusions 
of these researchers have guided the application of social 
science to industry for the past four decades. The problems as-
Alex Carey is a graduate of London University and is at present senior lecturer in 
psychology at the University of New South Wales, He is the author of a number of 
papers which critically examine the existing theory and practice of industrial psy-
chology. 
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sociated with work satisfaction are defined by these theories in 
very limited terms, however. They are examined only within the 
existing framework of corporate activity and concentrate on 
social rewards, status, and prestige factors—basic questions as-
sociated with the problems of power and authority in industrial 
life are neglected or avoided. In this way such theories effective-
ly depoliticize the activities of industrial social scientists for it is 
much more comfortable and acceptable to consider com-
munication processes and employee counselling than it is to 
question the structure of industrial authority. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the underpinnings of 
social science techniques in industry have seldom been sub-
jected to a thorough critical scrutiny. In the following chapter, 
Alex Carey undertakes such a critical analysis and suggests that 
the failure to recognize the vast discrepancy between the 
evidence presented and the conclusion of these studies and their 
frequent misdescription in the literature provides considerable 
insight into the ideological implicaUons of industrial psy-
chology and sociology. 
As Max Weber (1904) brilliantly argued, God and his intentions for 
mankind were invoked throughout the industrial revolution to 
provide divine approval for the kind of life-view and work attitudes 
ideally desired in employees by their employers.' This divinely-
sanctioned conception of life, work and values become known, of 
course, as the Protestant ethic. Its chief effect was to turn older 
Christian traditions and values on their heads (Tawney 1938, pp. 
241-66). 
In the Genesis story the Garden of Eden, in which Adam and Eve 
knew perfect happiness, was a place where idleness (if not dalliance) 
abounded—with God's approval. Work, according to this story, 
came into the world as a bane, not a boon, as a punishment and 
burden heavily restricting human enjoyment of life and its natural 
delights. But that conception of human nature provided, of course, 
no ideological basis on which to launch an industrial revolution. 
From the seventeenth century a profound revisionism developed. By 
1800 the new ethic was established.^ 
With the Protestant ethic, work ceased to be represented as a 
punishment imposed on man by God. Rather, to work now became 
man's peculiarly human distinction. It was discovered to be God's 
will that man should find grace and salvation through work; that he 
should, to this end, make his work a vocation and the ruling concern 
of his life; that he should give his body and mind willingly, cheerfully 
to work for its own sake, for the intrinsic vocational and pietistic 
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satisfactions it provided, and should abjure sloth and idleness as he 
hoped to escape eternal damnation. 
In modern, secular society God's will has substantially fallen from 
favour as a source of legitimation for social institutions and values. 
As his authority has declined, that of science in general and of the 
social sciences in particular has risen. Ever since Freud, at least, 
psychologists—and to a lesser degree other social scientists—have 
been supposed to know about "human nature" in a way that no one 
else does. So, nowadays, "scientific facts" about "human nature" 
are a distinctly more powerful ally in any political or ideological con-
test than is God's will. It may therefore not be wholly surprising that 
if in place of "God's will", "grace and salvation", and "eternal dam-
nation" in the above description of God's supposed attitude to work, 
one substitutes "man's nature", "his own best growth" (or 
"development"), and "neurosis" respectively one has an exact 
description of the latest scientific discovery about human nature by 
Frederick Herzberg (1968) the most eminent contemporary 
American industrial psychologist. But that is to anticipate. 
The puritan preachers of the Protestant ethic are the spiritual 
ancestors of today's industrial psychologists. The major effect, if not 
the conscious intention, of their sermons was to reconcile men to the 
values and other requirements of (then) modern industry as these re-
quirements were judged by owners of captial and hirers of labour. In-
dustrial psychologists in general perform a similar function. Many 
American industrial psychologists, perpetuating an especially mis-
sionary tradition, have gone further still. In the aspirations of 
American industrial psychologists since the time of F.W. Taylor 
(who is constantly pilloried by them for taking a more honest and 
realistic view) people must not only carry out industrial work in 
reasonable accordance with the basic contract by which they sell 
their time, labour, and skills for the material means to live; they 
must like what they have to do—even love it—and identify wholly 
with the institufion that hires them (Whyte I960, pp.35-59). 
All technologically underdeveloped countries (including Britain 
during the industrial revolution) have experienced great difficulty in 
persuading workers to accept the values and discipline of modern 
industry—the subordination of impulse and spontaneity to a rigid 
time schedule; the exchange of imaginative ritual and fantasy, which 
located work within a larger conception of life and values, for ex-
clusively material criteria of usefulness and worth. Such experience 
could lead to reasonable doubts about the appropriateness of 
modern industry to the natural needs and inclinations of human be-
ings, to their fulfillment, development, growth, and so on. But in-
dustrial psychologists—particularly American industrial 
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psychologists—have shown little disposition to any such doubts. 
Australia, Britain, and the United States, though with some im-
portant variations in history and popular values, share a puritan, 
Protestant ethic and free enterprise heritage. This heritage provides 
the wider perspective within which the subordination of the work of 
industrial psychologists to managerial criteria of efficiency and ad-
justment must be comprehended. 
The consequences of this background for industrial psychology 
and industrial sociology in the United States have been documented 
by Leon Baritz, who concludes that social scientists in U.S. industry 
have been "servants of power" and have "served power instead of 
mind" (Baritz 1965, p.210). 
In Britain, V.L. Allen (1961, p.51) attributes a similar though less 
complete subordination to similar historical causes—notably to 
management's control over both the access of social scientists to in-
dustry and over what they have studied when they got there. In Al-
len's account, employers "turned to social scientists for help" when 
from 1939 onwards, unionism and full employment seriously 
threatened management's traditional right of control in industry. In 
consequence, "when social scientists entered the field of industry 
they did so on employers' terms and concentrated largely on their 
problems".' 
Australian industrial psychology * shares with its British and 
American counterparts the general conditions of development 
described by Allen. Three related characteristics, however, dis-
tinguish it: a relatively embryonic state of development as a profes-
* If one assumes that sociology has something to do with exploration of the 
relations between the largest aspects of society (structures, institutions, and 
associated value systems) and the experience and behaviour of individuals (MUls 
1970), there is no discipline of industrial sociology in Australia - though some 
industrial psychologists occasionally employ a broader, more nearly sociological, 
framework of analysis, and some sociologists take a passing interest in industry 
and its organization and values. Indeed, work on industry by Western social 
scientists has been so largely restricted to the exploration of means for controlling 
individual or small group behaviour through manipulation of variables in the 
immediate vicinity of the work situation, and has been conducted so largely 
within a "free enterprise" system of power distribution and system of values -
which often seem taken for granted as though part of some order of nature - that 
it cannot, in general, be regarded seriously as sociology even when carried out by 
sociologists. 
However, in textbook and other usage, distinction between industrial 
psychology and industrial sociology is so blurred that studies of work group 
behaviour within almost any conceptual framework is liable to be described as 
industrial sociology. I shall not therefore attempt to maintain any systematic 
distinction between these fields in the present paper. 
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sion; a very limited base in indigenous research or theory; and a con-
sequent extreme dependence on imported research, theory, and text-
books. 
A recent Australia-wide survey of members of the Australian 
Psychological Society (Bordow 1971) indicates that about one 
hundred members can be reckoned to have some claim to description 
as industrial psychologists,' and that some one-third of these do any 
basic research. About half of this hundred are employed in teaching 
and management consultancy (equally divided). Some 10 per cent 
(i.e., about 10) are employed full-time in business or industry. The 
remaining one-third are employed by government agencies. 
Thus the principal occupations of industrial psychologists in 
Australia are teaching about industrial psychology and consultative 
services to managements. The latter services are comprised prin-
cipally of personnel work (selection, assessment, motivation, and 
morale problems ) and management development and training. 
The small number and principal occupations of Australian in-
dustrial psychologists have prevented the development of any sub-
stantial body of indigenous research or theory; though, it should be 
emphasized that, in the context of Aystralian industry, this is not a 
condition at all peculiar to industrial psychology. In 1969 Dr. Bruce 
Yuill's Organizational principles of management (1966) was "the 
only Australian textbook on this subject" (Byrt 1969, p. 104)— that 
is, the only Australian approximation to a textbook on industrial 
psychology. But two years earlier Professor F.J. Willett wrote of all 
management education in Australia (including its "psychological" 
component) that "(it) is far too dependent on overseas teaching 
materials and research concepts. Teaching is therefore derivaUve 
and Australian research is urgently required. ... The future position 
(of management education) is not satisfactory. ... All institutions 
lack teachers (and) the whole system lacks research" (1968, pp. 57-
80). 
In 1970 industrial psychologist Dr. Denis Pym, writing for the 
Australian Institute of Management, extended Willett's criticism to 
Australia's entire economic life, which he characterized as 
"derivative", especially in its "large-scale" dependence on imported 
ideas and practices" (1971, p. 199). In the same year the government-
sponsored Committee of Inquiry into Post-graduate Education for 
Management (Cyert Committee) noted succinctly that in both 
universities and colleges of advanced education "management 
research is generally absent among . . . staff members" (Cyert et al. 
1970, p. 12). 
In 1972, a comprehensive study of management education in 
Australia commissioned by the A.I.M. reported that although 
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"almost without exception University courses in the Management 
area appear to have been based initially upon international models", 
Australian research in this area had "made little progress" and was 
"accorded low priority" for the future. In colleges of advanced 
education there was no prospect of management research "for some 
years to come" (Boyce 1972, Appendix 4, pp. 10, 15, 22). Yet it was 
not "apparent" that any educational institution in Australia "had 
reviewed effectively the subsequent experience of their 
(management) graduates ... to determine the ... appropriateness of 
their teaching", despite the fact that there are "fundamental dif-
ferences between the Australian and the European and American en-
vironments as these affect the use in Australia of management 
education practices developed for these overseas areas" (pp.22, 28). 
A fairly cursory inspection of library shelves or catalogues will 
confirm the overwhelmingly imported content of every kind of 
management education in Australia, and of industrial psychology in 
particular. For example, the subject catalogue in the library of one 
university specializing in the area (the University of New South 
Wales) contains some 150 entries under Industrial Psychology. Of 
these some 80 per cent are published in the U.S. and draw almost 
wholly on American theory and research. Some 15 per cent are 
published in Britain by British authors. (The majority of these rely 
heavily on American research.) Some 3 per cent are produced by 
resident Australian authors; but in general around 90 per cent of 
these depend on imported theory and research—overwhelmingly 
American.' 
Perhaps there is a passing comfort in the fact that something not 
very different from the present Australian condition was common to 
the Western world until at least as recently as 1961. A UNESCO 
report of that year (Smith 1961, pp. 36-37) concluded that while in 
the U.S. "industrial sociology has been little affected by foreign in-
fluences", elsewhere "the pioneering influence of the United States 
has been too great" to allow any strongly independent development 
of industrial sociology; and that, in consequence, "in nearly every 
(country) the teacher of industrial sociology must depend quite 
heavily on material derived from research conducted by social scien-
fists in the United States". 
Australian industrial psychology has existed in any form at all for 
only twenty- five years. During all of that period such intellectual 
foundations as the subject has possessed were imported— 
overwhelmingly, and in large part uncritically, from the United 
States. 
It would matter less that the intellectual foundations of industrial 
psychology were imported if they were imported from a society with 
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an industrial history not too dissimilar from our own. In fact, 
Australian and American industrial histories vary greatly. 
Australia's industrial history has been marked by nothing com-
parable to the sustained vigour—frequently extending to violence— 
with which, until quite recently, American management sought to 
combat the growth of unions and guard against the development of 
public attitudes or ideologies that would present a serious challenge 
to management's traditional rights and prerogatives, or to the free 
enterprise system in general. 
It is only by a full appreciation of the social and political context 
within which U.S. industrial psychology has developed, and of the 
effects of that context on the intellectual and other content of U.S. 
industrial psychology, that we can begin to estimate the conse-
quences for related disciplines in Australia of their long dependence 
on U.S. research and textbooks. 
While, from 1904 onwards, the arbitration system gave some 
protection even to weak unions in Australia, and cushioned the con-
frontation between management's and labour's interests, in the U.S. 
the corporations employed violence and intimidation on a large scale 
to combat the growth of unions— and this condition continued until 
the 1950s. Thus in the 16 years to 1949 there were 143 deaths in the 
U.S. which were officially attributed to labour-management disputes 
(Streuben 1950, p.300f). 
In the United States the position of professional (including 
academic) industrial psychologists in conflicts of interest between 
management and labour has never been ambiguous; it has been to as-
sist managements to advance both their economic and their political 
goals. Thus a leading American industrial psychologist, writing in a 
widely used and highly regarded textbook on industrial psychology, 
is clear both about the inequity of the existing American economic 
system and about his own willingness to assist in the perpetuation of 
this inequity (Maier 1946, p.30): 
Both management and labour have certain social responsibilities 
which they must meet if the system of private enterprise is to operate 
unhampered by governmental restrictions, or even to survive at all. 
Since it is more to the interests of the owning classes than to that of 
the masses of labour to preserve this system, the former, especially, 
should have an understanding of their responsibilities and take a long 
range point of view. 
In a booklet entitled The Psychologist in Industry, the American 
Psychological Association (1962, pp. 1-16) warns managers that 
there are limits to what can be achieved on their behalf through even 
the most skilled promotion campaigns (for sometimes popular at-
titudes can be so adverse to the product being marketed that "even 
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the truth will be rejected"). However, the association leaves no doubt 
about the willing subservience of psychologists to management's 
political purposes: "Industrial psychologists are", the A.P.A. as-
sures American business, "probing such questions as how to build a 
favourable 'company image' ". And while 
the task of keeping the image of the company clear and valid among 
the various strategic sub-publics and among the population at large is 
a continuing one ... the industrial psychologist is increasingly helpful 
in bringing psychological devices and insights to the aid of manage-
ment in the effort to create and maintain a positive reputation, (p. 11). 
Moreover: 
while the psychologist's basic interest is human behaviour, he can help 
with management's most basic aim, increasing profitability ... 
General acceptance (i.e., by "rank and file employees") of manage-
ments' aims requires that each group be educated to see things in 
proper perspective and to understand its role in the broad setting. 
This alignment of everyone with management's aims is to be 
sought, not by objective changes which reduce the real conflict of in-
terests between operatives and management, but by "reeducation 
and restructuring of perceptions" (p. 14). 
In a passage (p. 12) which, despite a heavy infusion of benevolence, 
has overtones of political re-education centres and 1984, we learn 
that industrial psychologists also help employees: "Essentially what 
the industrial psychologist attempts to do is to help the employee 
come to ... a recognition of how his interests and management's 
coincide . . . help the employee adjust to the requirements of a suc-
cessful enterprise." 
Post-war there was a systematic attempt (with the assistance of 
ex-service psychologists) to apply what had been learned from war-
time propaganda to the objective of indoctrinating employees 
throughout the United States in an unqualified commitment to the 
free enterprise system' (Viteles 1953, pp.414-36). In general these ex-
ercises went under the name of Courses in Economic Education for 
Employees. They were given in management time (hence were vir-
tually compulsory) with crude pre and post tests from which im-
provement in "information" and "education" was assessed." 
By 1952 "systematic company training in economics (stood) out 
as one of the fastest growing and most significant management 
developments in recent years", (Opinion Research Corporation 
1952, p.5). Nationwide surveys of employees showed large apparent 
improvement, where economic training had been given, in "views ... 
which are consistent with the ideology of an economic system of free 
enterprise" (Viteles 1953, p.426). However, Viteles concludes, there 
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are "many methodological problems", and "much remains to be 
done in establishing the relationships between economic indoctrina-
tion ... and ... changes in ideology, morale (and) productivity ... ", 
if "maximum results in the way of changed attitudes" are to be 
obtained "from 'employee information' and similar programmes" 
(pp.428-29). For example, there is evidence from a major wartime 
study that, for the best results, one side only of an issue or argument 
should be presented to poorly educated people and those already of 
the desired view, but that two-sided presentations are more effective 
in influencing better educated people and those initially opposed to 
the desired view.' These results "suggest that different 
programmes—perhaps 'one-sided' for rank and file employees and 
'two-sided' for technical and supervisory personnel—may be re-
quired" (pp. 433-35). 
"Under any circumstances", Viteles concludes—in passages 
which foreshadow the predominant preoccupation of U.S. industrial 
psychologists with problems of attitudes and attitude change for 
twenty years after the war—"it appears that ... propaganda or in-
doctrination programmes must be based upon an extensive and 
detailed knowledge of existing employee attitudes and opinions ob-
tained through the application of appropriate survey techniques." 
Both the wartime experiment cited, he continues, and others which 
compare "the effectiveness of lectures, group discussions, and other 
procedures, point to the need for research designed to establish for 
industry the types of programmes which will produce most effective 
results in the way of attitude change" (emphasis in original). As part 
of such research employees should be asked what they like or dislike 
about specific programmes, for such inquiries will not only yield in-
formation useful to designing new programmes but will "produce ... 
a feeling of participation on the part of employees"—in planning 
programmes covertly aimed at their own indoctrination— "which 
can in itself contribute to (success) in moulding and modifying (their) 
attitudes" (pp.435-36; emphasis added). 
In 1954 the American Management Association published a 
report and appraisal of programmes for education of employees in a 
sample of fifty firms and corporations'" (Williams and Peterfreund 
1954). The report found that "so much in the way of economic 
education i s . . . going on" that " 'employee education' and 'economic 
education' have become virtually synonymous to many people". 
Moreover "a good number of respondents actually stated that 
'propaganda' and 'economic education' are synonymous in their 
companies. 'We want people to think right' " (pp. 12, 31). 
The principal technique used for changing beliefs and attitudes of 
employees consisted of small group discussion sessions (15-20 
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people) supported by films (or other teaching aids) and, usually, by 
trained discussion leaders. 
The study of ostensibly free discussion, in small groups led by 
democratic supervisors (i.e., "group dynamics") as a means of 
changing attitudes has a remarkable academic history, to which we 
shall return later. In the immediate post-war years this work led to 
packaged discussion programmes on economic education produced 
by Du Pont (HOBSO—How Our Business System Operates} and 
others. 
In 1954 the AMA report found some employee education to be 
almost universal in American industry (p. 49), while in some com-
panies "the total costs of presenting a discussion-type programme 
such as HOBSO ... came to as much as a million or even two million 
dollars" (p. 40). There were some (few) objections by management 
personnel that such employee education was "a propaganda effort to 
manipulate opinions and perceptions in the interests of 
management", that "people should ... not be subjected to 
'propaganda devices' on a 'capture basis' " (pp. 13, 32); and that the 
HOBSO programme in particular was manipulative and dishonest 
(p. 38)." More surprising, to an Australian viewpoint, managements 
were, by and large, able to secure the active cooperation of workers 
and local union officials'^ in the organization of indoctrination ses-
sions that had the aim (among others) of weakening unions. 
Moreover, in general, workers or their colleagues voluntarily made 
up the production lost through work-time spent in economic educa-
tion sessions'^ 
The purpose of the education programmes were frankly political'": 
Communism, socialism, particular political parties and unions are 
often targets of (managements' education) compaigns. (p.14). 
Many companies ... want to integrate the employee with his work 
group, to develop his "sense of belonging", to get him to identify his 
own welfare with the company's. Some employers view this kind of 
programme as a sort of "battle of loyalties" with the unions (p.29). 
Still other employers "believe strongly that morale (and produc-
tivity) improves" as a result of such programmes. But for the vast 
majority increased productivity was plainly secondary to political 
objectives. 
The American Management Association found no cause for un-
ease in all this, except for the practical consideration that "millions 
on millions of dollars are being spent on education for employees ... 
without any systematic or deep-seated appraisal" that could provide 
reassurance that the education was producing political and other 
changes in employee attitudes commensurate with its great cost ( p. 
49). 
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The report identifies a major problem in this area. Most surveys 
that attempt to assess the effects of employee education concentrate 
on whether the employee has learned the (more favourable) facts 
provided in the programmes. But almost nothing is known about the 
relationship between changes in the facts people accept and changes 
in their attitudes (feelings, emotions) and behaviour. The report 
notes uneasily that "it is possible that as people learn more facts 
about our economic system"—even facts selected by management— 
"they could just as easily become more critical of it ... as not" 
(P-47). 
The report recommends that intensive research in two areas 
should be urgently promoted. 
Intensive study, through interviews in depth with a variety of 
workers, of the facts, attitudes, behaviour triangle to establish how 
changes in information affect attitudes, behaviour in the plant 
(productivity, grievances, unions) and away from the plant (voting). 
Secondly, large scale research and surveys are required to produce 
national and local pictures of present employee information, at-
titudes and behaviour. A base line representing the present situation 
can then be drawn against which future changes in each area— 
information, attitudes, and behaviour—can be continuously charted. 
Within this frame the interrelationships between information and at-
titudes etc. could be closely monitored and explored and the effec-
tiveness of different education programmes for different purposes 
could be determined (pp.49-53).'' 
Study is particularly necessary, the report proposes, of the way in 
which the emotional content of employee attitudes limits changes 
that can be obtained through information-oriented education," and 
of how such resistance by employees to changes in their attitudes 
desired by management might be overcome. The report suggests that 
employee reactions to projective tests made from pictures of "ex-
ecutive offices, a new factory, a company's annual report, a manual 
worker ... , a new stock issue, etc.", might be used to explore 
emotional barriers to the production of attitude change in the direc-
tion of increased loyalty to, and indentification with, the free 
enterprise system (pp. 51-53). 
It may or may not be a matter of coincidence that the questions 
the AMA report identifies as problems for politically-oriented 
employee education have constituted the principal preoccupations of 
research and theory in social and industrial psychology from the end 
of the war to date: techniques of communication and leadership as 
these affect attitudes and attitude change—especially in a small 
group context—and associated problems of measurement". 
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There has been a major purpose to the foregoing excursion into the 
relationships between the political interests of American manage-
ments and the subject matter of social and industrial psychology. It 
is to point up the political context of the work of American industrial 
psychologists, and the consequent likelihood that the political in-
terests of American managements—which sponsor and/or host 
nearly all such work—will largely influence both the information 
about industry and the theories about industrial behaviour that find 
their way into textbooks. 
To explore this question further it will be necessary to distinguish 
the school (or tradition) of social science research which has long 
held a dominant place in management textbooks in America and 
abroad. Thereafter we shall critically examine the most celebrated 
studies in this tradition to bring out the consequences for Australian 
teaching in the management area of using American textbooks and 
theories with a naive disregard of the political context that has 
produced them. 
From UNESCO (Smith 1961) to the U.S. (Korman 1971), Britain 
(Lupton 1971) and Australia (Bucklow 1966) there is general agree-
ment that one, primarily American, school of social and industrial 
psychology (together with some latter day variations on it) has 
dominated the field for some forty years. Known as the "human 
relations" school it has, in Britain as in Australia, provided "the only 
ideas from the social sciences that many managers may have en-
countered" (Lupton 1971, p.17). 
The human relations tradition of work and theory had its origin in 
a series of research projects carried out at the Western Electric Com-
pany's Hawthorne works, near Chicago. Under the general direction 
of Elton Mayo, professor of business administration at Harvard, the 
"Hawthorne studies" continued intermittently from 1927 to 1935. 
These studies have long been celebrated as the scientific coming of 
age of industrial psychology (Blum 1949, p.47). A textbook in wide 
use in Australia for almost twenty years describes them as providing 
"a foundation on which all future research must be based" (Brown 
1954, p.85), a view shared by Colonel Lyndall Urwick. Indeed 
Urwick, whose influence in Australia has been considerable, waxes 
almost rhapsodic in praise of the Hawthorne studies and their 
abiding importance for all managements for all time (Urwick and 
Brech 1948)'^ The UNESCO report referred to above finds these 
studies "probably the best point from which to date the development 
of industrial sociology", and concludes that "it is unlikely that any 
subsequent investigations could have so great an impact as the 
Hawthorne studies" (Smith 1961, pp.23,56). 
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The distinctive conclusion reached by the Hawthorne researchers 
was that economic incentives are of relatively little importance for 
workers' motivation and productivity compared with attention to 
their social needs. Worker discontent, the researchers concluded, is 
often emotionally—indeed irrationally—based. Managements must 
therefore be more concerned about—must "guard and develop" — 
the "social sentiments" of workers (Whitehead 1938, p.205). If 
management gives greater attention to the social and emotional 
needs of the worker the reward, in terms of increased output and in-
creased loyalty to the firm, will be great. Management can achieve 
this result by training supervisors to exercise authority in a pater-
nalistic, human relations style and to foster satisfying social relations 
within work groups. The neurosis and maladjustment which underlie 
worker disaffection toward management—and so the disposition to 
support militant unions—can be dissipated by providing a quasi-
clinical counselling service which enables workers to let off steam by 
telling their problems as often as they like to sympathetic listeners 
(Wilensky and Wilensky 1951). 
An editor of Fortune magazine later described the key import for 
management of the Hawthorne studies and their conclusions: "the 
workers were a social system; (this) system ... determined the 
worker's attitude towards his job. The social system could work 
against management, but if the managers troubled themselves to un-
derstand (it) ... the system could work for management" (Whyte 
1956, p.37). Put more crudely—members of tight-knit work groups 
are subject to powerful conformist pressures. With the help of social 
scientists managements can create such work groups and use these 
pressures to further managements' interests (Thompson 1961, 
pp. 122-28). Until at least 1955 the human relations movement con-
sisted principally in a search for techniques of leadership through 
which such group pressures could be fostered and made to work for 
management (Goldthorpe et al. 1968, pp. 43-45)." 
After Mayo and the Hawthorne studies the next most influential 
figure in the human relations tradition is Kurt Lewin (Caplow 1964, 
pp.238-39; Homans 1968, p.259). "Although perhaps generally less 
well known than Mayo, Lewin had, if anything, an even greater im-
pact within social science" (Pugh 1971, p.213). Lewin's influence 
derives both from the research studies he directed and from a 
number of his students who, long after Lewin's death in 1947,con-
tinued to dominate much of social and industrial psychology 
(Homans, 1968, p.259; Korman 1971, p.9). Lewin largely continued 
the Hawthorne tradition (Benoit- Guilbot 1968, p.233; Smith 1961, 
p.32). He emphasized the importance of social needs and extended 
exploration of ways in which group situations affected, and so could 
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be used to control, individual behaviour (group dynamics). But 
Lewin introduced differences also. 
Mayo and the Hawthorne researchers had been frankly pater-
nalistic toward workers. Management (with the help of social scien-
tists) knows better, they had said, what workers want than do the 
workers themselves (Whyte 1956, pp. 40-43). It is therefore in 
everybody's interest that management— whose behaviour is 
governed by logic—should employ social scientists to help it control 
workers—whose behaviour is governed by unconscious, often ir-
rational, sentiments (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1964, pp. 255-69, 
563-68, 574-75). 
Lewin, by contrast, while similarly exploring ways of managing 
small work groups that would increase managerial control over their 
behaviour, made much use of the word democracy and called his 
recommended tactics democratic leadership or democratic participa-
fion (Kariel 1956; Pateman 1970, pp. 71-73). 
"Lewin's influence on industrial practice came largely", as 
Bucklow notes (1966, p. 60), "from three field studies directed by 
him with childrens' play groups, housewives and young girl pyjama 
machinists". The first and last of these studies (Lewin et al. 1939; 
Coch and French 1948 ) have long enjoyed the status of "classics". 
We shall return to them later. The study with housewives occurred 
during the war (National Research Council 1943). In it Lewin com-
pared the effectiveness of different techniques for changing the at-
titude of housewives towards consumption of greater amounts of 
liver and kidneys (meats not required for the troops abroad). His ex-
periments were claimed to show that democratic discussions with 
housewives, in small groups, produced greater changes toward the 
desired behaviour than did more conventional lecture or instruction 
sessions. These experiments, though apparently trivial, were an im-
portant influence on a decade of post-war research in social and in-
dustrial psychology. For they were taken to hold promise that inten-
sive psychological study of groups (group dynamics) would uncover 
new techniques for controlling behaviour. "These researchers", 
wrote J.G. Miller (1948, p. 287), "contain the first glimmerings of 
evidence that we have means to control scientifically the mass 
behaviour of human beings in a matter concerning which they feel 
they have freedom of action". 
Two key assumptions underpinned the work of the human rela-
tions school up to 1955: (i) that a certain ^f^e or manner of supervi-
sion and of reaching decisions with subordinates (variously called 
friendly, democratic, participatory, consultative, considerate, team-
oriented, etc.) will greatly increase the morale and satisfaction of 
workers; (ii) that the happier, or more satisfied, a worker is (e.g.. 
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with his work-group social relations) the harder he will work 
(Strauss 1971, p. 110). 
The second assumption was essential, of course, if the human rela-
tions approach were to retain any appeal to management's interest in 
output and efficiency. From 1955 onwards accumulating industrial 
research, observation, and practical experience slowly forced the 
abandonment of this assumption,^" with consequent rapid decline in 
the popularity of the human relations movement (Strauss 1970, p. 
145). It became evident there is, in general, little relationship 
between satisfaction and productivity (Brayfield and Crockett 1955; 
Vroom 1964). Workers may be miserable and productive or happy 
and idle (Whyte 1956, p. 58). 
Something had to be done about the collapsing foundations of in-
dustrial psychology's management-appeal. The solution was to dis-
cover (or decide) that there are different kinds of worker 
satisfaction—some related to productivity, others not; there is the 
(now discredited) satisfaction that comes from social and other con-
ditions associated with the work context; and there is another more 
individual (or egotistic) kind of satisfaction that comes from 
characteristics intrinsic to the job itself (mi&xesi, challenge, oppor-
tunity for responsibility, and self-direction etc.). Increase in satisfac-
tion from the former source, which the old human relations doctrine 
had emphasized, does not— it was shortly discovered—cause in-
creased effort and productivity. Increase in satisfactions of the latter 
kind—which the "neo-human relations" (or "human resources") 
doctrine would henceforth emphasize—does cause increased produc-
tivity. 
So between 1955 and 1960 job enlargement and job enrichment 
gradually replaced social needs as the alleged key to unlocking 
(without expensive salary rises) the energy of employees. Most in-
dustrial psychologists had long given some attention to job 
characteristics and regarded the shift as a change in emphasis only. 
Herzberg (1959) dramatized the shift in a theory which expressed it 
in a very extravagant form. He produced a vast confection of 
putative evidence in support of his theory and a suitable range of 
home-spun metaphors in which to express it (Herzberg 1968; Ludwig 
1973). Herzberg thereby established, in popular reputation, an ap-
pearance of having invented, and taken out patent rights in, the con-
cept of job enrichment.'' 
A number of characteristics have marked human relations 
theorists from the Hawthorne studies onward (Strauss 1971). 
Chief among these are 
(i) an insistent minimizing of the importance of money or material 
reward as influences on work behaviour in general and on 
productivity in particular 
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(ii) a disposition to attribute low output, lack of cooperativeness, 
absence, grievances, strikes or other worker behaviour un-
congenial to managements' values and objectives, to neurosis or 
maladjustment. 
Herzberg transcends the failures of pre-1955 human relations 
doctrine and resurrects these two features of it in an unprecendented-
ly extravagant form." 
In'textbooks of industrial and social psychology published during 
the last twenty years three studies or experiments (and three only) 
are commonly referred to as "classics": the Hawthrone studies, and 
two studies directed by Lewin. (The latter two studies—conducted 
with children's play groups and young girl pyjama machinists—have 
already been referred to as the basis of much of Lewin's influence on 
industrial practice.) 
A further study by Herzberg, published in 1959, was the founda-
tion of the pre-eminent public role and reputation Herzberg has en-
joyed in American industrial psychology for a decade. Although this 
study is not commonly described as a classic, its influence has been 
vast. A brief critical examination, seriatim, of these four studies fol-
lows. 
The Hawthorne studies became famous primarily because of their 
claims to have shown firstly that social satisfactions deriving from 
close work-group relations, and especially from friendly, uncoercive 
supervision, are very powerful influences on work behaviour, output 
and morale; and secondly that economic incentive alone can produce 
comparatively little effect on work behaviour. 
These conclusions were drawn from a series of three ex-
periments." In the first experiment five girls, who assembled 
telephone relays, were moved from the factory floor to a separate 
room. There they were given a special supervisor who was instructed 
to be relaxed, friendly, and uncoercive and to tell the girls to "work 
as they felt". They were also given a different payment system. On 
the factory floor the individual return to each girl was based on the 
average output of 100 girls. In the room the monetary return to each 
girl was based-on the average output of the five girls in the group, 
i.e., individual return was more closely related to individual output. 
During five months of the friendliest supervision no increase in 
output occurred. The girls wasted time and talked excessively. 
(When the supervisor complained they replied, "But you said we 
were to work as we felt.") Mild disciplinary measures were in-
troduced with no effect. After nine months of the best that friendly 
supervision could do, and static or declining output, two of the five 
girls were sacked for "low output and behaviour" (sic). 
Two new girls were introduced (Italian and Polish) who were the 
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principal support of their families. These two led a rapid increase in 
output and carried the others along with them (threatening on one 
occasion to "kill" them if they didn't work harder). As output in-
creased official supervision became friendly and relaxed once again. 
After a further 20 months output had increased by 30 per cent. 
The experimenters were convinced early that friendly supervision 
and associated social satisfactions had been principally responsible 
for the 30 per cent increase in out put. This conviction, epochal in its 
significance for industrial psychology, had come to them in a flash of 
insight (an e'claircissement they called it) and it never left them. It 
shaped all their future work and much of the history of industrial 
psychology for the following thirty years. However, they recognized 
that critics who lacked e'claircissement, and still believed economic 
reward of the first importance to workers, might point to the small 
group incentive system, which was much preferred by the girls, as a 
likely influence on the high output eventually achieved. So two 
further experiments were conducted—hopefully to confirm the ex-
perimenters' conviction that it was "skilled", human relations-
oriented supervision that had been responsible for the increase in 
output in the first experiment. 
Five girls on the factory floor were designated a group for pay-
ment purposes (as in the first experiment) but otherwise their super-
vision and circumstances were left unchanged (i.e., the only change 
introduced was that they were given the preferred payment system). 
Their output increased almost at once by 13 per cent. Because of dis-
turbance among the other girls in the department, who demanded 
the same payment system, the experiment was terminated after only 
9 weeks. Output dropped at once by 16 per cent. 
The experimenters tried again. Five more girls were selected. This 
time they were given friendly supervision but no change in payment 
system. Result: no increase in output over 14 months. Thus in sum: 
(1) When relaxed supervision and the preferred incentive system 
were introduced together there was no increase in output until 
supervision was tightened and two (of five) operatives sacked. 
Thereafter output rose rapidly. 
(2) When the preferred incentive system alone was introduced out-
put rose rapidly; when it was withdrawn output fell rapidly. 
(3) When relaxed supervision alone was introduced there was no in-
crease in output. 
However, by some remarkable strategies of argument and omis-
sion (Carey 1967) the experimenters come through with their eclair-
cissement, their conviction about the superiority of human relations-
style supervision over economic reward as an influence on worker 
motivation and output, intact. They conclude that "none of the 
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results gave the slightest substantiation to the theory that the worker 
is primarily motivated by economic interest"; and that "a wage in-
centive system was so dependent on its relation to other factors"— 
especially supervision and related social factors— "that it was im-
possible to consider it as ... having an independent effect on the in-
dividual". (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1964, pp.160, 575-76). 
Those are the most celebrated experiments and the most 
celebrated conclusions in the history of industrial psychology. 
Through American (and English) textbooks countless Australian 
students and managers have for thirty years been taught these non-
sensical conclusions, along with a nonsense account of the 
Hawthorne studies, as factual. 
Perhaps there is a kind of stern justice in all this. The man chiefly 
responsible for the Hawthorne studies, Elton Mayo, professor of in-
dustrial research at the Harvard School of Business, was an 
Australian who graduated in psychology from Adelaide University. 
The building which housed the first School of Applied Psychology in 
Australia, the Mayo Building at the University of New South Wales, 
was named in his honour. 
The second "classical" study was carried out at Iowa University 
and published in 1939 by Lewin, Lippitt, and White. Its subjects 
comprised four groups, each of five boys aged around ten years. 
From these groups four after-school clubs were constituted which 
engaged in a variety of hobby activities, such as mask-making and 
soap-carving. 
A balanced experimental design was planned in which each of the 
four clubs would continue in operation for eighteen weeks divided 
into three experimental periods of six weeks duration—making 
twelve experimental periods in all. There would be six experimental 
periods under "democratic" leadership and six under "autocratic" 
leadership. Each of four adult leaders would play both democratic 
and autocratic roles, and each club would, in different periods, have 
democratic and autocratic leadership by turn. Observers would keep 
detailed records of the social behaviour of the boys (e.g., frequency 
of "aggressive acts") and of productive output. 
The first six-weeks of democratic leadership, however, turned out 
badly. The boys (Charlie Chan Club) behaved in an "individual, 
anarchic way". So a new category of laissez-faire leadership was 
specially created, and the results from the first period of democratic 
leadership were relegated to that category (White and Lippitt 1960, 
pp. 20-22). In the end five experimental sessions were designated 
democratic, five autocratic, and two laissez-faire. 
Charlie Chan Club in its first democratic-cum-laissez-faire period 
had produced 34 "acts of aggression" per 50 minute meeting. With 
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considerable consistency it produced scores of 27 and 30 under 
further democratic and autocratic leadership. The experimenters 
allow—but then ignore—that the consistent aggressiveness (of 
Charlie Chan Club) may be due to the personality of the boys (Lewin 
et al. 1939, p.281). 
The other three clubs underwent a total of four (six week) periods 
of democratic leadership, and four of autocratic leadership. Every 
autocratic period produced less aggression than any democratic 
period. The former averaged 2 "acts of aggression" per 50 minute 
meeting, the latter 20 (Lewin et al. 1939, p.281). Under autocratic 
leadership the boys spent 74 per cent of their total time absorbed in 
work, under democratic leadership 50 per cent (White and Lippitt 
1962, p.540); output was higher under autocratic leadership (though 
we are not told how much higher where "a large quantity of work 
(was) done" (White and Lippit 1960, pp. 65, 87). These are the only 
results of the study which have any (and then dubious) claim to ob-
jectivity. 
It is a considerable tribute to the experimenters' attachment to the 
word "democracy" (both in its political connotations and in the 
sense in which a human relations supervisory style in industry is cal-
led democratic") that they are able to interpret this evidence in a way 
favourable to democracy, and conclude that it was more efficient 
and produced less frustation, less aggression or both. 
But it is even more remarkable that for thirty years subsequently 
unending versions of this trivial and worthless study have been 
spread over literally thousands of pages of journals, books, text-
books, and citations—ranging from education and industrial psy-
chology to international relations. After a time it was widely 
reported, in textbooks and articles, that output was highest in the 
democratically-led groups.--
In 1971 I read a paper on the study just considered to the Annual 
Conference of the Australian Psychological Society (Carey 1971). 
Subsequently one of Australia's best known industrial psychologists, 
who is head of a human relations unit in a large corporation, sought 
a copy of my paper. He offered no objection to its analysis but sug-
gested "toning down the ironic or sarcastic comments (for publica-
tion, because the prestige of Lewin, Lippitt, and White is so high that 
editors might possibly turn down your paper as being too aggres-
sive". 
The third "classic" study—or series of studies—was conducted 
among women sewing operatives at Harwood Manufacturing Cor-
poration, Marion, Virginia. The president of the company was (and 
is) a psychologist. Dr. A. J. Marrow. Marrow had worked closely 
with, and greatly admired, Kurt Lewin and his theories. The best 
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known report of the studies was published in 1948 by Coch and 
French, pupils and disciples of Lewin. 
Labour turnover and hostility toward management was very high 
at Harwood. In the operatives' view, management used transfers 
between jobs to cut piece rates and get rid of slower workers. Job 
changes and transfers were frequent. The company paid a "transfer 
bonus", but this fully made up the wages, while they learned the new 
job, of only half of any group of transferred workers—the half that 
relearned fastest. The rest lost money on every transfer. Operatives 
who were transferred most frequently quit most frequently (in the 
operatives' view, for economic reasons). This behaviour the ex-
perimenters call "resistance to change", and suppose to be ir-
rationally, emotionally based. The experiment was designed to show 
that group discussion with workers about to be transferred (i.e., 
"participation") could be used to overcome such resistance to 
change. 
Coch and French set up four work groups. One was simply told 
their job would be changed and what the new rate for it would be. 
This group's output and earnings on their new job were poor, they 
filed grievances about the piece rate, and three (out of eighteen) quit. 
Both the output attributed to them and their earnings were, of 
course, a function of the piece rate set. 
The other three groups were allowed to participate in "designing 
the new jobs and setting the new piece rates" (Coch and French 
1948, p.528). They were also trained in methods of work appropriate 
to the new job "so they (could) reach a high rate of production within 
a short time" (p. 521). In these three groups output and earnings 
were high and no one quit. 
Explanation of the results on straight-forward economic grounds 
would not seem difficult. But Coch and French claim the results 
demonstrate that allowing workers to participate in discussion about 
proposed job changes overcomes psychological barriers and enables 
management "to modify greatly or remove completely group 
resistance to change in methods of work and the ensuing piece rates" 
(p. 531). Coch and French's experiment has been widely celebrated 
on these grounds and is still reprinted in widely used selections of 
readings (Faunce 1967; Cartwright and Zander 1968). 
Later, French and others (1960) attempted to replicate this experi-
ment in a Norwegian factory. They were particularly interested in 
exploring the influence on worker behaviour of participation (i.e., 
discussion meetings) which provided a "feeling" of influencing deci-
sions about their work situation ("perceived participation") as dis-
tinct from actual influence ("objective participation"). This time all 
groups received similar retraining and the setting of all piece rates 
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was determined by negotiations between management and unions. 
Under these circumstances the groups which participated in discus-
sions prior to job changes performed no differently from the rest. 
But that experiment hasn't become celebrated. 
Discrepancies between evidence and conclusions in these studies 
raise questions about the integrity of social science research in 
industry—that is, about considerations other than scientific evidence 
that may affect the conclusions reached and the repute gained from 
any piece of social science research and from human relations 
research in particular. 
Peter Drucker, doyen of American management consultants, was 
emphatic, in 1950, that political objectives, not higher production, 
had been the principal inspiration of the human relations movement 
(p. V): 
The human relations policies which American management has been 
buying wholesale in the past ten years have been a conspicuous waste 
and failure, in my opinion ... Most of us in management ... have in-
stituted them as a means of busting the unions. That has been the 
main theme of these programmes. They are based on the belief that if 
you have good employee relations the union will wither on the vine. 
The validity and the implications of this judgment will be clarified 
by a brief review of the circumstances under which, in 1946, the 
human relations movement rose suddenly from relative obscurity to 
dominance in the field of industrial research. 
During the war years American unions grew in strength, govern-
ment involvement in labour-management relations increased, and 
government controls over prices, profits, and marketing were in-
troduced. When peace returned management regarded these controls 
as threats to its traditional prerogatives. 
During 1946 there was an unprecedented level of strikes and 
labour-management disputes. Removal of controls led to a rapid rise 
in both prices and profits and to public resentment against American 
business (Hughes 1946, p.5). The problems of improving American 
business's public image and of reestablishing labour discipline in 
peace time conditions, were such that, as reported by the New York 
Times in April (Porter 1946, p.3), "no reasonable observer could 
deny that the country is facing a crisis within the next few years": 
In the broader perspective many also realize that the future of the free 
enterprise system is at stake, in view of its world-wide competition 
with Socialism and Communism, as we succeed or fail in the coming 
years to provide greater economic democracy and social justice to 
match our political democracy. 
The solution, it was widely felt, should be sought through "apply-
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ing modern scientific methods in the study of human behaviour" to 
understanding the individual worker. The rapid development of the 
physical sciences had been "stimulated" by "their intensive ex-
ploitation" by industry. 
Responsible business and industrial leaders asked, 
(could not) the same ... be achieved in the social sciences ... if in-
dustry put its great organizing ability and financial resources behind 
such research work, not only in companies and trade associations, but 
in the country's great educational institutions? ... If the free enterprise 
system . . . is to be saved something like this will have to be done even-
tually ... If eventually, why not now? 
The following month (May 1946) a national conference of univer-
sity social scientists endorsed an ambitious plan to expand human 
relations training and research. The New York Times reported 
(Porter 1946, p.2) that, "Just as research in the biological sciences 
has accomplished wonders in preventive medicine, the social scien-
tists hope to prevent disease in, and indefinitely prolong the life of, 
the American system of free enterprise"; and that, although this was 
"a comparatively new approach" to labour management problems, 
and "still in a pioneering stage", 
hundreds of thousands of dollars have been contributed as grants and 
endowments to universities and other institutions for the pursuit of 
such work and large additional donations are scheduled. 
By September 1946 the American Management Association had 
taken up promotion of the human relations campaign. 
In a style reminiscent of a top salesman marketing a new product 
the AMA president, Alvin Dodd, told the Times the recently 
published AMA Annual Report "carried assertions by thousands of 
industry leaders stressing aptitude in human relations as absolutely 
necessary to men of supervisory calibre" (in fact it did not^'); and 
that "innumerable" copies of the report had been requested by, and 
sent to, libraries, universities, and other institutions. Mr. Dodd con-
tinued: "American business is taking concrete steps to insure that its 
management in all echelons ... is thoroughly conversant with intel-
ligent and enlightened human relations policies. (T)op executives ... 
are stating flatly that a knowledge of human relations is one of the 
most important, if not the prime requisite to management at all 
levels",— a requirement, the Times observes, "never (before) 
seriously considered by practical businessmen as of paramount im-
portance (Zipser 1946, p.l). 
Eight months later (May 1947) "twenty nine of the country's 
leading universities from coast to coast (were) engaged in labour 
research programmes" and Lever Brothers launched "a million dol-
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lar annual 'round table' fund to promote labour management unity 
through education". Businessmen noted that in the past "com-
paratively little (had) been invested in the study of the social sciences 
as they apply to the human relations of industry". 
In part explanation of American managements' sudden conver-
sion to an intense interest in the social sciences and human relations 
the New York Times noted that, in managements' view, "the at-
titude of workers toward their job ... and (toward) the whole 
economic system has a profound effect upon community opinion" 
and hence is important in producing a political climate that will "aid 
the preservation of the American system against the challenge of col-
lectivism". This (human relations) approach it was pointed out by 
management, "considers the workers as individual human beings in 
accordance with the American democratic tradition ... (and not) as a 
commodity to be used up by ... ruthless employers or as in-
distinguishable masses subject to the arbitary control of union or 
government dictators". (Porter 1947, pp.1, 9). 
In November 1947, the vice-president of personnel in the giant 
General Foods Corporation, Mr. Thomas G. Spates, told Princeton 
University it should make a course in human relations mandatory, 
and that universities in general "should pay more attention to human 
relations". Harvard protested that it was expanding human relations 
courses as fast as instructors could be trained. 
Spates claimed that mandatory human relations courses were the 
"surest way" universities and colleges could "aid American busi-
ness". He warned that, "despite some recent progress, greater efforts 
are necessary if communism is to be overcome in its battle for 
American workers". 
We have reviewed a range of material which reveals something of 
(i) the disposition of U.S. industry to recruit the skills and techniques 
of industrial psychologists in the service of political purposes; (ii) the 
disposition of industrial psychologists to be so recruited; and (iii) the 
disposition of industrial psychologists to reach conclusions not sup-
ported by evidence and of their profession to celebrate work having 
that character. 
It will clarify possible connections between these various disposi-
tions and the particular theories and conclusions that have won fame 
in the discipline of industrial psychology if we review briefly some of 
the ways in which "scientific" findings by industrial psychologists 
can have political use and import. Consideration of this question will 
have the advantage of providing a framework within which further 
examination of the work of American and Australian industrial psy-
chologists may be more intelligently—and intelligibly—pursued. 
Among the permanent ideological and political interests of U.S. 
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industry in the work of industrial psychologists have been: that in-
dustrial psychologists should avoid exploring basic questions about 
the structure of power and authority in American industry, for such 
exploration would invite discovery that basic changes in these areas 
would better serve the needs of employees, workers and society; and 
that industrial psychologists should develop theories and skills rele-
vant to the struggle to hold the hearts and minds of workers and the 
general public in favour o/ the free enterprise businessman and his 
values and against government controls, public ownership and mili-
tant trade unionism. 
In the context of the fervent pro-democratic and anti-
authoritarian rhetoric that accompanied the 1939-45 war against 
Germany the obviously authoritarian structure of U.S. industry 
made it a potentially vulnerable target for strongly aroused 
democratic, egalitarian sentiments. It became of political impor-
tance to management to popularize the notion that "democratic 
leadership" could be introduced in industry as it presently existed, 
and with general benefit. Plainly to introduce a plausible veneer of 
local democracy within an unchanged authoritarian superstructure 
would require psychological expertise. 
For some decades criticism has been gathering that the way in 
which modern U.S. industry and commerce is organized—with total 
reliance on competition and material gain as motive forces— 
deforms men and alienates them from their work and each other. 
Plainly theory or evidence from industrial psychologists to rebut 
these charges against industry have political value. 
If it can be scientifically established that what workers primarily 
want from their role in industry is social satisfactions that can readi-
ly be provided by friendly supervision and fraternal work group rela-
tions, and that money is of secondary importance to them, it follows 
both that workers have not been deformed in the way suggested and 
that there is no deep-seated conflict of interests between capital and 
labour in industry. If there is no abiding conflict of interests, no con-
flict of interests that cannot be resolved by friendlier supervision, 
better communication, more (democratic) consultation, then there is 
no need to raise basic questions about the present power and 
authority structure of industry and possible alternatives to it. 
The same result follows if it can be shown that what workers and 
lower level managers primarily need for greater satisfaction with 
their industrial role is not more money, but non-monetary 
"recognition", more "responsibility" (again without more pay); 
greater sense of "achievement" (again without more pay resulting); 
and a little more varied and challenging work—in a phrase "job 
enrichment". 
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If there is no deep-rooted conflict of interests, then industry's 
human problems are primarily due to "irrational", "emotional", or 
"psychological" causes which get in the way of adequate com-
munication and cooperation. Conversely any theory or doctrine 
which attributes the human problems of industry primarily to psy-
chological and irrational barriers to communication and cooperation 
denies, at least implicitly, the existence of a deep-rooted, rational 
basis for conflict of interests; denies that there may be fundamental 
and reasonable disagreement about what cooperation is for. 
There will be political (as well as economic) appeal in scientific 
theory or evidence that supports any of the foregoing conclusions. 
However, while the economic appeal of these conclusions to manage-
ment will depend on their validity, the political appeal will not. 
Similarly for studies which show that a high proportion of workers 
are satisfied with their jobs; scientific findings of this kind will have a 
political appeal to managements and leaders of corporations that is 
independent of their validity. 
By contrast, if researchers repeatedly endorsed, and psychologists 
and business schools continually proclaimed scientific findings that a 
low-level of job-satisfaction was widespread in industry, or that what 
workers primarily wanted from industry was money and what they 
were primarily discontented about was their share in the economic 
rewards of industry, these results would underline the basic confiict 
of interests in industry and direct critical attention to the existing in-
dustrial structure of power and privilege. 
The objective of a more democratic image for U.S. industry has 
political importance. Therefore, when industrial psychologists claim 
that workers are more contented—even work better—if they can be 
given a feeling of democratic involvement (or participation) in deci-
sions affecting them; when psychologists claim to show that workers 
can be given this feeling through managed participation which has 
minimal influence on decisions management has, in fact, taken in ad-
vance; then these claims have both political and economic appeal 
and are likely to be welcomed, promoted, and publicized without too 
close scrutiny of their allegedly scientific foundations. 
C. Wright Mills did not know that the most renowned experiments 
of the human relations school were virtually devoid of scientific 
worth. Yet he saw reason to regard the whole post-war human rela-
tions movement as public relations gimmickry. As early as 1948 he 
described the recent, much publicized industrial interest in 
democracy and human relations as illustrative of a new 
"sophisticated conservatism" whose distinguishing characteristic 
was its "use of liberal symbols for conservative purposes" (Mills 
1948). 
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In the final study to be reviewed, Herzberg sought to test his no-
tion (or hypothesis) that some aspects of work situations cause 
satisfaction and high motivation if they are good (but cannot cause 
dissatisfaction or adverse motivation no matter how bad they are); 
and that, conversely, other aspects of work situations cause dis-
satisfaction etc., if they are bad (but cannot cause satisfaction etc., 
no matter how good they are). Examples of the first category are 
(non-monetary) recognition and sense of achievement. They are cal-
led "satisfiers" or "motivators". Somewhat predictably, perhaps, 
money is an example of the second category and is called a "dis-
satisfier" or a "hygiene factor". 
Herzberg and his associates interviewed some 200 white-colUr 
employees about their work attitudes and motivation (Herzberg et 
al. 1959). The relevant managements were interested to obtain infor-
mation about their employees' attitudes and motives and let their 
employees know they were expected to cooperate with the inter-
viewers. 
Each person interviewed was first asked to recall occasions or 
events (in the near or distant past) which had been associated with (a) 
very "good" feelings about his job and (b) very "bad" feelings about 
his job. Next he was asked, in each case, to describe the good (or 
bad) feelings experienced and how they related to the event or occa-
sion which produced them. Finally, he was asked what effect these 
"high" and "low" experiences had on his job behaviour. 
Herzberg undertook no observation whatever of the actual work 
situations or work behaviour of his subjects. The empirical founda-
tions of his theory consisted entirely in 476 selected anecdotes (or 
parts of anecdotes) obtained from some 200 subjects, together with 
their self-appraisals about why they felt especially "good" or "bad" 
on the occasions to which the anecdotes referred. 
The result is a miasma of statistics in which, as in a Rorschach 
test, almost anything may be found, according to the motivation of 
the observer. However, two things will not be found there. It will not 
be found that anybody is motivated by events or conditions unrelated 
to his job, or that his job and what he looks for from it are subor-
dinate to his wider life of non-work concerns— such as meeting 
family needs for housing or education, building a boat, ending the 
Vietnam war, attending symphony concerts, or winning a frog-
jumping contest. This will not be found because Herzberg excludes 
from the anecdotes selected for analysis any anecdote (or part anec-
dote) "in which a factor in the personal life of the individual, having 
nothing to do with his job was responsible for a period of good or bad 
feelings, even if these feelings affected his job" (1959, p. 48)" 
This exclusion goes a long way to ensuring that Herzberg's results 
246 
Alex Carey 
will reveal a vocational attitude to industrial work, i.e., will reveal 
that men who work in industry are motivated primarily by (non-
monetary) satisfactions intrinsic to their job rather than that they see 
work as a means, through the income it provides, to other social and 
personal ends. 
Secondly it will not be found, in Herzberg's statistics, that 
monetary reward had any great importance as a source of motiva-
tion or satisfaction. 
It would hardly be a matter for surprise if, in a culture strongly in-
fluenced by the Protestant ethic, a management-supported inquiry 
found white-collar employees saying, "my greatest reward comes 
from a sense of personal achievement ... satisfaction in a job well 
done ... due recognition for hard-won skill", rather than "I'm in it 
for the money ... I can get my profounder, personal satisfactions 
elsewhere, thank you".-" But Herzberg's treatment of his data makes 
this outcome doubly sure. One illustration must suffice. 
Voluntarily produced anecdotes about memorable occasions of 
high satisfaction frequently centred on "some act such as a promo-
tion or wage increase which was not itself accompanied by verbal 
recognition". However, in "many" such cases the respondent, when 
probed further, said that he felt the promotion or wage increase had 
been a due recognition of his competence, or whatever. Herzberg 
classified all such anecdotes as instances of high satisfaction 
resulting, not from the promotion or wage increase, but from non-
monetary recognition. (1959, p.45). 
By a variety of interpretive shifts of this kind" Herzberg con-
cluded that workers seek primarily non-monetary, vocational 
rewards from industrial work (e.g., recognition, sense of achieve-
ment, responsibility, opportunity for growth); and that only these 
sorts of rewards can provide positive motivation and satisfaction. 
(Hence these vocational aspects of work are "satisfiers" or 
"motivators".) On the other hand, salary, good working conditions, 
job security are, Herzberg concludes, of secondary importance. 
These cannot, in his view, be sources of positive satisfaction or 
motivation. (They are called "dissatisfiers" or "hygiene factors".) 
The most that can be achieved through them is to reduce resentment 
or dissatisfaction to zero; except, that is, for a supposedly unfor-
tunate minority of maladjusted or neurotic (even pathologic) 
employees who are unnaturally oriented to satisfaction from these 
sources, and admit that they obtain positive satisfaction from high 
wages, job security or good working conditions (Herzberg 1968, pp. 
77-90, 178-92). 
With cosmic presumption Herzberg offers a "culture-free" defini-
tion of work and "the nature of man as it is in reality", (Herzberg 
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1968, pp. 43,77). It turns out that, according to his scientifically dis-
covered definition of man, people—or, more strictly, employees— 
who seek or obtain positive satisfactions from material rewards 
(rather than from sources approved by the Protestant ethic) are not 
only sick, unhealthy and maladjusted, but mentally ill, neurotic and 
pathological as well (Herzberg 1968, pp.77, 79, 80, 84, 85, 191-92). 
The appeal of this definition of man-as-worker to managing direc-
tors and shareholders is understandable—not least because if 
employees are told often enough that science and psychologists have 
shown their concern about money to be a symptom of neurosis they 
may come to believe it, and feel guilty about asking for pay rises. 
A personal anecdote about Herzberg is excusable at this point. In 
1970 Herzberg was jetting about Europe explaining to managers 
how unwise and unprofitable it was to suppose monetary incentives 
could contribute positively to the satisfaction or motivation of 
workers. He stopped off in London for one day to address a con-
ference. The Economist (6 June 1970, p.66) reported the occasion in 
an article entitled "Does your job bore you or does Professor 
Herzberg?" Four hundred and forty-four business executives paid 
£E25 each to listen to Professor Herzberg. Herzberg grossed some 
$A25,000 for one day spent explaining the relative unimportance of 
money as an incentive for employees. 
Three years later, in an interview with the editor of International 
Management, Herzberg gave a characteristically extravagant ac-
count of his revolutionary theory about the unimportance of pay as a 
motivator (Ludwig 1973, p.22). At the end Herzberg admitted that 
he himself was very expensive, concluding, "But, hell, I believe in 
hygiene factors" (i.e., in high material rewards). One is driven to the 
conclusion that Herzberg is either a comic artist, or an exploiter of 
the comedie humaine, of some genius. 
Notes to text 
1. See also R.H, Tawney (1938, pp.238 - 41, 311 - 13). For relevant excerpts from 
Max Weber see "Asceticism and the spirit of capitalism", in Burns (1969, pp.15 -
23). 
2, Although the conception that God required men to labour in a "calling" began 
with Calvin in the sixteenth century, it was not until the early decades of the 
seventeenth century that labour was transmuted from a divine requirement — to 
which man must be resigned — into "a spiritual need ,.. in (which) alone ... the 
soul (can) find health and (which) must be continued as an ethical duty long after 
it has ceased to be a material necessity" (Tawney, 1938, p.240). 
In the early seventeenth century the Puritan allegiance characterized prin-
cipally traders and workmen of modest means who, by their thrift, "method", 
and hardwork prospered notably. It was only after the Restoration (1660), 
and particularly with the later development of a wealthy class of in-
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dustrialists, that the Puritan ethos was elaborated from a self-discipline into a 
justification for the neglect and exploitation of the poor and underprivileged, 
and into an instrument for their psychological subjugation to the values and 
attitudes about work desired by employers. This latter development reached 
its consummation in the teachings of Wesley's followers at the end of the 
eighteenth century. See Tawney (1938, pp.201 - 10, 234, 257, 261 - 70) and 
E,P, Thompson (1968, pp,45, 50, 61 - 62, 386 - 90, 442). 
3, For a similar assessment of the role and history of social scientists in U.S, in-
dustry some fourteen years earlier see Arthur Kornhauser (1947) and C.W. Mills 
(1948), See also the UNESCO study by J.H. Smith (1961. pp.36 - 37) which 
found that "Industrial sociology tends to have certain characteristics derived 
from the traditions and outlook of its native social scientists. For example in the 
United States, relatively little attention has been given to the nature and causes of 
industrial conflict ,,, These national characteristics ... are most marked in the 
United States, where industrial sociology has so far been little affected by foreign 
influences, particularly those stemming from uncongenial areas of investigation, 
such as class relations in industry and challenges to management authority," 
4, The survey obtained a 64 per cent response to mailed questionnaires. It covered 
only industrial psychologists who are members of the Australian Psychological 
Society. Estimates based on this survey must therefore be regarded as crude 
guides only. (They could be underestimates by 100 per cent without materially af-
fecting their significance for the thesis of this paper.) 
5, The unquestioned ideological boundaries to Western sociological thought in this 
area are often indicated with a surprising naivete. Thus Frank Heller, (1971, p.41) 
discusses "the important British structural school of industrial sociology and the 
work of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations", which are distinguished for 
having escaped from the usual total preoccupation with "face to face or interper-
sonal relations" to an interest in "the systems nature of organizations and the 
analysis of some of their constituent parts". While it is true that the, limited and 
conservative, interest of the Tavistock Institute in structural/political aspects of 
industrial organization is without parallel in the U,S,, it is a little startling to be 
told that this work (e,g., at the Glacier Metal Company, Brown, 1960) has 
"provided examples of power-sharing that are not available in any other case ex-
ample". One wonders how long it will be before a majority of Western "industrial 
sociologists" recognize that their variables and their theories ought to be able to 
accommodate industrial experiment and experience in West Germany and 
Yugoslavia (not to mention 800 million Chinese) as "case examples" of 
something or other. 
6, Estimates for U,S, content or dependence are based on the percentage of all 
references in a book which are to American articles, textbooks, etc. Thus Bruce 
Yuill, in his Organizational principles for management provides a "selective 
bibliography" of almost 100 items. These divide: American 76 per cent, British 12 
per cent, Australian 6 per cent. 
Other Australian books on management and organization show a similar 
breakdown for the sources of research and theory from which they build: e.g., 
Byrt (1968, 1969, 1971). In Hines (1973) and Hunt (1972) the preponderance of 
references to American research and theory is around 90 per cent and references 
to Australian research approach zero. (Although both the latter books report case 
studies — i.e., uncontrolled observations and impressions — from Australian in-
dustry, these are interpreted within a framework of concepts and theory entirely 
built on and derived from overseas, and overwhelmingly American, research and 
speculation), 
7, As examples of "principles (from) research and practice in the field of 
propaganda (that) have value as general guides in planning programmes designed 
to infiuence employee attitudes", Morris Viteles (1953, p.431) mentions: "Repeti-
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tion, simplicity and emotional appeals ... which touch ... attitudes deeply embed-
ded ... by past conditioning" (emphasis in original); and "an indirect or disguised 
approach to moulding attitudes and opinions is more effective than propaganda 
which is easily recognised as such". 
8. Employees were judged "well-informed" (or "educated") if they believed (or 
claimed to believe) that "the consumer rather than the company sets the price"; 
"labour-saving machinery makes jobs"; "stockholders and employees interests 
are allied"; and if they opposed price controls, limits on profits, limits on salaries, 
government ownership and stronger unions; and poorly informed or educated if 
they did not (Viteles 1953; pp.23 - 25). 
9. "This finding contrasts with studies which have generally been accepted as 
demonstrating that with few exceptions, promotional campaigns that present first 
one view and then the opposite — perhaps on the theory that the public should 
decide rationally between them — are not effective" (Young 1945, p.514). 
10. Based on a survey and field work covering some fifty companies and relevant un-
iversities and conferences, 
11, HOBSO was originally developed by Du Pont, then made generally available 
through the National Association of Manufacturers and other sources. It is a cur-
rent favourite and is enjoying wide use, although it, too, has its critics (Williams 
and Peterfreud 1954, p.38): 
HOBSO would be all right if its users were honest... about what it is. It is not 
an open or free discussion. It is directed ,.. (T)he conference leader should say, 
"I'm going to tell you these things", not "We want your opinions", and then 
reject them or be selective in the opinions he accepts. What is the instructor 
going to put up next on the flannel board if nobody agrees that the piece of 
writing he holds in his hand is the next valid point?" 
12. There was "very vocal opposition raised by many international union officers", 
but this was "not reflected by the more cooperative position taken by most local 
union officers. There is little evidence to show that the unions as a whole have 
viewed management's educational efforts as a serious threat" (p.27). " . . . Only 
two or three companies out of fifty cited active union opposition" (p,28). 
13, "When discussion programmes involve taking employees away from their jobs on 
company time for meetings, etc., the production output for the day generally is 
maintained. (All but one) company ... reported higher output before or after the 
meetings to sustain total output, or said that where members of a group were out 
for the meetings in turn, the rest of the group picked up the slack" (p.40). 
14. Many political considerations were found to lead to "educational activities" by 
management. Among them; the growing strength of unions, which was felt to 
threaten "infringement of management prerogatives"; high taxes; "the many 
(public) references to high profits"; success of the German unions in obtaining 
codetermination; the nationalization of industries in Britain. 
A factor "underlying a large portion of the educational activity undertaken since 
the end of World War II has been the collectivist threat to the free enterprise 
system" represented by "the (U.S.) governments' increasing activity in the fields 
of public power and banking, and its closer regulation of many other activities .., 
On both a national and state level it sometimes appeared that the government and 
unions were allied against management" (p.21). 
15, It should be noted that public attitudes (and changes in attitudes) on a wide range 
of questions of political/ideological importance to management had already been 
closely monitored, through six monthly national polls, for a long time. From at 
least the time of U.S. entry into the war, in 1941, and the consequent increased 
regulatory role of government in industry, the Psychological Corporation con-
ducted six monthly polls (based on samples of 5,000) covering public attitudes, by 
economic class and union membership: to unions and their control by law; to 
government regulation of prices, profits etc; to increase in the government 
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payroll; to the "threat" of socialism and communism; and covering also com-
parative public confidence in union leaders, business leaders, and associations of 
businessmen (N.A,M. and Chamber of Commerce), See Link (1946) for detailed 
comments, 
16, For example: "A movie was made by a large organisation to acquaint its 
employees with the fact that the company stock was widely held. In a test being 
made of the effectiveness of the film (by interviewing employees on their reactions 
to it), one said: 'I understand the point of the film. It shows all kinds of people, 
from all walks of life, can own our stock, and do own our stock. I believe that all 
right. Anybody can be a capitalist. Even a young newspaper boy, like in the 
movie, can be one. Still, I wouldn't want anybody to call me a capitalist,' These 
studies are reported in Williams and Peterfreud 1954, 
17, After World War II there was "an explosive and rapidly mushrooming interest in 
small groups". The number of studies carried out with small groups between 1950 
and 1960 exceeded by more than four times the total number of studies carried 
out prior to 1950 (Deutsch 1968, p.265). In 1950 "communication" as a subject, 
was "hardly mentioned in textbooks on management"; by 1960 it was "among the 
most popular management subjects in America"; and there had been "a great 
change in the amount and nature of communications research". In 1960. small 
group leadership "was still the most popular topic for research in industrial social 
psychology" (Vroom and Maier 1961, p.461). By 1964 "the work on small groups 
... continue(d) to be voluminous" and had been extended to management groups 
(Leavitt and Bass 1964, p,379). "The chief questions" to which research on small 
groups "sought answers" were: "What determines whether a man changes his 
behaviour or opinion under the influence of others? In particular, what determines 
whether or not he conforms to the norms of a group?" (Homans 1968, p.260). 
18, "(The Hawthorne) investigations have not yet attracted (in Britain), especially 
among the ranks of sociologists and industrial managers, the degree of interest 
that their quality demands. Yet,,, there is no thought among the newest ideas on 
the social and personal character of the responsibilities of the executive that has 
not an echo or a reflection in the vast treasure-house of the work at Hawthorne," 
"What (the) contribution (of the group who took part in the Hawthorne studies) 
means, many managers in industry do not yet realize. Those alive today may see 
the knowledge that they have unfolded accepted as a commonplace or everyday 
practice. Or it may be left to writers of a later century to relate how this group in-
itiative was translated from a series of books and reports into principles and 
methods adopted by all responsible for executive control and supervision in in-
dustry. For whether general recognition comes sooner or later, their work is 
securely founded on scientific method and will endure" (Urwick and Brech 1948, 
pp,2. 6), 
19, See also Caplow (1964. p. 156): "We do not have to look very hard at the polar 
terms authority and democracy against the background of modern theories of ad-
ministration to notice a curious feature: democratic decision-making, permis-
siveness with respect to rules, the displacement of authority by consultation, and 
group participation in setting and enforcing norms are all conceived as devices for 
extending the organization's control over the individual member. When they func-
tion successfully, they decrease his ability to hold private purposes opposed 
to those of the organization. The autonomy conferred on the individual in 
small matters reduces his opportunities to deviate from the main outline of 
the organizational program." See also Golembiewski (1960, pp.207 - 8). 
"'Cohesiveness' is a measure of the attraction a group has for its members, and 
thus of the control a group exercises over the behaviour of its members ... (T)he 
possibility of tapping the potential power of cohesive informal groups to build 
support for organizational goals and guide worker action to these ends .,. Raising 
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of norms has been achieved through 'group decision-making' by the employees 
directed by a trainer," 
20, Compare the comment. "Management has at long last discovered that there is 
greater production, and hence greater profit, when workers are satisfied with their 
jobs. Improve the morale of a company and you improve production" (Parker 
and Kleemier 1951, p,10) and "high morale is no longer considered as a prere-
quisite of high productivity. (Moreover) the nature of the relationship between 
morale and productivity is open to serious questioning. Is it direct? Is it inverse? Is 
it circular? Or is there any relationship at all between the two; are they indepen-
dent variables?" (Scott 1962, p,93), 
21, Herzberg attributes to himself the achievement of "creating job enrichment" 
(Ludwig 1973. p.20), My own judgement accords with that of Hunt (1972, p,348) 
that "the concept of job enrichment is not new ,,, Many of the early management 
writers saw the need for enriching jobs as did most of the writers of the Human 
Relations school. Where Herzberg differed slightly was in his analysis of the 
relationship between the individual and the organizational structure," 
22, The editor of Management International has stated that "brushing aside pay as a 
motivator was one of the most revolutionary elements in Herzberg's theory" 
(Ludwig 1973, p.22). If that is the mark of a revolutionary social scientist then the 
human relations movement, from Mayo to Lewin and Likert, has been one con-
tinuous revolution. 
23, The summary description of the Hawthorne studies which follows is fully 
documented in Alex Carey (1967), 
24, For a devastating account of the authoritarian — even totalitarian — implica-
tions of Lewin's psychological theory see H.S, Kariel (1956); for an accurate and 
perceptive appraisal of the curious applications of the word"democracy" in the 
industrial context in general, and by Lewin in particular, see Pateman (1970, 
pp,69 fO. 
25, See, e,g., Jacques 1948, pp.128 - 9; French et al. 1960, p.3; Benoit-Guilbot 1968, 
p.23; and Raven 1968, p,289, 
26, The report of the AM A (1946), which runs to twelve pages, carries nothing except 
some claims that an unspecified number of managers had answered three ques-
tions about human relations in industry in ways which indicated they endorsed the 
AMA view that human relations were very important. 
27, Again "the story must not be about a sequence of events that revolved around 
high or low spirits caused by something unrelated to the job ... We did not include 
a sequence in which the ... origin of a person's attitude was his social life, mar-
riage ..." (Herzberg et al. 1959, p,41). 
Thus stories of worry or pleasure about salary increase or about promotion where 
that concern has its origin in non-work needs for increased money are excluded 
from Herzberg's analysis. 
28, Herzberg provides some "typical" stories told by his subjects when "probed" for 
an explanation about why a salary increase or promotion had (or hadn't) been an 
occasion of high satisfaction to them: An accountant had previously received only 
rises in pay as recognition of his worth. Then came a compliment from the boss 
... "Biggest thing," he said, "was the personal satisfaction with the job done and 
then a pat on the back." Again: an engineer was promoted to a new job along with 
an unexpected salary increase ... "Probed" as to why this caused him high 
satisfaction "he was pleased mainly because it indicated that his work was ap-
preciated and his superiors had confidence in him .,, af,er many years he still feels 
good because of that promotion." "Again," Herzberg concludes, "as with respon-
sibility we find in this story the secondary nature of increased income in increas-
ing the engineer's job satisfaction" (Herzberg et al 1959, pp.61 - 62). 
29, The audacity of Herzberg's (1959) interpretative shifts are breath-taking. Thus 30 
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per cent of his subjects' "stories" about occasions of very high job satisfaction 
centred on salary or promotion or both (see tables 6 and 7, pp.72, 75). Moreover, 
(appreciative) references to salary or promotion occurred 80 times in 228 volun-
tarily given descriptions of occasions of high satisfaction while discontented 
references to either occurred only 69 times in 248 stories about occasions of low 
satisfaction (pp.64, 72). 
Yet from this "objective" data (as he calls it) Herzberg, chiefly by manipulating 
percentages having widely discrepant bases as though they were frequencies — 
and indeed describing them as frequencies — is able to tread a completely invalid 
logical path to the conclusion that monetary rewards cannot provide satisfaction 
but can only cause or diminish dissatisfaction, (See footnotes to tables 3 - 9 and 
the final paragraph on page 82). 
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The Physical Environment Professions 
and the Australian Environmental Crisis 
PATRICK MULLINS 
Editors' We have sought, in this volume, to focus attention on the 
Notes social—or more specifically the professional—construction and 
manipulation of man's symbolic environment. The following 
chapter by Patrick Mullins, on the physical environment 
professions and the crisis in the Australian environment, 
diverges from the overall theme of the book only in the sense 
that it deals with a group who apply their knowledge to the 
problems of society in an aggregate sense rather than to the 
problems of the individual which has been the traditional con-
cern of the professional. 
The planning professions constitute a group who play a 
crucial role in Australian society but who, until now, have 
seldom received serious critical attention from social scientists. 
Mullins directs his critical attention toward the narrow social 
composition of the planning professions, their ideological con-
servatism, rigidity of thought and action, and their social 
elitism in the sense that important groups in the Australian 
community are excluded from the planning process at the ex-
pense of the hegemony of the professional planners. 
In addition, many aspects of the crisis in the planning 
professions have striking parallels with the problems now facing 
the helping professions generally. For example, the growth of 
grass-roots community movements (such as freeway protest as-
sociations) acting on their own behalf and seizing the initiative 
from the professionals has its counterpart in the "revolt of the 
clients" in the welfare sphere. 
Almost certainly, Australia's urban problems will grow 
with a concomitant increase in personal dissatisfaction and 
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social disorganization. The role of the physical environment 
professions in the future is not clear. Will their responses en-
compass all shades of community needs or will their actions, 
like those of so many professional groups, continue to be geared 
to the needs of narrow sectional interests or to simply further 
professional self-interest? Mullins identifies many of the pos-
sibilities for the future. For example, the increasing sensitivity 
to the "social" aspects of planning and the development of 
sophistication in social science methods—which of course may 
be used in a variety of ways from a public relations function 
(smoothing over discontent) to canvassing wide ranging com-
munity opinion. 
The crucial question which must be addressed by all of the 
professions discussed in this book is just who is to receive the 
fruits of the labours of the physical environment planners? Will 
the benefits accrue in a more even fashion to all members of the 
community or will the practices of the planners continue to be 
dominated by the special needs of corporate and political elites? 
Just as the Industrial Revolution was the instigator of the physical 
environment professions, so it seems that the present Australian en-
vironmental crisis will stimulate the development of new skills. The 
various social problems which resulted from the Industrial Revolu-
tion in Europe and North American were catalytic in the rise of the 
physical environment professions. These professions, engineering, 
architecture and town planning,' attempted to make planned 
changes of the physical environment as a means of solving problems 
of housing, overcrowding, health, poverty, and other social maladies 
arising in the extending urban regions of the industrializing popula-
tions. Their work represents an essentially technological approach to 
social problems. Initially, their attack was upon such specific issues 
as housing (architecture) and sanitation (engineering), but increasing 
urbanization made it apparent that some overall coordination of 
physical planning was necessary. In Britain, town planning arose 
largely in response to the writings of Ebenezar Howard, a Victorian 
Utopian with a dislike for cities, who postulated that residential areas 
should utilize the "best" of both the country and the city—thus the 
Garden City Movement. 
Currently, Australia and other industrialized nations are ex-
periencing what has generally been referred to as an "environmental 
crisis". The physical environment is being destroyed—natural 
resources are being depleted; air, water, and land are being polluted; 
and, in neo-Malthusian terms, the population is said to be growing at 
a faster rate than the production of available resources. As a result. 
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the social life of people and their physical and psychological welfare 
are being acutely affected (see Toffier 1970). It is the purpose of this 
paper to examine whether the current Australian crisis will activate 
additional skills or whether the existing and modified methods of the 
environment professions will be sufficient to combat perceived 
problems in the Australian environment. 
!n considering means of overcoming the environmental crisis, it is 
necessary to analyze the operation of contemporary environment 
professions, tracing their ideologies and planning practices, to arrive 
at an evaluation of the fit between ideology and practice. It is sug-
gested that while these professions have provided necessary planned 
changes, their future role will be limited by the intrusion of natural, 
social, and management sciences into planning activities. Under 
such circumstances the tight occupational structure of profes-
sionalism will not exist, since "The mental ability and dynamism 
necessary for this work, the ability to generate ideas to communicate 
with colleagues in a common language of'strategic choice', will not 
be generated by membership of any particular professional body" 
(McLoughlin 1973, p.71). 
In other words, planned changes in the physical environment will 
encompass a wider range of skills, extending the all-embracing trend 
of contemporary town planning and linking the specifically physical 
nature of planning with other planning activities in the Australian 
society. Professionalism has tended to categorize planning into 
specific spheres, with little concern for related activities. Town plan-
ning, admittedly, professes a wholistic approach in planning, but its 
practice in the physical environment is, to use Marsden's term, with 
a "design mania" {Royal Australian Planning Institute Journal, 
April 1972). 
The complexity of the environmental crisis will necessitate ad-
ditional occupational roles and methods for combatting contem-
porary problems. These will develop from conflicts of interests 
within Australia and other societies and from governmental de-
mands for creative and more successful methods. In this context, 
four predisposing situations can be identified as existing within the 
Australian society: 
(1) Conflicts within the environment professions about professional 
knowledge and planning practice. 
(2) Findings from social science research have highlighted dis-
crepancies between planning ideologies and professional prac-
tice. 
(3) People who have "benefited" (e.g., through urban renewal) or 
who have been negatively affected (e.g., through forced reloca-
tion because of freeway construction) by planning decisions, are 
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mobilizing themselves, or being mobilized, into political action 
groups to oppose such plans. 
(4) Australian governments—local, state and federal—are looking 
to a number of occupational groups to implement physical and 
other planning in Australia. 
These four interrelated factors contain the precipitating elements 
for changes in environmental planning in Australia. It means that 
future planning will more likely respond to the needs of a wider 
range of people, rather than merely to the strictly narrow benefits of 
those who already control most of the society's resources. Perhaps 
more importantly, planned changes will come about from conflicts 
between different groups within the society. These groups will not 
only represent business and industrial interests, but will include 
organized groups of people who oppose a proposed plan or who are 
suggesting particular changes to their social and physical environ-
ments. 
The remainder of this paper will analyze the position of the en-
vironment professions in Australia today, contrasting their 
ideologies with the benefits their skills have made to the quality of 
life in this society. The following comments will largely follow the 
four features mentioned above, with ideology and practice preceding 
discussion of political change arising from conflicts with mobilized 
forces of the powerless and from governmental demands. 
Professional ideology and planning practice 
In general terms, physical environment professions tend to be more 
pragmatically oriented than many other professions. They tend to 
see their role as simply providing a service which requires little or no 
contact between themselves and those who receive the benefit of their 
skill. The personalized commitment of occupations such as social 
work, medicine and nursing does not exist. Nevertheless, there is a 
strong ideological concern in using knowledge for social ends. Kee-
ble (1965) maintains, in fact, that, with medicine, town planning is 
the only profession committed to the total welfare of people. Other 
professions, it is implied, only deal with specific aspects of social, 
economic, psychological, or physical needs. 
It is this ideology of social benefit which is critical to this discus-
sion, since, if criticism is to be levelled at the environment profes-
sions, it must be in terms of ideology and the results of practice. 
Ideology provides the blueprint for practice and in the environment 
professions it is this system of ideas which gives a general operating 
rationale and a justification for planning practices. Obviously, if 
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there is a discrepancy between ideology and practice there exists a 
serious threat to the survival of such a profession. 
Within the environment professions three dominant and explicit 
ideologies exist beyond the generally stated one of social benefit. 
These ideologies are apparent within some, although not all, of these 
professions, and it is perhaps significant that engineering appears to 
state its aim in the most practical terms as providing society with a 
water and food supply and a transportation and communication 
system which, in turn, provides a satisfactory physical environment 
for living (Holland 1970). Beyond this, engineering appears to have 
no other explicitly stated ideology. 
Architecture and, perhaps more so, town planning, state their 
aims in terms of greater social ends. Architecture aims at providing 
leadership in the building industry through the art and science of 
planning and designing structures for people which are functional, 
safe, and aesthetically pleasing (Taylor 1955). Town planning, in 
contrast, attempts to make people happier because its planned 
changes make for an environment which is conducive to health, con-
venience, and safety, which facilitates social interaction between 
people, and which is visually attractive (Keeble 1969). From these 
aims, the principal ideologies become apparent: 
(a) To manipulate physical objects (buildings and other locales) as a 
means of encouraging localized social interaction. 
(b) To provide a "good',' physical environment which will not only 
be aesthetically pleasing but which will promote a healthy and 
"civilized" life. 
(c) To act as a referee in the conflict and competition for the 
physical environment. 
(a) Manipulation of the physical environment 
While the physical environment can facilitate contact between 
people (see Proshansky et al. 1970; Michelson 1970) considerable 
criticism has been levelled at the architectural and town planning 
aim of facilitating contact between people because of the crude en-
vironmental determinism which has been expressed (Broady 1968; 
Gans 1968). Social and cultural variables have been ignored in the 
way people use physical space and encouraged by certain research 
findings. Architects and town planners have tended to believe that, 
by modifying the physical environment, certain social ends can be 
achieved. The social end desired is a localized "community" of close, 
intimate ties of kinship and friendship. But as Michelson (1970) and 
others (for example Gans 1967) have pointed out, close localized as-
sociations between people in modern industrialized cities are usually 
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only developed under conditions of perceived homogeneity between 
residents and when they acknowledge the need for mutual aid. 
What is perhaps most striking about the manipulation of physical 
space for the achievement of intimate, localized social relationships 
is the fact that it is regarded as so desirable. It is felt that members of 
our society should break away from the impersonal, socially dis-
organizing and nasty city and develop "meaningful" relationships 
centred in local communities. This ideology is couched in terms of 
re-establishing, or what is believed to be re-establishing, the warm, 
rural-village-type atmosphere once said to exist in Australia and 
other similar societies. Such an ideology is part of the anti-urban 
bias within our society which sees the need to get back to our species' 
true existence—an association with the land—although as Suttles 
(1972) has indicated it seems unlikely that such a situation of 
residential bliss ever existed. The urbanized nature of the Australian 
society from the outset of colonization definitely meant that most 
people lived in cities and village life was atypical. 
In Australia, such views are associated with the decentralization 
of the population from the cities along the eastern seaboard. The as-
sociated aim is to prevent such cities growing any larger and, if possi-
ble, to reduce their size. 
While success will possibly be achieved in decentralizing the 
Australian population, the establishment of "meaningful" social 
relationships in small communities is unlikely. The type of social 
relationships which characterize the Australian society are not based 
in a geographic locality. Rather, they tend to be spread over dis-
tance. Therefore, residents of large Australian cities will have 
members of their social network, whether friends or kin, scattered 
within the city, often at considerable distances, and scattered 
beyond, in other cities, towns, states, and even in other countries. In 
other words, the intimate associations people have in the Australian 
society are not based in a restricted geographic locality. Whether this 
predisposes a socially and psychologically disorganizing situation is 
questionable. A good deal of publicity is given to the increased 
pathological nature of cities and the comparatively happier situation 
in smaller communities. Pathology is invariably put in terms of 
crime rates and recent publication on Australian city life (Cleaves 
1974), for example, quotes differences in crime rates between the 
rural and urban sectors of the United States, suggesting a com-
parable situation in Australia. While the figures quoted showed 
crimes against property as being much greater in urban than in rural 
communities, and that rates of aggravated assault were twice as 
great in urban than rural areas, the author failed to point out that 
rates of forcible rape, although marginally higher in urban areas, dif-
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fered little, and ignored the fact that rates for murder and 
manslaughter were almost 25 per cent higher in rural areas. He ig-
nored, therefore, the most serious crimes against the person—crimes 
which are then used as a basis for criticizing urban regions. 
Rates of mental illness have also been used to suggest the advan-
tages of living in small, intimate communities. But even here there 
exists no proof for the acceptance of such a belief. Eaton and Weil 
(1955), for example, entered a Hutterite religious community in the 
United States which was close-knit and socially isolated from the 
surrounding population, to test the assumption held by local 
townspeople and farmers that psychological illnesses were non-
existent among members of this community. Their findings were 
contrary to popular belief. The Hutterites had rates of mental illness 
equal to the wider society. There was a difference, however, between 
the two populations according to the types of severe mental illness— 
that is, psychosis. Manic depression tended to occur more frequently 
among the Hutterites, while schizophrenia was more prevalent in the 
wider American society. The authors hypothesized these differences 
to be associated with the type of social organization in the two pop-
ulations. Severe mental illness of the manic depressive type, they 
suggested, was more likely to occur where social ties were intense 
and localized, as was the case in the Hutterite community. 
Schizophreniza they thought to be more characteristic of the imper-
sonal "mass" society. 
Therefore, by these more "objective" criteria, there is little reason 
to suppose small, cohesive communities are better places in which to 
live than large centres where there is more impersonal contact. 
Even using subjective criteria, there does not seem to be any 
relationship between the size of the population and residents' evalua-
tion of the place. A recent study of United States cities (Fischer 
1973), showed no significant relationship between the size of a com-
munity and residents' feelings about the place. Those in large centres 
were as satisfied as those in smaller centres. 
What these comments have attempted to do is simply question the 
rather naive assumption that developing localized community life 
will improve the quality of living. As a planning aim it may be im-
possible because on the whole people do net desire such a life style. 
Moreover, it may not be a very desirable aim since such com-
munities may not be the Utopian ideal implied in the ideologies of 
architects and town planners. Localized communities of intense and 
intimate ties are socially, if not physically, isolated places. 
Characteristically they are socially and politically conservative, with 
a great resistance to change, and a hostility towards outside groups 
and individuals. 
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The existing social and cultural milieu in which people live, then, 
may not allow the situation of localized social relationships which 
architects and town planners express in their ideologies. As a result, 
any moves in this direction are likely to fail. However, what has not 
been mentioned so far and what is indirectly related to the ideologies 
of architects and town planners, is the desirability of having social 
relationships, which, while not localized, are at least extensive and 
intensive. This, then, is a related ideology and it seems that it can be 
questioned along similar lines to the above arguments. One illustra-
tion is worth mentioning. 
Boissevain (1974) makes an interesting comparison between 
Protestants and Roman Catholics in the Netherlands. The religious 
ideologies of these groups have contributed significantly towards the 
types of social relationships individuals in these groups have. Protes-
tants, because of the Calvanist ideology of obtaining salvation 
through faith alone, do not see the need for help from others as 
necessary for salvation—"God has selected those who are to get to 
heaven". The consequence of this ideology is a social situation in 
which Dutch Protestants have sparse social networks. Extensive in-
timate associations are not regarded as important in religious terms 
and therefore they do not exist. In contrast, the religious ideology of 
Roman Catholics in the Netherlands stresses the need for making 
use of other persons in order to obtain salvation. This is not only 
among the living (the clergy, the religious, kin, and "your 
neighbour") but also, interestingly, among the dead (saints, who are 
to be used as intermediaries with God)! As a consequence the sorts of 
social network these people have are intense and extensive. 
This example highlights differences in the nature of social 
relationships between the two groups based in particular ideologies. 
It suggests no necessary difference in the quality oflife of these peo-
ple. 
The comments made so far do not deny the possibility of finding 
areas in cities where residents have the dense and localized types of 
social relationships architects and town planners have attempted to 
achieve through changes in the physical environment (see Gans 
1962); Young and Willmott 1963). What is being questioned is the 
simplistic acceptance of the planned possibility of this and the 
desirability for all people. To provide physical structures which are 
conducive to social contact, the people being planned for must have 
cultural values and social behaviours which fit such designs (see 
Brolin and Zeisel 1969). If these do not exist these plans will fail. 
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(b) Providing a "good" physical environment 
Just as social and cultural factors intervened in the planned aim of 
facilitating social interaction, these elements also determine the way 
people perceive their physical environment. In an aesthetic sense, 
people may view environments quite differently from members of the 
environment professions. Lansing and Marans (1969) have shown 
that while there was conformity in attitudes of residents living in 
areas evaluated by professionals as "good", areas judged as "un-
satisfactory" by planners were not similarly evaluated by residents 
of those places. Similarly, among working-class residents in a 
number of inner city suburbs of Brisbane, whose residential environ-
ment had been criticized as unsatisfactory, very positive social and 
environmental associations were expressed (Mullins 1973). 
Therefore, the narrow and rather rigid definition by environment 
professions as to what is aesthetically pleasing in an environment, 
can be inappropriate in the planning process. People may not regard 
such a physical change as aesthically pleasing. Robin Boyd's (1961) 
scathing criticism of the Australian built environment—the 
"Australian ugliness"—may siinply be a reflection of a tortured 
aesthete who represents a minority viewpoint. 
Aesthetics, this concern for the beautiful, is a dominant ideology 
among architects. But as Boyd (1969, p.429) points out, the creative 
side of architecture is being usurped by those professionals who are 
flirting and gamboling with what he calls "anti-architecture". This 
movement is increasing, he claims, as developers are coming to dic-
tate architectural tastes and architects are being indoctrinated by 
technology (see Block 1969) and the social sciences (see Saini 1971). 
As a consequence, the architectural imagination is being eroded 
away. 
It has been, is, and always will be, an art, or to be more precise, an act 
of superior imagination; that is, an activity which is capable of 
producing things which do not merely please the observer, they move 
him or her. They raise the spirit or the heart or the soul or the mind or 
the emotions—or whatever other name you wish to give the quality 
which distinguishes us from vegetables. 
If in fact, as Boyd has indicated, architecture is losing its creative 
side, raw recruits to the profession do not indicate this. Pemberton 
and Sinnamon (1972) have shown how students entering three 
Australian architectural schools saw the opportunity for creativity 
and self-expression as being the most important reason for choosing 
architecture. It could, of course, be argued that the influence of 
architectural schools destroys these hopes and replaces them with 
technological and social <science concerns. It seems unlikely. 
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however, that this should occur, although a technological and social 
science perspective is probably added to the creative side of the stu-
dent. 
There is a danger, however, of people being ignored if Boyd's ad-
vice is taken. Under this condition, architecture becomes a socially 
isolated artistic act principally for the benefit of the architect and a 
small number of people who share a similar aesthetic ideology. The 
mass of people are ignored and become irrelevant under such condi-
tions. "The more architecture can be described as the morally 
neutral currency of 'aesthetics', devoid of political content for the 
people affected, the more elite and the more removed from the 
political review of ordinary people become the experts who use this 
currency" (Goodman 1972, p. 153). 
One final point needs to be made about reactions to the physical 
environment. Considerable debate exists on the effects the built en-
vironment has upon people. What perhaps comes as somewhat of a 
surprise and contrary to many of the beliefs of the environment 
professions, is that, with few exceptions, the built environment does 
not exert the devastating social and psychological impact that many 
environment and other professionals seem to imagine (Michelson 
1970). The most significant relationship between the physical en-
vironment and the rise of social pathology has been shown to exist 
under conditions of forced residential mobility— when people are 
made to relocate because of the construction of a freeway or because 
of urban "renewal". In other words, social pathology is most closely 
related to planning decisions (Fried 1963; Gans 1962). It is not 
specifically the physical environment which effects the devastation, 
but it is as a result of an interweave between the environment and the 
social world, which is shattered by the planning process. 
(c) Town planning as an environmental referee 
For town planning, one of the most important aims is "to reconcile 
competing claims for the use of limited land so as to provide consis-
tent, balanced and orderly arrangment of land uses" (Foley 1960, 
p.216). Planners then, act as environmental referees, or, at least, 
they attempt to act as controllers of the built environment. In reality, 
however, they have had comparatively little success. The type of 
economic and political system which characterizes the Australian 
society and other similar societies as "free-enterprise systems", 
means that town planners are only one group competing for control 
over resources of land. They are in competition with entrepreneurs of 
the physical environment— developers, real estate agents, industry, 
business, and private investors. 
In competing with environment entrepreneurs, town planners tend 
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to be allied to governments, whether federal, state, or local, since 
these hold the ultimate power in planning decisions. Therefore, in the 
competition and confiict for the resources of the physical environ-
ment, planning is a political act related to the economic institution. 
(Donnison 1973; Gracey 1969). But because of the free-enterprise 
system, those who have the greatest power and economic control 
have the most say in planning decisions. This largely results from the 
acceptance by governmental members of the power consortium's 
ideology of free-enterprise. As a result, governments are often loath 
to intervene in the operations of the capitalist market system. What 
occurs, then, is a situation in which the most powerful groups in the 
society are working for their own interests, with or without the aid of 
town planners. They control land use and distribution and determine 
the operation of specific activities in certain locales. "Under the 
guise of public responsibility, the ruling economic elites worked for 
the adoption of zoning laws that would reinforce their territorial 
dominance and prevent the invasion of undesirable types of land use 
(and people) into communities they controlled" (Friedmann 1973, p. 
2). 
Despite some grandiose claims (Rosenberg 1972), town planning 
has never had much control over the game. Within the urban con-
text, the "city game" as Jakubowicz (1973) calls it, is being won or 
has been won (depending on whether it is considered one long game 
or a series of short ones), by the politically and economically power-
ful private sector. Unless the public sector becomes comparatively 
more powerful, the influence of town planning, as well as other en-
vironment professions, in the control over the built environment, will 
remain secondary. 
Yet it is not only because environment entrepreneurs have greater 
intrinsic power that the environment professions have less say in 
urban and regional change. It is also because members of these 
professions are traditionally conservative. They tend to accept the 
ideology which allows for the present control, because their own 
ideologies dictate such an acceptance. Town planning, for example, 
from its inception has attempted only to remove the physical 
symptoms of a problem-ridden society (e.g., poor housing) while still 
accepting the social structure which is causing these problems. 
Radical suggestions for changing the social structure to allow a 
redistribution of wealth and other resources and which, in turn, 
would abolish debilitating physical environments, are not made 
because they are contrary to planners' acceptance of the present 
system (see Gans 1968; Gracey 1968; Grabow and Heskin 1973). 
They have been intent on curing the symptoms without diagnosing 
and preventing the "disease". 
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It seems unlikely that the picture of conservatism in town planning 
and the other environment professions will change. Recruitment to 
professional schools is ensuring this. Overwhelming numbers who 
enter these professions are from upper middle-class families. That is, 
from families where one or both parents are professionals or 
managers, occupations which traditionally are conservative. 
Pemberton (1969) has shown this trend for recruits into university 
architectural schools and Anderson and Western (1970) have shown 
it for students entering university engineering schools.^ No empirical 
data seems to exist for entrants into Australian planning schools, but 
generalizing from the British experience (Marcus 1971), it can be as-
sumed to be similar. 
The conservative ideology of planning professions, then, con-
tributes to the control the private sector has over the physical en-
vironment. Under such conditions town planning and the other 
professions have contributed little towards the alleviation of social 
problems in our society. But this is a situation they share with many 
others who have been directly attempting to make certain changes to 
situations perceived as undersirable. "The planning system relates to 
the people it is to serve in exactly the same way as the educational 
system relates to the people it is meant to serve: it complements and 
reflects the class structure, giving most to those who already have a 
lot and giving least to those who need most" (Davies 1972, p. 229). 
The influence of the planned in changing planning practices 
People who receive the least from the economic and political system 
are invariably those who are disadvantaged by planning schemes. It 
seems that, in the future, there will be increasing political opposition 
from these people to the schemes which will affect them. In 
numerous Australian cities resident action groups are, in alliance 
with other organizations such as trade unions, developing viable op-
position to freeway construction and urban "renewal" (see Cox and 
Howard 1973). 
The more impersonal relationship existing between environment 
professionals and those being planned for provides a key in under-
standing the changes which are likely to occur within planning 
processes. The nature of this association, in contrast with some other 
professions, means that these workers are rarely in direct contact 
with people benefiting from their plans. With perhaps the exception 
of an architect who is in direct contact with a client for whom he/she 
is designing a house, environment professionals do not have the face-
to-face contact that, for example, nurses have with their patients or 
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solicitors have with their clients. They utilize their skills for social 
aggregates and social groups and not individuals. They design an of-
fice block, they build freeways, and they design residential areas for 
use by a wide range of people with whom they are unlikely to come in 
contact. 
The very nature of this relationship presents a predisposing situa-
tion for political opposition. That freeways go through residential 
areas and, that urban "renewal" is implemented in specific localities, 
means that those who are opposed to such schemes can easily iden-
tify each other because of mutual visibility. Your neighbour also has 
to go. Thus mobilization of opposition becomes relatively easy. 
In contrast, the atomised face-to-face associations between profes-
sionals such as solicitors and doctors and their clients or patients do 
not present a situation making for ease of political opposition since 
visibility of sympathizers does not exist. Any dissatisfaction which 
may be expressed by a client or a patient does not become grouped 
into social dissatisfaction, but remains as an individual complaint. 
Therefore, the control over this interpersonal relationship is main-
tained by the professional. 
The more impersonal nature of the contact between the environ-
ment professionals and the planned and the resulting political op-
position, is significant for change in these professions. Conflict will 
give rise to change. While it must be accepted that such political op-
position has not always been successful (Gans 1962), nor have people 
who have been affected been totally committed to opposition (Fel-
Iman and Brandt 1971),' resident action groups in Sydney and 
Melbourne have been successful in persuading governments to halt 
freeway schemes and stop redevelopment plans. These decisions, 
therefore, will force environment professionals to scrutinize and 
justify their own practices and probably eventually stimulate change 
in professional practice. 
The increasing awareness among professionals and among govern-
ments of potential opposition has forced a greater sensitivity about 
planning. Greater need is now seen in the desire to consult and get 
active participation of the public in planning decisions. But as a 
number of people have pointed out, such public participation more 
often than not is a public relations deal attempting to persuade peo-
ple to accept a particular plan (Simmie 1971). Public participation 
may succeed in diverting a freeway away from a number of houses, 
but the freeway still goes through. It may prevent certain parts of a 
residential locality being "renewed", but urban "renewal" still goes 
ahead (Davies 1972). In effect the public are not deciding the out-
come. It has been decided beforehand. 
The other area in which those being affected by planning are 
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receiving assistance is through advocacy planning, where the poor 
and disenfranchized are represented by a politically powerful person 
or group, who present their case (Rauscher 1973). While this ap-
proach has been relatively successful, (and perhaps what is called a 
resident action group in Australia is probably more an advocacy 
group than a politically organized group of residents), certain disad-
vantages exist for the clients of advocate planners. The advocacy 
group organizes residents into political action and as Piven (1970) 
has pointed out, this often means power has been taken out of the 
hands of the people, specifically in the form of street protest. In ef-
fect, as Hartman (1970) indicates, advocate planners are "hired 
guns" who fight city hall on its own grounds. Instead, what thev 
should be doing is assisting local organizers to establish a political 
group and then withdrawing from the scene. 
Although those who are invariably affected by the most severe 
planning decisions (and these are low-income groups), are not always 
successful in stopping such decisions, they are, at least, contributing 
towards a greater sensitivity on the part of environmental profes-
sionals as to the effects of their skills and an awareness of who 
benefits. In conjunction with governmental pressures and demands 
in planning, this sensitivity will contribute towards change. 
Implications for the environment professions in Australia 
What has been outlined in the preceding pages is the questionable 
relationship between the planning ideologies of the environment 
professions and planning practices. 1 he increasing self awareness 
among these professionals resulting from social science research and 
from the protests of people objecting to their plans, has meant un-
easiness and conflict within these professions. Even within engineer-
ing, the most pragmatic of all professions, there is a greater sen-
sitivity to the effects of schemes such as freeways (Torda and Barus 
1969). In Australia, Groves (1972) has stressed the need for local 
engineers to become aware of the social implications of their plans 
and advocates a humanistic perspective in engineering, the absence 
of which, he claims, has led to much of the troubles in contemporary 
society. He also implies that many of the planned decisions made in 
Australia are ethically questionable, since the code of ethics for the 
Australian Institute of Engineers specifies the professional's respon-
sibility to the community ahead of to the profession, to other 
engineers, or to sectional and private interests. In the past, planned 
engineering decisions have benefited limited numbers of people 
rather than all members of the society. 
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As mentioned earlier, the conflict within architecture is between 
the artistic side and social committment. Since many of the 
ideological assumptions held by architects about physical manipula-
tion of the environment for social ends have been questioned, the 
profession will need to reconsider the social implications of architec-
ture and the ways people behave in certain settings. 
The most significant conflicts in the environment professions are 
occurring within town planning. Divisiveness is centred in two inter-
related issues—membership to the professional organization and the 
knowledge-base of the profession. As a result two sides are apparent 
within the Australian town planning scene. One emphasizes a clearly 
identifiable professional skill in town planning and a need for a 
specific training and education. Professional acceptance occurs only 
after the relevant training and experience (Keeble 1965, 1973; 
Taylor, 1972). The other side stresses how town planning is not a 
specific skill but an amalgamation of skills, drawing particularly 
from the design bases of engineering and architecture. The views of 
this group are expressed in the April 1972 issue of the Royal 
Australian Planning Institute Journal. The group comprises 
members of other environment professions who have been working 
in the planning field, social scientists, and those with administrative 
positions in planning. The social and management sciences are es-
pecially vocal in their opposition to the membership and training 
issue since they are emphasizing the need to take a physical applied 
social science as the basis for planning practices rather than the pre-
sent physical design orientation. 
The nature of town planning is probably central to the upheaval 
within the dicipline. Unlike architecture and engineering, town plan-
ning became a professional body, in the sense of receiving a Royal 
Charter, well into this century, while other environment professions 
were established in the middle of the last century. Town planning 
drew upon these environment professions as well as from a number 
of different natural and social sciences, rather than having a clearly 
identifiable and distinctive skill of its own. While it shares with the 
other planning professions a restricted entry qualification, it does not 
have the clearly definable criteria for malpractice that engineering 
and architecture have. This may be the result of the type of 
relationship the town planner has with those being planned for. 
Under conditions where the professional-client relationship is in-
terpersonal, face-to-face, the definition of malpractice is clearly 
stated, but under conditions where large numbers of people are af-
fected it is not so specific. More particularly, where there is a situa-
tion existing of potential loss of life (.e.g., collapse of a bridge) or 
theft, malpractice is more easily identifiable. But where there are 
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social consequences of a planned decision, malpractice is not clearly 
indicated. Therefore, ethical problems in professions seems to lie in 
physical health or where property is endangered, rather than where 
the social or psychological life of the people is affected (e.g., the 
shattering of localized social networks or the grief for the loss of the 
home). Contrary to McLoughlin's (1973) claim, then, social rather 
than physical or economic malpractice can be identified within town 
planning and the other environment professions. 
What seems likely in the future, is that physical planning will be 
linked more closely with other forms of planning (e.g., economic 
planning) and there will be a swing away from a concentration on 
physical design and a much greater emphasis placed on the natural 
and social sciences. These changes will occur irrespective of changes 
within the planning institute. The current demands by governments 
are for a wide variety of skills and not only for town planners and 
other physical environment professions. According to Hall (1973) 
town planning as a profession will maintain its generalist education 
but it will change from the emphasis on design to one stressing 
mathematics and cybernetics and the social and management 
sciences. It is possible, under these circumstances, for town planning 
to maintain a distinctive identity and maybe act as a coordinator of 
physical planning. Yet even here, it seems unlikely that, along with 
other environment professions, it will possess all the skills necessary 
for implementing changes in the physical environment. Crucial to 
future changes in the Australian environment is the question of who 
holds political power. If the public sector, through the various 
governments, demands a greater say in environmental practices, 
then the administrators of planning bodies within these public ser-
vices will play a powerful role in determining future changes. The 
direction of the change will be dependent upon the basic training of 
administrators—whether they are environment professionals or 
other professionals or experts. So it seems likely that not only will 
there be considerable upheaval and shifts in power among the com-
petitors of the physical environment who have specifically iden-
tifiable skills, but, more importantly, the changes which will result 
will probably ensure a more humane practice based upon the "public 
interest" (Friedmann 1973). 
Conclusions 
The environmental difficulties perceived to exist within Australia are 
not being met by the environment professions because of the dis-
crepancies existing between professional ideology and professional 
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practice. Furthermore, changes within these professions are likely to 
occur because of the increasing number of people opposing the im-
position of plans they deem as undesirable, because the environment 
professions are beginning to look at their own practices and because 
governments are demanding a wider range of skills to solve en-
vironmental and related social problems. Under these conditions 
new skills are developing which will not have the tightly-knit oc-
cupational grouping of professionalism. Conservatism inherent in 
professionalism has placed barriers against any radical change in en-
vironmental planning. New non-professionalized occupational skills 
may overcome this and allow for broader, less elitist, less change 
resistant and less centralizing physical planning. 
Notes to text 
1, Surveying is also an environment profession, but because of the dominance of 
architecture, engineering and town planning the discussion has concentrated on 
these professions, 
2, Home (1970) has indicated how engineering students in colleges of advanced 
education and institutes of technology are less likely to be from upper-middle-
class families. As these tertiary institutes increase in importance, it will be in-
teresting to see whether the structure of the student intake into engineering will re-
main the same and whether this will alter the practice of engineering, 
.V Indications from the results of unpublished data of a study I have been conducting 
on the social consequences of the Brisbane Northern Freeway, show a similar 
trend. Low rates of participation in protest tends to be a consequence of large 
numbers of old people who find it difficult to take an active part and a feeling of 
despair in stopping the freeway. 
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Epilogue: The Future of the Helping 
Professions in Australia 
PAUL WILSON 
As we have seen throughout this book, the notion, structure, and 
operation of the helping professions in Australia have come under in-
creasing attack. The murmurings of discontent have not only been 
confined to accusations of high-cost services, sloppy work, and 
monopolistic self-interest. Increasingly, attacks on the professions 
have centered on the institutionalized procedures which allow profes-
sionals the exclusive right to "help" other people. In Australia the 
debate over who has the right to help other people has not yet ap-
proached the intensity of similar debates that have raged for many 
years in American society. 
There a "siege mentality" has developed amongst those who 
believe they have an inalienable right to "treat" other people in 
response to the arguments of those who believe that such a right 
should no longer exist. One recent example illustrates the intensity of 
this debate. In June 1974 the board of trustees of the American 
Psychiatric Association unanimously adopted a resolution that 
began yet another round in the fight over who is qualified to practice 
psychotherapy, independently of psychiatrists. The answer, ac-
cording to organized psychiatry, was no one. The board passed a 
resolution opposing pending legislation granting direct reimburse-
ments to clinical psychologists or social workers under the Federal 
Employees Health Benefit Plan. According to a spokesman from the 
American Psychiatric Association, the action was taken after much 
soul-searching and to "protect the public". 
Paul Wilson graduated in psychology from the University of Canterbury and ob-
tained his doctorate in political sociology from the University of Queensland, He has 
taught in Australian and New Zealand universities and in 1974 was Visiting Fulbright 
Professor at the University of California at Irvine, His academic interests are in the 
fields of criminal behaviour, deviance, and social problems in modern industrial 
society. He is currently undertaking research on police forces in developing countries, 
the legal profession, and youth and leisure. 
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At a lively session of the National Advisory Mental Health Coun-
cil meeting during the same month members expressed dismay and 
outrage over the psychiatrists' action. Kenneth Little, executive 
director of the American Psychological Association, angrily at-
tacked the position taken by the psychiatrists. According to 
Behavior Today (24 June 1974, p.2) Little stated that in his opinion 
the testimony was slanted to exploit the fears of those listening, im-
plied wrongly that emotional and behavioural problems are mainly 
medical, classified the federal worker seeking benefits for emotional 
and behavioural problems as a mental patient, and clearly opposed 
consumers' freedom of choice. Little went on to say that the psy-
chiatrists' position "threatens to negate two decades of labor and 
does a great disservice to the mental health movement". He also 
stated that the likely motive behind the resolution of the psychiatrists 
was an economic one. Social workers at the meeting were as furious 
as the national mental health officials. 
After years of detente between psychiatrists and other mental 
health professionals the recent rift sharply brings into focus the fric-
tions existing between the helping professions. In Australia, these 
frictions have yet to manifest themselves in such a vitriolic manner 
but undercurrents of dissent are already evident. One very real pos-
sibility in the future, then, is that open warfare will be declared 
between many of the helping professions over the question of who 
controls the mental health market place. Undoubtedly such a battle 
will further illuminate the view expressed many times in the book 
that the helping professions are more concerned with helping 
themselves than with helping other people. It seems likely that the 
cynicism towards many of the professions already held by substan-
tial numbers of Australians will be intensified. 
This, of course, does not mean that the professions will lose their 
monopoly over significant aspects of our social and political life. On 
the contrary, as Martin Oppenheimer (1973) in a provocative article 
entitled "The proletarianization of the professions" suggests, con-
tinued criticism of the professions could well lead to a unionization 
of professional workers rivaling blue-collar unions in demands for 
higher wages and better working conditions. Proletarianization by 
itself will not necessarily lead to any more than narrow 
protectionism—particularly when such proletarianization occurs in 
a period of job shrinkage and social isolation caused through 
demystification of the professional ideology. Under these conditions 
professionals will become like workers—they will tend to protect 
themselves first and worry about widespread demands for a realloca-
tion of national economic and political priorities afterwards. 
In this country, demystification of the professions has already led 
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to a proletarianization of many professional groups. For example, 
despite irrefutable evidence demonstrating the simplicity involved in 
basic divorce and conveyancing procedures, the legal profession have 
tightended their ranks and refused to let para-professionals enter 
these fields. Similarly, although there is a singular lack of any 
evidence conclusively demonstrating the efficacy of professional psy-
chological therapies, Australian clinical psychologists have con-
tinued to raise the qualifications needed by those who wish to join 
their ranks. New opportunities for the progressive expansion of lay 
therapy and the parallel progressive reduction of the "helping profes-
sions" are rejected in this country, partly because our highly in-
dustrialized and urbanized society has made us place such exag-
gerated value on standard products, uniformity, and certified 
quality. Nevertheless, client self-help and lay therapy movements 
will grow; of that there can be no doubt. They will grow as more peo-
ple recognize that individual professions have failed to serve their 
clients adequately, that their "objective" or "uninvolved" 
philosophy on controversial matters serves only professionals and 
not the society as a whole, and as radical professionals themselves 
expose the professional ideology as part of an economic and political 
system in which the profit motive is central. 
Radical movements in the Australian professions have not yet 
reached the stage of their counterparts in the United States. We do 
not, for example, have highly organized groups of radical profes-
sionals such as the National Lawyers' Guild or the Medical Commit-
tee for Human Rights, both groups which exert considerable power 
and prestige in the United States (see Perrucci 1973, pp. 179-94). 
But such groups will grow, and with this growth will come a further 
erosion of the view that only the helping professions should intervene 
in the personal and social problems that characterize human society. 
As with political imperialism, professional imperialism will only ac-
centuate the movement towards personal self-help and self-
determination, a movement which might borrow some of the science 
and technology developed by the professions but which will not allow 
the professions exclusive rights to use such technologies. In this con-
text see the excellent article by Ivan Illich, "The professions as a 
form of imperialism". 
This book has been deliberately critical of the helping professions. 
We do not deny that some of the professions and their technologies 
have substantially assisted what broadly could be called the human 
condition. We have not attempted to catalogue the benefits to 
mankind which the professions have bestowed upon us—after all, 
such benefits are thrust down our throats by the public relations ex-
perts that act as mouthpieces for the professional societies. 
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In a sense, we have attempted to balance the books—to present a 
view of the professions that we hope will warn citizens about the 
adverse effects of professional arrogance. For, in a very real sense, 
current day professionalism baptizes the view expounded by psy-
chologist B.F. Skinner that concludes that freedom is of relatively 
little consequence to the human condition. 
There is a very real danger in this country that professionalism 
and bureaucracy will join forces to establish a dominion over our 
lives more implacable than any tyranny feared by the authors of our 
constitution. Already in Australia there is a juggernaut of self-
righteous mental health professionals, social scientists, and middle-
managers which is attempting to make protests and deviance not 
merely difficult but inconceivable. To a considerable extent, social 
control is now in the hands of the helping professions: the psy-
chiatrist is replacing the policeman while the social worker sub-
stitutes for the prison warden. Public policies are coming from the 
same old political vestedness but in a manner which does not allow 
for a political response. When psychiatrists or psychologists ad-
minister methadone or lobotomy to control crime in the streets, 
when social workers or counsellors determine addiction proneness or 
violence proneness or protest proneness in children, when laws 
provide for "indeterminate" sentences, there is a new kind of 
hegemony over our lives. It looks as benign as the family doctor, but 
as we have seen many times during this book, it is just as unwilling to 
see its esoteric judgment subjected to open and critical discussion. 
The prevailing philosophy of the helping professions—the view 
that "we know what's best for you even though you cannot possibly 
understand our science" creates the most potent tool of political 
repression in the history of the world. When it becomes truly part of 
the aim of government, when professionalism becomes absolute 
power, fascism will have arrived. It will have arrived not from the 
malice of the professionals themselves—indeed, the individuals who 
constitute the helping professions might be some of the most decent 
people in our community. Rather, fascism will have arrived through 
the absence of ideology and moral judgment on the part of the help-
ing professions. If there is one major challenge facing all of the help-
ing professions then it relates to the development of a political 
ideology which recognizes the power that the professions maintain 
and which at the same time directs the members of those professions 
towards a redistribution of that power so that the gap between the 
provider and consumer of professional care becomes less vast. We 
dedicate this book toward the development of such an ideology. 
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